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This thesis treats of the use and meaning of the Greek concept of eleutheria (freedom) and 
the cognate term autonomia (autonomy) in the early Hellenistic Period (c.337-262 BC) with a 
specific focus on the role these concepts played in the creation and formalisation of a 
working relationship between city and king. It consists of six chapters divided equally into 
three parts with each part exploring one of the three major research questions of this thesis. 
Part One, Narratives, treats of the continuities and changes within the use and understanding 
of eleutheria and autonomia from the 5
th
 to the 3
rd
 centuries. Part Two, Analysis, focuses on 
the use in action of both terms and the role they played in structuring and defining the 
relationship between city and king. Part Three, Themes, explores the importance of 
commemoration and memorialisation within the early Hellenistic city, particularly the 
connection of eleutheria with democratic ideology and the afterlife of the Persian Wars. 
Underpinning each of these three sections is the argument that eleutheria played numerous, 
diverse roles within the relationship between city and king. In particular, emphasis is 
continually placed variously on its lack of definition, inherent ambiguity, and the malleability 
of its use in action. 
      Chapter one opens with the discovery of eleutheria during the Persian Wars and traces its 
development in the 5
th
 and early 4
th
 centuries, arguing in particular for a increasing 
synonymity between eleutheria and autonomia. Chapter two provides a narrative focused on 
the use and understanding of eleutheria in the years 337-262. It emphasises continuity rather 
than change in the use of eleutheria and provides a foundation for the subsequent analytical 
and thematic chapters. Chapter three analyses eleutheria itself. It emphasises the inherent 
fluidity of the term and argues that it eschewed definition and was adaptable to and 
compatible with many forms of royal control. Chapter four looks at the role of eleutheria 
within the relationship between city and king. It elaborates a distinction between Primary and 
Secondary freedom (freedom as a right or freedom as a gift) and treats of eleutheria as a 
point of either unity or discord within a city‘s relationship with a king. Chapter five explores 
the connection between freedom and democracy and looks at how the past was used to create 
and enforce a democratic present, specifically in constructing both Alexander‘s nachleben as 
either a tyrant or liberator and the validity of Athenian democratic ideology in the 3
rd
 century. 
Chapter six concludes the thesis by returning to the Persian Wars. It analyses the use of the 
Wars as a conceptual prototype for later struggles, both by kings and by cities. Exploring the 
theme of the lieu de mémoire, it also outlines the significance of sites like Corinth and Plataia 
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Note on Abbreviation and Editions 
 
      Throughout this PhD thesis I use the Harvard system of references. I follow journal 
abbreviations as they appear in L‟Anneé philologique. Greek authors are abbreviated after 
Liddell and Scott while Latin authors are abbreviated after the Oxford Latin Dictionary. I 
provide below abbreviations for authors not mentioned in these works. All Greek references 
and quotations are from the TLG, excluding Simonides (Page 1981), Hyperides‘ Against 
Diondas (Carey et al. 2008), and George Synkellos (Adler & Tuffin 2002). All translations of 
literary sources, unless noted, are from the editions of the Loeb Classical Library. All 
translations of epigraphic sources, unless noted, are my own. 
      Complete consistency regarding the use of Greek and Latin names is impossible and I 
make no pretence to it. I favour the Greek form throughout (Demetrios; Ambrakia, etc), but I 
use Latinised names when they are most recognisable (Athens, Corinth, Aristotle, Alexander, 
etc.). When two persons have the same name I use the Latinised form for the most famous 
and the Greek form for others: Alexander (III, the Great) and Alexandros (son of 
Polyperchon); Aristotle (philosopher) and Aristoteles (proposer of IG II
2
 43). 
      For political terms I use a capital to denote a deity and a lower case to denote a concept, 
so Demokratia, Boule, and Demos (deities and personifications) and demokratia, boule, 
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     The concepts of eleutheria and autonomia have been the subject of in-depth studies for the 
Classical and Roman periods, but no similar work exists for the Hellenistic period itself.
1
 
This is partly because it has often been seen as a period of socio-political decline leading 
inexorably to the Roman conquest of the east; Philip of Macedon‘s victory at Chaironea 
heralded the death of the polis and the end of Greek freedom.
2
 This view is what one may call 
the ‗declinist model‘. Although this view is now widely discredited its repercussions are still 
felt by the fact that topics studied for the Classical and Roman periods remain untreated for 
the Hellenistic. The Greek slogan of freedom is one. As recently as 1984 it was necessary for 
Erich Gruen to make the seemingly obvious statement that ―it can be shown that declarations 
of ‗freedom‘, in one form or another, play a persistent role in international affairs through the 
whole of the Hellenistic era‖.
3
 Gruen, however, was not concerned with the Hellenistic period 
itself, but with detecting within it the precedents for Rome‘s use of eleutheria. This thesis 
treats the early Hellenistic period as a chronological and historical unit defined by the 
relationship between city and king, not as a period of decline from the Classical period nor as 
a prelude to the arrival of Rome. My analysis begins with the foundation of the League of 
Corinth in 337 and ends with the Athenian defeat after the Chremonidean War in 262. 
 
Overview of Previous Scholarship 
      Previous studies on eleutheria have focussed mainly on the 5
th
 century. Kurt Raaflaub 
examined the origin of the concept eleutheria and its use within the 5
th
 century while Martin 
Ostwald did the same for autonomia. Important articles on the use and understanding of both 
concepts have been added by Bikerman, Lévy, Figueira, Karavites, and Hansen. Karavites, 





Seager and Tuplin have explored freedom in the Hellenistic period but both saw it as a 
debased, empty political slogan.
5
 In general, however, whatever work has been carried out on 
freedom in the Hellenistic period has approached it from the question of king/city relations, 
                                                 
1
 Classical Greece: Raaflaub 2004 (translation and revision of Raaflaub 1985); Ostwald 1982. Roman Greece: 
Heidemann 1966; Bernhardt 1971; Ferrary 1988: 45-218; Guerber 2002; 2009: 33-78. Dmitriev (2011: 112-41) 
devotes only one chapter to the years 323-229. 
2
 See most recently, Runciman 1990; Cawkwell 1996. Raaflaub too recently stated that ―Greek liberty was 
crushed at the battle of Chaeronea‖ (OCD s.v. Freedom in the Ancient World). 
3
 Gruen 1984: 133. 
4
 On the historiography of eleutheria and autonomia, see Ch.1 §1.1-2. 
5
 Seager & Tuplin 1980; Seager 1981. 
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either as one aspect of an individual king‘s policy with regard to the Greek cities under his 
authority or as one aspect of the question of king/city relations in general.
6
 
      The works of Alfred Heuß, Wolfgang Orth, and John Ma reveal the general trend of 
scholarly arguments regarding the nature of the relationship between city and king and the 
role of freedom within this. In his 1937 book Stadt und Herrscher des Hellenismus Alfred 
Heuß argued that a king could never, and indeed never tried to, impinge on the independence 
of the cities. He denied that there existed a legal basis for king/city relations and contended 
instead that the relationship was defined by royal adherence to Greek concepts and ideals, 
most notably the freedom of the city. This, he argued, was an inalienable right for all. He 
refused to distinguish between free and un-free cities arguing instead that when freedom was 
granted it was simply the reconfirmation of an inherent right that had only temporarily been 
in abeyance. Most importantly, he proposed that royal power never undermined civic 
independence; kings did not control cities, they just held their loyalty during times of war. 
      This view was immediately criticised by Elias Bikerman who showed that cities could 
indeed be subordinate to royal power which had the potential to be direct and invasive.
7
 
Further, he argued that a royal grant of eleutheria was a tangible status benefaction because 
cities did not have freedom as an innate right and so could at times be un-free. 
      The strongest critique of Heuß‘ work, however, was made by Wolfgang Orth in his 1977 
work Königlich Machtanspruch und städtische Freiheit. Orth argued the complete opposite 
of Heuß and claimed that the Greek cities were totally powerless before the military might of 
the Hellenistic empires. Eleutheria was nothing but a buzzword, a civic concern that was paid 
lip-service by the kings before then being completely ignored. Any form of deference to a 
king, be it honours for a philos or the institution of ruler cult, revealed the abject submission 
of the un-free city to royal power. Orth‘s view was particularly influential on scholarly 
perceptions of Greek freedom in the Hellenistic period with numerous later scholars arguing 
that ‗the freedom of the Greeks‘ was just a royal sham used to dupe the cities into supporting 
the kings.
8
 According to this model, ‗the freedom of the Greeks‘ was a political slogan of 
                                                 
6
 Royal Policy: Wehrli 1968: 104-29; Billows 1990: 189-236 (Antigonos); Seibert 1969: 176-89 (Ptolemy 
Soter);  Burstein 1980; 1986b; Lund 1992: 118-52, 199-205; Landucci Gattinoni 1992: 231-43; Franco 1993: 
58-173 (Lysimachos); Heinen 1972: 37-46; Mehl 1986: 217-19; Grainger 1990: 179-91 (Seleukos Nikator). 
Relationship: Heuß 1937: 216-44 (general); Orth 1977 (early Seleukids); Seager 1981 (Rome and Antiochos 
III); Ma 1999: 150-74 (Antiochos III); Giovannini 2004: 80-3 (Ptolemy and Iasos); Capdetrey 2007: 198-214 
(Seleukid Empire). 
7
 Bikerman 1939. 
8
 Seager & Tuplin 1980; Seager 1981; Burstein 1980b; 1986a: 21; 1986b: 134; Grainger 1990, see esp.59, 62, 
114, 161; Oliva 1993; Wheatley 1997: 165-7. 
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little to no practical significance which was only used to gain support during royal military 
campaigns. 
      However, despite the prevalence of Orth‘s view in the 1980s and 1990s it was challenged. 
Bikerman had earlier pointed to a middle ground between total civic independence and 
complete royal control, and numerous scholars continued, after him, to view the relationship 
between city and king as more reciprocal in nature than was argued by Orth.
9
 This view was 
given a full exposition in John Ma‘s 1999 study Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia 
Minor. Ma aligned himself with Bikerman and argued for the ‗vitalist model‘: that the 
Hellenistic period saw the continued vitality and importance of institutions like the polis and 
concepts like eleutheria. The relationship between city and king was not defined by either 
complete civic independence or total royal control, but was rather a shifting relationship 
based on a continual process of negotiation. It was characterised by a vibrant and mutually 
dependent system of civic petition and royal benefaction whereby the city‘s status within the 
empire existed as a series of royal benefactions like tax-exemption. Such civic statuses were 
created, granted, and defined by royal proclamation and as such acknowledged royal 
authority over the city. However, the cities were not themselves powerless. Since the kings 
were continually in need of their active support numerous means existed for the cities to 
influence royal policy and attain for themselves preferential treatment and an increase in 
status, such as passing honours in the king‘s favour and using moral force to ensure added 
benefactions from him. 
      Ma focuses on defining the role played by eleutheria within king/city relations by 
analysing the typology of civic statuses, that collection of royal benefactions and guarantees 
that defined a city as ‗free‘ or ‗subject‘. He discerns three main statuses: ‗genuinely free 
cities‘ (existing outside an empire), ‗free cities‘ (free by royal grant), and ‗dependent cities‘ 
(subject to the king). He subdivides the category of ‗free cities‘ into those who received 
freedom by submitting to royal control and having the status guaranteed by royal decree 
(‗surrender and grant‘) and those who ensured it as a result of a bi-partite alliance with the 
king undertaken on apparently equal standing (‗allied‘).  
      Ma‘s model is overly legalistic, as has been recently argued by Laurent Capdetrey, and 
his views on the role of eleutheria as a medium of interaction between city and king can be 
criticised on two specific counts (detailed further in Ch.3 §2.3). First, Ma argued that ‗free 
cities‘ were not subject to any forms of royal control but were as free and independent as 
                                                 
9





 This ignores a fundamental distinction between both types of free 
city. What Ma terms ‗free cities‘ were liable to royal interference and numerous examples 
attest to their being subject to royal taxation, garrisons, or the authority of royal officials. 
Although a ‗free city‘ may still claim to be free, the nature of that freedom was 
fundamentally different from that of ‗genuinely free cities‘ because it was freedom 
guaranteed by and compatible with royal power; ‗genuinely free cities‘ were free because 
they were not submissive to royal power. There is a very important practical and conceptual 
difference here that Ma does not take full cognisance of (see further below). 
      Second, Ma argues that eleutheria was a legal status with solid, meaningful definitions 
and that as a result of this there existed a legal distinction between ‗free cities‘ that attained 
the status by either royal declaration (‗surrender and grant‘) or treaty (‗allied‘). In practice, 
however, both ‗surrender and grant‘ and ‗allied‘ cities were equally liable to royal 
impositions and we should conclude that the guarantee of freedom through alliance was itself 
simply a form of ‗surrender and grant‘. Ma‘s creation of distinctions within ‗free cities‘ 
undermines our understanding of the adaptability of the use in action of eleutheria as a part of 
king/city relations. We should only distinguish between what Ma termed ‗genuinely free 
cities‘ and ‗free cities‘ and view the practical status of the latter as not strictly defined by 
legal definitions, but fluid and characterised by a malleable series of benefactions and 
statuses based on royal grant and civic petition. 
 
Critique of Previous Scholarship 
      There are however two more deep-seated problems with the focus hitherto taken in most 
studies of eleutheria in the Hellenistic period. The first problem is chronological. It is 
increasingly being noted that the early Hellenistic period was an era of transition and should 
be treated separately from both the Classical period and the later Hellenistic period, which 
was itself characterised by the arrival of Rome.
11
 The early Hellenistic period is typified by 
the expansion of the Macedonian monarchies and the creation and development of a bi-partite 
working relationship between the old Greek cities of Greece, the Aegean, and Asia Minor and 
the newly formed Macedonian empires. John Ma‘s study produced a layered analysis of the 
relationship between cities and king in the late 3
rd
 century when eleutheria was already a 
concept of some importance within a sophisticated and long established system of Seleukid 
rule. There remains, however, the question of how and why the concept of eleutheria came 
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over time to hold this vaunted position within the dialogue between city and king. To answer 
this we must look at the role played by eleutheria in the early Hellenistic period when the 
mechanisms of the relationship between city and king were being developed. This thesis is 
the first attempt to do so. 
      The second problem is methodological. Modern studies of the early Hellenistic period 
have continually looked at eleutheria as part of the wider issue of the relationship between 
city and king. This has had the positive effect of highlighting the practical use in action of 
eleutheria, but it has also had the negative effect of moving analysis away from the concept 
itself and solely onto its relevancy for one particular academic question. This approach is 
exemplified in the works of Heuß, Orth, and Ma. Although their conclusions differ all 
conduct their analysis in the same way: they analyse the relationship between city and king 
first and then treat of eleutheria as one aspect of it. 
      This approach has problems. First, it leads scholars to mould their interpretation of 
eleutheria to fit the requirements of their model for the king/city relationship. Thus, Heuß 
could see eleutheria as guaranteeing the inalienable right of all cities to complete 
independence from foreign control, while Orth could dismiss it as empty propaganda 
designed to dupe the Greek cities into supporting one monarch or the other. Second, it creates 
an imbalance whereby eleutheria is studied simply as one of the many symptoms of the 
relationship between city and king rather than acting as a cause of it. Since eleutheria pre-
dated the creation of a working relationship between city and king, we should analyse the 
ways in which it helped delineate the structural and ideological boundaries around which that 
relationship crystallised. In Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece Thomas Martin 
argued that ―it always seems better to start historical investigation of the relations between 
the Hellenistic kings and the Greek city-states from the premise that these relations were a 
matter of practical arrangements worked out in a context unaffected by considerations of the 
theoretical components of royal and civic sovereignty‖.
12
 Martin is of course correct to 
emphasis the ―practical arrangements‖ of power within the relationship between city and 
king, but we must not remove ―theoretical components‖ like eleutheria because these both 
structured and defined the practicalities of royal power. Ideology influenced not only the 
ways in which royal impositions were justified to the city but it also defined the language, 
and therefore the nature and understanding, of the relationship between both parties. 
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      Martin‘s placement of ―practical arrangements‖ over ―theoretical components‖ hints at a 
key problem in studying eleutheria in the early Hellenistic period. Because no one has yet 
analysed what the Greek cities or the Macedonian monarchs actually meant when they 
referred to eleutheria or autonomia in the late 4
th
 and early 3
rd
 centuries, the role played by 
―theoretical components‖ like eleutheria in articulating the ―practical arrangements‖ of the 
relationship between city and king has yet to be fully appreciated. This study is therefore 
necessary because not only does no detailed treatment exist of the important role played by 
eleutheria within king/city relations in the early Hellenistic Period but whatever work has 
been done on this question has approached it from the wrong perspective. Scholars have been 
inclined to analyse the relationship first, draw conclusions on this, and then apply them to an 
interpretation of eleutheria. My approach is to first study the use and understanding of 




 centuries before then applying my conclusions to both an analysis 
of the nature of the relationship between city and king and a treatment of the importance of 
eleutheria within the early Hellenistic city.  
 
Methodology 
      Mogens Hansen has outlined three ancient forms of eleutheria: the freedom of the Greek 
city from foreign control, the freedom of a faction (usually democratic) to political equality 
under law, and the freedom of a free individual in contrast with the slave.
13
 I am concerned 
primarily with the first, but I do address the second when necessary. Raaflaub has argued that 
when analysing eleutheria it is important to be attuned to changes in the use of the concept 
since these both influence and reflect social and political change. Therefore, I am careful 
within this thesis to base my analysis of the role of eleutheria within king/city relations on a 










      In studying eleutheria as an aspect of king/city relations there has sometimes been a 
tendency to focus more on royal rather than civic usage.
15
 Throughout this thesis I argue that 
it is important to treat of both uses together. To this end I adopt and adapt an approach 
outlined by John Davies for interpreting the Hellenistic kingdoms.
16
 Employing Davies‘ 
model I detect and analyse three perspectives on the use of eleutheria. First, top-down: its use 
by a ruling power (usually a king) to gain the support of cities. Second, bottom-up: its use by 
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cities either as a point of ideological unity with or an assertion of discord against a ruler. 
Third, middle ground: its use as a political or cultural expression by and within the city itself. 
At times the royal use of freedom may stand in contradiction to the civic use, but it remains 
important to analyse both as valid interpretations and applications of a fundamentally 
adaptive and malleable term. This is particularly important since it is only through differences 
in use that we can trace differences in understanding and so fully comprehend the importance 
of eleutheria in the early Hellenistic period. 
      It has not always been the case that scholars have treated alternative uses of eleutheria as 
equally worthy of analysis. This is a manifestation of a wider misunderstanding of the 
difference between use and meaning, one I am at pains to avoid throughout this thesis. It is 
common for scholars to assume a particular meaning for eleutheria and then criticise it as 
empty and cynical when not used in the way they would expect. They then end up applying 
pejorative, modern standards to their analyses.
17
 Graham Oliver has highlighted a major flaw 
in this approach by noting the ―relativity and ultimate subjectivity‖ of modern scholars‘ 
opinions on what actually constitutes an imposition on freedom.
18
 Royal impositions like 
garrisons and taxation, though frequently cited by scholars as negations of a city‘s freedom, 
could at times be perfectly compatible with eleutheria (Ch.3 §1.1-2). Therefore, what one 
might expect eleutheria to mean was not always representative of how it was used. Within 
this thesis I do not apply a restrictive modern meaning to eleutheria because the term was 
adaptable and appeared in different contexts to define different conditions. Each use, even if 
contradictory, reveals its importance in fulfilling a specific role at that time and in that 
context. Concepts like eleutheria are, as Raaflaub pointed out, ―concentrates of many things‖; 
they do not have a single definition but can be interpreted and applied in various different 
ways.
19
 Because its use in differing contexts contributed to its nuanced and multifarious 
understanding it is important not to apply modern standards to eleutheria or judge one use of 
it as valid and another as cynical. Rather, one must analyse the means by which it could be 
used in seemingly contradictory ways and draw from this conclusions on the nature of the 
concept itself and the role it played within political discourse. 
      I have argued against John Ma‘s typology of statuses but I nonetheless think it necessary 
to have some form of general methodological model for analysing eleutheria as an aspect of 
early Hellenistic king/city relations. To that end, I employ throughout this thesis a division 
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between Primary and Secondary freedom (see Ch.4). That is, Primary freedom as a quality 
self-asserted, self-guaranteed, and independent from the control of another polis or empire, 
and Secondary freedom as something granted by royal power and compatible with its various 
manifestations of control. Ma‘s distinction between ‗genuinely free cities‘ and ‗free cities‘ is 
pejorative in that implies that the latter‘s freedom was not perceived as genuine, which in turn 
suggests that eleutheria was just insincere royal sloganeering. Both categories of cities were 
free in their own, different ways. The free city that was not part of an empire saw its freedom 
as the quality of not being under a king‘s control; the free city that was part of an empire saw 
its freedom as guaranteed and defined by royal control. Consequently, freedom was either a 
quality asserted by oneself or a quality granted by another. This marks the division between 
Primary and Secondary perceptions of freedom and denotes the two mutually exclusive ways 
that freedom could be understood within the relationship between city and king. 
      Primary and Secondary freedom may denote the two ways of conceiving of eleutheria 
itself, but the conditions that constituted that freedom could in both cases be seen either 
positively or negatively, that is the Positive freedom to do something and the Negative 
freedom to not be restricted by something (see further, Ch.3 §2.1). This distinction can 
perhaps be explained as one of authority, namely the wish to acquire it (Positive) and the 
wish to curb it (Negative). Although Isaiah Berlin was not the first to draw this important 
distinction he was the first to popularise it in his 1959 essay Two Concepts of Liberty.
20
 Peter 
Liddel may have recently critiqued its use, but the ideas of Positive and Negative freedoms 
nonetheless remain a useful shorthand for characterising those criteria that the ancient Greeks 
saw as guaranteeing or impinging their eleutheria.
21
 
      While I am concerned with analysing eleutheria as an aspect of king/city relations, I am 
also concerned with viewing it outside of this context and so appreciating the greater 
versatility and significance of the term itself. I focus on the question of memorialising and 
commemorating eleutheria within the early Hellenistic city from the perspectives of its 
connection with democracy and its role within the memory of the Persian Wars. This 
necessitates a different approach to that undertaken throughout the rest of the thesis and in 
this regard I have been influenced by Pierre Nora‘s concept of the lieu de mémoire: ―un lieu 
de mémoire dans tous les sens du mot va de l‘objet le plus matériel et concret, éventuellement 
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géographiquement situé, à l‘objet le plus abstrait et intellectuellement construit‖.
22
 Sites, 
monuments, objects, and individuals could encapsulate and evoke abstract, ideological 
significance where the precise historicity of the event was not as important as its emotive 
resonance. Nora applied this concept to a study of the memory of the French revolution of 
1789, but it is equally applicable to ancient Greece, as Michael Jung has recently shown in 
his study of Marathon and Plataia as lieux des mémoires.
23
 In the final chapters of this thesis I 
show how not only landscapes, monuments, individuals, and institutions could be used to 
evoke the memory of the past and apply it anew to the needs of the present, but also how that 




      Any study of the early Hellenistic period is hindered by the limitations of the evidence. It 
is important to make clear that I am not concerned with judging how free a city was or was 
not. Since I am interested only in analysing the use and understanding of the term eleutheria 
and its application within internal diplomacy, my work must be based on references to that 
concept itself. This means that I am restricted, primarily, to literary and epigraphic sources. 
The works of the Athenian orators Demosthenes, Aischines, Demades, Lykourgos, and 
Hyperides survive until 322 (the date of Hyperides‘ Epitaphios), but a large proportion of this 
material is of limited use as it concerns the years before 337. Further, it preserves a very 
Athenian use of eleutheria and so too much reliance on it would only lead to a limited, 
Atheno-centric understanding of the term.
24
 Books 18-20 of Diodoros‘ Bibliotheke offer an 
invaluable, detailed account of the years 323-302 and are based on the lost work of 
Hieronymos of Kardia, an Antigonid courtier and historian who was an eyewitness to, and 
active participant in, the history he described.
25
 Plutarch‘s lives of Demosthenes, Phokion, 
Alexander, Demetrios, and Pyrrhos are also important, particularly for the account of the 
early 3
rd
 century preserved in the latter two. Other sources like Pausanias‘ Description of 
Greece and Justin‘s heavily condensed epitome of Pompeius Trogus‘ Philippic History are 
also helpful. However, since these sources are all secondary it is difficult to establish whether 
or not the use of eleutheria and autonomia within them reflects the author‘s own usage or that 
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of his primary sources. With the almost total loss of the primary sources this question is 
impossible to answer. 
      By far our most important body of ancient evidence for the early Hellenistic period is the 
decrees of the Greek cities and the letters of Hellenistic kings and their officials. They 
preserve the voice of the demos and king and offer a contemporary view on their relationship 
and the political dialogue of the time. Thus, the epigraphic material is invaluable for 
discerning how and in what contexts terms like eleutheria were used. There remain however 
limitations on the evidence. Royal letters were by and large published at the initiative of the 
city when a benefaction or favourable status was confirmed. This takes the letter out of its 
wider context by presenting it as the final statement on a question when we know that it was 
but one link in a chain of negotiation consisting of civic decrees, royal letters, and speeches 
by ambassadors on both sides. The publication of a favourable letter served to ―provide 
confirmation, a means of pinning down oral discourse‖, but it also denotes for us the loss of 
this discourse, that wider context of petition and response that led to the guarantee of a 
status.
26
 The royal letter exists somewhat divorced from its wider diplomatic context. A 
process of negotiation took place before a grant of a status benefaction, but it is only in 
exceptional circumstances, such as in the decree of the Ionian League for Antiochos I 
(IK.Ery. 504) or in the letter of Antiochos II to Erythrai (IK.Ery. 31), that we get an insight 
into it. 
      Civic decrees may preserve the final word of the demos, but they too are selective. In 
particular, they do not record the debate that would have occurred within the ekklesia 
beforehand. They eschew internal, factional conflict within the city and present the demos as 
holding a single, unified voice. In some cases this ‗unity‘ may only have come about after 
long, impassioned, and ultimately unresolved debate. It is only when we can compare the 
epigraphic material with the literary, which often takes us behind the epigraphic façade, that 
we can detect this discord. Naturally, when debate concerns the nature of a city‘s freedom or 
its relationship with a king, as was the case in Athens in 304/3, civic decrees may only reveal 
one interpretation of a city‘s freedom (see further Ch.4 §3). 
      Two further types of evidence have often been seen to reflect the independence of the 
polis. The first is coinage. The communis opinio used to be that a city under royal control was 
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free if it minted its own (particularly silver) coins but un-free if it did not.
27
 This view was 
critiqued by Thomas Martin in his study on the coinages of Thessaly under Macedonian 






 He broke the connection between freedom and coinage 
by showing that a state‘s right to mint coins was not affected by its submission to another 
power. Graham Oliver and John Kroll argued the same conclusion for Athens under 
Antigonos Gonatas in the years post-262.
29
 Christopher Howgego pointed out that there was 
clear evidence of a link between independence and coinage, but Andrew Meadows showed 
that this link arose in the late Hellenistic period and was a reflection of Rome‘s intervention 
in the institutions of the Greek poleis.
30
 Sonja Ziesmann analysed the coinages of a selection 
of states in Greece and Asia Minor said to have either been granted autonomia by Philip and 
Alexander or fought for it from them and showed that in the late 4
th
 century no connection 
existed between a city‘s freedom and its ability to mints coins.
31
 Most recently, Marie-
Christine Marcellesi has argued that throughout the Attalid kingdom royal and civic types 







      The link between freedom and coinage appears to be broken but the subject requires 
further study. Works on sovereignty and coinage have generally treated of either the late 4
th
 
century (Martin and Ziesmann) or the late Hellenistic period (Meadows), thus avoiding the 
transitional early Hellenistic period. To assume that the link between freedom and coinage 
did not exist at all during the early Hellenistic period is just as dogmatic as claiming that it 
existed everywhere. For example, if the series of coins from Tion dated post-281 and bearing 
the inscription ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΑ are to be connected with the liberation of the city from 
Herakleian control c.281 then we have at least the use of civic coinage to advertise freedom.
33
 
Oliver‘s and Kroll‘s work on Athens and Antigonos Gonatas is a step in the right direction, 
but further work needs to be done on the relationship between coinage and freedom within 
specific poleis in the late 4
th
 and early 3
rd
 centuries. However, considering the current 
communis opinio and the limits of this thesis I do not analyse coinage as an indicator of 
freedom unless the term eleutheria appears on the coin itself. 
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      The presence of walls has also been taken at times to indicate a city‘s freedom.
34
 
However, as with coinage, this is a vexed question in need of detailed study for the period in 
question. A connection between the city‘s control of forts and the political independence or 
eleutheria of the demos is often made, but the connection is one of military security leading 
to political security and the freedom of the city.
35
 In other cases a connection is explicitly 
made between the city‘s freedom and its walls. Kolophon‘s ability to build a wall joining the 
ancient city to the modern is connected with Alexander‘s and Antigonos‘ grant of eleutheria 
to the demos
36
 while Chios connects the building of a wall through public subscription with 
the protection of its eleutheria and autonomia.
37
 In both these cases, however, the connection 
between walls and freedom can only be made because the city published an inscription to this 
effect which has survived to the present day. Walls and forts could certainly add to a city‘s 
sense of freedom but we cannot assume that in every case their presence was a sign of it. It is 
impossible to judge ideology from architecture alone so I will only make the connection 
between walls and freedom when it is explicitly drawn within the evidence. 
 
Outline of Thesis 
      This thesis treats of the use and meaning of the Greek concept of eleutheria (freedom) 
and the cognate term autonomia (autonomy) in the early Hellenistic Period with a specific 
focus on the role these concepts played in the creation and formalisation of a working 
relationship between city and king. It consists of six chapters divided equally into three parts 
with each part exploring one of the three major research questions of this thesis. Part One, 
Narratives, treats of the continuities and changes within the use and understanding of 
eleutheria and autonomia from the 5
th
 to the 3
rd
 centuries. Part Two, Analysis, focuses on the 
use in action of both terms and the role they played in structuring and defining the 
relationship between city and king. Part Three, Themes, explores the importance of 
commemoration and memorialisation within the early Hellenistic city, particularly the 
connection of eleutheria with democratic ideology and the afterlife of the Persian Wars. 
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       Chapter one offers a narrative of the origins and use of eleutheria and autonomia in the 
5
th
 and early 4
th
 centuries. I begin by tracing the initial distinction between both terms before 
arguing for an increase in the use and significance of autonomia in the early 4
th
 century as a 
result of its appearance within Spartan foreign policy and the King‘s Peace. This increased 
importance of autonomia resulted in it being seen to convey a meaning equal to that of 
eleutheria. As a result both terms were joined together as a entirely new political phrase – 
eleutheria kai autonomia – in the late 380s, specifically in the context of the Second Athenian 
Confederacy. I argue that this phrase was an ideological tautology used to express the ideal of 




 centuries both 
terms were interchangeable and could be used synonymously. However, I show that despite 
this synonymity autonomia could also describe one specific aspect of eleutheria: the 
empowerment of the demos as the sovereign recipient of a royal grant of freedom. 
      Chapter two builds from the first by providing a narrative of the appearance and use of 
eleutheria and autonomia within the early Hellenistic Period, c.337-262. Since this chapter 
serves as an historical orientation for the reader its structure is more narrative than that of 
chapter one. As my main purpose is to orientate the reader for the subsequent analytic and 
thematic chapters, I emphasise throughout this chapter the appearance and development of 
the three major themes that underline this thesis: the connections and continuities in the use 
and understanding of eleutheria from the Classical to the Hellenistic Periods; the role played 
by eleutheria as a point of dialogue between city and king; and the omnipresence of the past 
within the use of eleutheria to conceptualise the present. 
      Chapter three is split into two sections with the first serving as a basis for the second. 
Section one is concerned with the features that were (and still are) seen to negate freedom, in 
particular garrisons and taxation. I show that these did not always inhibit freedom but could 
be presented as compatible with or even a support of it provided it served a function 
beneficial to the city. The terminology used to describe such features is important: a phylake 
(defence) rather than a phroura (garrison) or a syntaxis (contribution) rather than a phoros 
(taxation) hint at synergy rather than exploitation. Section two explores some of the different 
ways of analysing eleutheria. I look first at defining freedom through the application of 
Positive and Negative freedoms. I then apply this to an analysis of the use in action of 
eleutheria and argue that each use, even if cynical or hypocritical to us, must be analysed as a 
valid interpretation of it. Finally, I treat of the question of the role of eleutheria within 
modern typologies of statuses. Focusing particularly on John Ma‘s work, I argue for a more 
malleable understanding of the use and meaning of eleutheria in king/city relations. 
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      Chapter four applies the conclusions reached in chapter three to the question of the role of 
eleutheria within king/city relations by focusing in particular on the application of Primary 
and Secondary perceptions of freedom as a theoretical model. I emphasise that eleutheria 
operated either as a point of unity or discord depending on the politics of its application: 
kings employed it to bind the city to the empire under royal patronage (Secondary freedom), 
while cities outwith the empire asserted it as a point of discord against royal control (Primary 
freedom). Focusing then on the relationship between king and Secondary free city I trace the 
practical and conceptual limits within which eleutheria operated as a royal status benefaction 
and argue that rather than defining a distinct status it was a general condition that varied in 
form from city to city. Finally, I take Athens‘ relationship with Demetrios Poliorketes in the 
years 304-301 as a case study for conflict that could arise between Primary and Secondary 
perceptions of freedom within king/city relations. 
      Chapter five concerns the connection between eleutheria and demokratia, both as an 
aspect of democratic ideology and as a means of constructing a democratic present through a 
revision of the recent past. It explores these themes by comparing and contrasting Athens, 
with her strongly polis-asserted understanding of democracy (Primary freedom), and the 
cities of Asia Minor, where democracy, like freedom, was a quality guaranteed by the king 
(Secondary freedom). I look first at Alexander‘s democratic nachleben and analyse how for 
the Greek cities of Asia Minor he was a guarantor and defender of eleutheria and demokratia, 
but in Athens he could be seen to be either a patron of or threat to democracy depending on 
the political requirements of the time. I then contrast Athens‘ political fluidity in the years 
322-287 with the aggressive and revisionist pro-democratic narrative presented by the post-
287 democracy. I show that democratic ideology was remarkably consistent between both 
Athens and the cities of Asia Minor, but I stress a fundamental conceptual difference between 
the Athenian understanding of demokratia as a Primary freedom and the Asian conception of 
it as a Secondary freedom. Lastly, I turn to terminology and question why after Alexander so 
few Successors are recorded as referring directly to, or guaranteeing, demokratia. 
      Chapter six explores the memory and commemoration of the Persian Wars. I am 
influenced throughout by the concept of the lieu de mémoire which I apply in its broadest 
sense by looking at the Macedonian and Greek manipulation of the places, monuments, 
documents, and concepts associated with the Persian Wars. I begin by exploring Philip‘s and 
Alexander‘s attempts to promote Hellenic unity under Macedonian rule by exploiting the 
historical significance of sites like Plataia, Thebes, and Corinth for the memory of the Persian 
War. I then turn to Athens and evaluate the juxtaposition of Macedon and Persia in the 
15 
 
Athenian propaganda of the Hellenic and Chremonidean Wars, highlighting in particular the 
exemplification and manipulation of memory through space and cult, most notably at Thebes, 
Plataia, and in the cults of Zeus Eleutherios at Athens and Plataia. Finally, I survey the 
juxtaposition of the Gallic Invasions and Persian Wars in both literature and monumental 
structure, especially the layout of monuments at Delphi, before detailing the different 
perception of the Gallic Invasions as a struggle for soteria and not eleutheria. 
      Two appendices provide catalogues of the epigraphic attestations of eleutheria, 
autonomia, demokratia, and soteria in Athens and mainland Greece and the Greek cities of 

















































Chapter 1: The Origins, Development, and Synonymity of Eleutheria and  






―Eleutheria meant in essence simply the state of not being actually and legally 
subject to a foreign power, even if bound to it by various obligations. Hence its 
similarity to autonomy.‖ 
Billows 1990: 195 
 
Introduction 
      It is fitting that a study of the political use of the Greek concept of eleutheria should open 
with the Persian Wars, that epoch-making series of events that gave birth to the concept itself. 
The connection between the Persian Wars and eleutheria has been thoroughly studied by 
Kurt Raaflaub in his recent book, The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece, while the 
origins of the term autonomia have also been the source of detailed studies by Ostwald, 
Karavites, and Raaflaub. In spite of this work, and perhaps as a result of its focus on one term 
or the other, the nature of the relationship between both terms – their different focuses, inter-
connectivity, and perchance even their synonymity – has not been satisfactorily addressed. 




 centuries both terms were wholly synonymous, 
while others claim that they were clearly distinct. Obviously both cannot be the case. Since 
eleutheria and autonomia commonly appear within the Hellenistic literary and epigraphic 
evidence pertaining to the relationship between city and king, as well as underlying the 




 centuries, their precise association with one 
another should be established before one analyses their role in formulating the relationship 
between city and king. Consequently, the following chapter will be concerned with just this. 
      In Section one I examine the origin and development of both terms individually and 
emphasise their initial distinctions in use and meaning. Eleutheria was understood as a 
negative freedom that could describe both the condition of being independent of another 
power and the process of liberation from such a power. Autonomia was understood as a 
positive freedom that asserted the internal independence of a state while under the wider 
subordination of another. In Section two I turn to the use and understanding of autonomia in 
the early 4
th
 century and argue that its continued invocation by Sparta led to an increase in its 
meaning whereby it came to denote a condition equal to, if not synonymous with, that of 
eleutheria. To express this new meaning the phrase eleutheria kai autonomia was coined in 
the context of the Second Athenian Confederacy. In Section three I draw together again both 
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 centuries eleutheria and autonomia were 
synonymous and that this arose from an increase in the significance of autonomia rather than, 
as has often been claimed, a decrease in the significance of eleutheria. 
 
SECTION 1: THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ELEUTHERIA AND 
AUTONOMIA IN THE 5
TH
 CENTURY 
      In what follows I trace the individual origins of eleutheria and autonomia before then 
analysing together the different focuses of each. Following the recent work of Kurt Raaflaub 
I distinguish between eleutheria as describing the external condition of freedom as 
independence from foreign control, but autonomia as describing the internal condition of 
freedom as self-government. However, by critiquing Raaflaub‘s work I argue that, although 
he discerns distinct meanings for eleutheria and autonomia, both could be used 
synonymously even in the 5
th
 century because autonomia could hold a significance very close 
to, if not exact with, that of eleutheria. This conclusion will inform my analysis of autonomia 





      The work of Kurt Raaflaub has been instrumental in understanding the origin and 
development of the Greek concept of eleutheria in the 5
th
 century, and this brief analysis is 
highly indebted to it. In particular, Raaflaub has revealed the centrality of the Persian Wars in 
stimulating the creation of eleutheria after 479 to define the condition of not being under 
Persian control. He has shown that the abstract noun eleutheria developed from the use of the 
adjective eleutheros within the master-slave dynamic to describe an individual who was not 
under the control of another; in Athens in particular eleutheros and doulos were used by 
Solon to describe release from and submission to debt bondage.
1
 Eleutheria was discovered 
in the wake of the Persian Wars but it only achieved its full conceptual development in the 
late 470s once the magnitude of the victory and its long-term significance were fully 
understood.
2
 Throughout the 5
th
 century the Persian Wars were remembered as a struggle for 
Greek eleutheria. Thucydides records that Pausanias sacrificed to Zeus Eleutherios after 
Plataia,
3
 while Simonides‘ epigrams claimed that those who died at Plataia ―clothed Greece 
                                                 
1
 Raaflaub 2004: 23-57, esp. 45-57. Solon 36.5-7 (after West 1972: 141): Γῆ μέλαινα, τῆς ἐγώ ποτε ὅρους 
ἀνεῖλον πολλαχῆι πεπηγότας, πρόσθεν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἐλευθέρη; cf. l.15. On Solon‘s land reforms, see 
also Harris 2002: 415-30; 2006 249-71. 
2
 Raaflaub 2004: 58-67, 84-9; see also Karavites 1982: 146-7. 
3
 Thuc. 2.71.2-4; Raaflaub 2004: 58-67, 84-9. 
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in freedom,‖ that at Artemision Athens ―laid the bright foundations of freedom,‖ and that at 
Salamis Athens kept ―all Greece from seeing the dawn of slavery‖.
4
  
      In the wake of the Persian defeats at Salamis and Plataia and Sparta‘s reluctance to lead 
an aggressive war against Persia in the Aegean and Asia Minor, Athens assumed the 
hegemony of the Greek allies c.478/7.
5
 The Athenian-led alliance, more commonly now 
called the Delian League, was originally designed to expel Persia from the remainder of 
Europe and ravage the King‘s land.
6
 To this end, Hellenotamiai were charged with assessing 
a supposedly voluntary tax (phoros) of money or ships to be paid by each ally to a common 
fund on Delos.
7
 The expansion of warfare under Athenian leadership was initially justified as 
a campaign to ensure the eleutheria of the Greeks of the Aegean and Asia Minor, but this was 
soon seen as a pretext for Athenian aggression against Persia and the imposition of empire 
over the voluntary allies.
8
 John Davies has recently argued that due to the problems inherent 
in maintaining a large navy Athens had either to expand control over the allies so as to secure 
the raw materials needed to supply her fleet or forgo her naval experiment altogether.
9
 Since 
she chose the former her continuing hegemony over the Greek allies was a direct and 
inevitable consequence of the failure of Xerxes‘ invasion. Cities that tried to leave the 
League, like Naxos in 471 and Thasos in 465, were besieged, had their walls torn down, and 
were forced to hand over their navies to Athens (Thuc. 1.100-1). Further, Athens increasingly 
interfered with her allies‘ constitutions,
10
 while from 454 League funds were moved to 
Athens and the phoros became a forced and unpopular tribute.
11
 
                                                 
4
 M&L 26=SEG XL 28; cf. Pi. P. 1.73-8. West (1970) associates the Marathon epigrams with Salamis. The use 
of δούλιο*ν ἐμαρ ἰδεν+ has presumably deliberate Homeric connotations (Il. 6.463). Similarly, ἐλεύθερον ἆμαρ 
appears in both an epigram for the Megarian dead in the Persian Wars (IG VII 53=Simon. XVI) and Homer (Il. 
6.455; 16.831, 20.193). Chambers (1973: 42-56) looks at the significance of Marathon and Artemision for 
Athenian views on their past. 
5
 Hdt. 8.3; Thuc. 1.95-6; D.S. 11.46.4; ATL III 97, 225-33; Brunt 1993: 47-74; Raaflaub 2004 87-9; Ostwald 
1982: 24-5. On the date, see Arist. Ath. 23.5 with Rhodes 1981: 295-6. 
6
 Thuc. 1.95-6. Hornblower (1991a: 141-7) argues that Athens‘ aim from the start was leadership against Persia. 
7
 Thuc. 1.96.1-2; D.S. 11.47; Plu. Arist. 24.1; ATL III 229-33. On the Hellenotamiai, see Hornblower 1991a: 
145-6. It has been argued that while the League itself was to be permanent the phoros was only intended to last 
for the duration of the war with Persia (Wade-Gery 1945: 217 n.11; ATL III 230-1). Its permanency – ratified in 
the Peace of Nikias of 421 (below n.11) – no doubt contributed to the unpopularity of the term. 
8
 Thuc. 3.10.3; 6.76.3-4; Raaflaub 2004: 87-9; É. Will 1972: 132. Note in particular the claim of the 
Mytilenians: ξύμμαχοι μέντοι ἐγενόμεθα οὐκ ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις͵ ἀλλ΄ ἐπ΄ 
ἐλευθερώσει ἀπὸ τοῦ Μήδου τοῖς Ἕλλησιν (Thuc. 3.10.3). 
9
 Davies 2007. 
10
 IK. Ery. 4 (=M&L 40); Lys. 2.54-7; cf. X. HG 3.4.7. Both democracies (at Erythrai by the late 450s [M&L 40; 
IG I
3
 14], Samos in 440/39 [Thuc. 1.115.3], and Miletos by the mid-430s [Herrmann 1970]) and oligarchies (X. 
Ath. Pol. 3.11) were installed. Meritt expressed scepticism on the ―systematic‖ installation of democracies (ATL 
III 149-54) and Brock (2009) has recently confirmed this. 
11
 Thuc. 1.96.2 (with Hornblower 1991a: 146), 99.1, 121.5; Plut. Arist. 25.2-3; Raaflaub 2004: 137 with further 
references. The date of 454 is based on the fact that the Athenian tribute lists begin in this year, a synchronism 
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      With the decrease in the Persian threat and the concomitant increase in Athenian control, 
Athens entered into a position of imperialist hegemony over the allies: a transformation 
reflected in modern terminology as the change from the Delian League to the Athenian 
Empire. The more Athens was seen to be negating the freedom of the allies the more she 
turned freedom into a slogan by referring to her own past exploits on behalf of it. Eventually, 
the destruction of the allies‘ freedom become justified as a manifestation of Athens‘ 
freedom.
12
 This led to the creation of two new dynamics: first, the use of eleutheria to 
describe the unequal nature of Greek control over Greeks, not simply Persian or foreign 
control over Greeks; second, Athens‘ creation of new methods of justifying her control over 
the allies as a manifestation of her own eleutheria. When cast in the role of Persia – negating 
the freedom of the Greeks – Athens turned to the past, specifically her role in the Persian 
Wars, for justification. The contributions of others to the Wars were diminished and Athens‘ 
role in their victory was presented as pre-eminent.
13
 From this, Athens claimed that she alone 
had ensured the freedom of the Greeks and so her freedom was more important than anyone 
else‘s and could be asserted over it, having being captured and razed twice, yet still having 
fought and triumphed against Persia, Athens viewed her empire as her reward and saw herself 
as superior to those who had submitted in 480/79.
14
 From having promised freedom for the 
Greeks of Asia Athens now saw their freedom as unworthy and indeed a subversion of the 
full expression of her own. 
      The Peloponnesian War was in large part a reaction to Athens‘ oppression of her allies‘ 
freedom. Thucydides records that Athens, like Persia before, was enslaving the Greeks and 
that both Mytilene and Corinth appealed to Sparta against Athens‘ imprecations on their 
freedom (Thuc. 1.124.1; 3.10-13).
15
 At the negotiations of 431 Sparta was happy to assume 
the mantle of defender of Greek eleutheria from Athens (Thuc. 1.69.1) and as the war 
                                                                                                                                                        
questioned by Pritchett (1969). The continued payment of the phoros was ratified in the Peace of Nikias of 421 
(Thuc. 5.18.5; cf. 4.81; SV 188; Ostwald 1982: 9, 28; Bosworth 1992: 125). 
12
 Raaflaub 2004: 179-81. 
13
 M&L 26=SEG XL 28; Hdt. 7.139, Thuc. 1.73-8; Lys. 2.24, 44-7; Isoc. 4.71-2, 98-100; 5.97; cf. Plato Menex. 
242a-c, 244c; Raaflaub 2004: 166-172, 179-81. 
14
 Thuc. 6.76-80, 82.3-83.1 (with Hornblower 2008: 501-3); Isoc. 4.66-72, 83, 94-100; 6.43, 83; cf. Hdt. 6.11-
13; 7.139; 8.22, 85.1; Chambers 1973: 83-8. For the idea that Athens‘ empire was a reward for her sufferings on 
behalf of the freedom of all Greeks, see Isoc. 4.66-72, 83, 94-100, cf. 6.43, 83; Chambers 1973: 83-8. 
Thucydides connects Athens‘ empire with its position as the freest of all Greeks (2.36-43; 6.89.6; 7.69.2; 
8.68.4). 
15
 Thucydides has Hermokrates of Kamarina claim that for the Ionians the Persian Wars simply saw a change of 
masters from Persia to Athens (6.76.4). For Athens as enslaving the Greeks, see Thuc. 1.121.5; 3.10.3-5, 63.3; 
4.86.1, 108.3; 5.9.9; 6.77.1, 88.1; 7.66.2, 68.2. She was also called a polis tyrannos, see Thuc. 1.122.3, 124.3; 
Ar. Eq. 110-20. On the expression, see Tuplin 1985. 
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progressed she continually claimed to be freeing Greece from Athenian control.
16
 However, 
like Athens before, Sparta was using the Greek wish for eleutheria to justify and expand her 
own hegemony and her apparent altruism was soon questioned. The Spartan admiral Alkidas 
murdered Athenian allies despite that fact that they fought under compulsion (Thuc. 3.32.1-
2), Sparta openly reneged on its commitments to defend Plataia as a site of Greek eleutheria 
in 427 (Thuc. 3.53-68), and after its capture they executed the Plataian survivors in order to 
expedite Theban entry into the war (Thuc. 3.68). Further, Brasidas liberated numerous 
Chalkidic cities only to install harmosts (military governors) and eventually return the cities 
to Athens in the Peace of Nikias, according to which they were to remain autonomous but 
now pay the phoros to Athens.
17
 The Peace severely undermined Spartan claims to be 
defending eleutheria since it guaranteed Athenian control over those states that Sparta had set 
out to liberate ten years before (Thuc. 5.18.8) and caused many of her allies to allege that 
Sparta was, with Athens, trying to enslave Hellas.
18
 Worse still, in 412 Sparta concluded a 
treaty with Persia that acknowledged the Great King‘s authority over the Ionian Greeks and 
led to further claims that Sparta was trying to enslave Greece beneath the Persian yoke (Thuc. 
8.18, 37.2, 43.3). 
      As an abstract concept, eleutheria initially lacked any kind of positive definition.
19
 
Negatively, it described the status of not being subject to Persian political and military 
control, but it was a quite indistinct concept that was used through its simplistic contrast with 
douleia to denote freedom from or submission to the control of another power. It was an 
emotive call to arms, a quality for which one would fight and die,
20
 but it did not in any 
binding way define a specific situation or series of criteria; the manifestations of subjection 
and liberation – garrisons, governors, taxation, political interference – do not appear to have 
been as yet indelibly shackled to it, although they were to become so in the 4
th
 century (below 
§3). Eleutheria, the abstract noun, existed both as an active verb (eleutheroo) and a concrete 
noun (eleutherosis). All three forms of the word described different aspects of liberation: the 
verb to describe an individual or state liberating another (eleutheroo), the concrete noun to 
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 Thuc. 2.8.4, 72.1, 78.4; 3.13.7, 32.2, 59.4, 63.3; 4.85-7, 108.2-3, 121.1; 5.9.9; 8.43.3, 46.3; cf. Isoc. 4.122. For 
Sparta‘s use and abuse of eleutheria during the Peloponnesian War, see Raaflaub 2004: 193-202. 
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 Liberation: Thuc. 4.80-1, 83-8. Governors: Thuc. 4.132.3; 5.3.1. Phoros: Thuc. 5.18.5. Karavites (1982: 150-
2) argues that Brasidas tried to obstruct the peace because he suspected that the fallout would be detrimental to 
both his and Sparta‘s reputations. Brasidas was given heroic honours in Skione for his actions ὡς ἐλευθεροῦντα 
τὴν Ἑλλάδα (Thuc. 4.121.1; 5.11.1; Hornblower 1991a: 380-5, 449-56). 
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 Thuc. 5.22.1, 27.2, 29.3; Raaflaub 2004 196-8; L. Mitchell 2007: 144-6. Concern over the nature of Sparta‘s 
liberation of Greece had been voiced as early as 427 (Thuc. 3.32.2). 
19
 Welles 1965: 37-8. 
20
 Lévy 1983: 256-7, 269-70. 
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denote this process (eleutherosis), and the abstract noun to describe the resulting condition of 
being liberated (eleutheria). However, as we shall see further below, although eleutheria 
described the process and abstract condition of being free it was autonomia that was used 
within treaties and inter-state diplomacy to define the specific status arising from this (below 
§1.2). So, in 424 Brasidas freed the Chalkidic cities from Athenian control but the resulting 
status awarded them was autonomia (Thuc. 4.86-8). 
      The 5
th
 century gave rise to two important and inter-connected aspects of the Greek 
concept of eleutheria. First, it became common that for one state to exercise fully its freedom 
it had to control and thus in part negate the freedom of other states. Second, eleutheria 
offered a means of describing the nature of power relations between Greek states as one of 
large states oppressing the freedom of smaller ones. Eleutheria was initially a concept writ 
large to describe the position of Greece as not being under Persian control, but when Athens 
expanded control over the Aegean states after the defeat of Persia she was seen to be a threat 
to the freedom of the Greek cities. Thucydides records that Athens‘ control of the allies led to 
her position as the freest of all states.
21
 This imbalance between the freedom of Athens and 
that of her allies meant that eleutheria was now used to define the power dynamics of inter-
polis relations and acted as a rallying cry for the removal of one state from the control of 
another. Aigina and Corinth called on Sparta to liberate the Greeks from Athenian control in 
431, while after the Peloponnesian War Thebes called on Athens to help liberate the Greeks 
from Sparta during the Corinthian War of 395-387.
22
 
      Eleutheria was a concept of importance to all states. Smaller, dependent states under the 
oppressive influence of leading poleis like Athens and Sparta used eleutheria to describe the 
urge for independence, either by themselves (as was the case with Naxos, Thasos, and 
Mytilene under Athens) or with the assistance of others, and so used it to elicit the support of 
another leading polis in their liberation; a bottom-up approach. Leading poleis, however, 
could respond to such claims, or indeed assert them spontaneously, and claim to be liberating 
the cities; a top-down approach. Such claims were rarely if ever altruistic, but they allowed 
states like Athens and Sparta to define their military campaigns not as assertions of their own 
power but as manifestations of concern for the enemy‘s oppressed allies, thus leading to the 
attainment of both willing allies and moral authority.
23
 However, the enforcement of 
eleutheria as the will of a hegemon led to problems. Military concerns ultimately trumped 
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 Above n.14. 
22
 X. HG 3.5.12-13. On the Corinthian War see the recent work of Fornis (2008). 
23
 Raaflaub 2004: 87-9. See also Mytilene‘s remark to Sparta in 428/7 (Thuc. 3.13.7): ἢν δ΄ ἐλευθεροῦντες 
φαίνησθε͵ τὸ κράτος τοῦ πολέμου βεβαιότερον ἕξετε. 
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benevolent magnanimity and although Sparta claimed to defend eleutheria she used the 
slogan to mask imperial expansion. The Peloponnesian War revealed the essential paradox of 
freedom in an age of major power blocs: to deny one state was to trust in and ally with 
another, thus creating a cycle of supposed liberation and oppression. Athens defeated Persia 
and assumed a leading position over the Greek states initially based on voluntary leadership, 
allied goodwill, and eleutheria. However, to maintain this position Athens had to control the 
allies, thus negating their freedom. Sparta was then called upon by Megara and Corinth to 
free the Greeks and in doing so replaced the hegemony once held by Athens. To maintain this 
leading position Sparta in turn had to enforce control over her new allies and in the 
Corinthian War Athens was again called upon to free the Greeks (X. HG 3.5.12-13). The 
cycle of hegemonies was to continue during the 4
th
 century during which time eleutheria 
continued to denote, as it had in the 5
th
 century, the ideal of ―freedom from all internal and 
external compulsion‖.
24
 However, political propaganda was increasingly expressed through 
autonomia, a term closely connected with eleutheria and of central importance to 4
th
 century 
politics and diplomacy. 
 
1.2. Autonomia 
      The origin and early development of autonomia has been traced on numerous occasions 
and a certain communis opinio has been reached. Autonomia originated within the 5
th
 century 
Athenian Empire and was used to define the position of allies under Athenian military control 
who had lost their eleutheria but were still internally self-governing.
25
 Autonomia grew 
therefore from the relationship between stronger and weaker states. Some saw it as a negative 
status defined by its contrast with, and inherent lack of, eleutheria. It thus denoted the weaker 
state‘s submission to the stronger, but the stronger state‘s guarantee to the weaker of its 
internal political independence through the use of its own laws, ―self-government which is 
willing to accept subordination to a superior power in some matters‖.
26
 While this is one 
aspect of its use, others have pointed out that it can also be used to describe a position very 
similar to, if not identical with, eleutheria, a point to which I will return below.
27
 The 
difference in use reflects of course the term‘s lack of definition; in many cases it appears to 
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 Karavites 1984: 167-78, 177. 
25
 Ostwald 1982: 14-46; Karavites 1982: 153-5; Hornblower 1996: 477; Raaflaub: 2004: 157-60 (with further 
references). Bikerman (1958) sees its origin within the relationship between Persia and the Greek cities of Asia 
Minor. Lévy (1983: 249-52) and Figueira (1990: 82-6) argued that autonomia antedated the Persian Wars, but 
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27
 Lévy 1983: 256-7, 261-7; Hansen 1995a: 25-8; 1998: 79-80; Ma 2009: 126-8. 
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be understood simply as the opposite of that with which it is contrasted.
28
 Raaflaub, for one, 
has argued that autonomia carried many shades of meaning which would have been 
understood and emphasised in different contexts.
29
 
     Autonomia was fundamentally part of the language of diplomacy and was commonly used 
in interstate relations to define the status of allies within the alliance systems of hegemones 
like Athens, Sparta, and Argos.
30
 Aigina was perhaps guaranteed autonomia in the Thirty 
Years‘ Peace of 446.
31
 The Peace of Nikias of 421 ensured the autonomia of those cities 
captured from Athens by Sparta and then returned to Athenian control and paying the phoros 
(Thuc. 5.18.2-5). The Peace of 418/7 between Sparta and Argos also guaranteed the 
autonomia of each other‘s allies.
32
 Brasidas freed the Chalkidic cities from Athenian control 
in 424/3 before then granting them autonomia as Sparta‘s allies.
33
 Athens similarly freed the 
Sicilian cities from Syrakuse in 415 (Thuc. 6.84.3, 87.2) before then making them allies and 
granting them autonomia (Thuc. 6.85.1-2). Thucydides records that autonomia was the status 
given to Athenian allies during the Delian League but lost when it developed into the more 
autocratic Athenian Empire (Thuc. 1.97.1, 139-40; 3.10-11, 39.2, 46.5).
34
 Within the 





 Mytilene post-427/6 (IG I
3
 66.11-12), Selymbria in 408 (IG I
3
 118.10-11), 
and Samos in both 412 (Thuc. 8.21; cf. IG I
3
 96) and 405 (IG I
3









      Although autonomia could denote both dependence and independence, and thus carry a 
meaning close to that of eleutheria, some scholars have insisted on studying autonomia 
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 Sealey 1993: 241-4. Hansen (1995a: 34-5) explores a similar approach. 
29
 Raaflaub 2004: 149, 155-7; cf. Bikerman 1958: 324; Lévy 1983: 257. 
30
 Ostwald 1982: 6-7; Karavites 1982: 154-7; Lévy 1983: 259-61, 167-9. 
31
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 John Ma (2009: 129-34) has recently emphasised its importance as a status benefaction. 
35
 If so, then this is this earliest documentary appearance of autonomia. Ma (2009) analyses the significance of 
autonomia as an Athenian benefaction and status definition for Karpathos. 
36
 On the context of Athens‘ grant of autonomia to Samos in 412, see Ostwald 1993. Ma (2009: 128) suggests 
that IG I
3
 29 also concerns a grant of autonomia but the term is not preserved on the stone. Autonomia is also 
guaranteed to Rhittenia in its alliance with Gortyn of c.480-450 (I.Cret. IV 80). 
37
 Figueira (1990: 64-72) has argued for different understandings of autonomia by Sparta and Athens by 





 A notable exception to this is Kurt Raaflaub who recently 
treated of the 5
th
 century origin and development of both terms together.
39
 Raaflaub argues 
that it is both difficult and counter-productive to try to define autonomia, but that in spite of 
this it is possible to discern very clear usage and therefore meaning.
40
 Eleutheria, he argues, 
looks outwards and defines the negative freedom of independence from a tyrant or foreign 
power; autonomia, on the other hand, looks inwards and defines the positive freedom of 
being free to do something. This argument had earlier been made by Bikerman, but Raaflaub 
augments it by arguing that even in examples where eleutheria and autonomia apparently 
carry the same meaning and define the same position they are in fact simply emphasising 
―opposite aspects of the same reality‖: eleutheria expresses the negative, external aspect of 
freedom from foreign control; autonomia denoting the internal, positive aspect of freedom as 
self-rule. Therefore, although they could both be used to define the same situation, the choice 
of one over the other was not arbitrary but reflected the particular focus (internal or external) 
that the author wished to emphasise.
41
 
      Raaflaub‘s distinction is subtle and I wonder whether the difference he draws between 
external and internal focuses is actually present in the sources. At times it appears that he is 
forcing this distinction onto authors who seem to be playing on the ambiguity, perhaps even 
synonymity, of eleutheria and autonomia. Both terms were never accurately defined and are 
frequently used ambiguously; Thucydides never states that ―autonomia denotes one‘s internal 
freedom to do X‖. Is it the case then that when both terms appear together and seem to define 
the same condition they in fact maintain subtle differences in internal and external focus, as 
Raaflaub argues, or is it that their inherent ambiguity in use and understanding allows him to 
apply such a subtle distinction in emphasis? In short, when Raaflaub reads the evidence is he 
elucidating a subtle distinction within it or reading his own distinction onto it? 
      Raaflaub is surely right to argue that there is a general distinction between eleutheria as 
external and autonomia as internal, but his meticulous division of both need not apply in 
every case. There are examples where no obvious distinction appears and it seems that 
ancient authors are exploiting ambiguities, not enforcing distinctions. In such situations we 
should not automatically apply Raaflaub‘s distinction de rigour, rather we should at least be 
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aware of the possibility that ancient authors may be exploiting ambiguity or synonymity. In 
one sentence Herodotos refers to the central Asian tribes revolting from Assyrian control and 
gaining their freedom; in the next he refers to them as consequently being autonomous (Hdt. 
1.95.8-96.1). In his account of the Mytilenian debate Thucydides has Kleon state that 
autonomous Mytilene revolted for eleutheria (3.39.7) but Diodotos claim that free Mytilene 
revolted for autonomia (3.46.5-6).
42
 In the debate at Kamarina he has Hermokrates 
cryptically describe the Kamarinians as ―free Dorians from the autonomous Peloponnese‖.
43
 
In each case eleutheria and autonomia seem to be inter-changeable and describe the same 
position. Raaflaub‘s distinction between internal and external focus could be forced onto 
these examples but this would be methodologically unsound because they provide no 
evidence for it. Rather, we should appreciate that in such cases the author‘s focus is on the 
ambiguity between both terms, not the subtle delineation of internal and external statuses. 
Indeed, Raaflaub implies as much by stating that in the example of Hermokrates, 
Thucydides‘ ―juxtaposition of free and autonomous has the cumulative effect of creating a 
superlative positive notion‖.
44
 Clear distinctions could exist, but so too could ambiguity or 
even the impression of synonymity. 
      The potential synonymity between eleutheria and autonomia is also evident in other 
contexts. In addition to describing the status of dependent allies within an alliance, autonomia 
could denote the status of tribes outside the power of an empire or state and so carry a 
meaning equivalent to complete independence from foreign control.
45
 We might at first 
assume here a meaning equivalent to that of eleutheria – freedom from foreign control – but 
Raaflaub argues instead that autonomia denotes the unqualified ability of these tribes to use 
their own laws. Eleutheria, he argues, would only be used if one wished to describe the 
freedom of these tribes from foreign rule. Regardless of whether or not the use of autonomia 
                                                 
42
 Lévy (1983: 261-7) argues that Kleon sees autonomia as a status granted by Athens and eleutheria as freedom 
attained by armed revolt. Diodotos, however, uses eleutheria to mean that Mytilene is not enslaved within the 
Athenian Empire but is revolting through words to attain independence from it, i.e. autonomia. Kleon, according 
to Lévy, sees autonomia as compatible with the Athenian arche, Diodotos does not. Figueira (1990: 71) argues 
for confusion here between Spartan and Athenian understandings of autonomia. See also, Karavites 1982: 158-
61. Hornblower (1991a: 394, 427-8) criticises Lévy‘s analysis as ―somewhat forced‖ and points out that it 
would ―demand that Thucydides be universally strict in his use of technical terms‖, which, particularly in his 
speeches, he was not. 
43
 Thuc. 6.77.1: Δωριῆς ἐλεύθεροι ἀπ΄ αὐτονόμου τῆς Πελοποννήσου τὴν ΢ικελίαν οἰκοῦντες. Hornblower 
(2008: 497-8) translates this as ―Dorians and free inhabitants of Sicily, prung from the autonomous 
Peloponnese‖. He also comments on the ―positive combination of ‗freedom and autonomy‘‖. For further 
possible examples of the synonymity of eleutheria and autonomia, see Lévy 1983: 256-7. 
44
 Raaflaub 2004: 152 with n.196. 
45
 Lévy 1983: 256-7; Sealey 1993: 241-2. See Thuc. 2.29.3, 96.2, 4, 98.3-4, 101.3; 6.88.4; Hp. Aër. 16; X. An. 
7.8.25; Cyr. 1.1.4; D. 1.23; 4.4.8; D.S. 19.17.3, 19.3. 
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reveals a subtle, internal focus the simple fact remains that it denotes a position that can also 
be called eleutheria. Therefore, even if they did originally carry subtle distinctions eleutheria 
and autonomia could describe the same position or status and carry similar, even inter-
changeable meanings.
46
 Because autonomia was used in different ways to denote more than 
one position and since the ancient Greeks did not rigorously define and classify political and 
ideological terminology, we would expect Raaflaub‘s subtle distinction in focus to be quickly 
undermined.
47
 Unfortunately, Raaflaub does not take his analysis of autonomia into the 4
th
 
century. In what follows I argue that in the 4
th
 century both eleutheria and autonomia became 
completely synonymous and that the means by which this came about reveals the potentiality 




SECTION 2: THE IMPORTANCE OF AUTONOMIA IN THE 4
TH
 CENTURY 
      Xenophon‘s Hellenika documents events of the early 4
th
 century and maintains a focus on 
autonomia exceptional in the works of ancient historians. Herodotos, Thucydides, Polybios, 
and Diodoros all refer to eleutheria (as verb, noun, and adjective) much more frequently than 
autonomia,
48




 century writers Andokides, Isokrates, Demosthenes, 
Aristotle, Lykourgos, Dinarchos, and Hyperides.
49
 Uniquely, the Hellenika mentions 
autonomia (39 times) more often than eleutheria (29 times).
50
 Moreover, if we exclude 
references to eleutheria as the personal position of the free citizen or liberated slave (15 
times), then the numbers are even more pronounced: 39 mentions of autonomia in a political 
context against 14 mentions of eleutheria. This unprecedented focus on autonomia over 
eleutheria has never to my knowledge been commented on, but I argue that it reflects the 
continued and expanded use of autonomia within Spartan and Greek 4
th
 century international 
diplomacy in Greece and Asia Minor.
51
 
                                                 
46
 Hornblower (2003: 224) points out that autonomia can denote a degree of absence of foreign control and in 
this regard carries a meaning similar to eleutheria. 
47
 Welles 1965 (on defining eleutheria). Rhodes 1999: 36 (on 4
th
 century autonomia): ―the Greeks tended to 
legislate as if the meaning of key words was self-evident and did not need to be defined‖. 
48
 Herodotos: (E)leutheria=81, (A)utonomia=2; Thucydides: E=106, A=48; Polybios: E=136, A=12; Diodoros: 
E=332, A=76. 
49
 Andokides: E=11, A=5; Isokrates: E=64, A=19; Demosthenes: E=155, A=21; Aristotle: E=281, A=1; 
Lykourgos: E=10, A=1; Dinarchos: E=20, A=1; Hyperides: E=27, A=1. Arrian‘s Anabasis may refer to 
autonomia 23 times and eleutheria 20, but the use of autonomia is not political; it is only used to describe native 
tribes outside Persia‘s and Alexander‘s control. 
50
 Only 6 further references to autonomia occur in Xenophon‘s works (An. 7.8.25; Cyr. 1.1.4 [twice]; Ages. 
1.10; Lac. 3.1.4; Vect. 5.9.2), bringing the total number to 45. Eleutheria (noun and verb) appears a further 111 
times. 
51
 Cuniberti (2006: 13-15) provides a useful quantitative analysis of the appearance of the stems δημοκρατ- 
αὐτονομ- and ἐλευθερ- from the 6th century BC to the 2nd century AD. However, he looks only at chronological 
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      In this section I look at the use of autonomia in the early 4
th
 century and argue that two 
understandings of it existed: a Spartan one that saw autonomia as denoting alliance with and 
dependency upon Sparta (a status similar to her Peloponnesian allies), and an Athenian-led 
one that saw autonomia as signifying a state‘s full internal and external freedom. It was 
widely seen that Sparta‘s particular application of autonomia was not representative of the 
meaning it held within treaties. Therefore, as the speech of Autokles of 371 shows (see 
below), confusion existed over what exactly it denoted. Consequently, both Spartan and 
Athenian-led understandings of autonomia existed. I argue that to denote the Athenian-led 
definition of autonomia as full internal and external freedom the phrase eleutheria kai 
autonomia was coined and then enshrined within the Second Athenian Confederacy. 
      In the early 4
th
 century Sparta appears to use autonomia in the same way as it had in the 
later 5
th
 century (above §1.2): to denote the position of states removed from the control of an 
opposing power and integrated into Sparta‘s own power-bloc as a series of autonomous but 
dependent allies. In 402/1 Sparta forced Elis to grant autonomia to her perioikic cities who 
then allied with Sparta.
52
 In 395 Lysandros invaded Boiotia and called on Haliartos ―to revolt 
from the Thebans and become autonomous‖, i.e. ally with Sparta (X. HG 3.5.18). During his 
campaigns in Asia in 397/6, Derkylidas made the Greek cities autonomous by removing them 
from Persian control and allying them with Sparta (X. HG 3.2.12-20). Agesilaos maintained 
this policy from 396 and in a meeting with Tissaphernes stated that his intention was that the 
Greek cities of Asia Minor ―shall be autonomous, as are those in our part of Greece‖, thus 
denoting their status as autonomous but dependent allies.
53
 The proposed peace treaties of 
392 and 391, according to which the Greek cities would be autonomous, failed because 
Thebes, Argos, and Athens feared that Sparta would use the principle of autonomia to 




                                                                                                                                                        
distribution of references century by century; he does not compare at the use of these terms by individual 
authors. 
52
 X. HG 3.2.23-31; D.S. 14.34.1; Paus. 3.8.3; Karavites 1984: 179-80. For a detailed analysis of the war of 402-
400 between Elis and Sparta, see Capiro 2005: 82-98. Capreedy (2008) looks at the tension between Elis‘ local 
hegemony and Sparta‘s control of the Peloponnesian League. 
53
 X. HG 3.4.5: δ΄ εἶπεν αὐτονόμους καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Ἀσία πόλεις εἶναι͵ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ παρ΄ ἡμῖν Ἑλλάδι. 
See also, X. Ages. 1.10; Plu. Ages. 9.1; Polyaen. 2.1.8. Karavites‘ (1984: 178) claim that this denoted external 
freedom is correct only in regards freedom from Persian influence, not Spartan. Bosworth (1992: 127-31) treats 
of the Spartan use of autonomia in Asia Minor. Seager & Tuplin (1980) argue that the Greeks of Asia Minor 
only became conceived of as a unit between 400-386. 
54
 X. HG 4.8.14-15. The congress of 392 is known from a speech attributed to Andocides and a fragment of 
Philochoros (Andoc. 3; Philoch. FGrH 328 F149), though the authenticity of the speech and the date of the 
congress are debated. Both Keen (1995b; 1998) and Badian (1991: 29-30) support the date of 392. Harris (2000) 
argues that the speech of Andocides is a later rhetorical exercise. 
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      The King‘s Peace of 387 marked a progression in Sparta‘s position in Greece; Diodoros 
calls it the point at which Sparta began to fully expand her hegemony over Greece (15.19.1). 
The terms of the peace were handed down from Susa by the Great King. He decreed, and the 
Greeks accepted, that the cities of Asia were to be his, Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros were to 
be Athenian, but all the other cities, both large and small, were to be autonomous.
55
  Further, 
the King threatened to punish any who did not abide by these terms (X. HG 5.1.31).
56
 As 
overseer (prostates) of the peace Sparta was able to enforce its terms according to her own 
understanding of autonomia and ensure the dissolution of opposing power groups. Thebes 
was forced to dissolve the Boiotian League and grant the cities their autonomia (X. HG 
5.1.32-3).
57
 However, when the Spartan general Phoibidas garrisoned the Kadmea in 383 
Thebes was even denied its own autonomia.
58
 The burgeoning synoikism of Argos and 
Corinth was also stopped and the Argive garrison removed from Corinth.
59
 Mantineia was 
destroyed in 386 and sub-divided into four autonomous komai, each allied with Sparta.
60
 In 
383 Sparta campaigned against Olynthos in order to protect the autonomia of those cities 
Olynthos was bringing into her sphere of influence. When Olynthos surrendered in 379 peace 
was made according to which she was to have the same enemies and friends as Sparta, to 




      Autonomia was the key component of Sparta‘s international policy and was repeatedly 
enshrined within the Persian-backed koinai eirenai (common peaces) that appeared 
                                                 
55
 The abandonment of the Greeks of Asia was a black-spot on Sparta‘s record (D.S. 14.110.4; 15.19.4), 
something that Alexander manipulated during his invasion of Asia Minor in 334-332 (below pgs.194-5 with 
n.30). 
56
 Isokrates (4.115, 117, 175, 176; 8.68) and Diodoros (14.110.2-4; 15.5.1-2, 19.4) also refers to autonomia as 
the central tenet of the Peace. 
57
 For Spartan actions after the King‘s Peace, see D.G. Rice 1974; Tuplin 1993: 87-100. On Sparta‘s promotion 
of the autonomia of the individual over the federalism of the Boiotian and Olynthian Leagues, see Bearzot 2004: 
21-30. 
58
 X. HG 5.2.25-36; D.S. 15.20.1-3; 16.29.2; Nepos Pelop. 5-6; Plu. Ages. 23; Moralia 575f-576a, 807f; Aristid. 
Rh. 409, 486, 488; Polyaen. 2.3.1; Plb. 4.27.4; Scholium on Demosthenes 3.127. Sparta‘s actions were widely 
unpopular (X. HG 5.4.1; 6.3.7-9; D.S. 15.20.2; Isoc. 4.126) and the Theban exiles eventually removed the 
garrison in 379 (X. HG 5.4.1-12; D.S. 15.25-7; Plu. Pelop. 7-13). 
59
 X. HG 5.1.34. On the union of Argos and Corinth, see most recently Bearzot 2004: 31-6; Fornis 2008: 149-
176. 
60
 X. HG 5.2.1-7; D.S. 15.5.3-5, 12.1-2; Ephor. FGrH 70 F 79; Plb. 4.27.6-7; Paus. 8.8.9; cf. Plu. Pelop. 4. 
Capiro (2005: 216-21) places the destruction in the context of Sparto-Mantineian relations within the 
Peloponnesian League in the late 5
th
 and early 4
th
 centuries. Bearzot (2004: 37-44) argues that the destruction 
reveals a conflict between federalism and civic autonomy, but Rzepka (2005) correctly highlights that this ―says 
more about how the Lacedaemonians applied the principle of autonomy to the poleis‖. 
61
 X. HG 5.2.11-24, 2.37-3.9, 3.18-20, 26-7; D.S. 15.19.2-3, 20.3-23.5. 
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throughout the first half of the 4
th
 century, from 387-367.
62
 This in turn led to the 
institutionalisation of autonomia as a key component of Greek international policy applicable 
in equal measure to both hegemones, like Thebes, and dependent poleis, like the Boiotian 
cities. As mentioned above, treaties between Sparta and Elis‘ perioikic cities, the cities of the 
Olynthic League, Olynthos itself, the dissolved Mantineian komai, and others were made on 
terms of autonomia with autonomia denoting the removal of a state from the hegemony of a 
rival power and its forced alliance with Sparta. 
      However, Sparta‘s interpretation and application of autonomia was widely unpopular in 
the 390s and 380s and gave rise to an Athenian-led movement against Sparta‘s prostasia of 
the peace and application of autonomia.
63
 In 384/3, after the destruction of Mantineia, Athens 
made an alliance with Chios on terms ―of eleutheria and autonomia‖.
64
 Over the next six 





 and presumably Mytilene, Methymna, Rhodes, and Byzantion.
67
 
Finally, in 378/7, the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy was published, prescribing 
that members were to be ―free and autonomous, and to live at peace occupying their own 
territory in security…being governed under whatever form of government he wishes, neither 
receiving a garrison nor submitting to a governor nor paying tribute‖.
68
 
      The 370s were a decade of decline for Spartan power. Defeats by Athens at Naxos in 376 
and Alyzia in 375 and by Thebes at Tegyrai in 375
69
 were followed by Athenian successes in 
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 On the phenomenon of the 4
th
 century koine eirene, see especially Ryder 1965; Jehne 1994. See also Moritani 
1988. 
63
 Bertoli (2003: 88-9) places the Second Athenian Confederacy in the context of Spartan abuses of autonomia. 
64
 GHI 20.20-1 (App.1 num.1) ; cf. Isoc. 4.28. Initial contact was apparently made by Chios (GHI 20.13-15, 30-
5). A second copy of this treaty confirming the exact same terms – eleutheria kai autonomia – survives as IG II
2
 
35 (App.1 num.2). 
65
 The alliance between Thebes and Athens does not survive, but it is mentioned elsewhere as having had the 
same terms as that of Chios (GHI 22.19-25); IG II
2
 40 may preserve a fragment of it (Cargill 1981: 52-6; 
Harding 33). Negotiations with Thebes were ongoing when the charter was published in Prytany VII 378/7 (GHI 
22.72-8, with notes on pg.103; cf. Cargill 1981: 57-8). Stylianou (1998: 258-9) argues that the alliance with 




 44.21-2 (App.1 num.4). 
67
 Mytilene: GHI 22.81; Isoc. 4.28. Methymna: GHI 23 with the editors‘ notes on pg.108. Rhodes: GHI 22.82; 
D.S. 15.28.3. Byzantion: IG II
2
 41 (Tod 121); D.S. 15.28.3; Isoc. 4.28. Rhodes (2010: 263-8) provides a useful 
overview of the foundation of the Confederacy. On Athens‘ earliest allies, see Accame 1941: 32-7; Cawkwell 
1973: 47-60; Stylianou 1998: 249-59. Cargill (1981: 51-67) treats of Confederacy membership in general. 
68
 GHI 22.10-23 (App.1 num.3). For these provisions in action, see Cargill 1981: 131-60; Hornblower 1991b: 
211-15, 217-19; Bosworth 1992: 136-8; Bertoli 2003: 88-91; Rhodes & Osborne 2003: 101-2 (cf. the editors‘ 
comments on GHI 24, 51, and 52); Rhodes 2010: 268-76. Stylianou (1998: 256-7) argues that these guarantees 
could be ignored in specific cases should the synedrion deem it necessary and pass a dogma to that end. 
69
 Naxos: D.S. 15.34.3-35.2 with Stylianou 1998: 305-10. Alyzia: X. HG 5.4.64-6; D.S. 15.36.5 with Stylianou 
1998: 317. Tegyrai: D.S. 15.37.1-2 with Stylianou 1998: 318-9; Plu. Pel. 16-17. 
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the Adriatic in bringing Kerkyra, Akarnania, and Kephallonia into the Confederacy.
70
 Such 
actions led to re-negotiations of the King‘s Peace in 375
71
 and later in 371.
72
 Both peaces 
may have re-confirmed the principle of autonomia for all Greeks under Spartan prostasia, but 
as had been the case in 387 they did not last long because the Spartan application of 
autonomia – forcibly removing cities from another‘s control, making them autonomous 
allies, and so securing one‘s own hegemony – led directly to the outbreak of renewed 
hostilities. Thebes refused to sign to the peace of 371 because she again feared that Sparta 
would use the principle of autonomia to remove her control of the Boiotian cities. As 
anticipated, a Spartan army under Kleombrotos invaded Boiotia in 371 but was defeated at 
Leuktra. This effectively signalled the end of Spartan hegemony in Greece and marked the 
beginning of a decade of Theban invasions of the Peloponnese and Lakonia.
73
 Another koine 
eirene was negotiated in Athens in 371/0 which again guaranteed the autonomia of all cities, 
both great and small, but now divided the prostasia between Sparta and Athens and 




      With the rise of Theban land power the application of autonomia as an aspect of the koine 
eirene changed. Whereas Sparta had destroyed Mantineia in alleged defence of autonomia, 
Thebes now oversaw her reconstruction for the same reason (X. HG 6.5.3-5).
75
 Whereas 
Sparta had repeatedly called for the dissolution of the Boiotian League in the name of the 
autonomia of the Boiotian cities, Thebes now enforced her control over the League and 
                                                 
70
 X. HG 5.4.64-6; D.S. 15.36.5 with Stylianou 1998: 314-17; GHI 24. Xenophon even comments on the 
goodwill felt towards Athens in the Adriatic. 
71
 Diod. 15.38.1-2 (with Stylianou 1998: 320-9): πάσας τὰς πόλεις αὐτονόμους καὶ ἀφρουρήτους εἶναι; Isoc. 
8.16: τοὺς Ἕλληνας αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ τὰς φρουρὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων πόλεων ἐξιέναι καὶ τὴν αὑτῶν 
ἔχειν ἑκάστους. For further references to autonomia as a clause within the peace, see D.S. 15.38.2, 40.1, 51.3; 
Isoc. 16.10, 17, 24, 43; cf. 15.109-10; X. HG 6.2.1. Philochoros (FGrH 328 F151) records that it was a renewal 
of the King‘s Peace and that an altar to Eirene was erected in Athens. For analyses of the peace of 375, see 
Ryder 1965: 124-6; Jehne 1994: 57-64; Stylianou 1998: 320-8. 
72
 X. HG  6.3.12, 18: δέχεσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην͵ ἐφ΄ ᾧ τούς τε ἁρμοστὰς ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἐξάγειν͵ τά τε 
στρατόπεδα διαλύειν καὶ τὰ ναυτικὰ καὶ τὰ πεζικά͵ τάς τε πόλεις αὐτονόμους ἐᾶν. Cf. D.S. 15.50.4. For 
analysis, see Ryder 1965: 127-30; Jehne 1994: 65-74; Bearzot 2004: 93-108. Stylianou (1998: 382-4) argues for 
the Great King‘s active participation in this peace. 
73
 X. HG 6.4.1-19; D.S. 15.51-6 with Stylianou 1998: 386-407. On Thebes‘ absence from the peace of 371, see 
Stylianou 1998: 384-5. 
74
 X. HG 6.5.2-5: Ἐμμενῶ ταῖς σπονδαῖς ἃς βασιλεὺς κατέπεμψε καὶ τοῖς ψηφίσμασι τοῖς Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν 
συμμάχων…αὐτονόμους εἶναι ὁμοίως καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας πόλεις. Stylianou (1998: 408-9, with 
bibliography) argues that Athens was the sole prostates of the peace. Sordi (1951), Ryder (1965: 132-3), and 
Rhodes (2010: 232) more plausibly suggest that ―autonomy was to be defined for the peace as it was in the 
Confederacy‖ (contra Lewis 1997: 31). 
75
 It is worth noting that Elis is recorded as having contributed three talents to the reconstruction. By supporting 
the re-foundation of Mantineia Elis was vicariously supporting her right to control her own perioikic cities, a 
claim earlier challenged by Sparta. 
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sought to dissolve Spartan power in Lakonia by liberating the Messenians, re-founding 
Messene, and inserting a clause on Messenian autonomia into the koine eirene of 367.
76
 
Regardless of the change of hegemon from Sparta to Thebes, the principle of autonomia 
remained central to Greek inter-state diplomacy and the institution of the koine eirene. 
Specific applications of autonomia may have changed – used to destroy Mantineia by Sparta; 
used to rebuild it by Thebes – but it was still used in essentially the same way: to undermine 
the centralised power of an opponent by removing from its control dependent and allied 
states. The legal application of autonomia within the koinai eirenai to all Greek states had 
formalised it as the central tenet of Greek diplomacy and the defining quality of civic 
independence. However, because it was never sufficiently defined the meaning and 
significance of autonomia could be seen to be much greater than Sparta‘s, and later Thebes‘, 
imperialistic applications of it. 
      Despite the fact that autonomia was ubiquitous within Greek diplomacy and treaties of 
the early 4
th
 century, the term was nowhere adequately defined. No single understanding of it 
existed. So, Xenophon records that Autokles said to the Spartans in 371 that ―you always say, 
‗the cities must be autonomous,‘ but you are yourself the greatest obstacle in the way of their 
autonomia‖.
77
 Peter Rhodes in particular has pointed to the example of the Boiotian cities, 
whose presence within the Boiotian League was seen to be compatible with autonomia by 
Thebes but not by Sparta, as an example of the fact that multiple understandings of 
autonomia could exist at the same time.
78
 Bosworth and Sealey have similarly pointed out 
that autonomia was often defined in respect of conditions that it was not, such as taxation, 
garrisons, and lack of self-government.
79
 Its appearance without definition in treaties like the 
King‘s Peace meant that it could, and was, used by Sparta to justify any action she saw fit.
80
 
Consequently, since Sparta used autonomia to install garrisons and harmosts, interfere with a 
city‘s internal politics, exert military and political control, and destroy independent cities, 
autonomia itself came to define the opposite of these conditions.
81
 Tissaphernes and 
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 Plu. Pelop. 30.7, 31.1; X. HG 7.1.36-7. On the foundation of Messene by Epaminondas in 369/8, see D.S. 
15.66.1 with Stylianou 1998: 435-6; cf. Plu. Ages. 34.1; Paus. 4.26.5-27.9; Isoc. 6.28. Xenophon omits the 
event. On the koine eirene of 366/5, see Ryder 1965: 136-9; Jehne 1994: 82-90; Stylianou 1998: 485-9. 
77
 X. HG 6.3.7: ὑμεῖς δὲ ἀεὶ μέν φατε· αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις χρὴ εἶναι͵ αὐτοὶ δ΄ ἐστὲ μάλιστα ἐμποδὼν τῇ 
αὐτονομίᾳ. On Autokles‘ speech, see most recently Bearzot 2004: 85-92. 
78
 Rhodes 1999; Keen 1995a. Hansen (1995b; 1996) argues that the Boiotian cities were not autonomous under 
Theban hegemony. 
79
 Bosworth 1992: 125-31; Sealey 1993: 243-4. 
80
 Sealey 1993: 243-4. Ryder (1965: 40) argues that Sparta ensured that autonomia was not defined. 
81
 Garrisons and Harmosts: X. HG 3.1.4, 6-7, 16-20, 2.20; 4.8.1-3, 5; cf. D.S. 14.38.2-3, 84.3. Phleian Exiles: 
X. HG 5.2.8-10, 3.10-17, 21-5. For other examples of Sparta interfering in the internal government of states, see 
de Ste Croix 1954: 20 n.5. 
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Pharnabazos defined autonomia as the demobilisation of Sparta‘s armies and the removal of 
Spartan harmosts and garrisons (X. HG 3.2.20), as did Konon and Pharnabazos later.
82
 The 
Second Athenian Confederacy made numerous guarantees ―so that the Spartans shall allow 
the Greeks to be free and autonomous‖.
83
 This led to the creation of a second use of 
autonomia that was contrasted with Sparta‘s abuses of it and her impositions on both the 
internal and external independence of many Greek states. 
      This anti-Spartan understanding of autonomia was enshrined within the Second Athenian 
Confederacy through the phrase eleutheria kai autonomia. Sparta‘s abuses of autonomia, 
when coupled with the increased importance of the term in the early 4
th
 century, led to a 
growth in the meaning and understanding of the concept. However, the Athenian-led 
understanding of autonomia as full internal and external freedom appears to have been 
inherent within the 5
th
 century meaning of autonomia (above §1.2). Therefore, the Athenian-
led interpretation of autonomia as complete internal and external independence could simply 
be seen to be an expansion into 4
th
 century international politics of a meaning already present 
within the 5
th
 century. Whatever the case, two understandings of autonomia existed in the 
early 4
th
 century, one that denoted partial submission and one that denoted complete freedom. 
The use of eleutheria kai autonomia to describe the latter is of particular importance because 
it reveals the use of both terms together to denote a single, unified meaning as well as 
implying their synonymity and inter-changeability, a topic to which I now turn. 
 
SECTION 3: THE SYNONYMITY OF ELEUTHERIA AND AUTONOMIA 
      The relationship between eleutheria and autonomia has been a point of some debate. 
While it is clear that both terms maintained broadly distinct meanings in the 5
th
 century, 
though could at times be seen to describe the same situation, their precise inter-relationship in 
the 4
th
 has been questioned. Two main schools of thought exist: first, that both terms 
maintained separate meanings as external and internal freedom from the 5
th





 second, that both became intertwined, perhaps synonymous, as a result of a 
decrease in the meaning and significance of eleutheria.
85
 However, since autonomia could 
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denote full internal and external freedom by the early 4
th
 century we should perhaps see the 
potential synonymity of both arising not from a decline in the meaning of eleutheria, as 
argued by Richard Billows (quoted at the opening of this chapter), but from a sustained 
increase in the meaning of autonomia. An important and influential article by Mogens 
Hansen on the use and understanding of autonomia from the 5
th
 to the 3
rd
 centuries does not 
take into consideration the relationship of autonomia with eleutheria. He explores neither the 
inter-connectivity of both terms nor the significance this has on the meaning of each term 
either individually or in unison. Further, he ignores the fact that eleutheria and autonomia 
could have more than one meaning (denoting Primary and Secondary conceptions of 
freedom). He lists numerous examples of royal grants of autonomia but does not cite cases 
where autonomia defines a city‘s complete independence from foreign, or royal, control.
86
 
Thus he explores only one aspect of one concept. 




 centuries eleutheria and autonomia were 
synonymous. I begin with Bosworth‘s view that eleutheria was connected with autonomia so 
as to strengthen the former in the light of Spartan abuses of it, but I expand on this by 





 I suggest that the synonymity of both terms arose as a result of the expansion of 
autonomia to international importance and that this synonymity first became apparent 
through a series of alliances made by Athens after the King‘s Peace and as part of the build-
up to the Second Athenian Confederacy. To describe clearly the inter-connectivity of both 
terms Athens created a new political catchphrase – eleutheria kai autonomia – the first 
epigraphic and literary examples of which appear in Athenian sources from 384 and 380 
respectively. The phrase eleutheria kai autonomia defined the interpretation of autonomia as 
the full internal and external independence that was understood to be guaranteed by the 
King‘s Peace but consistently undermined by the Spartan application of autonomia. 
Eleutheria kai autonomia was the phrase adopted by the League of Corinth of 337 and was 
later perpetuated by Antigonos Monophthalmos in the years 315-301. While it ceased to be 
regularly used after 301, the individual terms eleutheria and autonomia continued to be inter-
changeable. Nonetheless, on certain occasions autonomia could be used to denote an internal 
aspect of eleutheria, namely the empowerment of the demos. 
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      The first clear evidence for a direct synonymity between eleutheria and autonomia arises 
from the Greek reaction to Spartan imperial policy of the early 4
th
 century, particularly the 
enshrinement of autonomia within the King‘s Peace of 387. In the early 4
th
 century Sparta 
continually used autonomia in a way that could both then and earlier be termed eleutheria, 
namely the removal of a city from the control of another power. However, because such 
autonomia meant in practice the city‘s subordination to Sparta and the potential for Spartan 
interference in its internal and external independence, a schism arose between the rhetorical 
use and practical application of autonomia. Nonetheless, because Persia and Athens 
employed autonomia to denote the removal of Spartan impositions, such as garrisons and 
harmosts, the term was increasingly seen in at least one way to be identical to eleutheria. In 
the King‘s Peace autonomia denoted independence from Persian control, and indeed the 
control of any other state, again a position hitherto termed eleutheria. This meant that 
autonomia could denote ideally both independence from another‘s control and the ability to 
govern oneself internally, internal and external freedom. Since this condition was to apply 
within the Peace to both small and large cities autonomia denoted in principle if not in 
actuality the independence of all states – hegemones and dependent poleis – from the internal 
and external control of others.
88
 It was Sparta‘s application of it that undermined this ideal. 
      Eleutheria and autonomia may have had identical meanings, but it was Athens‘ reaction 
to the peace that led to their explicit synonymity. The treaty of Prytany I 384/3 between 
Athens and Chios specifies that Chios is to be allied on terms ―of freedom and autonomy‖ 
(ἐπ’ ἐλευ[θε]ρίαι καὶ αὐτον|ομί[α]ι).89 Bosworth correctly highlighted that the use of 
eleutheria added emotive force to autonomia, so recently abused by Sparta, but he 
emphasised neither the significance of this connection nor its implications for the relationship 
between both terms.
90
 Cargill referred to the phrase eleutheria kai autonomia as part of the 
―standard rhetoric of Greek diplomacy‖, but the phrase is hardly standard at all since Athens‘ 
treaty with Chios is the earliest surviving use of the phrase in both epigraphic or literary 
sources.
91
 This important fact has not to my knowledge ever been highlighted but it is highly 
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significant, not least for the context in which it arose.
92
 Coming three years after the King‘s 
Peace the treaty responded to Sparta‘s cynical, exploitative, and self-centred application of 
autonomia: removing Theban control of Boiotia, nullifying the sympoliteia of Argos and 
Corinth, and destroying Mantineia. In this tense political environment the treaty sought ―not 
to contravene any of the things written on the stelai about the Peace‖ (GHI 20.21-3) but 
instead enforce under Athenian leadership a different interpretation of the autonomia offered 
by the Peace but abused by Sparta. The connection of eleutheria with autonomia served to 
enforce to this end the meaning of autonomia as internal and external freedom, while the 
creation of a new political slogan – eleutheria kai autonomia – revealed the synonymity of 
both terms and their use as a single phrase to denote a single meaning.
93
 This was an 
Athenian political dialogue (eleutheria kai autonomia) constructed in response to the Spartan 
one (autonomia). 
      A full definition of eleutheria kai autonomia was offered in the charter of the Second 
Athenian Confederacy (Prytany VII 378/7). Allies are twice stated to be free and autonomous 
(GHI 22.9-10, 19-20) and in contrast with the King‘s Peace this status is given a detailed 
definition: they are ―to live at peace occupying their own territory in security…being free and 
autonomous, being governed under whatever form of government he wishes, neither 
receiving a garrison nor submitting to a governor nor paying tribute‖.
94
 At this time Thebes 
was negotiating its entry to the Confederacy on these terms,
95
 while later in the same year 
Chalkis joined and was to be ―free and autonomous and self-governing, neither being subject 
to a garrison from the Athenians nor bearing a phoros nor receiving a foreign governor 
contrary to the resolutions of the allies‖.
96
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 44.21-6 (App.1 num.4). 
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      Marcello Bertoli has argued that eleutheria and autonomia are clearly defined within the 
Confederacy charter and so tried to separate from its list of guarantees the positive elements 
that define autonomia (own government, occupying territory) and the negative elements that 
define eleutheria (absence of garrison, governor, and tribute).
97
 However, any distinction 
between eleutheria and autonomia here would be artificially enforced because ―the 
juxtaposition of free and autonomous has the cumulative effect of creating a superlatively 
positive notion‖ not explicating the positive and negative connotations of the following 
criteria.
98
 In fact, it was autonomia that had been used in the early 4
th
 century to describe the 
removal of Spartan garrisons or governors,
99
 thus giving it the ability to describe both 
positive and negative aspects of freedom; eleutheria was simply added for emotive force. The 
use of specific defining criteria was, as I emphasised above, an attempt to forestall Sparta‘s 
continued abuse of autonomia by offering that which the King‘s Peace failed to deliver, a 
definition reflective of its meaning and to which Sparta and other powers would be morally 
and legally (in the case of those who joined the Confederacy) bound to adhere. 
      Significantly, the phrase eleutheria kai autonomia also appears in literary sources for the 
first time in the late 380s. Delivered in summer 380, Isokrates‘ Panegyrikos concerned itself 
with uniting Athens and Sparta against Persia in an attempt to arrogate to Greece the lands 
and wealth of Asia. It dates between the alliance with Chios (Prytany I 384/3) and the Second 
Athenian Confederacy (Prytany VII 378/7) and is part of the political and ideological 
environment in which the Confederacy developed. Isokrates was strongly against the King‘s 
Peace, which acknowledged Persian control over the Ionian Greeks and the position of the 
Great King as guarantor of Greek autonomia. On a number of occasions he refers to 
eleutheria as the ideology both of the Persian Wars and the goal of his hypothetical campaign 
in Asia Minor (4.52, 83, 95, 124, 185), but he only uses autonomia in reference to the King‘s 
Peace (4.115, 117, 175, 176). 
      On one occasion, however, the phrase eleutheria kai autonomia does appear in reference 
to the King‘s Peace (4.117). Isokrates sets the scene by claiming that the autonomia offered 
in the King‘s Peace (4.115: τὴν αὐτονομίαν…ἐν δὲ ταῖς συνθήκαις ἀναγεγραμμένην) has 
not come to pass but that instead Greece suffers pirates, mercenary garrisons, stasis, 
democratic and oligarchic revolutions, as well as the rule of tyrants and barbarians (115-118). 
He states that the Greek cities are so far removed from ―eleutheria kai autonomia that some 
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of them are ruled by tyrants, some are controlled by harmosts, some have been sacked and 
razed, and some have becomes slaves to the barbarians‖ (4.117), before then detailing in 
contrast the successes of the Persian Wars and thereafter, particularly the battle of 
Eurymedon and the Peace of Kallias (4.118). The change in Isokrates‘ terminology from 
autonomia to eleutheria kai autonomia may be entirely arbitrary, but since it is rooted in the 
context of the Greek reaction to the King‘s Peace and Sparta‘s application of autonomia it 
may perhaps reflect the different terminologies of the King‘s Peace (autonomia) and the 
Second Athenian Confederacy (eleutheria kai autonomia).
100
 This might appear to be a 
stretch, but we should bear in mind that this is the earliest recorded literary occurrence of the 
phrase eleutheria kai autonomia (summer 380) and that it appears in exactly the same 
historical and chronological context as the earliest epigraphic parallel (Prytany I 384/3): the 
Athenian-led Greek reaction to the terms of the King‘s Peace and the Spartan use and abuse 
of autonomia.
101
 Isokrates‘ example not only reveals, as before, the synonymity of both terms 
and their use together to express a single idea, it also shows that the phrase was used within 
both political rhetoric and inter-state diplomacy. Having their origin within the reception of 
the King‘s Peace, both the phrase eleutheria kai autonomia and the synonymity of eleutheria 
and autonomia continue through the 4
th
 century and into the 3
rd
. 
      First, the use of the phrase eleutheria kai autonomia. After its first epigraphic and literary 
appearance in the late 380s the phrase frequently re-appears during the 4
th
 century, often in 
contexts that reveal its importance within Athenian diplomatic tradition. Isokrates refers to it 
again in the Plataikos of c.375-371 (14.24-5) and in his letter to the rulers of Mytilene of 
c.350 (Ep.8.7) while it appears in both the alliance with Chalkis of 378/7 and the treaty with 
the Thracian kings of 357.
102
 It does not re-appear again epigraphically until Stratokles‘ 
honorary decree for Lykourgos of 307/6,
103
 though Demosthenes mentions it seven times 
between 351 and 330: first, as the position of native tribes outside Philip of Macedon‘s 
control (1.23; 4.4); second, as the status the Greeks would hold if the Peace of Philoktetes 
were emended to a koine eirene (7.30, 32); and third, as the terms of the League of Corinth 
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 The second use reflects Athens‘ emphasis on eleutheria kai 
autonomia in contrast with the autonomia alone offered in the Persian-backed 4
th
 century 
koinai eirenai; the third reflects Philip‘s adoption of this Athenian diplomatic and ideological 
tradition in the League of Corinth, an organisation that modelled itself structurally on the 
Confederacy and undermined the model of the 4
th
 century Persian-backed koine eirene by 
presenting a new, pro-Macedonian model for Greek peace.
105
 Therefore, not only can we 
perhaps see the use of eleutheria kai autonomia as a separate Athenian diplomatic tradition 
from the autonomia guaranteed by the Persian-backed koinai eirenai, but we can also trace 
the continuation of that diplomatic tradition under the League of Corinth and the Macedonian 
koine eirene of 337. The Confederacy and its guarantee of eleutheria kai autonomia began as 
an alternative solution to the problem of Greek autonomia posed by the King‘s Peace; the 
League adopted this Athenian alternative and built from it a new, Macedonian model for a 
Greek koine eirene. 
      The phrase eleutheria kai autonomia remained significant beyond the League of Corinth. 
In a universally overlooked but intriguing article P.J. Stylianou argues that the Macedonian 
koine eirene of 337 (the pax Macedonica) did not end, as is commonly assumed, with Greek 
defeat in the Hellenic War of 323/2 but that while the synedrion of the League was dissolved 
the koine eirene continued under Antipatros, Perdikkas, and Polyperchon before being 
supported by Antigonos from 315 until his death in 301.
106
 Stylianou‘s argument rests 
primarily on the contentious assumption that the cities of Asia Minor were League members 
under Alexander, but a secondary consideration is Antigonos‘ use of the phrase eleutheria kai 
autonomia in the declaration at Tyre in 315 and in his dealings with the Greek cities until his 
death in 301. This, Stylianou argues, deliberately echoes the terminology of the League of 
Corinth and the koine eirene of 337 and seeks to build from it a new koine eirene under 
Antigonos‘ leadership. Stylianou‘s argument is interesting, particularly since Susanne 
Carlsson has recently shown that Antigonos is the only ruler from the late 4
th
 century to the 
late 3
rd
 to use the phrase eleutheria kai autonomia, barring Ptolemy‘s brief imitation of it at 
Iasos in 309.
107
 Since the phrase does not appear in royal declarations after Antigonos‘ 
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 and since his son Demetrios founded under his initiative a successor to the League 
of Corinth in 302 (the Hellenic League), we should perhaps see Antigonos following the 
diplomatic tradition of Philip and Alexander in legitimising his rule by presenting himself as 
the sole defender of Greek eleutheria kai autonomia, a concept and phrase that I have shown 
originated in the Second Athenian Confederacy and continued under the League of Corinth. 
      Second, the inter-connectivity or synonymity of eleutheria and autonomia. The phrase 
eleutheria kai autonomia may denote a single idea with a collective meaning, but when used 
individually the terms appear to have been interchangeable. An epigram quoted by Pausanias 
from a 4
th
 century statue of Epaminondas exploits this synonymity by claiming that he left 
―all of Greece autonomous in freedom‖.
109 
Isokrates, whose work spans the 4
th
 century, 
continually exploits this synonymity. In his Panegyrikos (4.175) of 380 he claims ―that the 
states which have gained their eleutheria through the Treaty feel grateful toward the King, 
because they believe that it was through him that they gained their autonomia‖; in the 
Plataikos (4.43) of c.373-371 he states that Athens is fighting for the eleutheria of the Greek 
cities from slavery before also stating that she is fighting for their autonomia; in On the 
Peace (8.58) of c.355 he asserts that after Leuktra Thebes could have ―liberated the 
Peloponnese and made the other Greeks autonomous‖; in the Evagoras of c.370-365 he 
recounts that after Knidos the Greeks gained their eleutheria (9.56), but later says that it was 
autonomia, which he contrasts with douleia (9.68); finally, in the Panathenaikos (12.257) of 
339 he describes as autonomia Sparta‘s ancestral position of never having followed another‘s 
lead and always having been completely independent of foreign control, a status that would 
be better understood as eleutheria.
110
 Later examples also exist with Lykourgos describing in 
his Against Leokrates how the Peace of Kallias delineated boundaries for Greek eleutheria 
and that within these the Greek cities were autonomous.
111
 Both terms appear to have been 
interchangeable and synonymous. 
      That eleutheria and autonomia frequently appear as inter-changeable and synonymous in 
the 4
th
 century implies that they would have remained so in the 3
rd
. Susanne Carlsson has 
recently doubted this and stressed instead their distinction into the 3
rd
 century. Her 
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arguments, however, are based solely on epigraphic evidence from four poleis (Iasos, 





century autonomia could refer to both internal and external affairs. This is true, but she 
fails to explore this conclusion because she follows the work of Hansen who argues that 




 centuries and carried 
external and internal focuses respectively.
112
 Second, Carlsson argues that because the last 
extant royal guarantee of autonomia dates from shortly after 261 (IK.Ery. 31) and that 
guarantees of eleutheria increase from the 250s onwards, kings only referred to autonomia 
from 337-261 at which point royal dialogue changed and became expressed through 
eleutheria alone.
113
 This conclusion may be based as much on absence of evidence as on 
evidence of absence. Her evidence is solely epigraphic and comes only from Asia Minor. 
This may be necessary considering the focus of her work and the absence of literary sources 
but it raises questions concerning the ancient selection and publication of documents. For 
instance, although she claims that royal guarantees of autonomia ceased c.260-250, civic 





Moreover, five of her six attestations of eleutheria from c.261-200 come from one place, 
Mylasa, and constitute a dossier detailing Seleukos II‘s initial grant of eleutheria c.240 and 
Philip V‘s reconfirmation of it c.220. So, while the evidence could be made to reveal a 
decreased importance of autonomia within the 3
rd
 century it is not as pronounced as Carlsson 
makes out and her conclusion that royal discourse switched from autonomia to eleutheria in 
the 260s, thus signifying a different meaning for each term, is not certain. 
      In fact, epigraphic and literary sources suggest that eleutheria and autonomia were 




 centuries and that the decision to refer to one or the other 
may have reflected local traditions. IK.Iasos 2-3 and IK.Ilion 45 record alliances between 
Ptolemy Soter and Iasos on one hand and Antiochos I or II and Lysimacheia on the other. 
IK.Iasos 2-3 refer to eleutheria, autonomia, aphorologesia (absence of taxation), and 
aphrouresia (absence of garrisons) while IK.Ilion 45 mentions autonomia, aphorologesia, 
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 The absence of eleutheria in Lysimacheia‘s case marks not a different 
civic status, but rather that autonomia alone encompassed the meaning expressed at Iasos as 
eleutheria kai autonomia. This is also suggested by IK.Ery. 31 (shortly post-261) which 
records that Antiochos II confirmed to Erythrai, upon the city‘s request, Alexander‘s and 
Antigonos‘ earlier grants of autonomia and aphorologesia.
116
 Since there is no solid evidence 
that either Alexander or Antigonos granted the status of autonomia alone – both used either 
eleutheria or eleutheria kai autonomia – we must assume that the use of autonomia here was 
equivalent to the eleutheria or eleutheria kai autonomia that the earlier kings probably 
guaranteed.
117
 Further, Antiochos II‘s grant of autonomia and aphorologesia to Erythrai can 
be contrasted with Seleukos II‘s guarantee of eleutheria and aphorologesia to Smyrna shortly 
thereafter.
118
 Since it is again doubtful that two distinct statuses with the same qualifications 
are meant, we should conclude that both terms carried the same meaning. 
     The lack of a contemporary literary source for the late 4
th
 and early 3
rd
 centuries is a 
problem for analysing the inter-connectivity of eleutheria and autonomia at this time because 
it would provide a balance to the epigraphic evidence. Diodoros‘ account of the years 323-
301 goes back to the lost eye-witness historian and Antigonid official Hieronymos of Kardia 
and exploits the synonymity of both terms, particularly as a means of avoiding stylistic 
repetition.
119
 However, it is doubtful whether or not we can attribute Diodoros‘ specific use 
of one term or the other directly to Hieronymos and it is perhaps best not to analyse 
Diodoros‘ text as an example of the synonymity of both terms in the late 4
th
 century. 
      However, despite the large amount of evidence revealing the synonymity of eleutheria 




 centuries, there are examples which suggest that autonomia 
maintained a distinct emotive force, in particular a close connection with the internal, polis-
centred dynamics of a grant of eleutheria.
120
 This use appears very infrequently in the 4
th
 
century, but some examples do suggest it. Isokrates contrasts autonomia with anomia in the 
Archidamnos (6.64-5) of c.366 and explicitly juxtaposes autonomia with self-government 
(διοικήσαι τὰ σφέτερ΄ αὐτῶν) in the Panathenaikos of 339 (12.97). Hyperides perhaps 
connects autonomia with self-government, but the passage is fragmented and the context 
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 In the case of Miletos epigraphic evidence reveals that the city connected 
autonomia with the restoration of demokratia.
122
 For the 3
rd
 century, Seleukos II granted 
Smyrna eleutheria and aphorologesia but Smyrna instead refers to its autonomia, patrios 
politeia, and demokratia, again, as was the case at Miletos, preferring perhaps to emphasise 
the internal focus of autonomia.
123
 
      Although the evidence points overwhelmingly to the synonymity of eleutheria and 




 centuries, the above examples suggest that at times 
autonomia could carry a distinctly internal dynamic. However, since reference is also made 
to eleutheria in each of the aforementioned examples, we should conclude that autonomia 




 centuries to express a particularly internal aspect 
of eleutheria, namely the significance of eleutheria as a quality of the demos, its 
empowerment according to its own laws and democratic procedure (see further, Ch.5 
§3.2).
124
 Evidence from Priene adds another dimension and suggests that the choice to refer 
to eleutheria or autonomia may have been influenced by local traditions. Granted eleutheria 
kai autonomia by Alexander (I.Priene 1), Priene consistently referred to itself as autonomous 
(I.Priene 2-4, 6-7). This reflects not only the synonymity of eleutheria with autonomia but 






      In this chapter I argued three main points. First, that although eleutheria and autonomia 
perhaps expressed different perspectives on the same situation in the 5
th
 century, autonomia 
was able to carry in certain contexts a meaning very close to, if not synonymous with, 
eleutheria. This potential synonymity prefigures the eventual synonymity that would arise in 
the 4
th
 century. Raaflaub insisted that although autonomia and eleutheria could describe the 
same situation they maintained different internal and external focuses. However, since the 
degree of internal independence autonomia denoted was not fixed and so could vary from a 
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(SV 545; IK.Ery. 504; IG II
2
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in 297 (above n.108). 
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limited amount under subordination to another power to total freedom from foreign control, I 
proposed that Raaflaub‘s distinction in focus between eleutheria and autonomia was at times 
overly subtle. On certain occasions autonomia could be understood as having a meaning 
equal to that of eleutheria. 
      Second, that in the early 4
th
 century autonomia carried a meaning equivalent to that of 
eleutheria and that this meaning was enshrined as a polis ideal within the King‘s Peace and 
later koinai eirenai. I contended that two levels of autonomia existed. One was espoused by 
Sparta and defined autonomia as the status of her dependent allies. The other existed in 
opposition to this and defined autonomia as full internal and external freedom. Both 
understandings existed at the same time because no definition of autonomia was universally 
accepted; therefore it could denote mixed statuses. To convey this expanded meaning of 
autonomia the phrase eleutheria kai autonomia was coined. It arose in the context of the 
Second Athenian Confederacy and juxtaposed autonomia with eleutheria so as to apply to the 
former the emotive significance of the latter. As a result, eleutheria and autonomia grew 





      Third, I claimed that although both terms were most commonly used synonymously, 
autonomia could also be used to describe a particularly internal, political aspect of eleutheria, 
the empowerment of the demos to govern according to the laws, constitution, and traditions 
of the city. This was not a separate meaning, but rather an individual emotive force seeing 
eleutheria as the empowerment of the organs of the state itself. I was also careful in this 
chapter to highlight that eleutheria and autonomia did not have single meanings. Rather, both 
terms could describe contrary positions: freedom as granted by one power and conditional 
upon its goodwill (Secondary freedom) and freedom as a self-guaranteed right often asserted 
against another‘s control (Primary freedom). This distinction is of particular importance in 












Chapter 2: Towards an Ideological Narrative, 337-262 
 
―Greek liberty was crushed at the battle of Chaeronea…In the Hellenistic period, 
politics were controlled by the great powers; local autonomy was the best that 
could be attained.‖ 
Raaflaub 2003: 610 
 
Introduction 
      With this chapter I continue my narrative into the early Hellenistic Period. This 
necessitates a somewhat different approach. In the previous chapter, I drew the development 
of eleutheria in broad strokes, outlining certain trends of particular importance to its use and 
understanding in the Classical Period. Now, however, since I turn to the period with which 
the four subsequent analytical and thematic chapters are exclusively concerned, a 
chronological narrative, particularly one focused on the use and understanding of eleutheria, 
is necessary so as to orientate the reader and provide a backdrop for the subsequent discursive 
chapters. 
      The chapter is divided into ten sections, each based around a particular period or event 
displaying important developments in the use and understanding of eleutheria. Thematically, 
my narrative is underpinned by three main points, each elucidating one of the three research 
questions of this thesis. First, and relevant to Part 1 – Narratives, I trace the changes and 
especially the continuities in the use and understanding of eleutheria and autonomia from the 
Classical Period to the Hellenistic. Historical circumstances are open to quick, dramatic 
change – such as the rise of the Macedonian kingdoms – but the institutions and concepts that 
underlie these processes are less inclined to such change.
1
 Second, and relevant to Part 2 – 
Analysis, I introduce the role played by eleutheria as a point of dialogue between city and 
king, specifically the royal use of eleutheria as a means of attaining Greek goodwill (eunoia) 
and its use by the city as a means of manipulating royal intentions through moral force, 
questions more fully explored in Chapters 3 and 4. Third, and relevant to Part 3 – Themes, I 
touch upon at the omnipresence of the past within the use of eleutheria (and demokratia) to 
conceptualise the present, influenced in particular by the idea of the lieu de mémoire. Again, 
these questions are given extended treatment in Chapter 5 and 6. These three themes 
underscore the historical narrative and help tie the various narrative sections together. 
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 Gauthier 1984; 1985: 4-5; cf. É. Will 1988. 
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Section 1: Philip and Alexander in Greece and Asia, 337-323 
    Contrary to Kurt Raaflaub‘s statement (quoted at the opening of the chapter), the defeat of 
Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea saw the long-term death of neither the polis nor Greek 
eleutheria.
2
 Philip tried to mollify Athens by treating it leniently but his swift punishment of 
Thebes was designed to shift attention towards a Macedonian-led Panhellenic campaign 
against Persia with the ostensible aim of avenging the destruction of temples in 480/79 and 
bringing eleutheria to the Ionian Greeks (D.S. 16.89.2, 91.2).
3
 Demosthenes had presented 
Philip as a barbarian invader bent on destroying Greek freedom,
4
 so by shifting attention to 
Persia, the barbarian par excellence, Philip utilised such anti-barbarian sentiment for his own 
ends. A League of Greek states, the League of Corinth, was founded in 337/6. Comprising a 
new Macedonian-backed common peace, the League replaced both the Peace of Antalkidas 
and the Persian-backed 4
th
 century koinai eirenai; it provided a legal framework for the 
continuation of Macedonian authority in Greece, under which the Greek cities were to be free 
and autonomous.
5
 The League comprised a council (synedrion) of representatives from 
member states over which sat a military leader (hegemon) who commanded League troops.
6
 
      The League appropriated the memory of the Persian Wars to Philip‘s forthcoming 
campaign in Asia Minor. Corinth was the physical centre of the Hellenic League of 481-478 
and so exemplified the Persian Wars as a struggle for Greek eleutheria; by using the site for 
the League‘s foundation in 337/6, Philip paralleled the present with the past and evoked 
memories of the Persian Wars and eleutheria in order to validate and support his forthcoming 
invasion.
7
 The memory of the Persian Wars offered Philip a coherent ideological programme 
– defence of eleutheria from a foreign, barbarian invader – that could be appropriated to his 
own campaigns (Ch. 6 §1.1). 
      Alexander built upon these strategies.
8
 He employed League troops during his siege and 
capture of Thebes in autumn 335 and gave the synedrion the right to pass judgement on the 
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 See Carlsson 2005: 127-32, 149-50, with earlier references. 
3
 On Philip‘s treatment of Athens and the Greeks, see Roebuck 1948 (pgs.80-82 on Athens); Cawkwell 1978: 
166-76; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 604-23; Hammond 1994: 155-8. On the themes of freedom and revenge, 
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 Ryder 1965: 102-15; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 623-46; Patsavos 1983; Poddighe 2009. S. Perlman (1985) 
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Poliorketes, see below §6. 
7
 Hellenic League: Ch.1 §1.1. Bertrand (1992: 122-3) described Corinth as a space where ―les Grecs pourraient 
communier dans le souvenir des guerres médiques et préparer l‘expédition contre les Perses‖. 
8
 On what follows see the fuller treatment in Wallace 2011: 148-57. 
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Theban medisers for their alliances with Persia in 479 and now 335 (D.S. 17.14). The 
synedrion had Thebes destroyed, its citizens enslaved, and its exiles made outlaws (agogimoi) 
from all the cities of the League.
9
 This was formulated into an official dogma which granted 
Alexander, as hegemon, the authority to charge enemies as medisers and make outlaws 
(agogimoi) of any opponents (GHI 83 §4.25-8; 84a.10-13). Plataia, site of the Greek victory 
in 479, was re-founded as a physical and ideological balance to Thebes, thus displaying 
further Alexander‘s reference to the Persian Wars in the build-up to his Asian campaign 
(Ch.6 §1.2). 
      Alexander‘s use of eleutheria continued and expanded with his invasion of Asia Minor in 
334 where he associated it with democracy. The defining moment was his liberation of 
Ephesos in 334. The democratic faction saw in Alexander an opportunity to assert its freedom 
and so led an uprising against those who betrayed the city to Persia in 335.
10
 Persia had been 
supporting oligarchies within the Greek cities and when presented with the reaction of the 
Ephesian democratic faction, Alexander realised the political necessity of supporting 
eleutheria and demokratia as a means of gaining support throughout Asia.
11
 Adapting his 
policy to fit the Greek reception of it, Alexander manipulated the factionalism within the 
Greek cities in order to equate Macedon with eleutheria and demokratia and Persia with 
tyranny, oligarchs, and garrisons. Alkimachos was dispatched to the Ionian and Aiolian cities 
to oversee the introduction there of democracy (Arr. An. 1.18.1-2).
12
 Alexander‘s pro-
democracy policy ensured that even after the Persian re-conquest of much of the Aegean and 
Asia Minor in 333, the cities returned to his side in 332 confident of the return of eleutheria 
and demokratia.
13
 After his victory at Gaugamela, he again wrote to the Greek cities telling 
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 For a recent, comprehensive commentary on the destruction of Thebes, see Sisti 2001: 321-37. 
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them that all their tyrannies were abolished and that they could govern themselves 
autonomously (Plu. Alex. 34.2). 
      Alexander‘s relationship with the cities of Greece and the Aegean changed as he switched 
roles and began exercising authority not as hegemon of League allies but as king over subject 
cities. In 334 Alexander as hegemon had empowered the League to try the Aegean tyrants 
(GHI 84a.13-15; D.S. 17.14), but in 332 he empowered the cities by royal order to try the 
tyrants themselves (Arr. An. 3.2; Curt. 4.8.11). This shift in authority from hegemon to king is 
significant because the Aegean cities were part of the League but Alexander was not dealing 
with them through it. Therefore, although they enjoyed a more personal relationship with 
Alexander as king rather than hegemon this revealed a change in Alexander‘s relationship 
with the League itself from ostensibly legal to overtly personal authority. 
      The Exiles Decree may further mark Alexander‘s change from legal to personal authority, 
but it seems that he was nonetheless concerned with having the League rubberstamp it.
14
 
There is no evidence for League activity after 331, but similarly there is no evidence that it 
had ceased to function by 324/3.
15
 However, when Krateros was dispatched to Macedon with 
orders to take charge of ―the freedom of the Greeks‖ (Arr. An. 7.12.4), it may have been with 
a view to the implementation of the Exiles Decree. The reference to eleutheria suggests that 
the League, which had been established to safeguard Greek freedom, may have had some 
responsibility for the oversight of the Exiles Decree.
16
 Further, the Decree‘s announcement at 
the Olympic Games of 324 also implies a connection with the League since the Panhellenic 
Games were meeting spots for the synedrion.
17
 Since Nikanor, who was sent by Alexander to 
announce the Decree at the Olympic Games, spoke with delegates from the Greek cities (Din. 
Dem. 82, 103; Hyp. Dem. 4) he may also have communicated the decree to the synedrion for 
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ratification. If so, then the occasion suggests the confluence of Alexander‘s personal and the 
League‘s institutional authority and shows his return, albeit temporarily, to a policy 
(eleutheria) and institution (League) that had served him well between 335-332.
18
 
      Alexander‘s unilateral order for all Greek cities to restore their exiles placed royal 
command above civic law and probably violated the terms of the League of Corinth.
19
 
However, the application of this order was open to debate and ultimately authorised by civic 
laws.
20
 Alexander received embassies from the Greek cities, listening to each and seeking 
individual solutions to the Edict‘s general application.
21
 Tegea negotiated the terms of its 
reconciliation with Alexander and the return of its exiles was validated by civic law as an 
implementation of royal edict.
22
 At Eresos Alexander empowered the demos to judge the 
restoration of the family of the tyrants according to local laws.
23
 At Mytilene the return of 
exiles was decreed by royal edict but enforced according to local law.
24
 The royal declaration 
of an order (formulated as a diagramma) to be enacted according to local laws underscores 
the delicate Hellenistic balance between royal authority and civic freedom: the city 
acknowledges royal authority only for that authority to validate itself through civic laws.
25
 
      In the case of the return of the Samian exiles, however, there was no discussion with 
Athens, which held a cleruchy on the island. The announcement of its return to the Samians 
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was made before the Macedonian army.
26
 In a recent article Elisabetta Poddighe has shown 
that Athens argued that Alexander was playing the tyrant and undermining Athens‘ 
eleutheria, while Alexander responded by saying that Athens herself acted the tyrant by 
negating Samos‘ eleutheria.
27
 This dialogue marks an important point in the understanding of 
eleutheria as a political slogan. Although it was malleable and applicable in different, yet 
equally valid, ways, success came down to one‘s ability to enforce one‘s own interpretation 
through military and propagandistic power. Alexander could remove Samos from Athenian 
control just as Polyperchon could later return it to Athens in 319 (D.S. 18.56.7), both in the 
name of eleutheria, because each had the power and authority to do so. 
 
Section 2: The Hellenic (Lamian) War, 323/2
28
 
      News of Alexander‘s death was quickly followed in Greece by Athens‘ declaration of war 
against Antipatros, governor of Macedon during Alexander‘s Asian campaign, in late 
summer 323. Alliances were made with Aitolia, among others, and after initial victories at 
Plataia and Thermopylai, Leosthenes the Athenian general besieged Antipatros in Lamia. A 
series of defeats by sea, however, coupled with Macedonian reinforcements under Leonnatos 
and Krateros contributed to Greek defeat at Krannon in September 322. Athens surrendered, 
Piraeus was garrisoned, and a citizenship qualification of 2,000 drachmai was instituted. 
Antipatros installed similar ‗oligarchies‘ and garrisons throughout Greece.
29
 
      The presentation of the Hellenic War in both the epigraphic and literary sources is that of 
a war fought on behalf of Greek eleutheria. Diodoros paraphrases the Athenian decree 
declaring war: this parallels the Athenian-led struggle with the Persian Wars and assimilates 
Macedon to Persia as a foreign invader seeking to destroy Greek eleutheria (D.S. 18.10.2-3; 
Ch.6 §2.1). Hyperides‘ contemporary Epitaphios, delivered over the Athenian war dead in 
spring 322, also presents the Hellenic War as a defence of Greek eleutheria from Macedon 
and parallels it with the earlier defence of eleutheria in the Persian Wars. Leosthenes is 
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juxtaposed with the Athenian leaders of the Persian Wars, while the dead of 323/2 are praised 
above and beyond those of 480/79 (Ch.6 §2.2). The name ‗Hellenic War‘, as attested in an 
honorary decree of December 318 (IG II
2
 448.44-5), explicitly ascribes to it ideals of Hellenic 
unity (under Athenian leadership) implicit within Diodoros and Hyperides.
30
 It is usual for 
wars to be named after the opponent and so to emphasise division first, as with the naming of 
the Persian Wars ta Medika.
31
 However, the name ‗Hellenic War‘ marks a distinction from 
the ‗Persian War‘ since it emphasises unity rather than the opponent‘s otherness. 
Nonetheless, the testimonies of Hyperides and Diodoros show that in general Athens 
revisited its hegemony of 480/79 as a paradigm for its leadership in 323/2 and sought to 
define the Hellenic War via the ideology of the Persian Wars and Greek eleutheria. 
      The use of space was particularly important in defining memory and commemoration, as 
we saw with Philip‘s and Alexander‘s use of Corinth and Plataia. Copies of the first honorary 
decree for Euphron of Sikyon (IG II
2
 448.1-35), who brought the announcement of Sikyon‘s 
alliance with Athens, were erected on the akropolis and by the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios in the 
agora. The Stoa was a space with important ideological connections: it was dedicated to Zeus 
Eleutherios, commemorated Athens‘ victory in the Persian Wars, and was the location for 
numerous monuments celebrating Athens‘ eleutheria.
32
 This location marked an important 
ideological statement since it assimilated to the Hellenic War through space and monument 
the ideas of eleutheria and the Persian Wars (Ch.6 §2.3). Interestingly, however, memory 
could also be altered. In his Epitaphios, Hyperides overlooks Athens‘ victory at Plataia and 
claims instead that it took place at Thebes (D.S 18.11.3-5; Hyp. Epit. 5.14-20, 7.2-17). 
Hyperides could not invoke Plataia as a site connected with the Persian Wars and Greek 
eleutheria because it now fought alongside Macedon, the new barbarian enemy, and against 




3. Polyperchon and the Freedom of the Greeks, 319-317 
      After Athens‘ defeat in the Hellenic War an oligarchy was installed in the city and a 
garrison in the fort of Mounychia in Piraeus. The garrison was immensely unpopular within 
even the pro-Antipatros faction (D.S. 18.48.1-4; Plu. Phoc. 30.4-6). The government was 
based on a property restriction of 2,000 drachmai, but democratic institutions remained active 
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 448.27-9 with the emendations of Oliver 2003b; cf. Wallace forthcoming A: section 1. For the Stoa of 
Zeus Eleutherios, see Oliver 2003b. 
33
 Wallace 2011: 157-60. On Plataia as a lieu de mémoire for eleutheria, see Jung 2006: 225-383; Wallace 2011. 
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and the demos even commemorated some of its allies during the Hellenic War.
34
 Some 
oligarchic elements are detectable in the reduced boule and prominence of the anagrapheus 
over the archon, but the government is best seen as a timocratic democracy with a close, but 
not oppressive, connection to Macedon.
35
 However, it is termed an oligarchy in our sources 
and was remembered as such by the democrats (Ch.5 §2.1). 
      Upon Antipatros‘ death in autumn 319 power passed to Polyperchon. Overlooked and 
angered, Antipatros‘ son Kassandros established contacts with Antigonos and Ptolemy, as 
well as ensuring the loyalty of his father‘s partisans in the oligarchies and garrisons 
throughout Greece, most importantly at Mounychia where he replaced the governor Menyllos 
with his nephew Nikanor.
36
 To counter Kassandros‘ position in Greece Polyperchon decided 
to motivate the Greek cities against him.
37
 To this end, he issued an Edict in Philip 
Arrhidaios‘ name restoring the Greek cities to their position under Philip and Alexander, i.e. 
free and autonomous as under the League of Corinth, and condemned the actions of their 
generals, i.e. Antipatros (D.S. 18.56).
38
 This invalidated Antipatros‘ governorship of 
Macedon and Greece from 334-319 (the basis of Kassandros‘ power), pardoned the Greeks 
for the Hellenic War, annulled Antipatros‘ oligarchies and garrisons, and restored the general 
peace of 337. Those exiled and disenfranchised by Antipatros in 322, and earlier, were to 
return to the cities by the 30
th
 of Xanthikos (late March 318) and the Greeks were to side with 
Polyperchon. Although there was no direct statement of freedom, autonomy, democracy, or 
the removal of garrisons, the Edict was well received in Greece. 
      Reaction to the Edict was mixed, with different factions viewing it differently. One group 
within the Athenian ‗oligarchy‘ strongly favoured the removal of the garrison in Mounychia 
and so saw the Edict as a means to this end and a statement on Greek, specifically Athenian, 
eleutheria. Another group, under Phokion, preferred to side with Kassandros, maintain the 
garrison in Piraeus, and not restore the disenfranchised democrats. A third group existed with 
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the democrats (in Athens and elsewhere) who had been disenfranchised and/or exiled in 322 
and saw in the Edict a guarantee of their re-enfranchisement under a restored democracy. By 
its various receptions within and outwith Athens the Edict became seen to guarantee both 
demokratia and eleutheria from garrisons. Although not present within the Edict itself, 
Polyperchon would later emphasise just these qualities. 
      The key moment came in Spring 318. After the return and restoration of the Athenian 
democratic exiles two Athenian delegations were dispatched to Polyperchon at Phokis. The 
pro-status-quo side under Phokion now favoured direct Macedonian control of Athens and 
the continuation of the garrison in Mounychia under Polyperchon‘s control. The pro-
democracy side under Hagnonides called for the return of autonomia, the expulsion of the 
garrison from Mounychia, and the restoration of democracy, all in accordance with (its 
interpretation of) the Edict. Diodoros records that Polyperchon‘s instinct was to garrison 
Piraeus and so control Athens by force, but when faced with Hagnonides‘ narrative of 
freedom and democracy he realised that to deceive the Greek cities would destroy his support 
base (D.S. 18.66.2-3; cf. Plu. Phoc. 33). So, like Alexander before him, he exploited 
factionalism and declared his support for freedom and democracy in order that the Greek 
cities would see that support for him provided eleutheria and tangible political benefits. 
Enforcement of the Edict would now be conditioned by Greece‘s, specifically Athens‘, 
reception of it.
39
 Before his invasion of the Peloponnese in late spring/early summer 318 
Polyperchon dispatched letters to the Greek cities ―ordering that those who through 
Antipatros‘ influence had been made magistrates in the oligarchic governments should be put 
to death and that the people should be given back their autonomia‖ (D.S. 18.69.3). The Edict 
now assumed its full ideological significance as a statement on Greek freedom and 
democracy. 
      In late 318 another important document on Greek freedom was published, which connects 
directly with Polyperchon‘s Edict and reveals the degree of ideological interaction between 
royal and civic dialogues of freedom at this time. Similarly, it also offers insights into the 
civic memory and commemoration of freedom. Athens‘ second honorary decree for Euphron 




 Whereas the 
first decree used the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios and its connection with the Persian Wars to 
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enforce Athens‘ hegemony in the Hellenic War, the second used the Hellenic War to support 
Athens‘ actions in 318/7 by presenting the war as a struggle fought on behalf of democracy 
and freedom from garrisons, precisely Athens‘ concerns in 318/7.
41
 Hagnonides used the 
second Euphron decree to reinterpret the goals and ideology of the Hellenic War so as to 
enforce Athenian hegemony in 318/7 and continue the struggle against Kassandros. 
Euphron‘s removal of a Macedonian garrison from Sikyon in 323 offered a hopeful parallel 
for Athens, whose freedom was threatened so long as Kassandros‘ garrison remained in 
Piraeus.
42
 In purpose, therefore, both Polyperchon‘s and Hagnonides‘ dialogues of eleutheria 
served to promote unity against the common enemy, Kassandros, and his power base, his 
garrisons. Both used eleutheria to forward their own aims, but each use of it interacted with 
the presentation and reception of the other. Further, Hagnonides‘ re-interpretation of the 
Hellenic War within the second Euphron decree displays the vitality of the memory of 
freedom, specifically the Hellenic War, and the important role played by the past in 
validating action in the present. 
 
Section 4: Antigonos and the Greeks, 318-311 
      Antigonos is often seen as the Hellenistic ruler who made the greatest effort in pursuance 
of the freedom of the Greeks and enjoyed the largest support as a result.
43
 However, his 
concern was purely pragmatic.
44
 He used eleutheria as a means of expanding control through 
persuasion and ideological force, rather than military might and oppression. This, however, 
does not mean that the actual application of the ideal was cynical and fraudulent. An 
important distinction needs to be drawn between the nature of an intention and its actual 
results. Like Polyperchon, Antigonos had no altruistic concern for Greek freedom, but his 
purely pragmatic support of it in the face of numerous setbacks was real, if selfishly 
motivated, and brought certain tangible benefits, such as the removal of garrisons and 
installation of democracies.
45
 Antigonos‘ use of eleutheria reveals his concern for attaining 
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Greek support through goodwill (eunoia) and benefaction, achieved by defending and 
patronising polis ideals rather than exploiting military control.
46
 
      The years 319-315, however, are a black mark on Antigonos‘ record, most notably 
because his support of Kassandros ensured the fall of democratic Athens in 317. His concern 
for Greek freedom, therefore, is commonly seen to have begun with his declaration at Tyre in 
315. However, Antigonos‘ earliest cooperation with a Greek city, specifically termed ally 
(σύμμαχον οὖσαν), appears with Kyzikos in 319.47 Although others have shown that this 
does not display Antigonid concern for eleutheria,
48
 it does elucidate the origins of that 
concern and Antigonos‘ focus on removing garrisons as a condition of freedom. 
       In 319 Antigonos intended to move through Asia removing the satraps installed at 
Triparadeisos and replace them with his own friends (D.S. 18.50). This forced Arrhidaios to 
defend his satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia by garrisoning the Greek cities. Kyzikos, 
however, refused to accept a garrison, and choosing instead ―to maintain its freedom‖ was 
besieged (D.S. 18.51.3).
49
 When Antigonos heard of this he moved on Kyzikos but only 
arrived after Arrhidaios retreated. Nonetheless, Antigonos made clear his goodwill towards 
Kyzikos and publically sent ambassadors to Arrhidaios rebuking him for fortifying his 
satrapy and besieging a Greek ally. Diodoros, however, makes it clear that both Arrhidaios 
and Antigonos had the same intention, to garrison Kyzikos and use it in their forthcoming 
wars, and that Antigonos was using Arrhidaios‘ siege as a cover for this.
50
 Antigonos‘ late 
arrival marked, therefore, his failure to take the city. Still, ―he made his goodwill (eunoia) 
toward the city manifest, even though failing to gain his entire objective‖ (D.S. 18.52.2). 
Military failure was cleverly turned into propaganda victory. 
      Antigonos‘ ability to pluck victory from failure is the main point within this passage and 
it shows that he was aware of the importance of goodwill (eunoia) and of presenting himself 
as defender of the Greeks. Further, Kyzikos‘ resistance to Arrhidaios revealed to Antigonos 
the Greek cities‘ hatred of garrisons. It was Antigonos‘ initial aggression that forced 
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Arrhidaios to garrison the Greek cities and besiege Kyzikos (D.S. 18.50.5). The cities then 
immediately turned against Arrhidaios thus allowing Antigonos to arrive on the scene and, 
despite the failure of his initial plan to capture Kyzikos, present himself as the city‘s 
defender, all before a blow was struck with Arrhidaios. The situation was such that by forcing 
his opponents to garrison their cities Antigonos bred conflict between them and the cities 
under their control. This then allowed Antigonos to present his expansionist campaigns as 
manifestations of his concern for the cities‘ safety. Antigonos appears to have put this into 
practice by invading Lydia shortly afterwards. As was no doubt expected, Kleitos the 
Macedonian satrap of Lydia garrisoned the cities while Antigonos, ―taking some of them by 
force and winning others by persuasion‖, won allies by presenting himself as their defender, 
perhaps even liberator through the removal of garrisons.
51
 Antigonos‘ campaign at Kyzikos 
had been the immediate catalyst for this since it revealed both the extent of Greek hatred of 
garrisons and the importance of goodwill (eunoia) instead of military control. The second of 
these concerns appears in the balance of force and persuasion employed during the Lydian 
campaign;
52
 Antigonos‘ initial plan was to take control of Kyzikos by force but when this 
failed he turned to persuasion and at Kyzikos and in Lydia he assumed the role of defender of 
the Greek cities, achieving support through persuasion, benefaction, and eunoia, as 
Polyperchon had done before him. 
      At Tyre in 315 Antigonos proclaimed that the Greeks were to be free, ungarrisoned, and 
autonomous.
53
 This marks the beginning of his commitment to eleutheria in his dealings with 
the Greek cities, but Diodoros (19.61.4) is quick to show that this is not purely magnanimous 
since Antigonos expected that the Greek hope for freedom (τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς ἐλευθερίας) 
would make them eager allies (προθύμους συναγωνιστὰς). Antigonos‘ declaration 
mimicked that of Polyperchon in 319/8 and was perhaps influenced by the presence of the 
latter‘s son Alexandros at Tyre. Alliance with Alexandros ensured both a foothold in Greece 
and Polyperchon‘s experience with the slogan of eleutheria.
54
 
      Antigonos promoted Greek eleutheria as the removal of garrisons and the guarantee of 
aphorologesia to the liberated cities. In summer/autumn 315 his general Aristodemos and 
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Polyperchon‘s son Alexandros removed Kassandros‘ garrisons from Kenchreai, Orchomenos, 
and Megalopolis before Alexandros defected to Kassandros‘ side (D.S. 19.63-64).
55
 In 314 
Aristodemos removed Kassandros‘ and Alexandros‘ garrisons from Kyllene, Patra, Aigion, 
and Dymai (D.S. 19.66-67.2). By sea, in summer 315, Antigonos‘ nephew Dioskourides 
ensured the safety (asphaleia) of existing Aegean allies and brought further islands into the 
alliance (D.S. 19.62.9), no doubt claiming to bring them eleutheria.
56
 Lemnos joined 
Antigonos and may now have claimed its eleutheria and autonomia;
57
 good relations are also 
attested with Kos.
58
 Further reinforcements were dispatched to Greece under Telesphoros in 
spring 313 again to free the Greek cities and ―establish among the Greeks the belief that 
[Antigonos] truly was (πρὸς ἀλήθειαν) concerned for their freedom‖ (D.S. 19.74.1-2). By 
summer all the garrisoned cities of the Peloponnese, save Corinth and Sikyon, were freed, 
including even Oreos in Euboia.
59
 
      In Karia, in 313, a major land and sea campaign was also launched under Antigonos‘ 
generals Dokimos and Medios with the single purpose of freeing the Greek cities. Miletos 
was taken with civic help, Asandros‘ garrison was removed, and eleutheria and autonomia 
restored to the city.
60
 Antigonos took Tralles and Kaunos, while another nephew Polemaios 
captured Iasos, probably also granting it eleutheria and autonomia (D.S. 19.75.5; §5 below). 
Kolophon, Erythrai, Teos and Lebedos, as well as the cities of the Ionian League all had their 
eleutheria and/or autonomia acknowledged, with Erythrai also being made aphorologetos 
after Alexander‘s precedent.
61
 That autumn Polemaios was dispatched to Greece, again with 
orders to free the Greeks (D.S. 19.77.2, 78). He liberated Chalkis and left it ungarrisoned ―in 
order to make it evident that Antigonos in very truth proposed to free the Greeks‖ (D.S. 
19.78.2). He returned Oropos to the Boiotians, freed the Thebans by removing the Kadmean 
garrison, allied with Eretria and Karystos, before receiving entreaties from Athens to free the 
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 He also removed Kassandros‘ garrisons from the Phokian cities, 
before liberating Opus (D.S. 19.78.5).
63
 
      In summer 312, however, Telesphoros defected and captured Elis by deceit. He plundered 
Olympia and garrisoned Kyllene, before Polemaios brought him back to the fold, razed the 
garrison, and restored the treasure to Olympia. Diodoros‘ account specifies that Telesphoros‘ 
garrison enslaved Elis while its removal by Polemaios turned douleia into eleutheria.
64
 
Thomas Kruse has cleverly identified in Pausanias an Antigonid monument in Olympia 
depicting Elis crowning statues of Demetrios and Polemaios which he argues was erected in 
thanks for Polemaios‘ re-liberation of Elis and his preservation of peace.
65
 Kruse rightly 
emphasises that Telesphoros‘ garrisoning of Elis and plundering of Olympia were 
particularly dangerous to Antigonos because it undermined his claim to bring eleutheria and 
so put in danger the goodwill (eunoia) and trust (pistis) that he received from the Greek 
cities. Accordingly, Polemaios‘ important re-liberation of Elis and Olympia earned the 
general a statue on site. However, Polemaios‘ actions were of added significance because 
312/1 was an Olympic year, a co-incidence hitherto unrecognised.
66
 Telesphoros‘ rebellion 
took place in the summer, perhaps some months before the Olympic Games, but Polemaios‘ 
prompt removal of the garrison and restoration of the treasure betray his fear that at the 
forthcoming games a garrisoned and plundered Olympia would damage Antigonos‘ image as 
a truthful, trustworthy, and genuine patron of Greek eleutheria. Although Telesphoros‘ 
actions provided the greatest threat yet to the Greek perception of Antigonos‘ commitment to 
eleutheria, Polemaios‘ re-liberation of Elis meant that at the forthcoming Olympics the 
assembled Greeks would see a free, peaceful, and newly-liberated Elis under Antigonid 
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      By 311 Antigonos‘ position within Asia Minor, the Aegean, the Peloponnese, and central 
Greece was secure. His successes had been based on his continued commitment to defend 
Greek eleutheria by removing his enemies‘ garrisons. However, there were losses: he failed 
to ensure the alliance of Byzantion in autumn/winter 313/2, Demetrios lost the Battle of Gaza 
in autumn 312, and Seleukos regained the Upper Satrapies in 312/1.
68
 With failure to the 
north, south, and east, Antigonos‘ only successes lay with Greek eleutheria to the west. 
      The peace of autumn 311 between Antigonos, Lysimachos, Ptolemy, and Kassandros 
contained at its end a clause guaranteeing the freedom of the Greeks (D.S. 19.105.1).
69
 The 
importance of this clause to Antigonos is evidenced in a letter sent to Skepsis (and elsewhere) 
and a responding civic decree, both of which emphasise that it was his personal concern that 
led to its inclusion.
70
 In his letter Antigonos emphasises his continued concern for Greek 
freedom, even explaining the cycle of Successor wars as part of his struggle for Greek 
freedom. He also prescribed that allied cities swear a mutual oath of allegiance to defend each 
other‘s freedom, thus making king and cities synagonistai for eleutheria (OGIS 5+6). 
Freedom was presented as the ideological glue holding his empire together (Ch.4 §2.2), but 
Antigonos‘ position as sole defender of eleutheria was soon threatened by both the revolt of 
Polemaios and the campaigns of Ptolemy in 309/8. 
 
Section 5: Antigonos, Ptolemy, and the Struggle for Freedom 
      As early as 315 Ptolemy expressed his concern for Greek eleutheria by formulating a 
counter-Edict to Antigonos‘ declaration at Tyre, thus revealing his awareness of the Greek 
slogan of eleutheria as a means of attaining Greek goodwill (D.S. 19.62.1). In mid-310, just 
after the Peace of 311, Ptolemy charged Antigonos with garrisoning the Kilikian cities and 
undermining their eleutheria. With Antigonos away in the east, Ptolemy evidently planned to 
assume his role as defender of freedom and garner some of the support Antigonos enjoyed. 
Leonidas was dispatched to Kilikia, but since he only won over the cities by force we can 
                                                                                                                                                        
Polemaios‘ troops raised from the Nesiotic League and present at the Isthmos for one of the Nemean (autumn 
311) or Isthmian (spring/summer 312, 310) Games. 
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 Byzantion: D.S. 19.77.5-7. Gaza: see the works cited in n.66 above. Seleukos: Bosworth 2002: 210-45; 
Capdetrey 2007: 25-50. 
69
 On the peace of 311 and its historical circumstances, see Simpson 1955; Cloché 1959: 170-8; Bengtson 1964: 
88-93; Rosen 1967: 82-84; Wehrli 1968: 52-5; Müller 1973: 39-45; É. Will 1979: 54-7; Hauben 1987a; 
Hammond & Walbank 1988: 160-2; Lund 1992: 60-63; Errington 2008: 33-5. 
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 Munro 1899 (ed. prin.); OGIS 5+6 (letter/decree); RC 1 (letter); SV 428 (letter); Harding num.132 (letter); 
Austin nums.38+39 (letter/decree); BD 6 (letter/decree). 
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      Events reached a head in late summer 309 when Ptolemy began his personal campaign 
into the Aegean.
72
 Since Demetrios had retaken the Kilikian cities (D.S. 20.19.5), Ptolemy 
moved on Kilikia capturing Phaselis, Xanthos, and Kaunos.
73
 Myndos was also taken (D.S. 
20.37.1), as well as perhaps Aspendos.
74
 Plutarch (Demetr. 7.3) records a siege of 
Halikarnassos which was interrupted by the timely arrival of Demetrios. Kos was established 
as base-camp and contact was perhaps made with Rhodes and Miletos.
75
 The Suda (Δ 431) 




      From Kos Ptolemy contacted Polemaios, who had revolted from Antigonos sometime 
between mid-310 and mid-309.
77
 This ensured reinforcements, an increased standing in Asia 
Minor where Polemaios was still influential after his campaigns of 313 (D.S. 19.75.5), and an 
open gangway into Greece.
78
 Polemaios fortified Chalkis (IG II
2
 469) before sailing to Kos 
where over the winter of 309/8 he used his connections with the garrison he had earlier 
installed in Iasos to bring the city to Ptolemy‘s side. A treaty was made by which Ptolemy 
swore to protect Iasos‘ eleutheria, autonomia, aphrouresia, and aphorologesia,
79
 before 
Ptolemy had Polemaios poisoned that winter (D.S. 20.27.3). With Demetrios‘ successful 
defence of Halikarnassos closing Asia Minor to him, Ptolemy moved on Greece in spring 
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 Perhaps because Ptolemy had pillaged the area in summer 312 (D.S. 19.79.6-7). Antigonos‘ garrisons may 
have been presented as precautions against such raids and so contributed to the defence of the cities‘ freedom 
(below pg.85). 
72
 On Ptolemy‘s ‗Grand Tour‘, see Seibert 1969: 176-89; Buraselis 1982: 47-52; Hammond & Walbank 1988: 
168-70; Bosworth 2000; Hauben forthcoming; Meeus forthcoming. 
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 Philokles captured the polis of Kaunos (D.S. 20.27.1-2) and Ptolemy took the garrisoned acropoleis, the 
Herakleion and Persikon (Polyaen. 3.16; Bosworth 2000: 234 n.121). A statue-base for Philokles survives 
(I.Kaunos 82). Kaunos returned to Antigonid hands by 302 (I.Kaunos 4, 83) and remained loyal to Demetrios in 
287/6 (I.Kaunos 1; Plu. Demetr. 49.5). 
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 SEG XVII 639, recording a Ptolemaic garrison under [Phil]okles and Leonidas. Ptolemy‘s designation as king 
(ll.9-10: βασιλ|*εῖ Π+τολεμαίωι) would seem to date this post-306, but Wheatley (1997: 158) and Bosworth 
(2000: 233-6) nonetheless date the text to 309/8 and see in it Ptolemaic royal aspirations. Hauben (1975: 51-4, 
num.19) dates it post-305/4. 
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 Kos: D.S. 20.27.3; Bagnall 1976: 103. Philadelphos was born this winter: Mar. Par. FGrH 239b F19; Theoc. 
Idyll 17.58; Call. Del. 160-70. Rhodes: Bosworth 2000: 217-8, 236-8 with P.Köln 247, on which see Lehmann 
1988a; Paschidis forthcoming. Miletos: I.Milet 244 is a statue base for Πτολεμαῖος Λαάγου Μακεδὼν. The lack 
of royal title suggests a date pre-305 with the activities of 309/8 providing the best context. On dedications in 
the nominative as a reflection of status, see Ma 2007: 207-8. 
76
 Rosen 1967: 85-6; Seibert 1969: 180-3; Billows 1990: 145 n.18, 301 with n.32; Kruse 1992: 281-2 n.20; 
Wheatley 1997: 159-60. Some accept its authenticity, see Elkeles 1941: 13-14; SV 433; É. Will 1979: 61-3; 
Gruen 1984: 136. Buraselis (1982: 50-1) is undecided. Siebert (1983: 131-2) provides earlier bibliography. 
77
 Wheatley 1998a. 
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 Bakhuizen 1970: 125; Billows 1990: 200; Wheatley 1997: 160-1. 
79
 IK.Iasos 2+3 (App.2 nums.12-13). Giovannini (2004: 78-9) unconvincingly dates both IK.Iasos 2+3 to 306, 
contemporary with Demetrios‘ siege of Rhodes. 
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308, where Polemaios‘ murder left rich pickings. Sailing from Myndos he passed through 
Andros, liberating the island from its garrison, and landing at the Isthmos.
80
 
      Ptolemy took Sikyon and Corinth from Kratesipolis (D.S. 20.37.1-2; Polyaen. 8.58), as 
well as capturing Megara (D.L. 2.115).
81
 He chaired the Isthmian Games of 308 and declared 
his intention to free the Greek cities (Suda Δ 431), as Polyperchon had before him. Like 
Polyperchon and Antigonos, Ptolemy was ―thinking that the goodwill (eunoia) of the Greeks 
would be a great gain for him in his own undertakings‖ (D.S. 20.37.2). However, when 
support failed to materialise, Ptolemy fell back on military control. Corinth, Sikyon, and 
Megara were garrisoned and entrusted to Leonidas. Ptolemy then returned to Egypt, no doubt 
aware of Antigonos‘ return from the east. 
      Ptolemy‘s Aegean campaign presents a number of interesting features. His guarantees to 
Iasos (ἐλεύθερος ὢν καὶ αὐτόνομος καὶ ἀφρούρητος καὶ ἀφορολόγητος) could be seen 
either as upstaging Antigonos‘ commitment to aphrouresia or as guaranteeing to Iasos the 
continuation of the status it held under Antigonos.
82
 Ptolemy aimed to achieve the support of 
the Greek cities by presenting himself as a genuine defender and patron of Greek eleutheria. 
Where possible this was achieved through persuasion and eunoia rather than force.
83
 
However, as with Antigonos‘ Lydian campaign, both dynamics were employed. The Kilikian 
cities were all besieged, but at Iasos Ptolemy assumed the role of defender of eleutheria, 
framed through guarantees of aphorologesia and aphrouresia. Ptolemy did indeed garrison 
Sikyon and Corinth after he had declared the Greeks free, but it is important to note that this 
was a last resort employed when persuasion, dialogue, and appeals to eleutheria failed to win 
support. Like Polyperchon and Antigonos, Ptolemy had no altruistic love for eleutheria but 
he saw it as a profitable means of expanding hegemony through eunoia, synergy, and the 
granting of eleutheria and status guarantees. This is the course Ptolemy favoured; force was 
the recourse of the ideologically weak and only employed when persuasion failed. 
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 D.S. 20.37.1-2. The garrison may have been installed by Dioskourides under Antigonos‘ orders or 
independently by Polemaios on his journey to Kos, see Seibert 1969: 188 n.41; Billows 1990: 224-5. Hammond 
& Walbank (1988: 170) strangely claim that it was Kassandros‘. 
81
 Hammond & Walbank 1988: 170: ―[Ptolemy liberated] Corinth and Sicyon from the autocratic rule of 
Kratesipolis.‖ Polyainos, however, clearly states that Kratesipolis gave Corinth to Ptolemy, albeit by deceiving 
her troops. Paschidis (2008b: 248) attributes this to her wish to marry Ptolemy after the date of Polyperchon, 
which Paschidis dates to 308. Bosworth (2000) sees Ptolemy‘s actions as a manifestation of royal aspirations 
and a threat to Kassandros‘ throne. Zuffa (1971/2) sees them as orchestrated, with Kassandros‘ connivance, 
against Antigonos‘ holdings. Ptolemy also established a mint at Corinth in 308 (Ravel 1938; Chryssanthaki 
2005: 163). 
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 Billows 1990: 209-10. Antigonos granted aphorologesia to Erythrai, but the exact date is unknown (IK.Ery. 
31.22-3 [App.2 num.35]). 
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 Bosworth comments that Ptolemy brought both Rhodes and Knidos to his side ―through diplomacy rather than 
force‖ (2000: 217-8, 221). 
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Section 6: Demetrios Poliorketes in Greece, 307-301 
      Athens had fallen to Kassandros in 317 and had since then been under the rule of 
Demetrios of Phaleron who, as Kassandros‘ epimeletes, had citizenship restricted to those 
owning more than 1,000 drachmai (D.S. 18.74.3). Demetrios described his rule as a 
correction of the democracy (Str. 9.1.20) and to history he was often seen to be a lawgiver.
84
 
However, Pausanias (1.25.6; cf. Phaedrus Fab. 5.1) called him a tyrant, Plutarch (Demetr. 
10.2) termed him a monarch, Philochoros (FGrH 328 F66) called his rule a period of ―the 
undermining of the demos‖ (καταλυσάντων τὸν δῆμον, a charge Demetrios defended 
himself against [Str. 9.1.20]), and the restored democracy of 307-301 presented it as a period 
of oligarchic repression during which Athens was not free.
85
 Nonetheless, democratic 
procedures remained intact during these years even if few decrees were published on stone.
86
 
It was this regime that Antigonos decided in 308 to remove. Greek goodwill was, as ever, 
essential. Plutarch records an anecdote in which one of Antigonos‘ philoi recommends that he 
capture and hold Athens as a gangway (ἐπιβάθρα) to Greece. Antigonos disagrees, arguing 
instead that Athenian goodwill (εὔνοια) would be a surer gangway (ἐπιβάθρα) into Greece; 
the restoration of Athens‘ eleutheria and democracy would earn him greater support 
throughout Greece than forceful garrisoning would (Plu. Demetr. 8.3; cf. D.S. 19.78.2). 
      Departing from Ephesos, Demetrios Poliorketes entered the Piraeus by surprise on 
Thargelion 26
th
 308/7, one month and five days before the end of the Athenian year. He 
immediately proclaimed that he had been sent by his father to free Athens, expel the garrison, 
and restore the city‘s constitution. Fighting ensued and Demetrios‘ troops soon captured 
Piraeus.
87
 He encircled Mounychia, then freed Megara by expelling its garrison (Plu. Demetr. 
9.5), before finally returning to Athens to capture Mounychia and raze the fort (D.S. 
20.46.1).
88
 Athens was officially granted its freedom and democracy and entered into an 
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 I follow Philochoros‘ narrative of events (FGrH 328 F66; Plu. Demetr. 9.5-10.1; Wheatley 1997: 169-77). 
Diodoros claims that Demetrios took Mounychia before Megara (20.45.6-46.3; Billows 1990: 147-51). IG II
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479-80 (with restorations in Wilhelm 1942) honour Πυρ*--- Ἡρ|ακλ+εώτην, presumably an Antigonid officer 
though not identified as one by Billows (1990: App.3), for his help in removing the Mounychia garrison. 
      Plutarch and Diodoros differentiate the expulsion of Kassandros‘ garrison from Megara (Demetr. 9.5: τὴν 
φρουρὰν ὁ Δημήτριος ἐκβαλὼν) from the complete destruction of the fort at Mounychia (20.46.1: κατασκάψας 
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alliance of philia and symmachia with Antigonos. Importantly, the removal of the garrison in 
Mounychia ensured the perpetuation of the restored democracy. Polyperchon‘s failure to 
remove the garrison in 317 resulted in the collapse of the democracy and Athens‘ capitulation 
to Kassandros. Piraeus and the garrison in Mounychia were the cornerstones of Athenian 
freedom and democracy, and Demetrios understood as much. 
      Demetrios, however, departed Athens in spring 306 to invade Cyprus and Egypt and then 
besiege an independent Rhodes. The siege of Rhodes may have showed that Antigonos felt 
that if cities were to be free then it was only to be by his volition and in alliance with him, but 
it does not appear to have harmed Antigonid self-presentation as liberator-kings.
89
 In Greece, 
Athens entered the Four Years War, the period from 307-304 in which it countered 
Kassandros‘ attacks and awaited Demetrios‘ eventual return. During these years Athens 
revisited the memory of the Hellenic War, now invoking it as a parallel for the current 
struggle for freedom from Antipatros‘ son, Kassandros (IG II
2
 467, 554); as in 318/7, the 
plasticity of memory continued. Antigonid influence over the city during these years was 
apparently strong. Royal generals helped co-ordinate Athens‘ defence and Demetrios 
personally appointed one Adeimantos as Athenian general for an exceptional two consecutive 
years, 306/5-305/4.
90
 Such appointments, particularly that of Adeimantos, reveal the extent of 
Antigonid influence over Athens during the Four Years War. However, since they were 
connected with the defence of Athens‘ eleutheria from Kassandros they do not appear to have 
caused conflict within the city. Like other poleis, Athens could assimilate aspects of royal 
control when they contributed in a real and tangible manner to civic freedom (Ch.3 §1.1-2; 
Ch.4 §3). 
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      Demetrios returned to Greece in autumn 304. He broke Kassandros‘ siege of Athens and 
pushed him beyond Thermopylai, he freed Chalkis by removing its Boiotian garrison, allied 
with the Boiotians and Aitolians, and took Kenchreai. He expelled Kassandros‘ garrisons 
from Phyle and Panakton and returned both forts with Oropos to Athens.
91
 Elateia was 
perhaps also liberated now.
92
 In 303 he invaded the Peloponnese. The campaign, specifically 
the removal of Kassandros‘ garrisons, was presented as one fought on behalf of Greek 
freedom, an ideology particularly strong in Athens.
93
 Sikyon, Corinth, Bura, and Skyros were 
liberated and had their garrisons removed, so too Arkadian Orchomenos, Troizen, Akte, and 
Arkadia (excluding Mantineia).
94
 Pleistarchos‘ garrison was expelled from Argos and 
Demetrios chaired the Heraia festival there.
95
 Messene also came under his sway.
96
 At the 
Isthmian Games of spring/summer 302 Demetrios founded a Hellenic League of Greek states 
on the model of Philip and Alexander‘s League of Corinth.
97
 This alliance of newly-liberated 
Greek states consisted of a synedrion (council) of synedroi (representatives) from member 
states, and was overseen by a board of presidents (proedroi). Demetrios was hegemon 
(leader) of both the League and its forces.
98
 The League was a manifestation of Antigonid 
hegemony but with it Demetrios sought to justify this hegemony within accountable 
parameters that defined the cities as free and established legal structures protecting this. 
      In Athens, however, Demetrios‘ constant demands on the polis were seen to negate the 
eleutheria he had earlier granted. His initiation into the Eleusinian mysteries in spring 303 
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necessitated the reorganisation of the religious calendar.
99
 He demanded that his letters be 
given institutional weight within the ekklesia, and his mistress Lamia treated the city like her 
personal bank.
100
 The conflict between Athens‘ and Demetrios‘ understandings of eleutheria 
and the extent of royal interference each understanding permitted are important for our 
analysis of freedom as a potential point of both unity and discord between city and king 
(explored in Ch.4 §3). 
      Events in Asia soon had a bearing on Greece. In summer/autumn 302 Lysimachos 
invaded Hellespontine Phrygia from Thrace. Lampsakos and Parion capitulated and were left 
free. In Aiolia and Ionia his general Prepelaos took and garrisoned Ephesos, which he left 
free, as well as Teos, Kolophon, and Sardis, but failed to capture Erythrai and Klazomenai.
101
 
In Greece, Demetrios invaded Thessaly, freed Larissa and Pherai by removing their garrisons, 
and won over Antrones, Pteleon, Dion, and Phthiotic Orchomenos (D.S. 20.110.2-6). Before 
he could invade Macedon, however, Antigonos called him back to Asia. A hasty peace was 
made with Kassandros which left the cities of Greece and Asia free. This saved face by 
showing that Demetrios was not abandoning his campaign for Greek freedom, merely 
transferring it to a new sphere.
102
 Demetrios removed Prepelaos‘ garrison from Ephesos and 
returned the city to its previous status, before re-taking Lampsakos and Parion and entering 
winter quarters (D.S. 20.111.3). Events came to a head in summer 301 when at Ipsos the 
armies of Antigonos and Demetrios met those of Lysimachos and Seleukos. Antigonos lost 
his life in the battle. Lysimachos took control of Asia Minor as far as the Tauros, Ptolemy 
and Seleukos divided Syria between themselves, and Kassandros re-asserted control in 
central Greece. Demetrios, now a king without a kingdom, maintained some possessions in 
Greece and was to reappear again at Athens as conqueror in 295. 
 
Section 7: Demetrios and Ptolemy in Greece, 295-280
103
 
      Demetrios‘ return to Athens in 295 marked his return as guarantor of eleutheria and 
demokratia. Since 301/0 Lachares, general of the mercenaries, had made himself tyrant under 
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 The chronology of the years 301-295/4 is highly debated. I follow that favoured by Habicht (1997: 81-8) and 
Osborne (1985; 2006; cf. 2009a; 2009b: 84-5) in opposition to that of Dreyer (1999: 19-76). Grieb (2008: 73-5) 
overviews the debate and favours Dreyer. 
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the auspices of Kassandros.
104
 Opposition to his regime was led by Charias, the hoplite 
general, who garrisoned the Akropolis and ordered the people to feed his troops, only to be 
removed later and executed by Lachares. Charias‘ partisans, the obscure Peirakoi soldiers, 
occupied Piraeus while Lachares increased control over Athens.
105
 Asty and Piraeus were 




      When Demetrios arrived in spring 295 he exploited this division by siding with the 
Piraeus-based faction (Polyaen. 4.7.5) and starving the city into submission. The surrender 
took place, coincidentally, at the time of the civic Dionysia in Elaphebolion 296/5. Demetrios 
called the people to the Assembly, lined the theatre with his troops, and then announced a gift 
of 100,000 bushels of grain and the restoration of the offices (ἀρχὰς) most loved by the 
people, likely denoting the restoration of democracy.
107
 Demetrios‘ announcement is a classic 
example of the ‗surrender and grant‘ model of benefaction whereby a city, upon capture, 
loses its status only to have it returned again by royal order.
108
 Athens‘ democracy is so 
restored and the king as benefactor bestows grain on the famished populace. In thanks 
honours are granted, as had earlier been the case in 307, and Piraeus and Mounychia are 
given to Demetrios. These had been the bases of the democratic Peirakoi soldiers and it was 
from them that the democracy was restored. Demetrios‘ control of Piraeus and garrisoning of 
Mounychia, authorised by Athenian decree, offered a physical manifestation of his 
ideological control over the restoration and granting of democracy.
109
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 Grieb (2008: 75-7) argues that the appellation tyrant is a back-projection of later sources (Paus. 1.29.10; Plu. 
Demetr. 33.4; Polyaen. 4.7.5; P.Oxy. X 1235). 
105
 P.Oxy. XVII 2082 with new readings in Thonemann 2003. Charias is honoured in Agora XVI 129 (301-297). 
Bayliss (2003) attempts to identify the elusive ‗Peraikoi soldiers‘ and outlines the career of Charias. He also 
(2004; SEG LIV 232) reads IG II
2
 1956-1957 as lists of Lachares‘ mercenaries. 
106
 Lachares‘ rise to power started c.301/0 (Habicht 1997: 82–87; Osborne 2009a: 127; O‘Sullivan 2009a) but 
only became ‗tyrannical‘ c.297 (Rhodes with Lewis 1997: 45-6; Osborne 1981-83: II 148 n.641; Habicht 1997: 
83-5; Oliver 2007: 235-6). Pausanias attests to his connection with Kassandros (1.25.7; cf. IG II
2
 642). On the 
form and nature of the regime, see Habicht 1997: 81-7; Dreyer 1999: 19-110 (with exhaustive chronological 
analysis); Grieb 2008: 73-7. 
107
 Plu. Demetr. 34.4. On the term ἀρχάς as denoting the restoration of democracy, see Smith 1962: 118; 
Osborne 1981-83: II 144-53; Green 1990: 125; Habicht 1997: 88; Bayliss 2002: 106-7. T.L. Shear (1978: 54 
with n.150) argues that it refers only to the archons themselves. Thonemann (2005) analyses the significance of 
Demetrios‘ timing and his use of the Dionysia. On the political significance of announcing decrees at the 
Dionysia, see Wilson & Hartwig 2009; Wilson 2009. 
108
 Bikerman 1938: 133-41; 1939: 344-5; Ma 1999: 111-13. On speech-act theory, the process of granting status 
through declaration, see Ma 1999: 19-20. 
109
 The decree was proposed by Dromokleides (Paschidis 2008a: 129-31, A42).Demetrios also garrisoned 
Museion of his own volition (Plu. Demetr. 34.5). The Athenian decree was proposed by Dromokleides 
(Paschidis 2008a: 129-31, A42). 
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      For the remaining four months of the archon year 296/5 Demetrios instituted a second, 
abridged year of twelve shortened months, complete with shortened tribal prytanies.
110
 
Officials were elected for a second time, most notably the archon Nikias (termed Nikias 
hysteros) and the general of the equipment Phaidros of Sphettos.
111
 The normal secretary 
cycle continued into 295/4 and citizenship necessitated a dokimasia overseen by the 
thesmothetai.
112
 Peter Thonemann ascribes this shortened year to Demetrios‘ wish to display 
his authority by altering Athenian religious and civic time, as earlier done with the Eleusinian 
mysteries in 304/3. While this is true, Demetrios‘ actions also presented his arrival as a 
restoration of democracy with a re-organised democratic calendar displaying a new beginning 
after Lachares‘ tyranny.
113
 This is how his arrival was commemorated almost a year to the 
day later in an honorary decree for his philos Herodoros.
114
 Passed the day before the civic 
Dionysia of 294 (Prytany IX 15, Elaphebolion 9), it praises Herodoros for aiding the 
ambassadors sent to negotiate with Demetrios and striving to ensure peace (eirene) and 
friendship (philia) so that the war would be over and that the demos, having taken control of 
the asty, would continue to have demokratia.
115
 The decree‘s content and its announcement at 
the Dionysia of 294 commemorates Demetrios‘ capture of the city almost exactly a year 
beforehand and reveals how the pro-Demetrios party wished to remember the events of 
Elaphebolion 295:
116
 as a restoration by Demetrios of demokratia to a unified Athens 
consisting of both Piraeus and asty.
117
 
      However, when Demetrios assumed the Macedonian throne in 294 (Plu. Demetr. 36-7) he 
began to extend tighter control over Greece, thus allowing Ptolemy to present himself as 
patron of Greek eleutheria. Structural anomalies soon creep into the Athenian democratic 
system: Olympiodoros was archon for two consecutive years (294/3-293/2), the democratic 
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 Rhodes with Lewis 1997: 45-6; Habicht 1997: 88. 
111
 Nikias: IG II
2







 464.48-51; Osborne 1981-83: II 152-3. 
113
 Thonemann 2005: 72-4. Osborne (1981-83: II 144-53; 1985: 277) argues for a democracy from spring 295 




 646 (App.1 num.32); Thonemann 2005: 77. IG II
2
 647 was passed at the same meeting, as was Agora 




 646.15-23; App.1 num.32.  
116
 Thonemann (2005: 78) argues that the announcement of the decree and the narrative of events within it at the 
Dionysia mimicked Demetrios‘ announcement of the restoration of demokratia exactly a year earlier, on both 
occasions in the theatre to a packed Athenian audience. The demos was forced to remember its capitulation and 
Demetrios‘ power and magnanimity. 
117
 Note in particular ll.20-3: ὁ δῆμο|*ς…κομισάμε+νος τὸ ἄστυ δημοκρατ|[ίαν διατελῆι ἔχ+ων; cf. IG II2 
654.17-18 (Prytany XII 25, 285/4; App.1 num.36): καὶ κομισαμένου *τ+οῦ δήμ*ο+|υ τὸ ἄστυ; 653.21-22 
(Prytany VIII 29, 285/4): ὁ δῆμος | κεκόμιστ*αι τὸ ἄστυ+. Both describe the capture of the Museion in 287 and 
the return of democracy to the city (asty) of Athens. 
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grammateus was replaced with the oligarchic anagrapheus for 294/3-292/1, as had been the 
case in 321-318, and the oligarchs exiled in 304/3 were recalled in 292/1.
118
 Direct royal 
control is also attested at Thespiae and Thebes, governed respectively by Peisis and 
Hieronymos.
119
 Having assumed the Macedonian throne, Demetrios needed stronger, securer, 
and more direct control over Greece. As with Antipatros and Kassandros before him, he was 
forced to rely on garrisons and tyrannies, thus turning him into an oppressor of Greek 
eleutheria. When Athens revolted in spring 287 Ptolemy actively supported the city and 
assumed the now vacant role of defender of Greek eleutheria.
120
 The Athenian general 
Phaidros of Sphettos protected the grain harvest from the attack of Antigonid troops from 
Piraeus and the Attic forts while Olympiodoros led the capture of the Museion hill from the 
Macedonian garrison thereon.
121
 The Ptolemaic general on Andros, Kallias of Sphettos, 
brother of Phaidros, provided military assistance before and during Demetrios‘ siege (SEG 
XXVIII 60), and it was through the Ptolemaic agent Sostratos that peace was negotiated with 
Demetrios.
122
 Demetrios‘ control of Piraeus and the Attic forts was acknowledged and the 
king left for Asia and his eventual death. 
      The revolt asserted Athens‘ freedom and democracy over Demetrios‘ garrisons and 
oligarchy, as had been done against Kassandros in 318/7 and 307-301. Further, the revolt 
emphasises two important points regarding Athens‘ understanding of its own eleutheria: first, 
the removal of garrisons (Museion and Piraeus) was a necessary pre-requisite of freedom; 
second, the preservation of the grain supply was essential to the feeding and stabilisation of 
the renascent democracy. Phaidros was remembered for handing over the city to his 
successors ―free, democratic, and autonomous‖, while Pausanias says that with 
Olympiodoros‘ capture of the Museion ―Athens was freed from the Macedonians‖.
123
 In 
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 Habicht (1979: 27-33; cf. 1997: 90-1) defines the period 294-287 as an oligarchy, at least to the post-287 
democracy. On the nature of this regime, see also Dinsmoor 1931: 39-44; T.L. Shear 1978: 53-5; Dreyer 1999: 
111-48 (arguing against Habicht); Grieb 2008: 77-81. On Olympiodoros‘ dual archonship, see below pgs.166-7 
with n.41 and pgs.170-1 with n.56. 
119
 Plu. Demetr. 39. On Peisis, see above n.63. 
120
 On the date, see Osborne 1979; Habicht 1997: 95-7; Oliver 2007: 62-4, 121-3. Others argue for spring 286, 
T.L. Shear 1978; J.L. Shear 2010 (based on new readings of the Kallias Decree, SEG XXVIII 60). Paschidis 
(2008a: 137 n.2) outlines the debate. The revolt is almost entirely known from the lengthy honorary inscription 
for Kallias of Sphettos (SEG XXVIII 60; T.L. Shear 1978). 
121
 Phaidros: IG II
2
 682.30-6; Osborne 1979; Habicht 1979: 45-67; Habicht 1997: 95-7; Osborne 2004: 207-8 
(dating IG II
2
 682 to 259/8); Oliver  2007: 163-4; Paschidis 2008a: 140-5, A46. Olympiodoros: Paus. 1.26.2; 
below pgs.170-1 with ns.54-6. 
122
 SEG XXVIII 60.32-40. On Sostratos, see T.L. Shear 1978: 22-5; Sonnabend 1996: 237-43, 251-3. For 
Ptolemy‘s role in the peace, see Habicht 1979: 62-7; Dreyer 1999: 219-23. 
123
 Phaidros: IG II
2
 682.38-40 (App.1 num.48); Olympiodoros: Paus. 1.26.1-2. Also of note are IG II
2
 666+667 
which honour Strombichos, a Macedonian defector from the Museion garrison, and refer to the revolt as fought 
on behalf of eleutheria (IG II
2
 666.7-15 [App.1 num.46]; below §10). 
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addition, the shield of Leokritos, the first man over the walls, was dedicated in the Stoa of 
Zeus Eleutherios (Paus. 1.26.1-2), revealing again, as with the Euphron decrees of 322 and 
318, the importance of location as a medium of memory and its connection with struggles for 
freedom. Philippides of Kephale established on his return from exile a contest to Demeter and 
Kore ―as a memorial of the eleutheria of the demos‖ (IG II
2
 657.3-5) and the revolt is further 
presented as a return of eleutheria in the decrees passed by the restored democracy.
124
 
However, the physical division of Piraeus from Athens, seen already in 318/7 and 296/5, 
marked a conceptual division within Athens‘ understanding of eleutheria: the asty was free, 
but with Piraeus in Macedonian hands the united polis was not. The situation eased by 282/1 
when the Attic forts were recaptured, but since Piraeus was controlled by the Macedonians 
Athens was forced to use subsidiary ports.
125
 Because money and grain were the cornerstones 
of Athens‘ fragile democracy Athenian decrees of 285/4-282/1 frequently contained the 
anticipatory clause, ―when Athens and the Piraeus are united‖.
126
 An assault on Piraeus was 
attempted in the later 280s when Athens bribed Hierokles, a Macedonian general, to open the 
gates to the Athenian army. Hierokles, however, acted as a double agent and led the 
Athenians into an ambush in which eight generals and four hundred and twenty troops were 
slaughtered.
127
 Piraeus was to remain in Macedonian hands until 229 and the wish for its 
return was probably a motivating factor in the Chremonidean War (below §10). Athenian 
eleutheria and demokratia were, as always, intrinsically connected with the removal of 
garrisons and the control of Piraeus and the grain supply. 
 
Section 8: Lysimachos and Seleukid Asia, 301-262 
      After Ipsos, Lysimachos gained possession of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, which had 
since 334 a tradition of freedom. Although his image as tyrant of un-free Greek cities is now 
questioned,
128
 it is still notable that with the exception of his concession of eleutheria to those 
cities of Hellespontine Phrygia that came to his side in 302 there is not a single extant 




 654.15-17 (Prytany XII, 285/4; App.1 num.36); 657.31, 34-5 (Prytany III, 283/2; App.1 num.38). 
125
 Forts: Dreyer 1999: 232-40; Oliver 2007: 125-7. For the re-capture of Eleusis in 279, see Clinton 2008: 245; 
below pg.169 n.49. Ports: IG II
2




 653.21-2, 654.17-8, 32-5, 657.31-6; Agora XVI 181.30-1; Oliver 2007: 121-7. The idea is also present 
in IG II
2
 646.22-3 (295/4); SEG XXVIII 60.65-6 (270/69). 
127
 Polyaen. 5.17.1; Paus. 1.29.10. Oliver (2007: 56-60) dates this assault to 286/5 (cf. T.L. Shear 1978: 82-3; 
Gauthier 1979: 356; Dreyer 1999: 238), but a later date is not impossible. IG II
2
 5227a honours Chairippos who 
died during an assault on Mounychia, ―warding off the day of slavery on behalf of your beloved fatherland‖. 
The epigram could refer to Demetrios‘ assaults in 307 or 295 or even the failed Athenian assault of the 280s. 
128
 Burstein 1980a; 1986b; Lund 1992: 118-52, 199-205; Landucci Gattinoni 1992: 231-43; Franco 1993: 58-
173; Rogers 2001. Burstein (1986a) argues for different policies regarding the Greek cities pre- and post-301. 
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statement of freedom during his reign, either by him or by the cities under him.
129
 Since the 
example of 302 is a one-off whose purpose was to gain the support of the Greek cities during 
his invasion of Antigonos‘ empire, this would appear to mark Lysimachos‘ conscious 
avoidance of the term eleutheria in his relations with the Greek cities under his control. 
Further, Lysimachos does not appear in later inscriptions as a guarantor of eleutheria, as do 
Alexander and Antigonos.
130
 Although the old adage concerning absence of evidence applies 
– and we lack Diodoros‘ narrative post-302 – the lack of references to Lysimachos granting 
freedom suggests that he was notably reluctant to grant or recognise the status. 
      On the other hand, once the Greek cities of Asia Minor came, by and large, under 
Seleukid sway after the battle of Korupedion in 281, Seleukos and Antiochos were able to use 
their position of authority to grant benefactions to them, particularly in some cases the status 
of freedom. A just published inscription from Aigai commissioning divine honours for 
Seleukos and Antiochos refers to their guarantee of eleutheria, most likely in the aftermath of 
the battle of Korupedion.
131
 Antiochos also granted freedom to Priene, but the exact date is 
unknown,
132
 although it may be early since good relations existed between both from the 
early 270s.
133
 An apparently successful embassy under Komeas of Lamptrai was sent to 
Seleukos by the cities of Lemnos in 281 concerning their eleutheria;
134
 demokratia was 
returned to Lemnos and the island itself was returned to Athenian control.
135
 Seleukos‘ return 
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 Lysimachos did, however, help Elateia remove itself from ―the slavish bond of tyrants‖ and confirm its own 
eleutheria, see FD III (4) 220 (App.1 num.37); Lund 1992: 181. 
130
 IK.Ery. 31.21-6 (App.2 num.35). Numerous cities, free under Antigonos, were placed under close control by 
Lysimachos. The Ionian cities, free and autonomous under Antigonos (IK.Ilion 1.24-6; App.2 num.17), were 
placed under the control of a royal general (SEG XXXV 926; IK.Smyrna 557. Second copy: Syll.
3
 368). 
Kolophon, free under Antigonos (Mauerbauinschriften 69; App.2 num.9), was forced to synoikise into 
Ephesos-Arsinoe (Paus. 1.9.7-8; Rogers 2001). Lebedos, free but similarly forced to synoikise by Antigonos 
(RC 3.87-90; App.2 num.16), was destroyed (Paus. 7.3.5). 
131
 Malay & Ricl 2009:  39-47 (App.2 num.27). 
132
 S.E. M. 1.294; Orth 1977: 108-11 (identifying the king). 
133
 I.Priene 18 (c.280-270) contains three honorary decrees for the Seleukid officer Larichos (Gauthier 1980). 
The city became free in 297 with the removal of the tyrant Hieron (I.Priene 11; cf. IK.Eph. 2001), but this status 
was lost sometime before Antiochos‘ benefaction. The question is when. A context under Lysimachos makes 
most sense, particularly since Priene stopped referring to itself as autonomous from the mid-290s (Burstein 
1986b: 137-8; Crowther 1996: 226-7) and it was caught knowingly deceiving Lysimachos in his adjudication 
with Samos of 283/2 (RC 7). Still, a Seleukid context is not impossible, especially if Priene sided with 





 672.39-41 [+EM 12967] (App.1 num.40): a decree of the Lemnian deme Hephaistia. On Komeas, see 




 672.18, 28. SEG XXXVIII 74 is a fragmentary second copy (Schweigert 1941: 338-9; Tracy 2003: 55). 
The decree details conflict between the demes Hephaistia and Myrine (ll.17-39) and may be connected with IG 
II
2
 550, which concerns Athenian control of Myrine and mentions ―Antigonos‖. Since Tracy dates IG II
2
 550 to 
c.280-240 (2003: 109-10; SEG XLV 92[1]), another possible context is Antigonos‘ restoration of Lemnos in 
256/5 (below n.174). 
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of Lemnos echoed that of Antigonos in 307 and earned him cult honours there;
136
 
Lysimachos, in contrast, held the island from 301-281. Tion regained its eleutheria from 
Herakleia Pontika after Korupedion, but a Seleukid connection is not certain.
137
 After 281 
Kos was free/autonomous and democratic in its relations with both Seleukos and the 
Ptolemies and the status may have been acknowledged by both powers.
138
 Democracy was 
also perhaps awarded to Ilion.
139
 
      Seleukid relations with the Greek cities in Asia Minor began during the 290s-280s when 
in spite of Lysimachos Seleukos presented himself to them as a ruler deeply concerned with 
ensuring Greek eunoia through benefaction, as Polyperchon, Antigonos, and Ptolemy had 
done before him.
140
 This increased in the build-up to, and aftermath of, Korupedion. Seleukos 
deliberately contrasted himself with Lysimachos by further advancing his image as pious to 
the gods and trustworthy in benefaction to the Greeks.
141
 However, Seleukos was also 
concerned with establishing a precedent of eunoia through benefaction that could be used by 
his descendents, as is vividly detailed in a letter of 281 to his general Sopatros: ―for our 
policy (proairesis) is always through benefactions to please the citizens of the Greek cities 
and with reverence to join in increasing the honours of the gods, so that we may be the object 
of goodwill (eunoia) transmissible for all time to those who come after us‖ (RC 9.5-9). 
      Later Seleukids continued the process of granting eleutheria, autonomia, and demokratia 
to the Greek cities of Asia Minor, in many cases in accordance with the policies and 
precedents of their ancestors. Between 268-262 Antiochos allowed the Ionian cities their 
eleutheria and demokratia ―according to the policy (airesis) of his ancestors (progonoi)‖.
142
 
Antiochos II awarded autonomia and aphorologesia to Erythrai shortly after 261 in 
accordance with the precedents of Alexander and Antigonos and the care shown by his 
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 Phylarch. FGrH 81 F29; Habicht 1970: 89-90; cf. Orth 1977: 37; Burstein 1980a: 74 n.5; 1986b: 133. 
137
 Tion was subject to Herakleia (Memn. FGrH 434 F19.1), but a coin series post-281 bears the inscription 
ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΑ (Waddington 1910: 615-6 with num.4). On Herakleia at this time, see Burstein 1976: 86-9. 
138
 Herod. 2.27 (τὴν αὐτονομίην ὐμέων Θαλῆς λύσει) with Sherwin-White 1978: 92-7; cf. Grieb 2008: 184-5. 
For Kos and Seleukos in 281, see Hallof & Habicht 1998: 110, num.7 (SEG XLVIII 1093) with SEG LI 
1054.10-11 (c.280) and Syll.
3
 398.23-8 (279/8), which both express concern for Kos‘ fragile democracy.  
139
 IK.Ilion 25 (App.2 num.25), a democratic oath text dated to the early 3
rd
 century by the editors. Lund (1992: 
120-2), Rose (2003: 27-8), and Hertel (2004: 196) disassociate it from Lysimachos, but Hertel dates it shortly 
after his reign. Funck (1994; SEG XLIV 981) connects it with Seleukos‘ grants of eleutheria and demokratia 
after Korupedion. See also, Dössel 2003: 197-221 (SEG LIII 1372); Maffi 2005. 
140
 IK.Eph. 1453.5-6 (300/299); I.Didyma 479.5-9, 14-16 (300/299); 480.10-13 (300/299). 
141
 Piety: Schenkungen KNr. 280 (RC 5: donations to Apollo Didyma, 288/7); KNr. 304+460 (dedication to 
Zeus Olbios, 281/0). Relations with the Greeks: Heinen 1972: 37-46; Mehl 1986: 217-19; Grainger 1990: 179-
91; add also IK.Stratonikeia 1001. 
142
 IK.Ery. 504.14-20 (App.2 num.33); below n.152. 
72 
 
ancestors (progonoi) to the city.
143
 He also returned eleutheria and demokratia to Miletos and 
Didyma in 259/8,
144
 autonomia and demokratia to Smyrna c.248-242,
145
 and eleutheria and 
demokratia to Labraunda c.240.
146
 In the cases of the Ionian League, Miletos, Smyrna, and 
Labraunda the return of eleutheria also brought a return of demokratia, whether guaranteed 
by the king or emphasised by the city. Royal confirmations of freedom and democracy reflect 
the strong civic preference for the empowerment of the demos as a guarantee of political 
independence, as is emphasised at Priene (300-297),
147
 in the cities of Asia Minor (280-
278),
148
 at Kyme (280-270),
149
 and Erythrai (c.270-260).
150
 Further, numerous democratic 
oath texts of the 3
rd
 century detail the duties of the citizen in preserving the city‘s democracy 
and living according to its rules. Examples from the Tauric Chersonnese, Erythrai, Kalymna, 
and Kos reveal the close inter-connection between eleutheria and demokratia in civic 
ideology and show that though established within the Classical Period, this continued to 
expand during the 3
rd
 century (Ch.5 §2.2).
151
 





centuries continued throughout the 3
rd
 (see Ch.3 §1.1-2), such as tax exemption (IK.Ery. 
31.21-8) and the removal of garrisons (Memn. FGrH 434 F9) or tyrants (I.Didyma 358; App. 
Syr. 344). Attempts to offer a more precise definition of eleutheria through the imposition of 
modifying criteria, such as aphorologetos, aphrouresia, and patrios politeia, continued into 
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 IK.Ery. 31.21-8 (App.2 num.35); cf. Heuß 1937: 219. On the date, see Ma 1999: 267-8. IK.Ery. 30 is a 
fragmented honorary decree for Antiochos that is perhaps connected with this confirmation, see Habicht 1970: 
95-9. Piejko (1987: 713) offers an audacious but untenable restoration. 
144
 I.Didyma 358.6-7 (App.2 num.36); see below pg.182 with n.101 for context. In a later letter to Miletos 
(c.246-241) Seleukos II refers to ―the many great benefactions granted to your city by our ancestors (progonoi) 
and my father‖, implying no doubt Antiochos II‘s earlier liberation (I.Didyma 493.2-3; Corradi 1929: 218). 
145
 IK.Smyrna 573.65-6 (App.2 num.37); cf. FD III (4) 153.6-9 (App.2 num.38) referring to eleutheria and 
aphorologesia. IK.Smyrna 576 (App.2 num.39) is a severely fragmentary mid-3
rd
 century inscription referring 
to τὴν δη*μοκρατίαν — | — τὴν αυ+τονομίαν *— | — κα+ὶ ἀφρουρη*το— | — τὴ+ν πάτριον *πολίτειαν —]; it is 
perhaps connected with the synoikism, on which see now Bencivenni 2003: 203-46. 
146
 I.Labraunda 3a.7-8; 5.34; 7.9-10 (eleutheria); 3a.29-31 (demokratia); 8b.13-15 (eleutheria and demokratia); 
App.2 nums.40, 43, 44, 41. For Mylasa under Seleukos, Olympichos, and Philip V between 240-220, see 
Bencivenni 2003: 247-98. Isager & Karlsson (2008; App.2 num.42) publish a new inscription in honour of 
Olympichos of c.230-220 and mentioning eleutheria and demokratia (cf. BE 122 [2009] num.47). 
147
 I.Priene 11 (App.2 num.21); cf. IK.Eph. 2001; I.Priene 37.65-112. 
148
 Memn. FGrH 434 F11.4. 
149
 SEG LIV 1229 (App.2 num.29) details the responsibilities of generals to preserve and not undermine 
Kyme‘s democracy. It is perhaps connected with SEG L 1195 (dated c.270 by Gauthier in SEG LIII 1365), 
which honours Philetairos for a gift of weapons and mentions his concern for Kyme‘s democracy, cf. IK.Kyme 
12. 
150
 IK.Ery. 29 (App.2 num.34). Note also IK.Ery. 503, a 3
rd
 century copy of a late 4
th
 century decree honouring 
Philistes the tyrannicide and defender of democracy, see Heisserer 1979; Teegarden 2007: 182-209. 
151
 Chersonese: IOSPE I 401.5-14 (App.2 num.20). Dössel (2003: 179-96) sees it as a democratic oath sworn 
during civil war; cf. Chaniotis 2008: 116. Erythrai: IK.Ery. 504.15-18 (App.2 num.33). Kalymna: SV 545.21-2 
(App.2 num.46); cf. below pg.173 with n.66. Kos: Herzog 1942: 15 (App.2 num.18), an as yet fully 





 century. Again, this was connected with one‘s ability to create and enforce definition. 
On the one hand, the city achieved this by exploiting moral force to persuade the king to 
grant benefactions and statuses, like freedom. So, the Ionian League dispatched ambassadors 
to Antiochos I requesting that the king take care of the cities so that they remain free, 
democratic, and exercising their ancestral laws. Further, these ambassadors were to ―reveal 
[to the king] that in doing so he will be responsible for many good things for the cities and at 
the same time will act in accordance with the policy (airesis) of his ancestors (progonoi)‖.
152
 
Campanile emphasises the importance of reciprocity and indirect force in this passage: 
loyalty is displayed to the king through cult and ancestors, thus legitimising the royal line and 
Seleukid power; in return the guarantee of freedom, democracy and ancestral laws is 
requested, thus weakening the king‘s position as benefactor and forcing him to respond in 
kind with benefactions, in this case specified by the cities themselves.
153
 A similar situation 
appears at Erythrai which sent ambassadors to Antiochos II to show him that the city was 
autonomous and aphorologetos under Alexander and Antigonos, thus pressuring him to outdo 
his predecessors by reconfirming the city‘s earlier status and granting added benefits through 
the remittance of the Galatian tax.
154
 In both cases, it was the city that dictated the terms of its 
eleutheria and the criteria that constituted it by exploiting ancestral precedent, dynastic 
loyalty, and moral obligation. 
      On the other hand, however, the increased definition of eleutheria was also achieved by 
the king‘s favouring of specific modifying criteria, such as Antigonos‘ aforementioned 
preference for aphrouresia (§4 above), thus emphasising his ability to create and enforce 
definitions through a monopoly on the granting of status benefactions (see further Ch.3 §2.2). 
The Nesiotic League posthumously honoured Ptolemy Soter for his return of eleutheria, 
nomoi, patrios politeia, and his remittance of eisphorai;
155
 Lysimacheia‘s treaty with 
Antiochos I guaranteed the city‘s eleutheria/autonomia, demokratia, aphorologesia, and 
aphrouresia,
156
 while Seleukos II later recognised Smyrna‘s eleutheria, autonomia, 
demokratia, isonomia, and aphorologesia of land and city.
157
 The movement towards 
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defining eleutheria was an interconnected process undertaken by both city and king through 
different, yet related, methods. 
 
Section 9: The Gallic Invasions in Greece and Asia, 280-270 
      The king‘s monopoly on status benefactions and his role as defender of the Greek cities 
become more clearly conceptualised through the Gallic invasions of 280-278. These allowed 
the king to gain support and goodwill by presenting himself as protector and defender from 
the barbarian threat. When the Gauls arrived in Greece and Asia their repulse was initially 
undertaken by the cities. In Europe, Macedon was overrun and its then king Ptolemaios 
Keraunos was killed in battle.
158
 An alliance of Greek states staged an unsuccessful defence 
at Thermopylai in summer/autumn 279,
159
 before the Gauls were eventually repulsed at 
Delphi in late 279 by an alliance of Aitolians, Athenians, and Phokians, with not a little 
divine help.
160
 In Asia the Gauls were ferried across the Hellespont in 278 by Nikomedes of 
Bithynia to be used as mercenaries in his dynastic struggle with his brother and to defend 
both himself and the Northern League from Seleukid expansion.
161
 However, they soon took 
to ransacking the poleis‘ land, a soft target for their smash-and-grab style of warfare. Priene 
(I.Priene 17) and Erythrai (IK.Ery. 24, 28, cf. 29) undertook their own spirited defence, as did 
Kyzikos and Kyme with some assistance from Philetairos of Pergamon.
162
 
      The Gallic invasions offered the kings a golden opportunity to present themselves as 
defenders of the Greek cities, a means to legitimise their power and promote their own piety 
and Hellenism.
163
 In Greece Antigonos Gonatas defeated a body of Gauls at Lysimacheia in 
spring 277.
164
 Soon after, this victory was presented as being ―on behalf of the soteria of the 
Greeks‖ and commemorated by stelai dedicated in Antigonos‘ honour by Herakleitos of 
Athmonon on the Athenian akropolis during the Great Panathenaia of either 262/1 or 258/7 
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 In Asia, the kings also began to assume roles as defenders of the Greek cities 
from Gallic incursions.
166
 Erythrai moved from conducting its own defence to paying 
Antiochos II a protective Galatian tax (ta Galatika).
167
 Similarly, Philetairos‘ assistance to the 




      The Gallic Invasions lead to the creation of a new barbarian motif in Hellenistic history 
and historiography, a new ‗Other‘.
169
 Macedon kings continued to be presented as barbarians 
via a parallel with the Persian Wars (Ch.6 §2-3), but the violent arrival of the Gauls allowed 
the Macedonian kings themselves a means of promoting their Hellenic qualities. As a lieu de 
mémoire the Gallic Invasion of Greece was paralleled with the Persian Wars in form (as a 
violent barbarian invasion), in space (battles at Thermopylai and Delphi), but interestingly 
not in concept (Ch.6 §4). The Persian Wars were as a struggle for eleutheria; the Gallic 
Invasion for soteria. The conceptual difference reflected the different nature of the threat 
posed: one was lasting and political while the other was temporary and destructive. While the 
Gallic Invasion provided a fresh conceptualisation of the ‗Other‘ within the Hellenistic 
Period, one particularly employed by the Macedonian kings, it did not overtake the memory 
of the Persian Wars as a struggle for eleutheria. Thus, the Chremonidean War of 268-262 
was presented as a war fought on behalf of eleutheria because the nature of the struggle with 
Macedon was political, not one of small-scale raids. The Gallic Invasions marked a re-
discovery of the ‗Other‘, but they did not affect the ideological relevance of the Persian Wars 
as the parallel par excellence for a struggle for eleutheria. 
 
Section 10: Antigonos Gonatas and the Chremonidean War, 268-262 
      Since the departure of Demetrios to Asia in 287 Antigonos Gonatas‘ power had rested 
upon the tyrants and garrisons, such as Piraeus and elsewhere in the Peloponnese, installed by 
his father and loyal to him. This system of control was understandably unpopular, but 
necessary for the kingdom-less king, and was exploited by Pyrrhos who invaded the 
Peloponnese in 272 ―to set free the cities which were subject to Antigonos‖ (Plu. Pyrrh. 26.9-
10). Pyrrhos died that year (Plu. Pyrrh. 31-4) and Antigonos‘ position as king of Macedon 
was then secure. Nonetheless, he continued to rely on strategically placed tyrants and 
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 This dependency contributed to the Chremonidean War which was ostensibly 
undertaken by Athens, Sparta, and Ptolemy Philadelphos on behalf of the freedom of the 
Greeks and against Antigonos‘ destruction of the laws and constitutions of the Greek 
states.
171
 The war began in the archonship of Peithidemos (268/7) and finished in that of 
Antipatros (262/1) with Antigonos‘ capture of Athens by siege after his destruction of its 
harvest. Antigonos had kept the enemy troops divided by holding Acrocorinth and the 
Isthmos against Areos of Sparta, and preventing the Ptolemaic troops in Attica under 
Patroklos from rendezvousing with either those of Athens or Sparta.
172
 Athens‘ defeat came 
with the bitter imposition of yet another Macedonian garrison on the Museion, as well as the 
attendant loss of the Attic forts; freedom again lost with garrisons installed.
173
 However, as a 
measure of the connection between aphrouresia and eleutheria, Athens‘ freedom was 
returned by Antigonos in 256/5 when he removed the garrisons at Museion, Eleusis, 
Panakton, Phyle, Rhamnous, and Aphidnai, restored control of Lemnos and Imbros to 
Athens, and gave to the city the independence to elect its own officials.
174
 Piraeus, however, 
remained in Antigonos‘ control. 
      The evidence for the Chremonidean War is severely fragmented. We are fortunate, 
however, to have three important epigraphic texts which elucidate the ways in which Athens 
conceived of and presented the war as a struggle for eleutheria from Macedonian control. 
First, the Chremonides Decree of 268/7 (IG II
2
 686/7). Proposed by Chremonides son of 
Eteokles of Aithalides, it declares war on Macedon and very carefully presents this as a 
struggle for eleutheria (Ch.6 §3.1). This was done by assimilating Macedon to Persia and 
using Athens‘ defence of Greece‘s eleutheria in 480/79 as a parallel for her present actions. 
As with the Hellenic War, this process enforced Athens‘ hegemony by reference to the past. 
It presented the war as part of a wider cultural and quasi-national struggle against a foreign, 
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barbarian opponent (in the mould of Persia), thus assimilating to it a pre-existing, ready-made 
ideological context that asserted Athenian hegemony, Macedonian ‗otherness‘, and Hellenic 
unity through the quest for eleutheria. In contrast with the Hellenic War, however, the 
Chremonides Decree does emphasise some new elements, namely Atheno-Spartan unity and 
the need for homonoia between the Greek cities as a prerequisite of eleutheria from 
Macedon. Athens and Sparta had not stood united since 480/79 so their alliance now 
emphasised both the connection with the Persian Wars and the perception of the 
Chremonidean War as a national, Hellenic struggle in their image.
175
 
      Second, the Glaukon Decree of c.261-246.
176
 Proposed by the synedrion of the Greeks at 
Plataia it honours Glaukon son of Eteokles of Aithalides, brother of Chremonides and officer 
of Ptolemy Philadelphos (Ch.6 §3.2). Glaukon fought with Athens during the Chremonidean 
War and after Athens‘ defeat took up service with Ptolemy Philadelphos (Teles On Exile 23). 
The decree re-emphasises the tropes explored within the Chremonides Decree – connection 
with the Persian Wars, focus on Greek eleutheria, homonoia as an aspect of this, Ptolemaic 
assistance to the Greeks – and provides our first evidence for both the joint cult of Zeus 
Eleutherios and Homonoia of the Greeks as well as the Eleutheria Games in honour of the 
dead of 480/79. The origin of both cult and Games is debated, but their evident importance 
within the mid-3
rd
 century suggests that they are closely connected with the programme 
presented in the Chremonides Decree: homonoia, eleutheria, and the remembrance of the 
Persian Wars. Both cult and Games appear to have operated as foci of anti-Macedonianism, a 
dynamic aided by the importance of Plataia as a lieu de mémoire for eleutheria and the 
Persian Wars. This is furthered by a recently published decree in honour of Eudamos, 
assassin of Aristodamos, the Antigonid-backed tyrant of Megalopolis. That this decree was to 
be announced at the Eleutheria Games elucidates their politicisation and the concomitant use 
of Plataia and its historical traditions – Eleutheria Games and joint cult – as a mid-3
rd
 century 
recruiting ground for a loose alliance of anti-Antigonid states.
177
 
      Third, the honorary decree for Strombichos of 266/5 (IG II
2
 666+667; Naturalization 
D78a+b). The decree was passed in winter 266/5, in the middle of the Chremonidean War, 
and records that Strombichos was a Macedonian officer who had been stationed in the 
Museion garrison by Demetrios Poliorketes but had defected to the Athenian side in 287; he 
helped Olympiodoros‘ troops capture the garrison and aided the demos‘ struggle for 
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 The timing of the decree is notable. The Chremonidean War was, in part, 
Athens‘ attempt to remove the Macedonian garrison from Piraeus, an action deemed 
necessary for the full appreciation of the eleutheria of the united polis (asty and Piraeus). By 
winter 266/5 the war had been going on for two years and Athens had united with the forces 
of neither Patroklos nor Areos. By turning to the past and honouring Strombichos, now 
twenty years after the event in question, Athens revisited another potential means of attaining 
its goal: the removal of garrisons through the defection or bribery of Macedonian officers. 
This approach had failed spectacularly at Piraeus in the late 280s but was ultimately to prove 
successful in 229.
179
 Strombichos‘ example from 287 bears many similarities to that of 
Euphron of Sikyon in 318: an event and personality of the past is revisited and re-honoured 
because his previous actions are of present importance to the city. In both cases they had 
liberated a city by removing a garrison from it – Sikyon for Euphron; Athens and the 
Museion garrison for Strombichos – and were seen by Athens as successful historical 
solutions to the perennial problem of the Macedonian garrison in Mounychia and the 





      In this chapter I offered a narrative history of the early Hellenistic Period based around 
the use of eleutheria within ruler-city relations. I presented an outline of the historical 
development and use of eleutheria that will be explored in greater depth within the 
subsequent chapters. Rather than assuming a division between the Classical and Hellenistic 
periods I traced the continuities in the use of eleutheria and the ways in which it was 
understood. Both city and king used it to expand hegemony by claiming to liberate the 
oppressed from external control (§§1-3, 5-6, 8, 10). As in the 5
th
 century, eleutheria 
continued to be undermined by garrisons (§§3-4) and taxation (§§1, 5, 8), while remaining 
closely connected with democracy and one‘s ability to govern according to one‘s own laws 
(§§1, 3, 6-8, 10). 
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      I was sensitive to the continuity of the use and understanding of eleutheria from the 
Classical to Hellenistic Periods. Eleutheria continued to be seen to be undermined by 
oppressive foreign control and remained an important rallying cry for release from such 
control. While the nature of that control changed in many cases from that exercised by a city 
to that exercised by a king, its manifestations remained the same: garrisons, taxation, 
submission to external laws/authority, and the imposition of tyrannies. The growing 
synonymity of eleutheria and autonomia seen from the early 4
th
 century continued into the 
3
rd
, and the use of modifying criteria like aphorologesia and aphrouresia as a means of 
defining eleutheria was advanced by both civic petition and royal status definition and so 
remained central to its significance within international diplomacy (§§3-4, 8, 10). 
       With an eye towards the subsequent analytical chapters, I sketched the importance of 
eleutheria as a medium of interaction between city and king. Eleutheria was employed in 
different yet connected ways by both parties and served as a point of dialogue for promoting 
either unity or discord. Specific attention was placed on the royal use of eleutheria as a 
means of ensuring Greek goodwill (eunoia) and support, both for expansionist campaigns 
(§§3-6) and as a means of unifying their empire (§§1, 4, 8); it provided a means of defining a 
king‘s relationship with his subjects through persuasion and patronage rather than force and 
military might. To ensure support kings were concerned with appearing truthful and sincere 
and so granted real, tangible benefactions. The civic awareness of such royal concerns 
allowed cities to use moral force as a means of attaining and perpetuating such benefactions. 
Eleutheria was a slogan and cynically employed at times, but it played an important and 
central role in the relationship between city and king (further, Ch.3-4). 
      Also, in anticipation of the subsequent thematic chapters, I was aware of the important 
role played by the memory and commemoration of eleutheria (and the Persian Wars) as a 
means of defining and manipulating the present. The use of a strong, aggressive democratic 
ideology to adapt the past to the needs of the present is particularly apparent at Athens with 
its cycles of oligarchy and democracy (§§2-3, 6-7). Reference to both the Persian Wars (§§1-
2, 9-10) and the Hellenic War of 323/2 (§§3, 6) was used to ascribe to later conflicts a pre-
existing ideological programme based around the concept of eleutheria. The concept of the 
lieu de mémoire shows that the processes of this appropriation are dynamic and are formed 
through institutions (League of Corinth emulating Hellenic League of 481-478, §1), action 
(present wars paralleled with past ones, §§1-3, 9-10), space (Corinth and Plataia, §§1, 2, 10), 































Chapter 3: Analysing and Understanding Eleutheria in the Early 
Hellenistic Period 
 
―Freedom…required definition, and unlike the Romans, the Greeks had trouble 
with definitions.‖ 
Welles 1965: 32 
 
―It was the political theory of the day that cities were sovereign…There was no 
room in the theory for a king of a large territorial state to rule over a city, nor for a 
satrap either. But, as so often, people managed well enough without paying too 
much attention to the theory.‖ 
Grainger 1990: 136 
 
―En principe, la liberté et l‘autonomie excluaient la paiement d‘un tribute au 
souverain et l‘installation d‘une garrison royale dans la cité.‖ 
Migeotte 2005: 195 
 
Introduction 
      Statements of freedom can be read in different ways with each conditioning one‘s 
understanding of eleutheria. For example, according to the Peace of Nikias of 421 Delphi 
was to be autoteles, autodikos, and autonomos (Th. 5.18.2). In his study of autonomia, 
Ostwald read this exclusively, understanding that there existed a form of autonomia 
compatible with taxation and interference with the laws. Hansen read this inclusively and 
argued that autoteles and autodikos simply intensified the meaning of autonomia and defined 
two specific aspects of it.
1
 This is paradigmatic of the difficulties of understanding eleutheria. 
In 309, when Iasos allies with Ptolemy and was acknowledged as eleutheros, autonomos, 
aphrouretos, and aphorologetos (IK.Iasos 2), does this mean that there existed a form of 
eleutheria compatible with a phroura (garrison) and phoros (tax), or rather that aphrouresia 
and aphorologesia were two elements of eleutheria and simply intensified its meaning? 
      Crucially, both readings are semantically possible because the expression is ambiguous. 
However, some years later, c.305-283, Iasos again describes itself as eleutheros and 
autonomos even though it contributes a syntaxis (contribution), hosts a Ptolemaic phylake 
(defence), and is under the jurisdiction of a regional overseer or two (IK.Iasos 3). How is this 
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compatible with Iasos‘ earlier position as aphrouretos and aphorologetos? The answer raises 
two interesting points for this chapter. First, phylake and syntaxis are different terms and so 
compatible with the strict conditions of the 309 treaty, which only excluded a phroura and 
phoros.
2
 They denote a different intention and ideology by emphasising protection, 
negotiation, and synergy rather than oppression and taxation. Second, eleutheria is adaptable 
to the necessities of a situation. Eleutheria and autonomia originally appeared to guarantee 
exemption from taxation (phoros) and garrisoning (phroura), but this does not mean that they 
were incompatible with other forms of financial or military interference. Thus, the inherent 
ambiguity of the mantra ‗free, untaxed, and ungarrisoned‘ is put to work: by itself, IK.Iasos 2 
is read best by Hansen, but with the addition of IK.Iasos 3 Ostwald‘s reading becomes 
preferable (with the necessary disclaimer on terminologies). Each reading is correct in part 
and each is equally valid for understanding eleutheria. Neither, however, takes full 
cognisance of the adaptability of eleutheria to the necessities of different situations. This is 
what makes it so difficult to define and so useful an aspect of ruler-city relations, and this is 
what this chapter seeks to explore. 
      This chapter is divided into two sections, with the first offering a framework for the 
second. Section 1 deals with two of the most important features seen to negate eleutheria: 
taxation and garrisons.
3
 I repeat the argument that grants of aphrouresia and aphorologesia 
only absolved the city from the phroura and phoros and were compatible with other 
impositions like the phylake or syntaxis. Furthermore, I argue that these features need not 
always undermine a state‘s eleutheria, in fact they could be perfectly compatible with it, even 
contributory to it. Section 2 expands on this and in three parts explores the different ways of 
analysing, defining, and understanding eleutheria. Focus is placed on the adaptable use in 
action of eleutheria as an aspect of ruler-city relations. Part 1 looks at defining eleutheria 
through Positive and Negative understandings of freedom.
4
 It argues against a single meaning 
for eleutheria and emphasises instead the difficulties in defining freedom based on the 
ancient criteria used to classify it. This, more than anything else, argues for the fundamentally 
adaptive nature of eleutheria in use and understanding. Building from this, Part 2 focuses on 
its use in action and shows how seemingly mutually exclusive readings of eleutheria could 
appear in one situation. I argue that for a more layered appreciation of its meaning we must 
analyse each of its apparently contradictory or cynical uses as valid interpretations of 
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eleutheria. Part 3 treats of eleutheria as part of the typology of statuses between city and 
king. Having already established the fluidity of its use in action, Part 3 eschews the creation 
of rigorous typologies and argues for a more malleable understanding of the use and meaning 
of eleutheria in ruler-city relations. 
 
SECTION 1: NEGATIONS OF ELEUTHERIA 
1.1: Garrisons 
      The foreign garrison is the quintessential example of an oppressive imposition on a city‘s 
eleutheria. It is, however, evident that in certain cases the imposition of garrisons was not 
only compatible with eleutheria but even a defence (phylake) of it. Here I wish to look briefly 
at such contrasting views of the garrison and emphasise how it could be understood either as 
an imposition on or defence of freedom. Connected with this is the distinction between a 
phroura (garrison) and phylake (defence). The view is not new, but it is important and needs 
re-emphasis: a city subject to a garrison was not necessarily un-free.
5
 Such manifestations of 
royal power did not debase eleutheria into a meaningless slogan. Rather, eleutheria was 
adaptable to the necessities of power and more than one understanding of it existed: forms of 
garrisons and taxation were compatible with eleutheria for cities under royal control, just as 
they were incompatible for cities outside it. Employing again the very real distinction 
between understanding freedom in a Primary or Secondary sense, it is important to recognise 
the different understandings of eleutheria based on its use by cities within and outwith royal 
control. 
      The imposition of a garrison by a foreign power was generally seen as oppressive and 
indicative of foreign control, as reactions to Sparta‘s garrisoning of Athens in 404 and Thebes 
in 382 show.
6
 As a result of these actions, the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy 
saw freedom from garrisons as a core aspect of eleutheria (IG II
2
 43.23). Later, and echoing 
the events of 382, Thebes asserted in 335 that she could not be free while the Kadmea was 
garrisoned by Macedon (below §2.2). Hellenistic examples are legion. The Macedonian 
garrison (phroura) in Mounychia from 322-307 and 295-229 was consistently seen to be a 
negation of Athens‘ eleutheria.
7
 In 323 Rhodes regained its eleutheria by removing its 
                                                 
5
 Heuβ 1937: 108-9, 230-1; Préaux 1978: 410; Gruen 1984: 136; Ma 1999: 165-74; Capdetrey 2007: 193-215. 
6
 Athens: Xen. Hell. 2.3.13-14; Lys. 12.39-40, 58-61; Raaflaub 2004: 237-41. Thebes: Buckler & Beck 2008: 
71-8. 
7
 D.S. 18.66.2 (318); 20.45-46.1 (307); IG II
2
 657.34-6 (283/2; App.1 num.38); 834.10-12 (229/8): καὶ τὴν 
ἐλευθερίαν ἀποκατέστησ*εν τῆι πόλει με+|τὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ Μικίωνος μετὰ τοὺς ἀπ*οδόντας τὸν Πει+|ραιᾶ. 





 In 319 Kyzikos chose to resist Arrhidaios forcefully and undergo 
siege rather than accept a garrison (phroura) and change of constitution.
9
 In 313/2 Antigonos‘ 
generals Dokimos and Medeios freed Miletos by removing Asandros‘ phroura, an event 
Miletos saw as the return of its eleutheria and autonomia.
10
 In 281/0 Herakleia regained its 
eleutheria from Lysimachos by bribing the troops of his garrison (phroura), imprisoning their 
commander Herakleides, and razing the akropolis walls.
11
 Similarly, the Greek cities of the 
Black Sea asserted their autonomia from Lysimachos in 314/3 by expelling his phrourai.
12
 
Furthermore, a series of 3
rd
 century anti-tyranny decrees make territorial inviolability a key 
component of the free, democratic state.
13
 Common to all these examples is the presentation 
of the garrison as a phroura, a restrictive foreign imposition on the city‘s freedom. 
      In certain cases, however, the presence of foreign garrisons could be justified as a defence 
against an opponent who threatened the city‘s freedom.
14
 This understanding depended upon 
the reality of the threat posed by that opponent and the ability of the ruling power to present 
the garrison as a defensive feature contributing to the preservation of the city‘s eleutheria. 
Under Philip and Alexander the League of Corinth had Macedonian garrisons in Ambrakia, 
Thebes, and Corinth, and appointed officials ―in charge of the common defence‖ (οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ 
κοινῇ φυλακῇ τεταγμένοι).15 Their ostensible purpose was to maintain the status quo and 
ensure the peaceful co-existence of League members. Since the opening lines of the League 
Charter claimed that all members were ―free and autonomous‖ (D. 17.8), the garrisons and 
commanders officially contributed to this freedom even if they undermined a basic tenet of 
eleutheria as defined some forty years earlier in the charter of the Second Athenian 
                                                 
8
 D.S. 18.8.1; Ps.-Call. 3.33.4; cf. Liber de Morte 107; Wolohojian 1969: 272, pg.153. On this garrison, see 
Hauben 1977: 307-11; Wiemer 2011: 125-6. 
9
 D.S. 18.51-2; IG XII (5) 444.114; cf. Ath. 11.509a with Heckel 2006: 295 n.128. 
10
 D.S. 19.75.3-4; I.Milet. 123.1-4 (App.2 num.7). Other examples of the Antigonid removal of garrisons are 
Opus in 313/2 (D.S. 19.78.5; FD III (4) 463 [App.1 num.11]) and Troizen (RIG 452.7-9 [App.1 num.27]) and 
Argos in 303 (Plu. Demetr. 25.1; ISE 39; cf. Schenkungen KNr. 42-3). 
11
 Memn. FGrH 434 F6.1-2; Burstein 1976: 85-7. 
12
 D.S. 19.73. See also Burstein 1986a; 1986b; 1980: 75, where he argues that Lysimachos only used garrisons 
in ―special circumstances‖. 
13
 Different features are emphasised. SEG LI 1105.24-30 (teicha); Herzog 1942: 15 (tan akran); IOSPE I 401.8-
12, 18-22 (limena, teiche, chora); SV 545.23-6 (phrourai). 
14
 Bertoli 2003: 97-8. A good example is D.S. 19.66.3, where Aristodemos garrisons Kyllene to ensure its safety 
(τὴν ἀσφάλειαν) from Alexandros, son of Polyperchon. 
15
 D. 17.15; IG II
2
 329.12-13. Culasso Gastaldi (1984: 65-72) emphasises their military function and Bosworth 
(1994b: 849) calls them garrison commanders. Hammond & Griffith (1979: 639-42), however, disagree. The 
clearest parallel for the office is the position of the royal strategos in Demetrios‘ Hellenic League (SV 446.68-
9): *τῶι στρατηγ+ῶι τῶι ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων ἐπὶ τῆς κοι|*ν+ῆς φυλακῆς καταλελειμμέν*ωι+. 
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Confederacy, namely the absence of garrisons.
16
 However, the garrisons were widely seen 
neither as defence from Persia, itself endangered by Macedonian imperialism, nor guarantees 
of inter-polis peace. For many they were simply the impositions of an oppressive power. 
Accordingly, the Akarnanians expelled their garrison upon Philip‘s death and Thebes sought 
to expel the garrison on Kadmea in 335, declaring that she could not be free so long as she 
was garrisoned (D.S. 17.3.3-4.3; Din. 1.19-20). The view of garrisons as defending freedom 
was not in itself impossible, but the problem lay in the fact that although Philip and 
Alexander sought to present the garrisons as a defence of eleutheria, as ensured by 
membership of the League of Corinth, they served no ostensible purpose for the likes of 
Thebes, Athens, and Argos, other than repressing by force their own eleutheria. 
      There are, however, examples of foreign garrisons – frequently a phylake but sometimes a 
phroura – serving defensive purposes and contributing directly or indirectly to the city‘s 
freedom. In 334, Alexander installed garrisons in Chios (phylake; praesidium) and Priene 
(phroura), in each case justified by reference to the city‘s eleutheria. With further garrisons 
in Mytilene (phroura) and Rhodes (praesidium) the connection between defensive garrisons 
and civic freedom was probably widespread.
17
 From 315 onwards Antigonid policy focused 
on aphrouresia as a defining feature of freedom,
18
 but when garrisons did appear they were 
apparently justified as a defence of the eleutheria guaranteed under Antigonid suzerainty.
19
 
Iasos, liberated in 313, was garrisoned by Polemaios – under Antigonos‘ orders – by 309 at 
the latest, perhaps as a precautionary defence of its freedom (IK.Iasos 2). After the Peace of 
311 Ptolemy charged Antigonos with having broken the clause regarding Greek freedom 
because he had garrisoned the cities of Kilikia,
20
 but these garrisons were likely precautions 
against the kind of destructive raids launched by Ptolemy himself on these cities in summer 
312 (D.S. 19.79.6-7). 
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 Above pg.46 n.5. Bertoli 2003 uses the charter (IG II
2
 43) as a yardstick against which to measure subsequent 
uses of eleutheria. This is contentious. The charter is an attempted definition constructed in response to Spartan 
actions; it is not the conclusive definition, such a thing did not exist. 
17
 Chios: GHI 84a; Curt. 4.8.12-13. Priene: GHI 86b.14-15; that Alexander ‗allows‘ the garrison (καὶ τὴμ 
φρουρ *ὰ+ν ἐ|φ*ίημι ὑμῖν εἰ+σάγει*ν εἰς τὴν ἄκραν+) may suggest that it was controlled by Priene, contra Mileta 
2008: 101; cf. Sherwin-White 1985: 86 n.141 ―Alexander‘s recommendation about the phroura is too 
fragmentary for any certainty as to its original purpose.‖ Mytilene: Arr. An. 2.1.4; cf. Curt. 4.5.9. Rhodes: Curt. 
4.8.12-13. Hauben (above n.8) argues that it undermined Rhodes‘ freedom. 
18
 D.S. 19.61.3 (εἶναι δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἅπαντας ἐλευθέρους͵ ἀφρουρήτους͵ αὐτονόμους). Chalkis, for 
example, had its phroura removed in 313/2 (D.S. 19.78.2), c.306/5 (IG II
2
 469; App.1 num.17), and 304 (D.S. 
20.100.6; Schweigert 1937: 323-7 num.4 [App.1 num.19]; IG XII (5) 444 frag.b.128-9). 
19
 Simpson (1959: 404-5) argues that, where it appears, garrisoning was a necessity, not a weakness in 
Antigonid policy relating to Greeks. This is exculpatory, but Antigonos was more sparing with garrisons than, 
say, Kassandros and Ptolemy in Greece and the Aegean. 
20
 D.S. 20.19.3-6: ἐγκαλέσαντες Ἀντιγόνῳ διότι φρουραῖς τινας διείληφε τῶν πόλεων. 
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      Demetrios‘ Hellenic League of 302/1 justified the installation of garrisons in numerous 
locations around Greece as a defence of eleutheria from the very real, and very recent, threat 
of Kassandros and his generals. At Corinth, Prepelaos‘ phroura was removed from the 
Acrocorinth and replaced, on the Corinthians‘ own insistence, with a defensive phylake until 
such time as the war with Kassandros ends.
21
 Further garrisons at key locations such as 
Aigosthena (perhaps also Megara) and possibly Chalkis ensured wider security without 
risking public opinion.
22
 Late in 302 Prepelaos attacked Ephesos, Teos, Kolophon, Erythrai, 
and Klazomenai. Diodoros‘ account implies that some, if not all, held Antigonid garrisons, 
particularly Ephesos, whose constitution Prepelaos altered.
23
 However, an honorary decree of 
the Ionian League of 306-301, of which all the above cities were members, refers to ―the 
eleutheria and autonomia of the cities‖, thus signifying that although holding Antigonid 
garrisons these cities remained free and autonomous.
24
 In fact, individual League poleis like 
Teos, Kolophon, and Erythrai explicitly refer to themselves as free during Antigonos‘ reign.
25
 
Further, and emphasising again the distinction between an imposing phroura and a defensive 
phylake, Diodoros records that when Demetrios re-took Ephesos in late 302 he removed 
Prepelaos‘ phroura and replaced it with his own phylake.
26
 Similarly, Lysimachos‘ garrisons 
and troops defended Priene and other cities during Demetrios‘ raids in 287/6.
27
 Later, 
Seleukid troops and garrisons in Asia Minor offered protection to the cities against Gallic 
raids.
28
 Although not apparent in each and every case, it is clear that a contributing factor in 
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 D.S. 20.103.1-3: τὴν Κόρινθον͵ ἣν ἐφρούρει Πρεπέλαος…τῶν δὲ φρουρῶν καταφυγόντων…τοὺς 
Κορινθίους ἐλευθερώσας [Demetrios] παρεισήγαγε φυλακὴν εἰς τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον͵ βουλομένων τῶν 
πολιτῶν διὰ τοῦ βασιλέως τηρεῖσθαι τὴν πόλιν μέχρι ἅν ὁ πρὸς Κάσανδρον καταλυθῇ πόλεμος. 
22
 Aigosthena: above pgs.62-3 with n.88. Chalkis: implied by the fact that Chalkis was the gathering point for 
Demetrios‘ land and sea forces in spring 302 (D.S. 20.110.2; Knoepfler Décrets XIII, 10, XIV [=IG XII (9) 198, 
199+230, 210]; cf. Plu. Demetr. 43.3). 
23
 D.S. 20.107.4-5; IK.Eph. 1449 with Rogers 2001: 615-20. On Prepelaos‘ campaign, see pg.65 above. 
24
 IK.Ilion 1.24-6 (App.2 num.17). For the speculative attribution of this text to the reign of Lysimachos, see 
above pg.57 n.61. 
25
 RC 3-4.87-89 (App.2 num.16); Mauerbauinschriften 69.6-7 (App.2 num.9); IK.Ery. 31.22-3 (App.2 
num.35). 
26
 D.S. 20.111.3: καὶ τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ Πρεπελάου τοῦ Λυσιμάχου στρατηγοῦ παρεισαχθεῖσαν φρουρὰν ἀφῆκεν 
ὑπόσπονδον͵ ἰδίαν δὲ φυλακὴν εἰς τὴν ἄκραν καταστήσας παρῆλθεν εἰς Ἑλλήσποντον. See also Rogers 
2001: 615-20 with IK.Eph. 1448, 1450 (=Bielman Retour 16), 1452-3, 1455. A phroura on Andros in 308, 
installed by either Antigonos or his renegade general Polemaios, is recorded by Diodoros (D.S. 20.37.1; above 
pg.61 with n.80). 
27
 I.Priene 14 (=BD 11), 15 (=RC 6), cf. 16 (=RC 8). 
28
 OGIS 748 (=Austin 225); Grainger 1990: 205-6; Ma 1999: 257-68, reading OGIS 219. Priene, under Sotas, 
also held fortified positions against the Gauls (I.Priene 17.24-5, 30-4). Erythrai conducted its own defence but a 
Seleukid military presence is likely (IK.Ery. 24; Barbantani 2010: 89-90). One Athenaios Dionysiou was an 
Erythraian general in the 270s and collected money for the Galatian war (IK.Ery. 24.5, 17); he is to be identified 




the role of the garrison was the idea that it contributed something tangible to the maintenance 
of the city‘s eleutheria. In this regard it appears at times as a phylake rather than a phroura. 
      As already mentioned, phylake has a meaning difference from phroura. Whereas the 
latter implies oppression and control, the former denotes defence and cooperation and 
frequently appears to be compatible with the city‘s eleutheria, to which its defensive function 
could be seen to contribute.
29
 If the king was bound to recognise a city as free then it was 
important that his imposition of royal troops was seen to protect the city‘s freedom rather 
than restrict it. Hence the use of phylake over phroura. The different terminology allowed 
him to simultaneously confirm a city as ungarrisoned (aphrouretos) yet still impose on it an 
ostensibly defensive military presence (phylake), all while maintaining his ideological 
commitment to the city‘s eleutheria and respecting the city‘s privileged status as 
ungarrisoned. Though beyond the chronological limits of this work, the example of Philip V 
and Lysimacheia displays particularly clearly this distinction between phylake and phroura 
and its use in action. In 198 Flamininus and Philip V met in conference in Lokris. There the 
Aitolian Alexandros accused Philip of stationing a phroura in Lysimacheia. Philip responded 
by claiming that it was not a phroura but rather a phylake, and that it defended Lysimacheia 
from the Thracians.
30
 Earlier examples of this phenomenon have already been highlighted at 
Iasos under Ptolemy and Ephesos and Corinth under Demetrios. 
      It was also important that the city accept the ruler‘s interpretation and recognise the 
imposition of a garrison as an ostensible defence of freedom and stability. For this to happen 
the garrison had to be actively and effectively seen to accomplish its defensive goals. In 322 
Athens agreed to a temporary garrison in Mounychia, but when the pro-Antipatros 
government began to see it as repressive and requested its removal Antipatros refused. This 
was a major source of contention and eventually turned the moderate oligarchs against 
Kassandros in 319.
31
 If the garrison was seen to not fulfil its purpose, or to negate that which 
it set out to achieve, then its validity could be questioned. Chios accepted Alexander‘s 
phylake in 334 ―until the Chians are reconciled‖ (GHI 84a.17); once this happened Alexander 
abided by his word and removed the garrison upon Chian appeal (Curt. 4.8.12-13; Rhodes 
also appealed). Similarly, Iasos accepted Ptolemy‘s phylake and willingly paid a contribution 
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 An early example of this use may be IG I
3
 38. It concerns Athenian affairs on Aigina c.457-445 and mentions 
a φυλακὲ[ν...]; Aigina was allegedly guaranteed its autonomia in the Thirty Years Peace of 446 and this may 
perhaps be connected with that event (above pg.24 with n.31). Woodhead (1974: 378-80) sees this as Athens 
tightening its defence of Aigina, but Lewis (1954: 24) aptly highlights the use of phylake rather than phroura. 
See also Figueira 1981: 22 n.104. 
30
 Plb. 18.3.11, 4.5-6: οὐ τοὺς φρουροῦντας...ἀλλὰ τοὺς παραφυλάττοντας. Cf. Chaniotis 2008: 112-14. 
31
 D.S. 18.48.1, cf. 74.3; Wallace forthcoming A. 
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to it because it fulfilled its duty of protecting the land (IK.Iasos 3). Corinth went further and 
requested a phylake from Demetrios, thus authorising a royal imposition as a manifestation of 
civic will.
32
 In Itanos on Krete Patrokles was honoured for maintaining the city‘s security and 
allowing it to employ its own laws; a garrison is highly likely.
33
 The garrison as a defence of 
eleutheria, security, or a city‘s laws marks it and its purpose as a point of cohesion between 
civic mindset and royal will.
34
 Once the garrison ceased fulfilling this role or the city ceased 
ascribing to this ideology it would then be seen to be oppressive. 
      There are, however, difficulties in making a universally clear-cut distinction between a 
phroura as an imposition and a phylake as a defensive feature.
35
 The difference between both 
may be little more than ideological. For example, Demetrios‘ phylake on the Acrocorinth 
lasted from 303 until its expulsion by Aratos in 243.
36
 At some point its function and public 
perception changed from that of a phylake to that of a phroura, presumably when it ceased to 
be a defensive feature against Kassandros and become instead a symbol of Antigonid control. 
The word phylake has clearly defensive connotations, but in practice the garrison had to be 
seen to fulfil this defensive role. In 313/2 Antigonos‘ general Polemaios removed 
Kassandros‘ phroura from Chalkis and left the city free and ungarrisoned (D.S. 19.78.2). 
However, an Athenian decree of post-306/5 reveals that Polemaios had earlier stationed one 
[---]otimos [ἐπὶ τὴν | τ+οῦ Εὐρίπου φυλακὴν, most likely denoting (and euphemising) his 
command of a garrison.
37
 Whether installed under Antigonos‘ orders or by Polemaios‘ own 
volition after his rebellion from Antigonos, the removal of the garrison by [---]otimos was 
seen to herald the return of eleutheria to Chalkis in accordance with Antigonid policy.
38
 
Demetrios‘ and Polemaios‘ phylakai were ostensibly defensive, but both, despite their 
euphemistic nomenclature, came to be seen as oppressive. Terminology was important – 
hence the general distinction between phroura and phylake – but it was not enough. A 
phylake that did not contribute to the wellbeing of the city was a powerful restriction on that 
city‘s eleutheria. 
        So, the garrison need not always be an oppressive feature. Rather, it could be compatible 
with – indeed ensure – the city‘s eleutheria. However, certain criteria had to be met. First, the 
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 D.S. 20.103.1-3; cf. Plu. Demetr. 34.4-5. Buraselis (1982: 48 n.42) emphasises that garrisons could be 
imposed at the will of a free city, cf. Simpson 1959: 405-6.  
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 I.Cret. III (4) 2, 3; Spyridakis 1970: 71-7; Bagnall 1976: 120-6. 
34
 Heuβ 1937: 230-1. 
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 See Ma 1999: 117-18. 
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 469.3-8 (App.1 num.17). The situation is similar to that of Megara in 307/6: a prominent city 
dramatically left ungarrisoned, but troops stationed nearby serve the same purpose (above pgs.62-3 with n.88). 
89 
 
city had to accept the royal garrison by acknowledging its validity and recognising its role in 
defending the city‘s stability and freedom. Second, the garrison itself had to live up to this 
and actually defend the land and protect the city from the incursions of foreign powers. This 
was its function. If it failed in this regard then it risked being seen as nothing but a tool of 
royal domination and the eventual impetus for popular revolt. Ultimately, the perception of a 
garrison‘s function was closely connected with its name. A city may be aphrouretos but the 
presence of a phylake was within the strict semantic boundaries of its status. Such linguistic 
delicacies allowed manoeuvrability but also contributed to the ideological definition of the 
garrison‘s purpose. The city was no longer garrisoned, it was defended. Little difference may 
exist in practice – a phylake ensures civic loyalty as much as a phroura – but words are 
important; they helped define positively the nature of the relationship and they influenced the 
way people conceived of such impositions. For a garrison to be seen to be a defence of a 
city‘s freedom it had to balance both ideology and action; the phylake had actually to defend. 
 
1.2: Taxation 
      Tribute was one of the most noticeable and burdensome aspects of foreign control, but 
like the imposition of garrisons it could appear in different guises (syntaxis, eisphora, 
dapane, Galatika), some compatible with or even contributory to eleutheria. A vital 
distinction here is that between the phoros and the syntaxis.
39
 The term for freedom from 
taxation is aphorologesia, a grant which, strictly speaking, absolves the city only of the 
phoros; a city was never asyntaxetos or adapanetos. A city can be free yet make any number 
of other forms of financial contribution.
40
 
      Like garrisons, taxation was frequently seen to be an imposition on the eleutheria and 
autonomia of the city. In the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy, the allies were to 
be free and subject neither to garrison, archon, nor phoros, all in direct contrast with Sparta‘s 
imperialist policies over the previous three decades.
41
 For the Greek cities of Asia Minor the 
Persian phoros and/or dasmos was a mark of their subservience to the Great King. Alexander 
realised this and dispatched Alkimachos to free the cities of Ionia and Aiolia by installing 
democracies, removing oligarchies, and cancelling the phoroi they paid to the barbarians, 
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 Herrmann 1965: 138-45; Nawotka 2003: 26-8. Heuβ (1937: 106-11, esp. 109-10) denies the distinction. Over 
time syntaxis and phoros may have grown synonymous, but there is little evidence for this in the early 
Hellenistic Period, see Nawotka 2003: 26-8; Jones 1940: 318 n.26 (on Plb. 21.24, 46). 
40
 Hahn 1978: 16-18. Terms like asyntaxia do not exist regarding financial impositions. 
41
 GHI 22.19-23 (App.1 num.3); Ch.1 §2 (historical context). 
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evidence of which exists from Ephesos, Erythrai, and Chios.
42
 Antigonos and Antiochos I re-
confirmed Alexander‘s gift of eleutheria and aphorologesia to Erythrai, while Ptolemy Soter 
likewise recognised Iasos‘ eleutheria and aphorologesia.
43
 Antiochos I or II also confirmed 
identical terms with Lysimacheia.
44
 Ptolemy is said to have freed the cities of the Nesiotic 
League by returning their laws and lessening certain eisphoria, probably assessed by 
Demetrios in the 290s.
45
 Later, Ptolemy Philadelphos claimed that his father removed ―harsh 
and difficult‖ phoroi and paragogia from Miletos.
46
 
      Some forms of taxation, particularly the syntaxis, appear to have been compatible with 
the city‘s eleutheria. As we have seen with garrisons, terminology is important. Phoros and 
syntaxis may have achieved much the same goal, but the former‘s implication of oppressive 
and foreign taxation, arising primarily from its use under the 5
th
 century Athenian Empire, 
was a very real concern. Under the Athenian Empire phoros was compatible with autonomia, 
but by the 4
th
 century that compatibility had ceased.
47
 Theopompos states that when founding 
the Second Athenian Confederacy the Athenians were careful to ―call the phoros syntaxis, 
since the Greeks bear with difficulty the name phoros‖.
48
 Syntaxis was a pseudonym for 
phoros but the name change was important since it brought a change in implication, as 
Plutarch himself makes clear (Solon 15.2): 
 
―Now later writers observe that the ancient Athenians used to cover up the ugliness 
of things with auspicious and kindly terms, giving them polite and endearing names. 
Thus they called harlots ‗companions‘, taxes ‗contributions‘, the garrison of a city its 
‗guard‘, and the prison a ‗chamber‘.‖
49
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 Arr. An. 1.17.10, 18.1-2; I.Ery 31.21-8; GHI 86b. 
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Hornblower 1996: 477. 
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ὄνομα. Theopompos‘ use of phero denotes the burden of the phoros; it is a load given from one to the other 
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49
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φιλανθρώποις ἐπικαλύπτοντας ἀστείως ὑποκορίζεσθαι͵ τὰς μὲν πόρνας ἑταίρας͵ τοὺς δὲ φόρους συντάξεις͵ 
φυλακὰς δὲ τὰς φρουρὰς τῶν πόλεων͵ οἴκημα δὲ τὸ δεσμωτήριον καλοῦντας. 
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      Syntaxis was understood as a contribution and so was compatible with eleutheria. Under 
the Second Athenian Confederacy members were free and untaxed (phoros), but contributed 
a syntaxis.
50
 Alexander removed the phoros but the cities of Asia Minor still contributed a 
syntaxis towards the war against Persia and the maintenance of their newly-found eleutheria 
and demokratia.
51
 Antigonos extracted a dapane from Skepsis and elsewhere during the third 
Successor war and justified this by claiming that its use in the war contributed to the 
eleutheria of the Greeks.
52
 The syntaxis Ptolemy extracted from Iasos was probably 
connected with the Ptolemaic phylake, which protected Iasian land and preserved Iasos‘ 
eleutheria and autonomia (IK.Iasos 3).
53
 Similarly, the monies contributed by the Nesiotic 
League under both Antigonos and Demetrios and Ptolemy Soter would have been connected 
with the maintenance of their eleutheria, as already guaranteed by both.
54
 Erythrai was 
absolved of the Galatika by Antiochos II, but as it is presented as an unusual honour the 
assumption is that it was widespread and therefore perfectly compatible with eleutheria and 
aphorologesia.
55
 Later, Selge could make payments of up to 700 talents to Achaios without 
demeaning the patris or undermining its eleutheria (Plb. 5.76.10-11). Syntaxis was less 
offensive than phoros and implied synergy over oppression, a contribution to a common goal 
rather than a foreign imposition. 
      Part of the compatibility of syntaxis with eleutheria lay in the purpose of the money. The 
phoros was most often simply a tax paid to the ruler and open to use however he saw fit.
56
 
The syntaxis, however, often appears to denote a contribution to the defence of the city and 
its freedom. Therefore, it is paid at times into a common fund, such as the treasury of the 
Second Athenian Confederacy or the Nesiotic League, a fund over which the hegemon did 
not always exercise direct and complete control.
57
 Admittedly Alexander controlled the 
assessment, collection, and expenditure of the syntaxis between 334-332, but the purpose of 
the money was towards a common good, the campaign against Persia and the freedom of the 
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Greek cities. Similarly, Ptolemy and his subordinates were most likely in direct control of the 
syntaxis levied from Iasos, but again the money was apparently intended to defend the land 
and secure Iasian freedom.
58
 The different conception between phoros and syntaxis reflects in 
part their different functions, and therefore different relationship to eleutheria. 
      The evidence shows that as with garrisons, various forms of royal taxation (even the 
imposition at times of royal officials) could be compatible with civic eleutheria. Again, the 
terminology used and the presentation of the tax were important elements in the city‘s 
willingness to accept it. The king would present the tax not as an imperial phoros, but as a 
syntaxis or dapane, which carried the idea of synergy. Thus, a change in terminology sought 
to alter ideology and make the tax a contributing factor in the city‘s preservation, political 
independence, and eleutheria.
59
 However, it was also necessary for the city to ascribe to this 
view and concede to the king the ability to enforce his authority over the city so as to protect 
his grant of eleutheria. 
 
SECTION 2: DEFINING ELEUTHERIA IN ACTION 
      ―No matter how consistently they applied the policy, at no time did any of the senior 
Diadochoi intend to set the cities ‗free‘ as we might conceive the term. The concept of 
‗freedom‘ and autonomy meant simply this: that a polis may govern itself in any way it 
chooses, labelling itself democracy or oligarchy or tyranny as it wishes, but ultimately, 
control of its external policies rests solely with the dominant adjacent dynast(s)….[freedom 




      There are problems here. First, Wheatley seems to judge the ancient usage based on its 
failure to live up to modern value systems. This methodological error clouds his judgement 
on the use of eleutheria and contributes to his second mistake. Wheatley describes eleutheria 
as a ―cynical gambit‖ because he sees it as nothing more than internal autonomy. But if 
eleutheria is used by both king and city alike to mean just this, by what criteria then are we 
justified in deprecating it as a ―cynical gambit‖? Third, Wheatley claims that eleutheria 
entailed no actual ―effort‖ on behalf of the Diadochoi. However, he later states that in 307 
―Athens was ‗free‘, but needed aid to maintain and cement her new status‖, before 
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enumerating Antigonos‘ gifts of land, money, grain, and timber; freedom indeed entailed 
very real commitments if it was to be a successful policy.
61
 
      Wheatley‘s privileging of modern usage and understanding over ancient is a 
methodological problem, and one that I am at pains to avoid throughout this thesis. Modern 
assumptions are to be avoided and ancient usage should be the primary criterion for analysing 
ancient eleutheria. If certain usages seem cynical to our eyes, that is just the understandable 
diversity of an imperfectly defined ancient term in action. Numerous different presentations 
existed, and we must be careful to judge each as part of a wider, adaptable usage. We must 
not simply take one usage and use it to define others as cynical gambits. 
      As has been stated before, the focus of this section is on the adaptability of eleutheria to 
various situations. Three parts treat of this from different perspectives: Part 1 looks at 
definitions; Part 2 looks at differing interpretations in use; and Part 3 looks at the typology of 
statuses between city and king. Again, I am concerned with constructing an image of 
eleutheria based on the multifarious aspects of its use in action. Use elaborates meaning, and 
the fundamental malleability of its use argues for a layered and adaptable appreciation of its 
meaning. 
 
2.1: Positive and Negative Freedom 
      Numerous different approaches exist for analysing eleutheria. In my introduction I have 
emphasised that of Primary and Secondary freedom, which distinguishes between freedom as 
an inherent, inalienable right (Primary) and freedom as a gift, guaranteed, defended, and 
authorised at the behest of another power (Secondary). A second approach expanding from 
this is that of Positive and Negative freedom. Rather than defining the conceptual state of 
freedom, this looks to define freedom according to the concrete features that contribute to or 
negate it. Some prefer to define eleutheria and the polis through positive freedoms, the active 
use of certain positive qualities: democracy, the ability to use one‘s own laws, or to control 
one‘s own lands. Others prefer negative freedoms, freedom as the passive absence of certain 
common restrictions: the imposition of garrisons, taxes, or foreign overseers. Here I argue 
that we must employ both definitions, but even then we should be aware that they do not 
offer the only means of understanding freedom.
62
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      The typology of Positive and Negative freedom is a useful way of looking at Greek 







centuries eleutheria was continually defined by a series of criteria either active (Positive) or 
passive (Negative) in nature. The charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy is a good 
example as it gives a detailed definition of freedom/autonomy at that time and within that 
context. Members were to be ―free and autonomous…to live at peace with a secure hold over 
their own land…to employ whichever constitution they liked, not to receive a garrison, not to 
be subject to a foreign official (archon), not to pay a phoros‖.
63
 Here we see clearly the mix 
of Positive (live at peace; hold of land; own constitution) and Negative (no garrison; no 
archon; no taxation) freedoms. Eleutheria can encapsulate both the freedom to do X and not 
be subject to Y. 
      Hellenistic examples are of identical character. There are examples of eleutheria being 
defined purely positively, as the freedom to be a democracy and employ both the patrioi 
nomoi and (or) the patrios politeia.
64
 Other examples define eleutheria purely negatively, as 
aphorologesia and/or aphrouresia.
65
 There are also a whole series of mixed definitions, 
employing both positive and negative elements. In 334 Alexander freed the Ionian and 
Aiolian cities by removing the oligarchies and phoros, installing democracies, and returning 
the laws (Arr. An. 1.18.2). In 318/7 and 307/6, after the return of the democracy, Athens‘ 
freedom consisted of democracy, nomoi, and the absence of garrisons and oligarchy.
66
 
Miletos, in 313, was free because the garrison was removed and democracy was restored.
67
 
Eretria similarly defined its eleutheria as the absence of a garrison and the presence of both 
democracy and the patrioi nomoi.
68
 The honorary decree of the Nesiotic League for Ptolemy 
Soter commends him for freeing the cities, removing certain taxes and dues, and returning the 
patrioi politeiai and nomoi.
69
 Ilion‘s treaty with Antiochos I or II describes the city as 
autonomous, democratic, aphorologetos, and aphrouretos.
70
 In a fragmentary decree of 
c.240-230, Smyrna calls itself autonomous, democratic, aphrouretos, and employing its 
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 The importance of ownership of land as an element of eleutheria appears at 




      In almost all cases the choice of Positive and Negative criteria, and therefore each polis‘ 
individual definition of eleutheria at that point in time, was conditioned by the immediately 
preceding circumstances. As is argued throughout this thesis, this again shows that the 
‗meaning‘ of eleutheria was fundamentally adaptive and malleable to the necessities of its 
use in action. The terms of the Second Athenian Confederacy were a reaction to both Spartan 
and 5
th
 century Athenian abuses of autonomia. Alexander‘s concern for democracy and his 
removal of the phoros were based on Persia‘s use of both oligarchies and phoroi. Antigonos‘ 
use of aphrouresia exploited the wide use of garrisons by other Successors. Ptolemy‘s 
addition of aphorologesia attempted to expand on Antigonos‘ aphrouresia and offer an added 
incentive to potential allies. Seleukos‘ grants of eleutheria and concern for Greek eunoia after 
Korupedion were an attempt to contrast his rule with Lysimachos‘ and ensure the loyalty of 
his old subjects. Eleutheria was expansive and adaptive, capable of holding a different focus 
at different times based on the needs and experiences of both ruler polis, both of whom 
sought to apply to it some form of tangible meaning. 
      The typology of Positive and Negative freedom is the main means of defining eleutheria. 
However, the diversity of criteria used reveals the multiplicity of ways in which eleutheria 
could be conceived of in individual circumstances. Each specific use of Positive and Negative 
criteria was not a full definition of freedom so much as one facet of its wider understanding 
important to that city at that point in time. This individual meaning was dependent in each 
instance upon the city, the time, and the historical context. Naturally, this alters the way one 
conceives of eleutheria and understands its use in action. So, aphorologesia was of 
importance to Erythrai under Antiochos II because it was a significant element of 
Alexander‘s grant of eleutheria in 334, and was acknowledged as such by Antigonos 
Monophthalmos. The control of the land and the Attic forts was of importance to Athens 
post-287 because with Piraeus under Antigonid control it was upon them that the democracy 
depended for grain and security. However, whereas Athens may have seen its freedom as 
dependent upon the removal of royal garrisons, Iasos had little apparent concern in removing 
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either her phylake or syntaxis and focused instead on maintaining her eleutheria by securing 
control of harbour taxes (IK.Iasos 3).
73
 
      So, despite the prevalent use of Positive and Negative criteria we do not have one, all 
encompassing, clear definition of eleutheria; no such thing existed. The charter of the Second 
Athenian Confederacy may be the fullest attempt but it too is simply a reaction to the needs 
of the times. Each definition of eleutheria is connected with one or more criteria, often 
different from criteria used elsewhere. So, in one case freedom is the absence of garrisons, in 
another the use of a democracy, in yet another, the ability to be in charge of one‘s own land. 
This has obvious importance for the ‗meaning‘ of eleutheria. Individual instances do not 
create a coherent, rounded image of eleutheria, but when taken together they can be used to 
create a composite impression of what eleutheria ought to be, in its widest, most exclusive 
sense: the avoidance of foreign control and interference in all matters and the ability to 
govern oneself, economically, militarily, and legally, according to one‘s own laws, both 
domestically and internationally. 
      It is important to state that this is the ideal and not reality. Even in supra-polis 
organisations like the Second Athenian Confederacy, the League of Corinth, or the Hellenic 
League, in which the eleutheria of members was carefully defined, there was a difference 
between what eleutheria entailed on paper (or stone) and in practice. Athens‘ self-interested 
imposition of garrisons and cleruchies, among other things, led to the disintegration of the 
Confederacy.
74
 Similarly, the imposition of a garrison in Sikyon (and surely elsewhere), the 
expulsion of the tyrants from Eresos, and the illegal entry of a Macedonian trireme into 
Piraeus were some of the small acts that fuelled Greek resentment against the League of 
Corinth.
75
 More generally, the imposition of garrisons and the support of tyrannies 




      The example of Iasos is of particular importance here because the use of different Positive 
and Negative criteria between IK.Iasos 2 (309/8) and IK.Iasos 3 (305-282) is instructive for 
our understanding of how such criteria assist in defining eleutheria.
77
 In IK.Iasos 2 the city is 
free, autonomous, aphorologetos, and aphrouretos, a Negative definition implying that Iasos‘ 
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freedom consisted of not being garrisoned or taxed. However, in IK.Iasos 3 the city houses a 
Ptolemaic phylake and contributes a syntaxis, both forms of garrisoning and taxation. 
Furthermore, although proofs (ἀξιώματα – most likely the terms given in IK.Iasos 2) of 
Iasos‘ eleutheria and autonomia are given to the Ptolemaic official Aristoboulos by the Iasian 
ambassadors no mention is made of the earlier guarantees of aphorologesia and aphrouresia. 
This omission suggests that despite the strict semantic compatibility of syntaxis with 
aphorologesia and phylake with aphrouresia the imposition of both did to some degree 
undermine Iasos‘ earlier guarantees of aphorologesia and aphrouresia and the city perhaps 
drew attention to this by avoiding mention of these guarantees.
78
 Phylake and syntaxis 
euphemise royal impositions on the eleutheria of the polis by operating within the semantic 
boundaries of aphrouresia and aphorologesia. However, the evidence from Iasos suggests 
that such impositions could still be seen to negate these guarantees. Since these guarantees 
defined the city‘s eleutheria we would now expect the city to cease being free. But, contrary 
to expectations, it retains its eleutheria. This would seem to that the use of Positive or 
Negative criteria is not in itself a definitive method for understanding a city‘s conception of 
its own eleutheria since the city can remain free even after their erosion. Eleutheria is 
adaptable to the changing situations of the polis and compatible with the removal of those 
guarantees that appear at one stage to have defined it. 
      Two further examples are indicative of the resilience of eleutheria. First, Mylasa was 
freed by Seleukos II c.240 and granted control over its land, particularly the shrine of Zeus 
Labraunda. However, although Mylasa still hosted a royal garrison in 220 this does not seem 
to have negated its eleutheria (I.Labraunda 3a.10-14, 4.10-16; below §2.3). Second, in 
Stratokles‘ honorary decree for Lykourgos, Athens is free, autonomous, and democratic 
because it maintained its democratic authority in the face of Alexander‘s power.
79
 Passed in 
Prytany VI 307/6 the decree doubles as a warning to Demetrios Poliorketes of the city‘s 
ability to withstand tyrannical power (Ch.5 §1.2.2). However, between 304-302 Demetrios 
succeeded where Alexander failed and used his influence over Stratokles and the Athenian 
demos to ensure the exile of many of his radical democratic opponents.
80
 In clear 
contradiction to the paradigm established in the Lykourgos decree Athens subsumed its 
democracy to royal will.
81
 Nonetheless, Athens still called itself ―free and democratic‖ (Ch.4 
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§3). Again, even though an official definition of eleutheria is undermined the city still 
promotes its freedom in the publication of its decrees. With both Iasos and Mylasa we have 
only the official decrees and treaties of the city, a genre of document that is careful to project 
an image of unity and cohesion. Plutarch‘ s Life of Demetrios takes us behind such texts and 
reveals the fervent debate taking place within the polis itself about the nature and 
understanding of its own eleutheria (examined in Ch.4 §3). However, for present purposes, 
these examples show that although Positive and Negative criteria of freedom offer a fruitful 
way of analysing the conception of eleutheria at a specific point in time, they are not by 
themselves the sole means of understanding eleutheria, which has layers of meaning and 
understanding and is fundamentally adaptable. 
      The choice of Positive and Negative criteria was dependent upon the politics of a 
particular situation and was frequently a reaction to preceding events. It was an attempt to 
give eleutheria some form of definition and is indicative of its understanding by one polis or 
Successor at one particular point in time. However, these criteria were an ideal and were 
frequently eroded in reality, sometimes even leading to the negation of a city‘s freedom (as 
with Athens‘ allies during the Social War of the mid 4
th
 century). In other cases, however, the 
city maintained its eleutheria despite these erosions (Iasos, Mylasa, Athens in 304-302). 
Therefore, eleutheria could exist beyond the definitions ascribed to it. Although regularly 
defined by Positive or Negative criteria it had a meaning, understanding, and practical use 
beyond them and could even be compatible with their inevitable removal. It was adaptive to 
the necessities of change, often incorporating an emotive charge over definite criteria. 
 
2.2: Differing Interpretations of Eleutheria 
      The above analysis of Positive and Negative freedom shows that when it came to the use 
in action of eleutheria numerous different points of view could exist at any one time. The 
corollary of this is that no single, exclusive interpretation of eleutheria existed. Different 
parties emphasised different readings of eleutheria based on different criteria, offering even 
radically different and mutually exclusive understandings of it. In such situations it is difficult 
to analyse usage without falling into the trap of following one as sincere and valid and 
another as hollow and manipulative. The goal of course is to maintain an analytical balance 
and present a reading of each usage sensitive to the position and understanding of each party, 
treating each as perfectly applicable and valid. Moreover, it is important not to espouse a pro-
Athenian bias. That is, when presented with both an Athenian and another interpretation of 
eleutheria not to automatically favour the Athenian as sincere, or indeed correct. Just because 
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it is Athens, the self-professed and widely acknowledged defender of Greece‘s eleutheria in 
480/79, does not mean that its reading of eleutheria is the only valid one.
82
 
      The conflict between Alexander and Thebes in late 335 is an informative case-study of 
such differing interpretations of eleutheria. Two points of view are present, the ‗League‘ 
view of the League of Corinth, which interprets eleutheria in a legalistic manner according to 
the official status of League members, and the ‗polis‘ view of Thebes and Athens, which 
promotes a more traditional interpretation based on the freedom of the city from foreign 
restrictions. Both operated in conflict with one another, but both were for the time and 
context perfectly valid interpretations of eleutheria. 
      According to the ‗League‘ view, the League of Corinth officially preserved the freedom 
and autonomy of all its members including even Thebes, with its garrisoned Kadmea and 
oligarchic government. Since this position had been recognised by all other members, Thebes 
was therefore theoretically free and autonomous and legally committed to maintaining the 
status quo as a preservation of this eleutheria. This stuck more closely to the letter of the 
League than to its spirit, but it was fully within the legal definition of eleutheria offered by 
the League and subscribed to by members.
83
 Commitment to the League represented a 
commitment to its interpretation of eleutheria and all this entailed. We may call this a 
―cynical gambit‖, but it was a legal reality, officially accepted by all League members. 
      Furthermore, numerous smaller poleis saw their eleutheria as dependent upon the 
Macedonian status quo. One of the League‘s professed goals was the maintenance of a pro-
Macedonian koine eirene among the Greek poleis, and many fully subscribed to this.
84
 
Certain Boiotian cities, like Plataia, Orchomenos, and Thespiai, saw in Macedon and the 
League their liberation from Theban oppression: Plataia was re-founded, Orchomenos‘ walls 
were re-built, and Thespiai was honoured by Alexander.
85
 Similarly, Messene, Megalopolis, 
and others saw the League as an escape from Spartan and Athenian oppression, a viewpoint 
later voiced by the Megalopolitan historian Polybios (18.14.6-7).
86
 The League was also 
concerned with liberating the Asian cities from Persian control and avenging the invasion of 
480/79. Both were emotive calls concerned with eleutheria and would have appealed to many 
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as a noble use of Macedonian hegemony, and a welcome respite from Athenian, Spartan, and 
Theban bickering. Even in Athens, Phokion could argue that Greek eleutheria could be 
achieved with Athens following Macedonian leadership, if only one looked at the wider 
Hellenic picture rather than the narrower Athenian one (Plu. Phoc. 16.5-7). 
      Alexander, as hegemon, was in charge of the invasion of Asia Minor, a campaign that 
epitomised in action the freedom and autonomy of League members and the quest to spread 
this to the Asian Greeks. This lay at the heart of his propaganda and his position. Thebes‘ 
defection from the League in 335 was a legal challenge, citing the terms of the King‘s Peace 
over those of the League of Corinth, as well as an assertion of a different understanding of 
eleutheria, one that presented the Great King as defender of eleutheria and Alexander as an 
oppressive tyrant.
87
 This inverted the dynamic Alexander sought and threatened the 
dissolution of the League. Alexander‘s destruction of Thebes was, therefore, an officially 
valid League action that sought to maintain the koine eirene, preserve Greek eleutheria, and 
punish the Medisers of (both the past and present), before liberating the Asian Greeks.
88
 
      Athens and Thebes espoused a different, ‗polis‘ view according to which the League was 
only a polite, legal face to the Macedonian hegemony achieved and maintained by the sword. 
The use of garrisons at Thebes, Corinth, and Ambrakia was a clear suppression of eleutheria, 
a view shared by Elis, Argos, Aitolia, and Arkadia who all supported Thebes‘ insurrection.
89
 
Further, the installation of what a speech attributed to Demosthenes calls ―tyrannies‖ at 
Messene, Sikyon, Thebes, and elsewhere also compromised the ostensible freedom and 
autonomy of League members.
90
 Tyranny is simply the Demosthenic polemic of the 
democratic faction, and the likes of Polybios were quick to point out that many of these 
‗tyrannies‘ were simply pro-Macedonian governments tired of Athens and Sparta (18.14-15). 
However, the point remains that the legal arguments of the League did not counter the 
emotive and cultural resonance of freedom as incompatible with garrisons, oligarchies, 
tyrants, and foreign control. 
      Alexander‘s use of the Persian Wars and his appeal to the liberation of the Greeks of Asia 
Minor were also open to criticism in Greece. In contrast to the Great King, Alexander was 
present in force, installing garrisons, razing Thebes, and supporting ‗tyrannies‘. He was the 
clear and present danger, not Persia, which had only been an indirect threat since the mid-5
th
 
century. In fact, Persia had a more recent track-record of defending eleutheria and autonomia 
                                                 
87
 Arr. An. 1.9.7; D.S. 17.9.5, 14.2; Plu. Alex. 11.7-8; Just. Epit. 11.3.9; cf. Din. 1.19-20. 
88
 Wallace 2011: 150-2; Ch.6 §1.2. 
89
 D.S. 17.8.5-6; Din. 1.18-20. On the movement against Alexander in 336/5, see Ziesmann 2005: 66-85. 
90
 Below pg.157 with n.13. 
101 
 
through the King‘s Peace, which Thebes emphasised as an alternative model to both the 
League and Alexander‘s interpretation of eleutheria.
91
 Alexander‘s attempts to deflect 
attention onto Persia were not foolproof; other interpretations of eleutheria existed. 
      In one way Alexander‘s garrisoning and destruction of Thebes was a cynical employment 
of eleutheria as propaganda. In another way, however, Thebes‘ decision to promote Persia as 
the model defender of Greek eleutheria was also an abasement of the ideal. Isokrates earlier 
opposed this idea in his Panegyrikos (4.115-18, 175), and others, like the Boiotian cities, 
acted likewise in 335. Both Alexander‘s and Thebes‘ views were to a degree cynical and 
manipulative, but this does not negate the validity of either as real and influential uses of 
eleutheria in action. 
      Other examples of mutually exclusive understandings of eleutheria are informative. In 
324, when the Exiles Decree threatened the return of Samos to the Samians, Athens sought to 
change Alexander‘s mind by claiming that he was negating Athens‘ eleutheria and acting like 
a tyrant. Alexander turned the claim upon its head and pointed out that Athens was in fact the 
tyrant and the occupation of Samos removed the Samians‘ freedom.
92
 Alexander restricted 
Athens‘ freedom just as Athens restricted Samos‘. The understanding of eleutheria was the 
same, but the difference lay in its application and who had the power to enforce their model. 
The Hellenic War also presents different understandings of eleutheria. Athens saw the war as 
a struggle for Greek eleutheria from Macedon and Athenian propaganda spoke proudly of 
―the freedom of the Greeks‖ (Ch.6 §2). However, the freedom of the Greeks was for Athens 
first and the Greeks second. An alliance of Boiotian cities fought a pitched battle against 
Athens at Plataia in autumn 322, thus inspiring Hyperides to condemn them as the ―first 
opponents of freedom‖; the Athenian attack on Styra on Euboia implies an anti-Athenian 
movement there as well.
93
 Athenian freedom did not equal Plataian or Euboian freedom and 
Athens oppressed Plataia and Samos to a much greater degree than Macedon oppressed 
Athens. Athenian propaganda during the Hellenic War was only one interpretation of 
eleutheria for one city; despite its force and pre-eminence it was not the only one. 
      As mentioned above, power played an important role in enforcing a definition or 
understanding of eleutheria. We have seen that while eleutheria certainly contained a series 
of ideals relating to the ultimate good and welfare of the state, no single unarguable definition 
                                                 
91
 Bertoli (2003: 92-4) distinguishes between Alexander‘s and Thebes‘ use of eleutheria, but sees Thebes‘ as 
reflecting the terms of the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy (above n.16). 
92
 Plu. Alex. 28 with Poddighe 2007; cf. 2009: 119-20. 
93
 Plataia: Ch.2 §2; Wallace 2011: 157-60. Styra: Str. 10.1.6; IG II
2
 647.1-3. The Macedonian troops under 
Mikion that landed at Rhamnous and were repulsed by Phokion perhaps sailed from Euboia (Plu. Phoc. 25.1-4; 
Bosworth 2003: 21 with ns.62-3; though cf. Heckel 2006: s.v. Micion). 
102 
 
existed. Therefore the definition of eleutheria in any given situation was dependent upon the 
ability of a state or individual to create and enforce their understanding of it. Power played a 
central role in this process. Whichever state or Successor was able to enforce their 
interpretation of eleutheria controlled the ideological discourse. Antigonos held this position 
between 315-301 and Ptolemy unsuccessfully contested it during his ‗Grand Tour‘ of 309/8. 
Others may not necessarily have agreed with one‘s definition, but military and ideological 
force was difficult to argue with and dissent was always something that had to be voiced 
carefully, through the right channels and in the correct ways. For example, Athens created the 
Second Athenian Confederacy because of the abuses of Sparta‘s interpretation of autonomia, 
but the Confederacy was careful to act within the bounds of autonomia as defined (or in this 
case, not defined) by the King‘s Peace (Ch.1 §2). Similarly, Athens was careful to accept 
Alexander‘s presentation of Thebes‘ ‗revolt‘, even though she had originally supported the 
Theban struggle for freedom.
94
 There was a time to contest another‘s definition of freedom 
and a time to follow it, and these had to be chosen carefully. Athens took on Alexander in 
324/3 over Samos; both emphasised the same conception of freedom – the right for one state 
to not be oppressed by another – but due to Alexander‘s military force his interpretation was 
ultimately successfully and Samos was returned to the Samians. 
      It may be a rather trite point but the freedom of one does not always equal the freedom of 
another. The same understanding may apply – freedom of X from the oppression of Y – but 
eleutheria can have more than one use and meaning at any one time, again emphasising its 
fundamental adaptability and lack of single definition. Different yet equally valid ways of 
understanding eleutheria could exist, each presenting different interpretations of its import 
and use. We may view one as more valid than another, but if both could exist then both were 
relevant in their own way. There is also the need to avoid an Atheno-centric viewpoint. The 
Hellenic War may have been presented as a war for Greek freedom, but it was only 
undertaken with Athens‘ freedom in mind and was executed at the expense of states in 
Euboia and Boiotia. One‘s monopoly of power helped one give to eleutheria a particular 
meaning and definition. If the kings could at times control, or at least influence, the definition 
of freedom then this raises questions concerning the role of eleutheria in negotiating the 
relationship between cities and kings and the status of cities, free and otherwise, within the 
Hellenistic kingdoms. 
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2.3: Typology of Statuses 
      In the early Hellenistic period two mutually exclusive typologies of free city existed: that 
which saw its freedom as dependent upon its independence from another power, often 
Macedon (Athens, Sparta, Thebes, etc.), and that which saw it as compatible with another, 
often royal, power (Plataia, Samos, etc.). This dichotomy brings us deeper into the question 
of eleutheria as a typology of statuses defining the relationship of the polis to that of the 
Hellenistic empire: a difficult subject, and one at the heart of any study of the period. The 
central question concerns the variations within the two general divisions of freedom from and 
freedom under Macedonian control. In the latter case, different sorts of free cities were 
dependent upon Macedonian power: some were allied while some entered the empire through 
conquest; some saw the empire as a defender of freedom from the domination of another, 
others saw it as simply a defence of freedom, irrespective of the presence or threat of an 
opponent. 
      The question of ‗typologies of statuses‘ and the role of eleutheria therein has recently 
been treated by both John Ma and Laurent Capdetrey.
95
 Although both focus on the Seleukid 
Empire, their conclusions are valid for the Hellenistic world in general when supplemented 
with other examples from elsewhere, as I will do throughout this section. Both analyses are 
based on a solid understanding of the ancient evidence, but it is my contention that not 
enough attention has been paid by Ma to the adaptability and malleability of the use in action 
of eleutheria. The result is that his analysis is too legalistic. Capdetrey‘s analysis is more 
natural in that it acknowledges greater fluidity between statuses. ‗Typology of statuses‘ also 
gives rise to difficulties by applying a modern system to ancient evidence that does not 
always fit it.
96
 When overly restrictive, it can stunt our understanding of the use and function 
of eleutheria, and therefore the malleability of ruler-city relations. I propose that Ma‘s and 
Capdetrey‘s typologies should be modified somewhat to take account of the adaptability of 
eleutheria and become more sensitive to the difficulties in creating definitions and typologies 
for a term which continually eschews both. 
      Ma‘s analysis builds on Bickerman‘s earlier work and is broken down into roughly three 
categories.
97
 First, ‗genuinely free cities‘, those that existed outside the empire. Second, ‗free 
cities‘, those that owed their freedom to royal recognition. Third, ‗dependent cities‘, cities 
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that were not free, but subject to the king.
98
 This latter category is further split into ‗subject 
cities‘, which frequently dated documents by regnal years and were integrated into the royal 
chora, and ‗subordinate cities‘, which were dependent but were not integrated into the royal 
chora. The status of dependent cities does not particularly concern us here, so I shall confine 
my remarks to what Ma termed the ‗genuinely free‘ and ‗free‘ cities.
99
  
      For my purposes, however, I would like to change this terminology. The use of 
‗genuinely free‘ implies that the eleutheria of this type of city was more valid than that of the 
‗free‘ city.
100
 This is a point I argue against throughout this thesis. There is no single 
interpretation of freedom; there are simply different ways of viewing it in different situations 
with each no more inherently valid than the other. Still, Ma is correct that eleutheria was 
conceived of differently by cities within and outwith the empire. With this in mind, I would 
alter his nomenclature somewhat and refer instead to cities that conceive of the freedom in 
either Primary or Secondary manners. This captures the essential distinction between freedom 
as a self-guaranteed right (Primary/genuinely free city) and freedom as royal benefaction 
(Secondary/free city), but refrains from drawing implicit pejorative judgements on the 
validity of one over the other. Therefore, whenever I speak of the ‗Primary free‘ and 
‗Secondary free‘ city I am critiquing and adapting Ma‘s distinction between the ‗genuinely 
free‘ and ‗free‘ city. 
      In his typology of ‗Secondary free‘ cities, Ma is mainly concerned with defining status 
through Bickerman‘s surrender and grant model.
101
 In this scenario, when a city surrenders to 
a king or is taken by him it loses any legal position it previously held. It lacks any official 
status and all guarantees by previous kings become null and void. Thus, the surrender. It is 
then up to the king to return a status to the city by royal grant. If the king acknowledges 
precedent he may restore the city‘s freedom and confirm certain guarantees like 
aphorologesia. However, the city‘s future is entirely dependent upon the king, who may 
decide not to return its freedom and instead make it a ‗dependent city‘.
102
 The city is not, 
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however, powerless and it can influence the king‘s decision by various strategies, such as by 
referring to honours it has passed or will pass (IK.Ilion 32), citing previous grants of freedom 
(IK.Ery. 31.21-8), appealing to dynastic proairesis (I.Didyma 480.10-13), or acclaiming the 
king‘s role as defender of the Greek cities (IK.Ery. 504.14-20). In Ma‘s view, once freedom 
is granted, ‗Secondary free‘ cities were not subject to any forms of royal control but were as 
free and independent as ‗Primary free‘ cities, i.e. those outside the empire.
103
 
      Ma also defines a second kind of ‗Secondary free‘ city, that whose eleutheria is 
acknowledged and upheld by the king in a bilateral treaty and alliance (philia kai 
symmachia), thus ‗allied‘ cities.
104
 Fewer early Hellenistic examples of this exist: Ptolemy 
and Iasos in 309 (IK.Iasos 2), Demetrios and Athens in 307/6 (D.S. 20.46.1-2), and 
Antiochos I or II and Lysimacheia (IK.Ilion 45) are the most prominent. Other examples of 
philia kai symmachia exist between city and king which do not make mention of the city‘s 




      For Ma, both models denote different legal bases for the king‘s acknowledgement of the 
city‘s freedom. Despite this, he is careful to note that the freedom of these cities, ―though 
nominally equivalent to the full freedom of genuinely independent cities‖, was in practice 
treated as a royal gift. As such, he feels that ―in the end, there may have been little practical 
difference for cities which had entered royal control through ‗surrender and grant‘, and those 
which had contracted an alliance with a king who enjoyed de facto control‖. 
      Ma is certainly correct to highlight the different quasi-legal origins of both the ‗surrender 
and grant‘ and ‗allied‘ models, just as he is correct to question the actual distinction between 
the practicalities of both. He does not, however, pursue this apparent contradiction, which is a 
shame since the different origin but similar treatment of both models is quite revealing for the 
use of eleutheria at this time. 
      Both models served to integrate the city into royal control. Their different quasi-legal 
bases show how the king was able to use eleutheria to integrate both ‗Primary free‘ and 
‗Secondary free‘ cities into a system that treated both parties the same: as free cities 
dependent upon royal will. The terms of alliance for the ‗allied‘ city were similar to those 
between independent states, often with acknowledgements of freedom, autonomy, and 
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 There is, however, a distinction based on their use in action; it appears that the 
very act of acknowledging the ‗allied‘ city‘s freedom meant that the king viewed that 
freedom as then dependent upon and guaranteed by his royal will and so identical with the 
freedom of the city gained through the ‗surrender and grant‘ model. In essence, alliance 
entailed the submission of the city to the king.
107
 
      This is even suggested by the terminology of alliance. Aphorologesia and aphrouresia – 
present in both IK.Iasos 2 and IK.Ilion 45 – may be royal guarantees of non-interference, but 
they suggest the potentiality of garrisons and taxation just as they seek to avoid them; they 
acknowledge that the king, as a stronger power, had the ability to impose such restrictions if 
he saw fit, as later happened in Iasos (IK.Iasos 3). Aphorologesia and aphrouresia denote that 
the ‗allied city‘ already saw itself as subordinate to the king and was trying to ensure limits to 
the potential, perhaps impending, royal presence. 
      Indeed, one could eschew the distinction between ‗allied‘ and ‗surrender and grant‘ 
models and argue that in its essence the very creation of a philia kai symmachia between city 
and king saw the submission of the city to royal power à la the ‗surrender and grant‘ model. 
Alliance on such terms seems to have entailed the entry of the city into the remit of the royal 
symmachia, a body of cities, free or dependent, which were to follow royal foreign policy – 
diplomatic and at times military – and could be disposed of as if they were one‘s empire.
108
 
Iasos and Ptolemy between 309 and 285, our earliest example of this phenomenon, is 
characteristic, but other instances exist. Athens was granted its freedom and democracy by 
Demetrios and entered into philia kai symmachia with the king, only to have its independence 
consistently undermined (D.S. 20.46.1; Plu. Demetr. 24, 26-7). Ilion was free and democratic 
but because of its place in Antiochos I‘s symmachia its territory could be disposed of as he 
wished.
109
 Philip and Lysimacheia allied in philia kai symmachia but Philip almost 
immediately garrisoned the city, employing like Ptolemy the ideological distinction between 
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phylake and phroura (above §1.1).
110
 The Philippeis were philoi kai symmachai with 
Antiochos III, but their use of royal dating formulae reveals their dependence on the king.
111
 
      In keeping with the fundamental adaptability of eleutheria, the freedom of ‗allied‘ cities 
varied depending on both the ability and will of the king to impose himself on the city and the 
readiness of the city to acquiesce to royal power and ideology. In a treaty of philia kai 
symmachia of c.295 or c.285 Messene allied with Lysimachos, most likely against Demetrios 
Poliorketes (SEG LI 457). It suffered no royal interference that we know of. Similarly Lyttos 
and Antiochos II formed an alliance ensuring the supply of Cretan troops to the royal army 
(SV 486). Since the goal in both cases was not the immediate expansion of royal power, as 
had been the case at Iasos, Athens, and Lysimacheia, the city maintained a greater degree of 
independence. 
      Alternatively, the city could take advantage of royal weakness to further ensure its 
eleutheria and develop a heightened role within the symmachia. During the decline of 
centralised Seleukid authority in Asia Minor during the Laodikean War, Smyrna garrisoned 
the fort at Palaimagnesia and ―concluded a treaty of friendship (philia) with those in 
Magnesia on all terms of benefit to King Seleukos‖.
112
 Faced with a strong and seemingly 
independent Smyrna, Seleukos responded to its ideological impetus and acknowledged in 
thanks its freedom, autonomy, and democracy. In this way, Smyrna put her eleutheria to 
work within the bounds of her philia kai symmachia to ensure a strengthened position within 
the Seleukid arche and the wider Greek world.
113
 Nonetheless, she justified it by reference to 
royal ideology and presented this freedom as solely dependent upon Seleukid fiat, employing 
her eleutheria so as to have it guaranteed by the king. 
      Eleutheria performed a very flexible role within the typology of statuses, undermining 
particularly the distinction between Ma‘s two types of ‗Secondary free‘ city (‗surrender and 
grant‘ and ‗allied‘). Consequently, it is more profitable to think simply in terms of one 
homogenous, but pliable, typology of free cities whose freedom was recognised by the king 
and remained to varying degrees under royal control. This group is to be contrasted with the 
‗Primary free‘ cities which remained outside royal control. In his recent study on the Seleukid 
Empire Laurent Capdetrey adopts this position, terming the former ‗cités dépendantes‘ and 
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the latter ‗cités libres et autonomes‘.
114
 This is a more natural way of thinking about the 
importance of eleutheria within the typology of statuses. It lays greater weight on the use of 
eleutheria in action rather than the quasi-legal basis of its application, and it acknowledges 
the inherent fluidity of the term and its compatibility with elements of royal interference. 
Capdetrey‘s terminology, however, is unsatisfactory. It still favours the idea that the freedom 
of the city outside the empire is more valid than that of the city within it. The term ‗cités 
libres et autonomes‘ implies that the ‗cités dépendantes‘ were not free or autonomous. As I 
have been at pains to emphasise, neither understanding of freedom is inherently more valid 
than the other, they are both simply different ways of looking at different situations. 
      It is necessary to think in terms less rigid than Ma‘s when eleutheria is involved. His 
typology of statuses is too legalistic and severe in its use of eleutheria as a criterion for 
measuring typologies.
115
 The uniformity of the treatment of ‗allied‘ and ‗surrender and grant‘ 
cities, despite their apparently separate legal statuses, as well as the numerous exceptions to 
his typologies,
116
 suggest that Ma‘s system should be fine-tuned to take more account of the 
fundamental malleability of eleutheria both in understanding and in action.
117
 
      Ma‘s position on the definition of eleutheria adversely affects his understanding of 
eleutheria as an aspect of his typology of statuses and more generally as a medium of ruler-
city relations. He holds that ―in certain contexts, αὐτονομία or ἐλευθερία were as clearly 
defined as ἀφορολογησία or ἀνεπισταθμεία, with consequences as real‖.118 Furthermore, 
he specifies the nature of this definition by arguing that ‗Secondary free‘ cities were not 
subject to any forms of royal control, like tribute (direct and, probably, indirect), or garrisons. 
They had an independent diplomatic policy, minted their own silver types, had their 
constitutional integrity upheld by the king, and were to all intents and purposes as free and 
independent as ‗Primary free‘ cities.
119
 Capdetrey has rightly criticised this as rigid and 
overly legalistic, arguing instead that a city was free if it was not integrated into royal land, 
enjoyed its own laws, and/or was free from tribute and controlled its own resources.
120
  
      In fact, Ma is aware that his definition of a ‗Secondary free‘ city has problems. He is 
careful to point out that freedom was considered to be a royal gift, allowed by royal fiat and 
revocable by it. He notes the appearance of royal incursions on this freedom: defensive 
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garrisons (phylakai), compulsory contributions to the state (syntaxis, eisphora), royal letters 
requesting (i.e. demanding) something, and general royal influence over civic institutions. 
Similarly, he notes instances where the characteristics of ‗Secondary free‘ cities, like minting, 
appear in cities that are only with difficulty described as free.
121
 
      These points weaken Ma‘s argument more than he admits. First, as argued above, they 
undermine Ma‘s distinction between ‗surrender and grant‘ and ‗allied‘ cities as the two kinds 
of ‗Secondary free‘ cities. Second, since ‗Secondary free‘ cities are open to any number of 
royal incursions, Ma‘s view that they were formally as free as ‗Primary free‘ cities needs 
some modification, especially since the latter‘s freedom is frequently characterised as the 
condition of not being subject to a king.
122
 Ma is correct to point out that both types of cities 
share the same terminology – eleutheria, autonomia, and demokratia – but he is wrong in 
claiming that this denotes similar positions. These terms are used because they are the 
standard rhetoric for defining and describing eleutheria. Their use by both types of cities does 
not denote similar positions, but different conceptions of the same terminology used to define 
different understandings of freedom. When used by a ‗Primary free‘ city eleutheria, 
autonomia, and demokratia are conceived of differently than when used by a ‗Secondary 
free‘ city. The terminology is simply the semantics of describing eleutheria. Simply put: 
same terminology, different understanding. 
      Beyond the distinctions between conceptualising freedom in Primary and Secondary 
ways, the use of eleutheria as a legal status between king and ‗Secondary free‘ city was much 
more fluid than Ma concedes. He argues, as mentioned above, that grants of freedom to a 
‗Secondary free‘ city were expected to have ―legal force‖ and so, in certain cases, gave 
eleutheria a meaning ―as clearly defined as ἀφορολογησία or ἀνεπισταθμεία, with 
consequences as real‖. This, however, is overly legalistic and places too much emphasis on 
concrete distinctions and meanings. By itself eleutheria had no inherent meaning; it was an 
abstract concept that denoted in essence simply the absence of Persian, or foreign, control. In 
my first two chapters I attempted to write a history of Classical and Hellenistic Greece that 
was sensitive to the constant (but unsuccessful) struggle to give solid definition to eleutheria. 
In the end, however, it was only ever as clearly defined as the modifiers used in conjunction 
with it, and any interpretation of it was contingent upon the power of the employer to enforce 
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that understanding on other states, as detailed above. Ultimately, this gave the king great 
strength in giving meaning and definition to eleutheria,
123
 a fact of particular importance to 
the ‗Secondary free‘ city, which relied on negotiation and royal grants to define its 
freedom.
124
 Eleutheria had no clear definition beyond that which was given to it in any 
particular situation or through any particular usage. 
      In fact, even terms such as aphorologesia were not as clearly defined as Ma suggests, nor 
were their consequences always real (above §2.1-2). Rather, they were employed within their 
strictest semantic limits, again as defined by the ruling or authoritative power. Aphorologesia 
defined only freedom from the phoros and could be compatible with eisphora, syntaxis, 
dapane, and Galatika, something Ma does not sufficiently emphasise. Similarly, aphrouresia 
meant exemption from the phroura alone and could be compatible with a phylake. 
      Although Ma is aware of such impositions, he does not take full cognisance of how much 
they undermine the idea of a clearly defined understanding of eleutheria for the ‗Secondary 
free‘ city. His treatment of one particular event is telling. Around 240, Seleukos II granted 
Mylasa its eleutheria and gave it control of its lands and the shrine at Labraunda. This was to 
be overseen by the Seleukid general and local dynast Olympichos.
125
 However, Olympichos 
did not hand over control of Labraunda and he instead garrisoned the fort at Petra. 
Nonetheless, Mylasa retained a good relationship with Olympichos and both turned to the 
Antigonids in 227. Mylasa appealed to Philip V for the removal of Olympichos‘ troops from 
Petra and the final restitution of the fort and Labraunda to the city. Philip favoured Mylasa 
and ordered Olympichos to hand over the shrine and its dependencies. Olympichos did so, 




      Ma emphasises the ―legal argument‖ and sees this as an example of Olympichos‘ 
accountability to the terms of Mylasa‘s eleutheria.
127
 This is certainly true; Olympichos‘ 
acknowledgement that the maintenance of the garrison in Petra was wrong is an important 
statement of royal accountability to a city‘s free status. It is also, however, an attempt to 
justify actions now seen to have been illegal and it shows that Olympichos was only spurred 
to return Petra and control of Labraunda because of pressure from a higher authority, not any 
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legal argument. It is of interest that when Olympichos returns control of the garrison to 
Mylasa he claims in a letter to the demos that he maintained the garrison solely in the city‘s 
best interests (a phylake rather than a phroura?).
128
 Indeed, it is remarkable that for (possibly) 
twenty years Olympichos could maintain an active military presence in clear contravention of 
the terms of Mylasa‘s grant of eleutheria. Since Petra was only returned to Mylasa once a 
petition had been sent to Philip V, we can genuinely wonder whether the fortress would ever 
have been returned if not for Mylasa‘s stubborn resilience.
129
 These actions show that instead 
of concrete definitions and legal structures, the meaning of eleutheria, as defined by its use in 
action, could be fluid and adaptable to both different situations and different definitions of it. 
Royal power could contravene its own terms of freedom by manipulating the purely semantic 
meaning of aphorologesia or aphrouresia, just as it could wilfully maintain a royal presence 
in clear contravention of the terms of its grant of freedom. As was also apparent at Iasos 
(above §2.1), continual civic resilience was needed to ensure the successful application of the 
royal grant of freedom for the ‗Secondary free‘ city. 
      It is necessary for us to think less rigidly when it comes to the role of eleutheria in 
defining legal statuses. Eleutheria was only as defined as the modifiers used in conjunction 
with it. Ideally it implied total freedom – no dating by royal years, full local autonomy, own 
laws, etc. – but in reality it was compatible with various levels of royal interference. This was 
the same for both ‗surrender and grant‘ and ‗allied‘ cities. We should see the distinctions 
between these statuses as fluid. Eleutheria may recognise an initial legal difference, but in the 
practicality of its application it shows that both types of cities understood of their freedom in 
the same, Secondary manner. Thus, the use in action of eleutheria undermines the seemingly 
apparent distinctions between initial legal positions, positing the need for a more flexible 
understanding of the concept of eleutheria itself. 
      It also seems clear that we need to draw a much wider distinction between the eleutheria 
of cities outside the empire and those within it. For ‗Primary free‘ cities the simple act of 
negotiating their eleutheria, of such central importance to the ‗Secondary free‘ city, would 
have undermined it.
130
 That a king would then be able to negate some of these guarantees – 
aphorologesia, aphrouresia – would only have been a further insult. Freedom as a right, a 
quality in itself, was not compatible with the idea of it as a royal benefaction. The example of 
                                                 
128
 I.Labraunda 4.10-13: [παραδί]|δωμι δὲ ὑμῖν καὶ Πέτραν τὴν πρὸς Λαβραύνδοις, [ἣν πρότερον+ | 
ἠναγκάσθημεν κατασχεῖν οὐ δι’ ἄλλην τινὰ *αἰτίαν πλὴν ἢ δι+|ὰ τὸ συμφέρειν τοῦτο τῆι πόλει. On his 
restoration of Petra and Labraunda, see I.Labraunda 6b.1-9, another letter of Olympichos to Mylasa post-220. 
129
 On these events, see most recently Bencivenni 2003: 247-98. 
130
 Capdetrey 2007: 205. 
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Smyrna and Lampsakos‘ refusal to acknowledge royal ideology and accept their freedom as a 
gift of Antiochos III in 197 is an example of this: the values of understanding freedom in a 
Primary rather than a Secondary sense.
131
 Since Smyrna and Lampsakos had previously been 
free in the Secondary sense, their commitment to Primary freedom in 197 reveals again that 
statuses were malleable, particularly where eleutheria was involved. However, this does not 
show that both statuses were similar. Although a city could move from one to the other and 
the terminologies for expressing both positions are to a large degree the same, there were 
practical, interpretive, and ideological differences that the mere similarity of terminology did 
not cover. Statuses were fluid, and movement between them entailed concrete differences, 
both in action (royal intervention) and understanding (Primary/Secondary), even if the 
terminology used to describe them remained the same. 
 
Conclusion 
      In this chapter I demonstrated that eleutheria is compatible with many forms of royal 
impositions providing that they fulfilled a number of criteria. First, impositions often sought 
to avoid the stigma attached to terms like phroura and phoros. So, instead, we hear of 
phylake, syntaxis, eisphora, and dapane. Second, these terms, and the impositions they 
denoted, needed to be seen to be ideologically beneficial to the polis, which itself had to 
accept this presentation. Terming a military post a phylake or a financial imposition a 
syntaxis implied defence and synergy over repression and taxation. Third, the phylake and 
syntaxis had to fulfil (or be seen to fulfil) these functions to some degree. This proved their 
function to the city and gave it a reason to willingly follow the royal ideology. I also argued 
that the semantic precision of aphorologesia and aphrouresia denoted simply the avoidance 
of phoros and phroura. In practice they were compatible with syntaxis or phylake. 
      In practical terms I showed that we need to think of eleutheria, and indeed define it, as 
more fluid and adaptable than has previously been done. Through a study of Positive and 
Negative freedom I analysed some of the ancient means of defining eleutheria, emphasising 
their inability to create a rigorous and coherent definition. Individual definitions existed and 
were grounded on the exigencies of individual situations and their immediate history. Again, 
however, the adaptability of eleutheria to different, even mutually exclusive, understandings 
and uses came to the fore, thus highlighting my continued argument that eleutheria was 
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 Liv. 33.38.1-7 with Ma 1999: 2-6. 
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fundamentally pliant and malleable to the particular needs of particular parties; it was a wide-
ranging concept that could mean all things to all men. 
      This has practical implications for the study of the typology of statuses, the quasi-legal 
relations between cities and kings. I argued against Ma‘s overly-legalistic approach and 
emphasised instead a bipartite distinction between Primary and Secondary perceptions of 
freedom based on mutually-exclusive understandings of freedom as either an inherent right 
(Primary) or granted by king (Secondary). I showed that the creation of rigorous typologies 
of status for ‗Secondary free‘ cities is counter-productive since they were subject to varying 
levels of royal interference, while in general a city could perceive of its freedom in both 
Primary and Secondary ways at different points in time. Again, eleutheria is adaptive to the 
individual positions and statuses of individual cities, defining in each situation different 
facets of that city‘s status or offering a positive definition of its situation. Classifications like 
Primary and Secondary or Positive and Negative freedom offer a useful shorthand for 
understanding general trends, but the fundamental malleability of eleutheria in use and 






















Chapter 4: The Role of Eleutheria in Relations between City and King 
 
―The tension [between kings and Greek cities] arises out of the existence, side by 
side, of two elements, both with their own traditions, yet forced by historical 
events to come to terms with each other.‖ 
F. Walbank 1993: 116 
 
―Kings reveal their power by leading the masses wherever they wish through 
either persuasion or force. They persuade through benefactions, but compel 
through force.‖ 
Δύνανται δ’ ἄγωντες ἐφ’ ἅ βούλονται τὰ πλήθη διὰ πειθοῦς ἢ βίας. Πείθουσι 
μὲν δὴ δι’ εὐεργεσιῶν, βιάζονται δὲ διὰ τῶν ὅπλων 
Strabo 9.2.40 
 
―Greeks were willing to acknowledge the superiority of a benefactor only if they 
were able and willing to protect and support autonomy and self-government.‖ 
Bringmann 1993: 8 
 
Introduction 
      This chapter builds on the previous by looking specifically at the role played by 
eleutheria within relations between king and city. My analysis is based on the different ways 
that cities and kings conceive of freedom, either as a self-attained right (Primary) or as a 
result of royal guarantee (Secondary). Having already established that eleutheria was 
adaptive in use, malleable to individual situations, and lacking a single coherent definition, I 
use this chapter to expand on these conclusions and argue that within the relationship 
between king and city eleutheria could function either as a point of unity or conflict between 
both parties. This functional duality was conditioned by the adaptability of eleutheria to 
different needs and situations. Eleutheria remained prevalent within king/city relations 
because its lack of definition meant that it could always be used to assert something positive 
for the city, or even assert something negative in a positive way. It always defined the 
relationship between city and king in the best possible light. Even when undermined in 
practice through the imposition of royal will, the city could still use it to assert moral force 
over the king and garner benefactions as a result. 
      The chapter is divided into three sections. The first two explore eleutheria via the 
distinctions of Primary and Secondary freedom, while the third provides a case study of these 
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distinctions in action. Section 1 analyses the role of eleutheria in the relationship between 
kings and cities free in the Primary sense. While Primary freedom as independence from 
foreign control could be seen to be a point of conflict with a king who sought to extend his 
influence over the city, eleutheria could also be seen as a point of unity between both parties. 
I draw attention to the different perception of the king‘s actions, as control of the city‘s 
freedom (conflict) or as support for it (unity). 
      Section 2 deals with the relationship between kings and cities free in the Secondary sense. 
This is subdivided into three parts. Part 1 offers a general overview of the relationship 
between city and king, laying particular emphasis on the euergetic process of civic petition 
and royal benefaction. Part 2 builds on this and looks at eleutheria itself as a benefaction, 
particularly its role in defining a positive ideology for the relationship between city and king. 
Part 3 delineates the practical and conceptual limits within which eleutheria operated as a 
status benefaction. I argue that eleutheria was not a single, concrete status but rather a 
general condition, the precise form of which varied depending on the city‘s success in 
accruing benefits and guarantees from the king. Further, I propose that although a city‘s 
eleutheria could be objectively undermined by royal impositions, it still existed as the ideal 
basis of the relationship between city and king. The city could still employ moral force to 
ensure that the king provide benefits and fulfil to some degree his self-ordained role as 
defender of eleutheria. 
      Section 3 expands on the arguments and theories put forth in Sections 1 and 2 by 
providing a case-study of eleutheria in action. It treats of Athens under Demetrios Poliorketes 
between 304-301 and looks at the ways in which eleutheria was used to vocalise both unity 
and conflict with the king depending on the politics of its employer. The difference in use is 
based on the city‘s assertion of Primary freedom, thus causing conflict with the king, and 
Demetrios‘ assertion of Secondary freedom, thus promoting unity with Athens but only on 
the city‘s acceptance of eleutheria as a royal benefaction. 
 
SECTION 1: ELEUTHERIA BETWEEN KING AND PRIMARY FREE CITY 
      Primary freedom was eleutheria guaranteed and asserted by the polis. It was attainable by 
the polis itself and was neither dependent on nor guaranteed by royal fiat. Since it 
necessitated that the city exist outside of the empire, it was achievable by very few.
1
 Indeed, 
                                                 
1
 Athens and Rhodes are treated in this section. Other examples at various points in time include Byzantion, 
Herakleia Pontika, and Kyzikos, see Rostovtzeff 1941: 587-92; Orth 1977: 248-9; Ma 2000: 357-8. Paschidis 
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one of its main criteria was the belief that eleutheria could not exist as a guarantee from 
another power, it was a self-asserted and self-determinable right, defined by the absence of 
royal hegemony or control. Eleutheria as Primary freedom existed as a point of division 
between city and king whereas eleutheria as Secondary freedom was a gift and part of the 
culture of petition and benefaction. Both understandings of freedom are conceptually 
incompatible but since both exist contemporaneously they present two equally valid views on 
the meaning and understanding of freedom, regardless of their mutual exclusivity. 
      Primary freedom may have denied royal ability to grant eleutheria, but that does not 
mean that a freedom-based dialogue could not exist between city and king. In the Primary 
understanding, kings may not be the sole guarantors of freedom itself, but that was not a 
problem so long as they did not present themselves as such. Eleutheria still formed a 
productive element in the relationship between city and king because the king‘s role as 
benefactor allowed him to grant the city certain gifts, like grain and money. These gifts 
supported the city‘s defence of its eleutheria by providing it with the materials needed to 
maintain its freedom but which it had difficulty procuring by its own means. The gifts of 
grain, money, and troops by Ptolemy, Lysimachos, and Kassandros during Demetrios‘ siege 
of Rhodes gave the island state the means to defend its own Primary freedom and the kings 
were therefore honoured as defenders of the city rather than guarantors of its eleutheria. They 
did not provide Rhodes with freedom itself, simply the means with which to maintain it.
2
 
Athens is similar. In the early 3
rd
 century Piraeus was separated from the city and so Athens 
lost its main conduit for imported grain, not to mention harbour dues and the money accruing 
from trade. The presence of Antigonid troops in Piraeus also posed a threat to the sowing and 
reaping of crops in the Attic chora.
3
 These were all threats to Athens‘ eleutheria, but the 
provision of grain and money by Ptolemy, Spartokos, Audoleon, and Lysimachos, as well as 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2008a: 490-3) points out that strong, independent states like Rhodes and Aitolia produce very few honorary 
decrees for royal officials. 
2
 On the siege and its effect on Rhodes‘ eleutheria, see most recently Wiemer 2011. Kassandros and 
Lysimachos were honoured for their contribution to Rhodes‘ soteria while Ptolemy was honoured as a god (D.S. 
19.100.2-4). Pausanias (1.8.6) claims that the Rhodians gave Ptolemy the epithet Soter, a statement long 
assumed to relate to the siege. Hazzard (1992) argues against this. In Pseudo Callisthenes‘ account of 
Alexander‘s will (3.33.8; Wolohojian 1969: 272, pg.154; cf. Liber de Morte 107-8), dated by Bosworth (2000) 
to 309/8 and connected with Ptolemaic-Rhodian diplomacy, Rhodes was to receive from Egypt money for the 
adornment of the city, triremes ―so that it would safely be free‖ (ὅπως ἀσφαλῶς ἐλεύθεροι ἦτε), and annual 
gifts of grain (σίτου ἐλευθερίας ἐξ Αἰγύπτου δωρεὰν). Although the money and grain are not directly 
connected to the maintenance of eleutheria, which has a military connotation through the gift of triremes, an 
implicit association exists between eleutheria and money, ships, and grain. 
3
 Oliver 2007: passim, esp.121-31, 209-12. 
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Seleukos‘ return of Lemnos, allowed the democratic asty to maintain its economic 
independence and stability and ensure its own eleutheria despite the loss of Piraeus.
4
 
      It could be argued that a city‘s reliance on royal gifts to ensure its freedom was a mark of 
dependency and therefore denoted the lack of truly self-guaranteed freedom. In a way this is 
true: although self-attained, Athens‘ eleutheria between 287-262 was heavily dependent upon 
royal gifts of grain and money achieved through petition and the grant of honours.
5
 Without 
such gifts the loss of Piraeus and the Macedonian control of Eleusis, Rhamnous, and other 
forts in the mid-280s would have been crippling; the loss of Piraeus alone had caused Athens 
to surrender to Kassandros in 317.
6
 The reliance on foreign support, by Rhodes or Athens, 
marks a sign of practical and ideological dependency: even if one‘s Primary freedom 
remained intact it did so thanks to the generosity of royal patrons. However, the weakness 
that such gifts of grain and money acknowledged could be turned into a point of strength, and 
therefore of unity between city and king. The honest discharge of gifts revealed the king to be 
a supporter of the city‘s Primary freedom and not an attempted controller of it. This 
difference in perception between support and control is important. Unlike Demetrios in 304-
301 (below §3) and 295 (Ch.2 §7), the Ptolemies did not seek to monopolise the granting of 
Athens‘ eleutheria, they simply aimed to support it from the 280s to the 260s as a balance to 
Macedonian power. 
      Freedom maintained an active role in relations between king and cities free in both 
Primary and Secondary understandings, but on two different levels. The difference can be 
seen as one between support and control. For the former the king‘s gifts of grain and money 
offered support to an ally in defence of its own eleutheria; the city may be heavily dependent 
upon royal patronage but its Primary freedom remains intact. For the latter, however, 
eleutheria itself is the royal gift with freedom acting as a means of control within the empire. 
The distinction between both positions was sometimes very fine. Royal support of a city‘s 
Primary freedom was never purely magnanimous. Ideas such as glory, honour, and reputation 
                                                 
4
 Halfmann 1989: 32-3. Ptolemy: IG II
2
 650; cf. SEG XXX 65. Spartokos: IG II
2
 653. Audoleon: IG II
2
 654, 655. 
Lysimachos: Agora XVI 172; cf. IG II
2
 808 with SEG XLVIII 817; Burstein 1980b; Henry 1990. Seleukos: IG 
II
2
 672+EM 12967 (App.1 num.40).With Piraeus under Antigonid control Athens was forced to use harbours in 
the Attic countryside: IG II
2
 654.29-30, 657.31-6; Oliver 2007: 123-5, 236-7. For the importance of grain 
collection during the Chremonidean war, see I.Rhamnous 3; cf. Oliver 2001b (analysis); Steinhauer 2009 (new 
readings). 
5
 T.L. Shear (1978: 26-7) highlights the urgency of the language used to describe one of Kallias‘ missions in the 
late 280s: καὶ παρακαλούντω*ν+ αὐτὸν σπου|δάσαι ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα Πτ*ο+λεμαῖον ὅ*π+|ως 
ἅν βοήθειά τις γένηται τὴν ταχ*ί+στην εἰς τὸ ἄστυ σίτ|ωι καὶ χρήμασιν (SEG XXVIII 60.47-50). Oliver (2007: 
241-7 with App. 8) dates this mission to Artemision 282. 
6
 Athens probably regained the Attic forts by 282/1 (Oliver 2007: 125-7). On the capitulation in 317, see D.S. 
18.74.1; Wallace forthcoming A. 
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were important, but gifts and support were motivated more often by the wish to maintain 
allies and expand influence.
7
 Thus, Ptolemy‘s support of Athens post 287 earned him an ally 
against Demetrios and a friendly foothold within Greece, just as support for Rhodes had 
earlier done for Ptolemy, Lysimachos, and Kassandros in 305. A delicate balance needed to 
be struck between the goals of the king and the city‘s Primary freedom. Klaus Bringmann 
expressed the position rather well when he pointed out that the gifts offered by a king to such 
cities, though essentially passive bribes for goodwill and support, must not favour the giver 
over the receiver. Thus the Achaian League refused Eumenes II‘s gift of money to provide 
travel expenses for its representatives because it felt that this would undermine its 
independence and make it indebted to the king. The gift was seen as a bribe for future support 
rather than a contribution to the League‘s freedom. The king had to make sure that his gifts 
were not seen to undermine the city‘s freedom, but rather support it.
8
 
      In other situations, however, royal benefactions that contributed to a city‘s eleutheria 
could be difficult to assimilate ideologically. Take, for instance, Antigonos Gonatas‘ return of 
Eleusis and gift of twenty talants to Athens in 279, a gift that would in a very practical way 
have helped Athens defend its freedom from the threat posed at that time by Antigonos‘ 
control of Piraeus and other Attic forts.
9
 Clearly Antigonos could not simultaneously be both 
undermining and defending Athens‘ eleutheria. How then were his benefactions received? In 
Plutarch‘s account of the honorary decree for Demochares (Plu. Moralia 851f), Antigonos‘ 
gifts are not connected with Athens‘ freedom, as was the case in the honorary decrees for 
Ptolemy, Audoleon, Spartokos, and Seleukos (above). Rather, the focus is placed on 
Demochares, who retrieved Eleusis and the gift of twenty talants from Antigonos. It would 
appear that although Antigonos was acting in a similar way to other kings – granting gifts to 
Athens that contributed to the maintenance of the city‘s freedom – his actions were not given 
an ideological dimension; he returned Eleusis just as Seleukos returned Lemnos, but due to 
political circumstances only Seleukos was presented as a defender of Athens‘ eleutheria.
10
 
      A city‘s self-assertion of Primary freedom could theoretically be a point of conflict since 
it denied the royal presentation of freedom as benefaction and the king as its sole guarantor. 
In practice, however, things could be somewhat different because freedom was, as ever, 
adaptable to the necessities of different circumstances. A city could be dependent upon royal 
                                                 
7
 Heuβ 1937: 227; Bringmann 1993: 15; 1995; Gauthier 1993: 213-15; Raaflaub 2004: 260. This theme 
underscores Bringmann 2000; see especially his comments on page v. See further, below §2.2. 
8
 Plb. 22.7-8; Bringmann 1993: 20-4; Gauthier 1993: 214-15. 
9
 On Antigonos‘ donation, see below pg.169 n.49. 
10
 Publication of the honorary decree for Aristides of Lamptrai, which also mentions Antigonos‘ return of 
Eleusis, will add further detail to the political and ideological context of Antigonos‘ gifts (below pg.169 n.49). 
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benefaction to a greater or lesser degree yet maintain its Primary freedom provided that the 
gift was not eleutheria itself, but rather the means by which the city could ensure it for itself. 
This marks a degree of civic dependency on royal will and shows that the city‘s Primary 
freedom could be jeopardised should the king stop supporting it. However, for a city free in 
the Primary sense, dependence on royal gifts marked a means to an end, the ultimate 
maintenance of its own eleutheria. For a city free in the Secondary sense, as we shall see in 
greater detail below, the gift was eleutheria itself. If the relationship between king and 
(Primary) free city was to work successfully then the king had to be seen to support the city‘s 
self-attainment of freedom, not seek to bestow it. 
 
SECTION 2: ELEUTHERIA BETWEEN KING AND SECONDARY FREE CITY 
      For a long time the image of relations between city and king in the Hellenistic period 
wavered between Heuβ‘ model of continued royal adherence to the legal autonomy of the 
polis and Orth‘s view of the king as all-powerful oppressor of the defenceless and un-free 
polis. A more sophisticated understanding of the relationship is now in the ascendency thanks 
in no small part to the early work of Bikerman and later Bertrand and Ma.
11
 This argues that 
the relationship between city and king was one of mutual necessity based on the premise of 
king as benefactor and protector and the city as loyal recipient of such benefactions through a 
processes of petition and dialogue and role assumption and fulfilment.
12
 The precise role 
played by eleutheria within this has, however, yet to be satisfactorily treated. As such, this 
section is devoted to an analysis of eleutheria as a means of interaction between king and 
(Secondary) free city. As I have consistently been at pains to point out, eleutheria is 
frequently found operating in different ways in different situations. Its lack of definition, 
coupled with its versatility as a political concept, allowed it to serve as a point of both unity 
and discord between city and king depending on the situation and the motives of those 
employing it. 
 
2.1: Petition and Benefaction: The Relationship Between City and King. 
                                                 
11
 For an overview of this debate, see my introduction. 
12
 The major statements are Bikerman 1938; 1939; Bertrand 1990; 2001; Ma 1999 passim, esp. 179-242; 
Capdetrey 2007. Others viewing relations in this manner are Corradi 1929: 209-24; Gauthier 1984; 1985 
passim; 1993; Lund 1992: 165-9; Gruen 1993; Billows 1995: 56-80; Campanile 1998; Bringmann 1993; 2000; 
Shipley 2000a: 59-86; O‘Neill 2000; Dignas 2002: 56-7; Cuniberti 2002; 2006; Bertoli 2003; Ma 2003; 
Giovannini 1993; 2004: 80-3; Shipley with Hansen 2006; Paschidis 2008a: 486-505; Erskine forthcoming. Orth 
(1977: 18, 182) felt that the king presented himself as benefactor only when oppression by power failed. Hahn 
(1978: 34) argued that benefaction marked a weakness in royal power. 
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      The Hellenistic period is defined by the two institutions of the Macedonian king and the 
Greek polis. Consequently, the relationship between both parties is, as Frank Walbank 
emphasised and is quoted at the top of this chapter, that of two entities ―forced by historical 
events to come to terms with each other.‖ Both parties needed to develop a relationship that 
took cognisance of each other‘s traditions and authority. That relationship, in its simplest 
form, was based on civic deference to royal authority and royal deference to civic laws and 
autonomy. The system of interaction was dynamic. A process of dialogue between city and 
king was continually played out and is preserved for us through royal letters and civic 
decrees. Within this discourse each party sought to promote itself through local traditions, 
authority, and both moral and military force, but was always careful to achieve balance and 
respect in this regard. This ever adapting procedure of interaction between royal and civic 
discourse lies at the heart of the relationship between city and king. 
      Royal dialogue is predominantly based on ideas of power, force, and control. These form 
the fundamentals of the ‗surrender and grant‘ model, the system by which the city, having 
surrendered itself to the king, loses all status only to receive it again as a result of royal grant 
(Ch.3 §2.3). The king strives to monopolise the authorisation of statuses and benefactions and 
seeks to promote himself as the sole guarantor of such. This is the basis of Secondary 
freedom: freedom as a royal grant. In its turn, however, civic dialogue emphasises royal 
benefaction and euergetism as well as a history of interaction. It attempts to neutralise the 
aggressive and ideological force of the royal version of history and construct kingship as a 
tradition of benefaction, not power, and as protection and care, not suppression and control. 
This asserts the discourse of the polis over that of the king, and since the city monopolised 
the granting of honours kings were pressured to ascribe to this discourse.
13
 Part of this 
process was didactic. The civic discourse of honours sometimes acted as role ascription, 
applying to the king, and even his philoi, a series of functions and qualities which it could 
then pressure him to fulfil through the use of moral force.
14
 Thus royal power and control 
could be construed as benefaction and defence, a system that served the interests of both 
parties by validating royal power within civic models and elaborating the king as benefactor 
and defender. Through this process royal power and control was veiled and presented instead 
                                                 
13
 Heuβ 1937: 246-7; Ma 1999: 228; 2000: 109-10; cf. Wehrli 1968: 127. For a contrary opinion see Orth 1977: 
52-5. Ma (2007: 213-14) emphasises democratic authority through the dedicatory inscriptions of honorary 
statues. 
14
 On role ascription and moral force, see Billows 1995: 74-8; Ma 1999: 204-6; cf. Bringmann 1993: 18-19 
―[Kings] tried to live up to the standards of benevolence that the cities were expecting‖. Shipley (2000a: 59-64) 
emphasises how literary accounts of monarchy assume that ―kings owe it to their position and to their dignity to 
behave in certain ways‖. For Demetrios and Athens, see below §3. 
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as exchange, influence, and adhesion. The historical events of royal conquest and civic 
subordination were then ―written into the inert stuff of history‖ and the relationship between 
both parties became one of synergy.
15
 
      For those cities that conceived of freedom in the Secondary sense, the initial grant of a 
benefaction, status, or indeed freedom itself (even when confirmed within a treaty – Ch.3 
§2.3) was not the end of the process. Freedom was a status benefaction that allowed the 
gaining of further benefactions, a stepping-stone to be employed in later negotiations. With 
this initial grant the king could present himself as munificent and amenable to civic petition. 
The city, by granting honours in return, confirms the king‘s ability to grant such benefactions 
and institutionalises a relationship of civic petition and honours in exchange for royal 
benefactions. The system is self-perpetuating and later embassies to the king can ensure the 
guarantee of added benefits, like aphorologesia and aphrouresia (Ch.3 §1.1-2), or indeed re-
confirmation of previous honours should the king die and a successor assume the throne.
16
 By 
publishing the grant on stone the city sought to give it tangibility and perpetuity, to turn it 




      Cities have numerous methods of petition, all based around the idea of exerting moral 
pressure on the king. They can ascribe a role to him and compel him to fulfil it,
18
 refer to 
civic honours already granted to him,
19
 profess their loyalty through examples of allegiance,
20
 
refer to earlier royal status grants,
21
 express their commitment to the dynasty,
22
 or refer to an 
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 Ma 1999: 199-201, 226-8. 
16
 IK.Ery. 31.21-8 (App.2 num.35); Giovannini 2004: 80. 
17
 Lund 1992: 110. Bertrand (2001) analyses the ways in which the city could neutralise royal authority and 
integrate it into its own freedom (see further, below §3). He argues that the process declines throughout the 
Hellenistic Period before eventually dying out with the pax romana. 
18
 Above n.14. IK.Ery. 504.14-20, where the king is presented as defender of the Greek cities: […πᾶσαν 
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 Below ns.22, 27. 
20
 Smyrna emphasises its loyalty to Seleukos II so as to ensure his confirmation of its eleutheria (IK.Smyrna 
573). The process also works in reverse. In I.Milet 139 Ptolemy Philadelphos requests Miletos‘ continued 
loyalty by providing evidence of the city‘s previous allegiance to his father. 
21
 Alexander the Great was often the precedent, see below pgs.155-6 with ns.9-10. 
22
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would display its earlier friendship and help gain mercy from the kings. IG II
2
 774 (c.250/49) displays Athenian 
loyalty to Antigonos Gonatas based on its earlier relationship with Demetrios Poliorketes (below n.27).  
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established royal/dynastic policy or proairesis.
23
 This whole system is based on what Ma 
called ―repressive tolerance‖, the procedure of legitimising royal power through the 
acceptance of the king‘s will as the ultimate source of status and the king as the sole 
guarantor of such. The result is that civic statuses, including eleutheria, become understood 
purely as royal benefactions. Since these are then achievable only through the process of 
petition and benefaction, the city‘s conceptual horizons are closed to any other possible 
means of attainment. The king becomes sole guarantor of eleutheria, a status now achievable 
only through royal benefaction. 
      This system, however, served the interests of both parties. By making himself accessible 
to a discourse of petition and persuasion the king channelled the city‘s potentially 
revolutionary zeal into dialogue rather than conflict. Similarly, the city acknowledged that 
tangible improvements, such as tax or garrison exemption, could be attained by petition and 
the passage of royal honours, rather than by rebellion. Overall, this avoided the need for 
violent revolution and so increased the stability and unity of the empire as an amalgamation 
of king and city,
24
 Walbank‘s ―two elements…with their own traditions‖. From the initial 
grant of status onwards, each benefaction confirmed by the king became an historical 
moment, a precedent that could later be invoked by a city to either ensure reconfirmation of 
that status/benefaction, should the city be dealing with a different monarch, or act as a 
stepping-stone for the attainment of greater benefactions.
25
 This integrated the cities into the 
concept of empire, specifically the continuous process of dynasty, by providing a series of 
pre-existing benefactions or precedents which could be invoked didactically to present to a 
new ruler with a history of close inter-relations achieved through a process of civic honours 
and royal benefactions.
26
 During times of weakness or succession the city would be less 
inclined to revolt if there was a pre-existing historical relationship of benefaction upon which 
both it and the king could draw to ensure the continuation of its privileged status, thus tying it 
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further to the empire and avoiding the impetus to revolution and independence.
27
 The system 
of petition and response, therefore, provided both city and king with a framework of 
benefaction, loyalty, and synergy around which their relationship could crystallise. As a 
status benefaction eleutheria played an important role in this procedure. 
 
2.2: Eleutheria as Benefaction 
      In a quotation prefixed to this chapter, Klaus Bringmann claimed that despite the deep 
differences that existed between the institutions of the king and the polis the king‘s role as 
benefactor validated his new relationship with the city by providing an understanding of 
kingship that emphasised the polis first and defined the king and his actions in terms of polis 
interests. The king as benefactor offered a means of assimilating royal power into civic 
structures without compromising the city‘s eleutheria.
28
 However, the role of king as grantor 
and defender of eleutheria specifically is a facet of his royal character untreated by 
Bringmann. Within the wider multi-ethnic world eleutheria was a tradition peculiar to the 
Greek cities and perennially important to a ruling power‘s relationship with them.
29
 The 
king‘s position as defender of eleutheria revealed him to be fulfilling one of the many roles, 
such as benefactor, ascribed by Greek tradition. Since Secondary freedom was granted and 
guaranteed by royal fiat, the function of eleutheria as an aspect of royal euergetism is of 
fundamental importance to our understanding of eleutheria as an aspect of king/city relations. 
      First of all, it is important to emphasise that as guarantor of eleutheria the king was not 
acting out of some high-minded sense of magnanimity. He was concerned with assimilating 
the city to his empire by presenting the latter in terms comprehensible and agreeable to the 
former; what Strabo described as the expansion of hegemony through persuasion over force 
(9.2.40).
30
 A grant of eleutheria, like any other benefaction, was a form of passive bribe. It 
aimed to enforce royal hegemony over civic freedom and integrate the city, and its statuses, 
into the mechanism of empire, what Gianluca Cuniberti termed ―autonomia senza 
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 Heuβ 1937: 242; Ma 2003: 180-3; Mileta 2008: 23-33. An early example is Mardonios‘ grant of what 
Herodotos calls democracy to the Greek cities of Asia Minor (Hdt. 6.43). 
30
 Persuasion and force are the twin powers of the Hellenistic king. Appian applies them to Seleukos Nikator 
(Syr. 281: δυνατὸς ὢν βιάσασθαι καὶ πιθανὸς προσαγαγέσθαι ἦρξε) and Diodoros to Antigonos 
Monophthalmos (18.52.8; above pg.56 with n.51). See also Diodoros‘ account of the Spartan hegemony of the 





 The allowance of freedom came at the price of obedience and loyalty. Freedom 
was guaranteed by the ruler alone and dependent solely upon his will. However, even within 
this understanding of freedom the city was able to exercise a certain limited hegemony over 
its neighbours and allies. Echoing Cuniberti‘s remarks, Hans-Ulrich Wiemer has recently 
argued that freedom and hegemony were inextricably linked, that freedom was ―the perfect 
realisation of what independence really meant‖.
32
 This, however, is to treat of freedom purely 
in a Primary understanding. It is abundantly clear that cities that owed their eleutheria to 
another power (Secondary freedom) could also exercise hegemony, but on a more local scale. 
Freedom and hegemony were not mutually exclusive. 
      Under the Athenian Empire localised Euboian hegemonies existed under the wider 
hegemony of Athens herself.
33
 Between 304-301, Athens was able to take the initiative in 
forming an alliance with Sikyon in Skirophorion 303/2 even though both cities were by then 
probably allied under Demetrios‘ Hellenic League and closely under his control.
34
 Smyrna‘s 
assimilation of Magnesia-on-Maiandros, though expressing fully Seleukos‘ authority in 
granting eleutheria, was an aggressive and expansive manifestation of its wish for hegemony 
on a local scale. John Ma has treated of the phenomenon of local, small-scale warfare and 
reached the conclusion that local hegemonies remained vibrant throughout the Hellenistic 
period and into the Roman.
35
 So, although royal acknowledgement of eleutheria entailed the 
civic surrender of hegemonia to the king, it was not a complete surrender of hegemony. The 
city remained capable of exercising hegemony on a local scale provided this did not harm 
royal interests and was justified within the discourse of civic obedience to royal loyalty. 
      The royal grant of eleutheria was a means of extending dominion, but it did so in a pre-
emptively euphemistic and integrative manner, one that played to civic expectations and 
attempted to utilise their emotive longing for its own ends. This is important. The civic 
response, however, fully engaged with this royal use – probably aware of the inherent lack of 
altruism – and by constant reference to it exerted moral force over the king, forcing him to 
live up to the role he had set himself and offer concrete benefactions to the city.
36
 Royal 
grants of eleutheria normalised the empire into the civic political sphere and provided a local 
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model by which the city could understand, and more importantly authorise, the king‘s 
exceptional position over it by defining that position as the maintenance of its freedom. The 
king not only defended the physical safety of the city (soteria – Ch.6 §4) and contributed 
benefactions to it, but also asserted his wish to defend its political independence and 
contribute to its development as a polis through the guarantee and protection of its freedom. 
      Eleutheria was unique as a benefaction because it synergised city and king by offering a 
positive ideological programme for their unity, one that promoted civic loyalty to the king but 
also necessitated his active support for the city‘s political wellbeing. This ideological 
dimension to eleutheria is of particular importance because beyond defining certain concrete 
improvements in a city‘s status and independence, eleutheria also provided an implicit 
statement of principles on the nature of the relationship between both parties. A king could 
grant benefactions to any city within his empire, free or otherwise, but a grant of eleutheria, 
though used as a stepping-stone to further benefactions, singled out the recipient as one of a 
privileged few (Ch.3 §2.3).
37
 It defined for those lucky enough to receive it the nature of their 
individual relationship with the king in terms of politics and ideology, rather than gift-giving 
and protection, although it certainly encompassed these as well. 
      The use of eleutheria as a means of engaging king and city is amply attested in individual 
instances.
38
 However, in certain cases eleutheria was elaborated to define the very nature of 
the king‘s relationship with all the Greek cities under his empire: eleutheria as the ideological 
glue holding the entire Hellenic face of the empire together. This, however, is rarer and 
usually connected with universal declarations of Greek freedom,
39
 the likes of which were 
employed by Alexander in Asia Minor between 334-332, Antigonos at Tyre in 315 and after 
the Peace of 311, and even Ptolemy in 310.
40
 In these situations eleutheria became more than 
just a status benefaction to a few favoured cities, but rather a general quality ostensibly 
entitled to all Greek cities and promised as a result of loyalty to a specific king. While the 
precise application of this freedom differed from city to city, the principle was one that 
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applied to all, and that was the important point. Eleutheria could be developed into the single 
defining characteristic of a king‘s relationship with the Greek cities under his remit. 
      It is central to the success of eleutheria as a unifying ideological concept that it be 
seriously pursued with genuine zeal, only then could it ensure the king both immediate and 
long-lasting support. Antigonos Monophthalmos is the archetype. He employed such a policy 
from 315 to 301 which, although not without its setbacks, met with huge success in Asia 
Minor, the Aegean, and Greece (Ch.2 §4-6).
41
 Alexander‘s earlier actions in Asia Minor, 
although of more limited scope, were equally successful (Ch.2 §1; cf. Ch.5 §1.1); 
Polyperchon‘s too, but only in the immediate aftermath of his Edict.
42
 Antigonos, therefore, 
had precedents for the support that could be garnered through universal declarations of 
freedom, but it was he alone who saw its full potential, employing it as the key characteristic 
of his relationship with the Greek cities from 315-301.
43
 
      Within Antigonos‘ letter to Skepsis of 310/9 and the civic decree passed in reply (OGIS 
5+6) we can trace Antigonos‘ successful use of eleutheria as a means of integrating city and 
empire. Antigonos presents himself as the sole protector of Greek eleutheria and uses it not 
only as a point of dialogue but also as a means of defining and authorising his wider actions. 
That is, he went so far as to explain the recent cycle of Successor Wars in local Hellenic 
terms, namely high politics as a manifestation of concern for Greek eleutheria. Within this 
programme his basileia and military aggression were justified as expressions of concern for 
Greek eleutheria.
44
 When peace was established in 311 on the impetus and ratification of the 
Diadochoi alone, Antigonos presented it to the poleis (here Skepsis), the local Greek actors, 
as a statement on Greek eleutheria for all, claiming that ―we exercised zeal for the eleutheria 
of the Greeks…as long as there was agreement on this we participated in the conference on 
the Hellespont‖.
45
 The war and the resultant peace were carefully explained in terms 
comprehensible and complimentary to the polis and Antigonos‘ relationship with it. 
      Further, Antigonos claimed that he had inserted into the treaty the requirement that: 
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―All the Greeks are to swear to aid each other in preserving their eleutheria and 
autonomia…so that afterwards eleutheria would remain more certainly secure for all 




      This oath is important, but the precise understanding of it has caused debate. P.J. 
Stylianou argued that the Peace of 311 ―was meant in fact to be between, on the one hand, all 
the Greeks, and on the other, Alexander IV and Macedon.‖
47
 The role of the Greeks within 
this peace is important, but I think Stylianou is mistaken here. An accurate understanding of 
the treaty is difficult because, although we have both literary and epigraphic sources, both 
detail different parts of the treaty. Diodoros gives a brief breakdown of the main clauses of 
the whole treaty: Kassandros is strategos of Europe until Alexandros IV comes of age; 
Lysimachos rules Thrace; Ptolemy rules Egypt and the cities in Libya and Arabia; Antigonos 
rules Asia; and the Greeks are to be autonomous (19.105.1). Antigonos‘ letter to Skepsis, 
however, elaborates in detail the clause on Greek autonomia, no doubt the least important 
clause for the Diadochoi signatories.
48
 This causes difficulty because Antigonos gives us a 
level of detail that does not exist within Diodoros‘ cursory account. 
      Antigonos seems to be referring to two clauses in the Peace of 311 concerning Greek 
eleutheria, the second being an expansion on the first. First, a clause that the Diadochoi were 
to uphold Greek freedom, something explicitly mentioned by Diodoros (19.105.1). Second, a 
clause entered on Antigonos‘ insistence that in pursuance of this the Greeks were ―to swear to 
aid each other in preserving their eleutheria and autonomia‖ (OGIS 5.58-61). Only in this 
way can it be said that both the Diadochoi and the Greek cities were bound together by oath  
to defend Greek freedom.
49
 Each party swore to defend Greek freedom but neither swore a 
treaty or alliance with the other; the Greek cities were never actually party to the Peace of 
311 because the Diadochoi and cities were individually bound by their own series of 
alliances, something the treaty in no way tried to alter.
50
 If any other clause within the treaty 
was broken then the Greek cities were not concerned. However, the clause concerning Greek 
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eleutheria was sworn upon by both Diadochoi and cities with the meaning that if any 
Diodochos broke it then the others were to attack while the cities were themselves to band 
together and defend their freedom in unison, thus effectively uniting cities and Successors 
against the offending party. Heuβ argued that this constituted a koine eirene and a mutual 
defence clause for the Greek cities.
51
 This is too strong; with no central organisation the 
Greek cities could not organise such mutual defence. The call to arms would have been made 
by Antigonos, or as it later transpired, Ptolemy, and under his leadership the Greek cities 
would unite against the offending party. The clause on Greek freedom was an ideological 
casus belli that existed both within and outwith of the treaty and could be used by one to open 
hostilities against a perceived offending party.
52
 Two separate oaths were sworn around a 
single clause on Greek freedom and both parties were required to defend this on identical 
grounds. Neither party was allied to the other, but they were to defend the same thing. This 
was the extent of the alliance between the kings and the Greek cities.
53
 
      Successor and city were united in oath on the defence of one clause, that of Greek 
freedom. Antigonos obviously intended this for his own use. From 310 onwards he was 
shifting his attention to Babylon and Seleukos, and a re-assertion of eleutheria would only 
help secure his Asian (under Demetrios and Philippos) and Greek (under Polemaios and 
Aristodemos) possessions during his absence.
54
 Manipulating the Greek concern for 
eleutheria was a convenient means of maintaining authority and stability through persuasion 
and goodwill over military force. Indeed, Antigonos could be reasonably certain that 
Kassandros, Lysimachos, and Ptolemy, none of whom had yet made use of Greek eleutheria, 
would have little cause or success in utilising such a clause against him. His actions were, 
nonetheless, risky because between 310-308 Ptolemy did claim the role of defender of Greek 
freedom and tried to rouse the Greeks in its common defence (Ch.2 §5). 
      As well as a means of undermining his opponents in the eyes of the Greek cities, 
Antigonos saw eleutheria as a means of unifying under one banner himself, his empire, and 
the Greek cities within it. By inserting a clause on Greek eleutheria, no doubt dismissed as 
meaningless by his co-signatories, and then requiring the Greek cities to swear to it 
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Antigonos created a coherent and encompassing ideological unity for his empire and the 
cities within it, but one which could be employed effectively in motivating the cities as allies 
against external threats. Eleutheria had been an important part of Antigonos‘ relations with 
the Greek cities since 315, and possibly earlier. With the oath of 311 he successfully created a 
pseudo-legal basis for his associations with the Greek cities within his empire, and potentially 
those outside it should he extend his influence. With campaigns in Ionia, Caria, the Aegean, 
and mainland Greece Antigonos had been carefully presenting the expansion of his empire as 
a defence of Greek eleutheria. Now, the cities under his influence were bound by oath to 
likewise defend his empire as an expression of this.
55
 Both he and the Greek cities were 
legally bound to defend Greek eleutheria, the most important concept yet seen for 
synergising city and empire. 
      This marked a level of ideological unity hitherto unseen. The League of Corinth was 
certainly alleged to defend the eleutheria and autonomia of its members (D. 17.8), but these 
qualities were dependent upon the terms of the League itself. Now, however, the relationship 
between king and city was based exclusively around the defence and continuance of the 
principles of eleutheria and autonomia and nothing else; this is unity between ruler and cities 
based primarily on loyalty to ideology and concepts, not to politics and treaties.
56
 The 
strength of this unity lay in its ambiguity. Eleutheria remained undefined, beyond perhaps 
Antigonos‘ promotion for aphrouresia. This was in direct contrast to its use in the League of 
Corinth with its multiple legalistic clauses. The individual application of eleutheria varied 
from city to city (below §2.3). Nonetheless, the concept itself was the unifying factor; it was 
vague enough so as not to restrict the king‘s actions unnecessarily but positive and 
affirmative enough so as to secure loyalty and extend hegemony. 
      Antigonos and Demetrios refined the use of eleutheria as unity in their dealings with 
Athens between 307-301. Here eleutheria was stated to be the proairesis (policy) of the 
kings, a paradigmatic manifestation of their character.
57
 From this it was presented as the 
driving force behind Demetrios‘ European campaigns of 307-301. As was the case with the 
Skepsis letter, aggressive campaigns of military expansion were portrayed simply as 
manifestations of Antigonid concern for Greek eleutheria. Antigonid philoi were commended 
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for their concern for ―royal affairs and the freedom of the Greeks‖, a phrase that explicitly 
unifies king and city, empire and Hellenes, under a common ideological purpose: the 
preservation and expansion of freedom for the Greeks as manifest through Antigonid 
expansion.
58
  The defence and promotion of eleutheria was the prime rationalisation of 
relations between the Antigonids and the Greek cities. It sought to unite both parties under a 
common ideological purpose and present the expansion of the empire as a manifestation of 
royal concern for Greek eleutheria.
59
 
      Eleutheria as royal benefaction, with the king as guarantor and defender, was designed to 
promote unity through a community of political and ideological interests. The example of 
Antigonos at Skepsis is particularly striking in that it reveals the creation of eleutheria as a 
legally-binding connection between the empire and the Greek cities. However, freedom could 
also be used to voice discontent and promote conflict, even in relations between the king and 
a Secondary free city within his remit. 
      Eleutheria promoted unity because it was a positive ideal that affirmed the rights and 
traditions of the polis and established the king as the new guarantor and protector of these. It 
promoted conflict, however, because it was not a universal gift and so its grant to one city 
implicitly acknowledged its absence from another.
60
 This aspect of eleutheria is not touched 
upon in most analyses of it. Eleutheria was granted only to a limited number of privileged 
cities, leaving many others not enslaved, but not officially acknowledged as free by the king 
and therefore in a weakened ideological position when it came to negotiating statuses and 
benefactions.
61
 Such cities were left with three choices: abide by the situation and try to reap 
certain limited benefits but not eleutheria;
62
 attempt to garner greater benefits possibly 
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leading to a (re-)guarantee of eleutheria through renewed honours and petitions;
63
 or seek to 
attain freedom either by forcefully removing themselves from the empire and asserting their 
own Primary freedom or attaching themselves to a rival ruler who was willing to grant them 
Secondary freedom.
64
 Eleutheria, or more precisely the lack of it, could split the city from the 
empire, either ideologically through the belief that both parts stood for different goals, or 
militarily through the aggressive assertion of that which they were denied by the king. Either 
way, this marked a weakness in Ma‘s ―repressive tolerance‖, the funnelling of rebellion into 
discourse through the procedure of petition, benefaction, and honours. 
      Conflict is also apparent in other ways. The dual understanding of freedom as Primary 
and/or Secondary is a case in point since it provides the city with Secondary freedom the 
model of the city with Primary freedom as a potential goal; a fuller manifestation of freedom 
which asserts the polis‘ self-determination even over royal authority. Although a city could 
be free in either sense, if a choice had to be made Primary freedom was often preferable for 
those who could realistically achieve and maintain it. Smyrna and Lampsakos again provide 
the example, preferring their own Primary freedom over the Secondary freedom offered by 
Antiochos III.
65
 Both cities felt that the risks ran in defending their Primary freedom 
outweighed the guarantees accrued by their potential Secondary freedom. The simple fact 
that both saw fit at some time in the late third century to abandon the Secondary freedom 
guaranteed by the Seleukid Empire and assert their own Primary freedom shows that the 
distinction was worth fighting over and the position of Secondary free city could be seen as 
restrictive of a greater goal. The impetus for such assertion may have lain with the lethal 
combination of renewed civic power, as exercised by Smyrna over Magnesia, and weakened 
royal authority, something that Claire Préaux highlights elsewhere.
66
 
      A further important point of conflict, analysed in greater detail below (§3), is the erosion 
of a grant of Secondary freedom through the gradual accumulation of royal impositions. This 
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process is difficult to trace epigraphically because royal letters and civic decrees normally 
hide debate and conflict,
67
 but both Athens (307-301) and Iasos (309-285) are examples of 
cities whose initial grant of freedom was eroded over time thus contributing to a decline in 
support for the current position of royal fidelity. As we will see later (below §2.3), these 
examples also show eleutheria (in the Secondary sense) operating as an ever-shifting point of 
balance between the twin extremes that led to its dissolution: too little royal control (inspiring 
the city to Primary freedom) and too much (negating the city‘s Secondary freedom). 
 
2.3: The Functional Limits of Secondary Freedom 
      Since the king alone held a monopoly on the definition of statuses, freedom could only be 
achieved by royal grant (Ch.3 2.3). However, the king did not hold a monopoly on the 
revocation of freedom because there was more than one way by which Secondary freedom 
could cease to exist. There were two clearly distinguishable situations: the revocation of 
eleutheria by royal pronouncement or the forcible civic re-assertion of eleutheria seen when 
the city removed itself from the royal alliance. This latter condition worked in two ways: 
either the city entered into the remit of another ruler, either by free will or conquest, and 
ensured a further guarantee of its Secondary freedom or it removed itself entirely from royal 
control and asserted its own Primary freedom.
68
 These two potential situations – royal 
revocation and civic re-assertion of eleutheria – mark the limits of Secondary freedom by 
demarcating the conceptual and ideological space within which eleutheria operated as a 
status benefaction in the discursive relationship of petition and benefaction. 
      Within the poles of royal revocation and civic re-assertion, eleutheria acted as a general 
status rather than a definite set of specific and strictly-defined criteria. It did not carry a single 
consistent meaning. Rather, the practical form of the status it denoted was fluid and 
constantly changing based on the city‘s success in accruing benefits and avoiding royal 
impositions. When a city gained more status guarantees and benefactions (aphorologesia, 
aphrouresia, etc) the practical form of its eleutheria was increased; when it suffered royal 
impositions (tax, garrison, enforced obedience to royal will) this was decreased. Too much 
movement in either direction might cause the city to lose its Secondary freedom through 
either civic re-assertion or royal revocation respectively. This model may be rather simplistic, 
but eleutheria operated fluidly and with great adaptability within the discourse of honours 
and euergetism that lead to the city‘s attainment of royal benefactions and status recognition. 
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      Two cities may be acknowledged by royal grant as free, but neither of them is free in 
exactly the same way. Neither of them holds precisely the same guarantees of their free 
status. Magnesia in the 240s was strong enough to act with almost total independence as 
Seleukos II‘s ―viceroy in Asia Minor‖, annexing Magnesia in his name and attaining royal 
recognition of eleutheria, autonomia, demokratia, and aphorologesia of land and city.
69
 
However, Iasos in the early third century was forced to accept a Ptolemaic phylake and 
syntaxis and petition Ptolemy‘s representative Aristoboulos not to annex its harbour dues.
70
 
Regardless of these differences both cities were officially free and their relationship with the 
king operated within that zone of dialogue already defined as existing between the 
extremities of royal revocation and civic re-assertion. The specifics of their freedom were 
different because their historical circumstances were different, and this caused each city 
varying degrees of success when it came to defraying royal impositions and ensuring 
benefactions and recognition of statuses. To understand the nature of Secondary freedom it is 
vital to realise that freedom itself was ill-defined and adaptable. Its use was, I argue, defined 
by the functional limits of royal revocation and civic re-assertion, but within these limits its 
meaning was malleable and its use was fluid, operating to different extents as benefaction, 
typology of status, and conceptual ideology for the unity of empire. The practical status of 
eleutheria was different from city to city and unique to each. No single definition of it 
existed. 
      I have defined eleutheria as a point of discourse which itself exists between two extreme 
situations that negate Secondary freedom, royal revocation and civic re-assertion. This model 
can, however, be further refined. Without going so far as to revoke the city‘s freedom the 
king did undermine it by continually asserting more and more royal control over the city by 
installing garrisons and taxes, or demanding obedience to royal will ahead of civic laws (see 
below). This process of erosion slowly undermined the initial grant of freedom and so cities 
often fought against it, as can be seen in the aforementioned case of Iasos claiming that 
Ptolemaic annexation of its harbour dues would undermine the Ptolemaic grant of freedom. 
This process is important because it reveals that there came a point whereby royal 
impositions became so oppressive that the city began to feel that its freedom was ceasing to 
exist in any practical sense. The city was still termed free in both royal letter and civic decree, 
but there was now a conflict between the civic assertion of laws and self-government and the 
royal assertion of control, authority, and obedience. Due to the fact that royal letter and civic 
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decree eschew discord this conflict is difficult to detect, but informative examples are 
furnished by Iasos under Ptolemy Soter and Athens under Demetrios Poliorketes (see further, 
§3 below). 
      Ptolemy‘s grant of eleutheria and autonomia to Iasos in 308 remained intact despite his 
imposition of a phylake and syntaxis. However, when Ptolemy attempted to assert control 
over Iasos‘ harbour dues sometime after 305 the city sent an embassy to his representative 
Aristoboulos claiming that this would be contrary to the terms of Ptolemy‘s earlier grant of 
freedom. Although Iasos would certainly have maintained its official status as free and 
autonomous, the loss of harbour dues was evidently the point at which it felt that its freedom 
would have become irreparably negated. Athens provides a further example. In 303 Athens 
existed as a free and autonomous city allied to Demetrios Poliorketes. However, Demetrios 
demanded that his word be given a measure of institutional force and be considered above 
civic laws and decrees. Some in Athens saw this as a negation of the city‘s freedom, but even 
after the city ratified Demetrios‘ wish it continued to be called free and autonomous, both by 
the king himself and in the decrees of the demos (below §3). 
      In both cases we can discern a point at which the city feels that the king has ceased 
treating its freedom as a mark of respect and unity and is now actively undermining it by 
enforcing further impositions. The city is acutely aware that it has reached the situation 
whereby the king asserts royal authority over civic freedom. The latter is now an 
encumbrance to the former and where before the king would have tried to persuade the city to 
accept his wish, as in Iasos‘ case using terms like phylake and syntaxis to present impositions 
as defensive of and contributory to freedom, he now feels confident to impose his will 
without justification. Iasos was successful in that its embassy guaranteed renewed control 
over its harbour dues and in doing so ensured royal recognition of its freedom, but its silence 
regarding its earlier grant of aphorologesia and aphrouresia marked its concession of these 
guarantees to the realities of royal power. Athens, on the other hand, acquiesced totally to 
Demetrios between 304-301 and saw its future slide slowly into blind obedience to royal will. 
Still, both continued to be called free. 
      The instant at which the city recognised the potentially irreparable damage to its grant of 
eleutheria was a tipping-point in the relationship between city and king. In official 
documentation the city would still be called and refer to itself as free, but a line had 
unofficially been crossed where eleutheria was perhaps fatally undermined by royal force. 
This ‗tipping-point‘ differed from city to city (harbour dues for Iasos; civic laws for Athens), 
but it would have existed in each free city; we just lack the means to detect it widely. It 
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marked the point at which the civic, but not the royal, understanding of eleutheria became 
undermined. Since the king maintained a monopoly on the granting and revocation of statuses 
eleutheria could only officially be revoked when the king said so, regardless of whether or 
not the city felt that he was undermining its freedom. Therefore, even though eleutheria was 
diluted in the civic understanding, the city still officially remained free, both in royal 
declarations and civic decrees. 
      This ‗tipping-point‘ marked a change in the understanding and function of eleutheria. 
Freedom as a status was only as defined as the modifiers used in conjunction with it 
(aphorologesia, etc.). Nonetheless, it implied control and utilisation of one‘s own laws, local 
self-government, and internal autonomy as long as this did not conflict with royal interests.
71
 
When cities like Iasos and Athens began to see that the royal guarantee of freedom was no 
longer compatible with the free implementation of their own laws the potential for conflict 
arose and the city may have been inspired to seek confirmation or attainment of its eleutheria 
elsewhere. In such situations eleutheria began to denote less and less in practical terms, and 
came simply to signify something akin to the inviolability of civic laws and decrees only as 
far as these did not conflict with ever-changing royal will. When royal will ceased to defer to 
civic authority and instead asserted control over it, the relationship between king and 
Secondary free city was in steep decline. 
      Once past this ‗tipping-point‘ eleutheria functioned as little more than an ideological veil 
concealing royal authority. Nonetheless, because it was extremely multifarious in function, it 
still exercised a degree of moral force over the king‘s actions and contributed to the city‘s 
receipt of concrete benefactions. Between 304-301 Athens was a city very securely under 
Demetrios‘ control. Objectively, it was not free, in the sense that it was not its own master 
and the level of royal control was much greater than what could usually be acceptable for 
even a city enjoying Secondary freedom. The tipping-point had been the Kleomedon affair in 
304/3 (below §3). However, eleutheria still remained prevalent, now more than ever before, 
in civic decrees, royal letters, and even architectural ideology.
72
 Even when practically 
undermined, freedom was a powerful idea to which it was still important to defer when in 
contact with the city. It was, as I have already said, ideological glue. Because the king had 
declared the city free, eleutheria remained present in the discourse between both parties.  
Even when apparently undermined it still facilitated the city‘s gaining of benefactions by 
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exercising moral force over the king‘s self-proclaimed role as its defender, as two Athenian 
decrees in honour of Demetrios‘ philoi reveal. 
      The Athenian decree in honour of Oxythemis of Larissa, philos of Demetrios and a chief 
officer in Greece between 304-301, praises him for manifesting concern for ―the eleutheria of 
the Greeks‖ and thanks  him for negotiating the release of captured Athenian horsemen.
73
 The 
phrase ―the eleutheria of the Greeks‖ refers generally to Demetrios‘ campaign against 
Kassandros in Greece. However, its appearance here in conjunction with Oxythemis‘ 
negotiations shows him applying this concern for Greek freedom more specifically in Athens‘ 
interests. Quality and action are implicitly connected. Indeed, Athens states that she is 
honouring Oxythemis so as to inspire other philoi to follow his example and aid the city 
through similar manifestations of their concern for Greek freedom.
74
 Although Athens‘ 
freedom had recently been severely undermined by Demetrios, eleutheria still served a 
practical function in facilitating and elucidating contact between both parties. It offered a 
paradigm for imitation and in doing so could help to inspire concrete benefactions to the city, 
both through the king himself and his friends. 
      A second case may be seen in the honorary decree for Medon, another royal philos.
75
 
Medon is honoured generally for having acted on behalf of ―the soteria of the demos and the 
eleutheria of the other Greeks‖ and specifically for being sent by Demetrios with some good 
but unknown announcement, which Paschidis speculates was Demetrios‘ return of the Attic 
forts to Athenian control.
76
 This, he argues, was a deal sweetener for Stratokles‘ re-
organisation of the calendar in 304/3 to facilitate Demetrios‘ induction into the Eleusinian 
mysteries.
77
 If so, then the return of the forts strengthened Athens‘ democracy just as the 




 558 (App.1 num.21). The date of the decree is contentious. M.B. Walbank (1990: 445-6, num.20) joins 
IG II
2
 558 with IG II
2
 484, which preserves the prescript of a decree dated to prytany VIII 304/3 (archonship of 
Pherekles, shortly after the Kleomedon affair). The join is accepted by Bielman (1994: 53-6), but rejected by 
Paschidis (2008a: 96 n.1) on false grounds. Paschidis claims that Tracy (2003: 151 n.3) rejected the association 
of IG II
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reorganisation of the calendar weakened it. The concepts of eleutheria and soteria facilitated 
Athens‘ acceptance of the forts as a bribe because they presenting the return of the forts as a 
strengthening of the city‘s freedom. 
      Although Athens‘ freedom of political action and independence was being constantly 
eroded, the ideal of eleutheria as an aspect of royal ideology continued to facilitate contact 
between both players and ensure for the polis prolonged benefactions by forcing the king to 
ascribe to the ideology and role he established but had since undermined. As the decrees for 
Oxythemis and Medon show, the city could still refer to its free status as a means of gaining 
benefactions from the king and his philoi. Nonetheless, a line had been crossed. The city now 
saw that the king had undermined its freedom to a degree that rendered that freedom almost 
obsolete in any practical sense. In this situation dissent against the king was a danger. 
Factions within the demos could push to reassert the city‘s freedom either by revolting from 
the king, and asserting anew a Primary understanding of its freedom, or by allying with 
another king and gaining an additional guarantee of its Secondary freedom. However, 
whether the city remained allied with the king, revolted from him, or allied with another king, 
eleutheria maintained an important role in the relationship between both city and king; its 
adaptability to different situations and understandings ensured as much. 
 
SECTION 3: ATHENS AND DEMETRIOS IN 303. A CASE-STUDY 
      I have mentioned the example of Athens and Demetrios in the late 4
th
 century a number 
of times. The years 304-301 are unique and highly informative because we have then the 
congruence of both epigraphic (a particularly active Athenian demos) and literary evidence 
(Diodoros XX and Plutarch‘s Life of Demetrios). Further, ever since his liberation of Athens 
from Kassandros and Demetrios of Phaleron in 307 Demetrios‘ actions in Greece and his 
relationship with Athens were based around his role as defender of eleutheria, a fact well 
represented in both source traditions. The period, therefore, offers a unique early Hellenistic 
opportunity to analyse the use and role of eleutheria, in both its Primary and Secondary 
forms, as an aspect of king/city relations. 
      My main focus will be on two particular events. First, Plutarch‘s account of Demetrios‘ 
dispatch of letters to the Athenian demos in favour of a friend and the reaction this elicited. 
Second, a series of honorary decrees passed shortly afterwards that refer to and detail further 
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letters sent by Demetrios calling for honours for at least two of his philoi. I will look at how 
the literary evidence reveals that Athens‘ implementation of its eleutheria and demokratia led 
to discord with Demetrios, but how in the epigraphic evidence both ideals are used by 
Demetrios to foster unity. An important part of this process is, I contend, the distinction 
between Athens‘ understanding of its freedom in a Primary sense and Demetrios‘ 
understanding of it in a Secondary sense. That is, Athens‘ belief that although Demetrios 
restored its freedom this was simply the return of something that was legitimately and 
inherently its own, and Demetrios‘ belief that Athens‘ freedom was contingent upon his 
goodwill alone and that the demos should accordingly accommodate his wishes. Freedom 
could be a point of conflict with the ruler when asserted by the demos because it promoted 
the city over the king, but a point of unity when used by the king to present himself as 
defender and patron. 
      The royal dispatch of letters to a city requesting honours for an individual and detailing 
his actions is not uncommon. The earliest Hellenistic example is of Polyperchon writing to 
Athens and requesting citizenship for two of his associates, Sonikos and Eu[---].
78
 The 
phenomenon appears later with Antiochos I‘s letter to Ilion requesting honours for his doctor 
Metrodoros, a citizen who had recently healed the king of a neck wound.
79
 In neither of these 
cases, however, do we have literary evidence detailing preceding conflict between city and 
king, as we have at Athens. This allows us to read Demetrios‘ letters, as represented within 
the Athenian decrees, with an awareness of the political and ideological environment that 
inspired them. 
      Plutarch describes how in spring 303 Kleomedon owed the demos fifty talents but that his 
son, Kleainetos, persuaded Demetrios to send letters to the demos requesting absolution of 
the fine (Demetr. 24.3-5).
80
 Although unhappy with the situation the demos obliged. It then 
debated a motion (ἐγράφη δὲ ψήφισμα) that from now on no Athenian citizen was to bring 
before it letters from Demetrios (Plu. Demetr. 24.4). When informed of this, the king was 
incensed. The demos hurriedly recanted its motion, executed some of those who proposed 
and supported it, and exiled others.
81
 A new decree of Stratokles was passed (Plu. Demetr. 
24.4): 
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―They voted besides (ἔτι δὲ προσεψηφίσαντο) that it was the pleasure of the 
Athenian people (δεδόχθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων) that whatsoever king 
Demetrios should ordain (κελεύσῃ) in future, this should be held righteous towards 
the gods and just towards men.‖ 
 
      In spring 303 Athens was at a crossroads. Demetrios‘ letters and Stratokles‘ re-
organisation of the civic calendar caused Athens to be unsure of the nature of its political and 
judicial freedom under Demetrios‘ rule. There is obvious unhappiness with Demetrios‘ 
actions, but Plutarch‘s account reveals a swing in the ekklesia from dissent to obedience after 
the Kleomedon affair. The end result is a manifestation of the initial problem: the expansion 
of royal power over the demos and the subordination of civic eleutheria to royal authority. 
      Royal letters, rather than diagrammata, were personal correspondences between a king 
and a city.
82
 They were usually phrased as polite requests, but contained the very clear 
insistence that it would be in the city‘s interests to act in such a way. Thus the king‘s will was 
performed, but the city could present its acquiescence as an enactment of its own laws, which 
remained valid and authoritative.
83
 In many cases a royal letter was seen to enforce freedom 
and civic justice, such as with the commissioning of foreign courts for inter-state arbitrations 
or by decreeing a trial but leaving its specifics in civic hands.
84
 In other cases it operated 
within the limits of civic laws, such as when Alexander sent letters to Eresos and Chios 
empowering them to try ex-tyrants under local laws (GHI 83; 84a-b).
85
 Alexander was 
ordering a specific action, but the terms of that action were delegated to the local laws. A city 
could even decide against the royal letter, as was the case with Eresos thrice deciding not to 
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foreign courts under the Ptolemaic Nesiotic League and stresses the focus on establishing laws and homonoia. 
Crowther (2007) shows that over half the extant texts detailing this phenomenon concern the cities of western 






 O‘Neil 2000; Dmitriev 2004; cf. Ottone 2006. Dmitriev (2004: 351-3, 376) comments on the use of 
diagramma/diagraphe under Alexander, cf. Landucci Gattinoni 2008: 59-60. On the royal diagramma, see 
Welles 1938: 254-6. It could also, however, enforce royal control over a city‘s constitution (Bikerman 1939: 
337-8; Bertrand 1990: 112).  
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allow the return of the descendents of its ex-tyrants despite the fact that Alexander, 
Polyperchon (in the name of Philip Arrhidaios), and Antigonos wrote to the city concerning 
the recall of its exiles (GHI 83 §§4-6). 
      There were two problems regarding Demetrios‘ letter to Athens during the Kleomedon 
affair. First, Athens sought to legislate against any and all royal letters. Second, Demetrios 
aggressively insisted on the pre-eminence of his royal will over civic laws. Earlier, 
Alexander‘s second letter to Chios requested – politely but leaving no doubt as to the king‘s 
insistence – the non-prosecution of a royal philos, Alkimachos, despite the fact that he was 
being tried ―for helping the barbarian‖ (ἐπὶ βαρβαρισμῶι), a charge against pro-Persian 
sympathisers delegated by Alexander himself to local laws.
86
 Alexander apparently enforced 
royal will over civic freedom but we do not possess a literary balance to show us how 
Alexander‘s letter was received within the polis. It is Plutarch‘s account of the reactions of 
both Athens and Demetrios that is so illuminating. 
      Plutarch presents Demetrios‘ letter on behalf of Kleomedon as a watershed moment in his 
relationship with Athens. It appears as Demetrios‘ first interference in Athens‘ legal system 
and the first enforcement of royal will over civic eleutheria. This may have been the case, but 
since Demetrios could personally designate Adeimantos as general of the countryside 
(strategos epi ten choran) for an exemplary two years (306/5-305/4) his influence had 
probably been growing since 307.
87
 Athens had had its freedom confirmed by royal will in 
307 and with Demetrios absent in Cyprus, Egypt, and Rhodes she could exercise this with 
limited direct interference. The events of Spring 303, however, represented a change. 
Stratokles had earlier advertised democratic authority ahead of royal will in the Lykourgos 
decree of 307/6 (Ch.5 §1.2.2), but with the Kleomedon affair the Athenian demos reached its 
‗tipping-point‘: that point at which it could concede no more without negating its freedom. 
The demos now realised that its eleutheria and demokratia were dependent upon Demetrios‘ 
will and that this was the more important of the two. The city‘s political, judicial, and 
military autonomy could accommodate Adeimantos‘ double generalship since it contributed 
directly to the maintenance of eleutheria from Kassandros during the Four Years War. 
Demetrios‘ letter, however, had nothing even remotely to do with defending Athenian 
interests and was therefore nothing but an imposition on the city‘s freedom. Civic authority 
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could not accommodate it as a defence of eleutheria or a manifestation of the king‘s concern 
for it. Rather, Demetrios‘ letter marked the point at which civic eleutheria clashed with royal 
will, and the latter won. 
      A precise analysis of Plutarch‘s account of the demos‘ debates provides insight into 
Athens‘ assertion of its own eleutheria at this time. The decree that Athens proposes 
concerning the non-acceptance of further letters from Demetrios does not appear to have been 
passed. In a forthcoming article Andrew Erskine highlights that in Plutarch‘s Life of 
Demetrios the phrase γράψαντος ψήφισμα denotes simply the proposal of a decree and not 
necessarily its resolution. Such is normally signified simply by ἐψηφίσαντο or some other 
form of the verb.
88
 Although Erskine does not cite the Kleomedon affair (Plu. Demetr. 24.3-
5) it is another example of this phenomenon and further supports his argument. Plutarch very 
clearly distinguishes the Athenian proposition on non-acceptance of Demetrios‘ letters 
(ἐγράφη δὲ ψήφισμα) from the demos‘ validation of Stratokles‘ decree on accepting 
whatever Demetrios orders as ―righteous towards the gods and just towards men‖ 
(προσεψηφίσαντο δεδόχθαι τῷ δήμῳ).89 The demos is unable to defend its own eleutheria 
or even apply it actively within the ekklesia but it accepts Demetrios‘ letters even though they 
undermine its eleutheria and nomoi. It can only debate a motion on protecting these qualities 
without having the resolve to enact it and defend them. When it comes to Demetrios‘ anger 
all hesitancy is lost; Athens validates the craziest of proposals
90
 and legally recognises 
Demetrios‘ orders as binding over the laws and freedom it has just debased. The demos 
cannot protect its freedoms but it is quick to debase them.
91
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 Plutarch‘s account contrasts the ineffective democratic demos with the effective pro-Demetrios demos and 
again highlights Athens‘ role in corrupting the king (cf. Plu. Demetr. 13.2). The emphasis on Demochares in 
Demetr. 24 may indicate that he was Plutarch‘s source here, though neither Jacoby (FGrH 75) nor Marasco 
(1984) make this connection. Sweet (1951; followed by Smith 1962) argues that the anti-democratic tone in 
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democracy (Democh. FGrH 75 F1). 
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      The fact that the demos‘ initial decree was not validated shows that debate concerning the 
meaning and application of civic freedom over royal will was the order of the day. In essence, 
the question was whether or not to enforce the mantra detailed by Stratokles himself within 
the Lykourgos decree, to assert democratic authority over royal will. There was enough 
support for the Kleomedon letter to be accepted, but the demos appears to have been divided 
when it came to passing a binding decree on whether or not the precedent was to continue. 
There was a schism in the demos over how to apply its eleutheria. Some would have 
favoured appeasement while others would certainly have promoted the city‘s right to its own 
nomoi, a claim, incidentally, that was central to Antigonid freedom propaganda (Ch.5 §3.2). 
Once the demos invalidated the proposal concerning the non-acceptance of Demetrios‘ 
letters, debate turned to the execution and exile of those who had proposed and supported it, 
thus providing further evidence for the division within the demos. The validation of 
Stratokles‘ decree, however, never appears to have been in doubt. Indeed, that the demos was 
willing to execute and exile those who spoke against Demetrios – some of whom, like 




      The demos was evidently unsure as to how to utilise and enforce its eleutheria and nomoi 
and debated this within the ekklesia. Freedom operated here as a point of conflict both 
internally within the demos and externally in its relationship with Demetrios. The demos was 
divided concerning the application of its eleutheria and so capitulated to Demetrios, 
something which ultimately led to the execution and exile of some of its members. Earlier, 
the demos had triumphed when it stood united against Alexander, an event proudly 
memorialised in the Lykourgos decree. Eleutheria also acted as a point of conflict between 
the demos itself and Demetrios. It was the demos‘ initial decision to assert its legal and 
political freedom against Demetrios that led to the king‘s interference within the workings of 
the polis. The active application of civic eleutheria conflicted here with royal will; the king, 
and indeed Athens itself under Stratokles, was quick to deny the former in the face of the 
latter. The conflict is apparently between the democrats‘ conception of Athens‘ freedom as 
Primary, thus denoting complete independence even to legislate against royal will, and 
Demetrios‘ conception of Athens‘ freedom as Secondary, thus as compatible with and 
malleable to royal will. Athens‘ uncertainty of the application and extent of its eleutheria 
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divided the city from the king and the demos from itself; obedience to Demetrios‘ royal will 
and understanding of freedom brought about unity, enforced though it may have been. 
      A very different picture is drawn within the epigraphic evidence, which consists of a 
series of honorary decrees for Demetrios‘ associates passed after the receipt of letters of 
recommendation from him. In two instances reference is made to the content of these letters, 
which emphasise the themes of unity and cohesion, built around the ideals of eleutheria and 
demokratia, thus giving us a very different picture of Demetrios‘ interaction with Athens and 
the use of eleutheria and demokratia as an aspect of this. 
      Four extant honorary decrees were passed on the last day of the year 304/3, Prytany XII 
29, Skirophorion 30. Two preserve exactly the same text and refer to letters of Demetrios 




 one preserves a 
different text concerning one Bianor (SEG XVI 58),
94
 while another preserves only the dating 
formulae and so may or may not have referenced a letter of Demetrios (IG II
2
 597 + Add. 
p.662). A fifth decree appears to mention a letter of Demetrios and may have been passed at 
the same meeting but since it is severely fragmented and no dating formulae survive it is not 
much use to us here.
95
 Excluding IG II
2
 597 + Add. p.662, which does not preserve the 
proposer‘s name, all of the decrees were proposed by Stratokles of Diomeia. The date of the 
letters, Skirophorion 304/3, is only a short time after the Kleomedon affair (early spring 303). 
It is interesting to note that we have no further epigraphic examples of Demetrios sending 
letters to Athens. Perhaps we can see in the royal letters of Skirophorion 304/3 Demetrios and 
Stratokles making a conscious effort to display and enforce the terms of Stratokles‘ newly 
passed decree concerning the ―institutional weight‖ of Demetrios‘ letters.
96
 Further, 
Stratokles‘ reference to royal letters in the text of each decree deliberately emphasises the 
letters‘ validity within the civic sphere and advertises royal authority over civic.
97
 
      Here, however, it is the content of the letters that is of primary importance since this goes 
some way to revealing how Demetrios saw fit to display and authorise his position. The 
decree in honour of Sotimos son of Dositheos of Kyrene, the fullest preserved text, is worth 
quoting (the decree for Eupolis preserves precisely the same text):
98
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―Stratokles son of Euthydemos of Diomeia proposed. In relation to what the king 
sent to the boule and the demos, declaring that he [Sotimos] is his friend, well-
disposed to the kings‘ affairs and the eleutheria of the Athenian people and that he, 
too, succours the fight for demokratia, and since the boule has deliberated in his 




      Freedom and democracy – those qualities implicit within Plutarch‘s account of the 
Kleomedon affair – are taken from the civic sphere and appropriated to the royal. Now the 
king and his friends are the guardians and supporters of Athenian freedom and democracy, 
not the polis. The democratic city has lost its ability to protect and enforce its own Primary 
freedom because the king has assimilated these features to himself and has assumed more 
fully the royal role of patron and protector, specifically of the city‘s Secondary freedom 
(above §2.1-3). Between the literary and epigraphic evidence we can see Athens‘ change 
from active exponent to passive recipient of eleutheria and demokratia. Through the dispatch 
of letters, now all but legally binding, the king dictates to Athens the preservation of her own 
freedom. The process of royal appropriation of civic freedom reappears continually in 
Athenian inscriptions from 304/3-302/1 where every single reference to eleutheria and/or 
demokratia commemorates either Demetrios himself or his philoi: IG II
2
 558 (304/3); Agora 
XVI 114 (304/3); SEG XXXVI 164 (304/3), 165 (304/3); IG II
2
 486 (304/3), 498 (303/2), 
559+568 (c.303/2); ISE 7 (303/2), which also refers to the erection of a bronze equestrian 
statue of Demetrios next to that of Demokratia (303/2).
100
 Within this programme the polis 
plays almost no role in defending its own eleutheria.
101
 
      Self-assertive though it may be, Demetrios‘ ideological monologue in these years is not 
self-centred. It is very consciously designed for public consumption and is targeted at the 
polis. His letters are directed specifically to the boule and demos. In this regard he is 
appropriating the language of the polis in order to normalise his relations with it. Eleutheria 
and demokratia act as a means of unifying city and king by presenting the king, his interests, 
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 The statue was apparently destroyed during the Antigonid damnation memoriae of 201 (Liv. 31.44) and its 
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and actions in terms that assert polis ideals.
102
 Demetrios is assuming the position of defender 
of Greek eleutheria and playing a formalised role within a local tradition. 
      Demetrios is expressing an understanding of eleutheria different to that of the demos. 
During the Kleomedon affair the demos may have argued that Demetrios was undermining its 
enjoyment of eleutheria and demokratia but with the dispatch of these letters to Athens 
Demetrios is arguing that Athens was in fact misguided. It is he alone who is the guarantor 
and defender of both these qualities and it is through the munificence and vigilance of both 
himself and his philoi that they are to be achieved. The division is essentially that of the city‘s 
understanding of its eleutheria as Primary freedom and the king‘s understanding of it as 
Secondary. Athens felt that freedom was a right and tried to assert it for itself; Demetrios 
claimed that it was a gift guaranteed by him alone and so tried to monopolise it himself (cf. 
Diod 20.46.1; Ch.3 §2.3). 
      This process is important. On first sight Demetrios seems to divide himself from the city 
by attempting to coerce it into accepting a different understanding of eleutheria. However, 
Demetrios‘ purpose within these letters is to utilise the royal understanding of Secondary 
freedom as a point of synergy between the disparate institutions of the Hellenistic king and 
the Greek polis. The decree for Sotimos (and that for Eupolis) is a good example. Sotimos is 
loyal to both the king‘s affairs and the eleutheria of the Athenians. He exists as a nexus 
connecting both city and king and assimilating the interests of one to the other.
103
 Through 
them and their actions the king‘s affairs and Athens‘ freedom are drawn closer. Since 
Sotimos is a friend of the king and since Demetrios is writing to Athens, his actions are a 
manifestation of Demetrios‘ own wishes and concerns. Modern work on role ascription 
usually focuses on the ways in which the city constructs a role for the king or his philoi to fill, 
but what we see here is Demetrios is using role ascription to provide Sotimos (and other 
philoi) with an ideological agenda that ingratiates him to Athens and reflects in turn the 
king‘s own concerns for Athenian eleutheria and demokratia.
104
 
      The process is vividly expressed by Sotimos‘ role as ―co-ally on behalf of the democracy‖ 
(συναγωνιστὴς ὑπὲρ τῆς δημοκρατίας).105 The συν- (co-) stem is deliberately ambiguous. 
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It can connect Sotimos with either Demetrios or Athens, but perhaps the intention is to 
connect all three parties who now, through Sotimos‘ example, work together defending the 
democracy.
106
 Numerous other examples from early Hellenistic Athens and elsewhere follow 
the same pattern: the synagonistes physically personifying the unity of royal and civic 
interests, usually expressed by mutual concern for eleutheria and/or demokratia.
107
 The ideals 
that motivate Sotimos also motivate Demetrios. In fact, since Demetrios wrote numerous 
letters of this sort to Athens it appears that he was actively applying to his philoi the qualities 
he would like Athens to see in himself: a concern for its eleutheria, the cohesion of this with 
royal affairs, and a mutual concern with upholding the democracy.  
      The letters also reveal a Demetrios concerned with promoting the democracy, a fact 
somewhat surprising since he rode roughshod over it a few months earlier. This is displayed 
vicariously through the designation of Sotimos (so too Eupolis) as a synagonistes for 
democracy. However, Demetrios also dispatched his letters to both the boule and the demos, 
and the resultant decrees for Sotimos and Eupolis were probouleumatic.
108
 This important 
fact suggests concern on Demetrios‘ part for ensuring that a semblance of democratic 
procedure was followed when submitting to his wishes. The boule was a cornerstone of the 
democracy and its decreased role between 322/1-319/8 reflects its more oligarchic character 
at that time.
109
 Demetrios‘ concern for the boule, when he could have just relied on Stratokles 
to propose the decrees, highlights his careful consideration for democratic procedure at this 
time. It also, however, symbolises his control over it: the maintenance of democratic 
institutions and procedure continued under his authority. Democracy is useful and can unite 
both parties, but only when employed on Demetrios‘ terms and not against his will. When 
utilised in this way it is a useful ideal for synergising his relationship with the polis. The 
difference is again between different perceptions of eleutheria as polis-assertive (Primary) or 
                                                                                                                                                        
on behalf of the city‘s eleutheria and demokratia is irrelevant. The important point is that king, city, and 
individual saw fit to describe his actions and relationship with the city in these terms because they offered a 
means of developing unity through ascribed ideology. 
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 Kralli (2000: 123) suggests that this need not be understood solely as Athens‘ democracy. However, in 
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king-assertive (Secondary). Both must meet somewhere and in this case that somewhere is 
dictated by the king. 
      Regardless of the reality of the situation Demetrios was concerned with showing that he 
was in fact supportive of Athens‘ democracy and indeed adherent to it. Democracy was too 
important and ingrained a concept for Demetrios to deny Athens. Instead, where it interfered 
with his interests, such as in the passing of a decree forbidding the use of royal letters in the 
ekklesia, Demetrios argued that democracy was best served by adhering to his wishes and 
displayed this by having both boule and demos validate these wishes. The dispatch of letters 
in support of Sotimos and Eupolis reveals Demetrios dictating to Athens the nature and 
meaning of its democracy. Freedom and democracy denote unity between city and king 
because he says so and because it is in the polis‘ interests not to refute the king‘s propaganda. 
      Demetrios‘ use of eleutheria and demokratia may have been cynical and hypocritical, but 
they offered a convenient way of eulogising Athens‘ relationship with himself by presenting 
the relationship as a unity of ideals and goals. Although Demetrios appears to have assumed 
some measure of unofficial control over the use and meaning of both terms, they continued to 
offer a common mode of expression within the polis for integrating king and city and 
understanding Demetrios‘ presence and actions. The decree for the unknown son of Menelaos 
of c.303/2 shows Stratokles connecting Demetrios‘ campaign in Greece with the honourand‘s 
concern for eleutheria and demokratia,
110
 while a dedication by Athenian epilektoi, specially 
selected troops serving with Demetrios in the Peloponnese in 303, praises the king for 
defeating the enemies of the democracy and liberating the cities of Greece.
111
 Freedom and 
democracy were the methods of defining Demetrios‘ actions in Greece and they served in at 
least Athens‘ case to assimilate those actions to the ideals of the polis, thus integrating both 
parties within a common ideological framework. The process was also physical. The epilektoi 
dedicated a bronze, gold plated equestrian statue of the deified Demetrios Soter next to the 
statue of Demokratia and thus close to the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios in the north-west corner 
of the agora.
112
 Demetrios‘ statue situated itself within an ideological topography and 
interacted directly with the physical personifications of both eleutheria and demokratia. The 
dedication was a constructed statement on the relationship of the king to both ideals and its 
location within the heart of Athens exemplified the role played by both in integrating king 
and city. 
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      Athens in 303 offers a case-study for eleutheria in action, which we see acting as a point 
of both unity and conflict. This again emphasises its lack of certain definition through the 
simultaneous existence of different understandings. Further, it again emphasises adaptability 
through its distinct implementation in different ways and situations. Fundamentally though, 
the Athenian case-study again brings to the fore the division between different perceptions of 
eleutheria, namely as Primary and Secondary freedom. The conflict between both 
understandings begins where each asserts its own understanding over the other. This became 
evident when the demos sought to assert against Demetrios its Primary freedom as self-
assertion and absence of royal interference, and later when Demetrios responded by enforcing 
on Athens his brand of Secondary freedom as benefaction and integration with royal will. 
      The aggressive and relentless expansion of royal authority over civic eleutheria acted as a 
‗tipping-point‘. Athens could accommodate certain impositions – like Adeimantos‘ dual 
generalship – if they could be seen to contribute to the defence of their eleutheria: in 
Adeimantos‘ case by protecting the countryside and maintaining Athens‘ hold on her forts. 
The phenomenon of the ‗tipping-point‘ for cities free in a Secondary sense has been analysed 
above (above §2.3), but Athens‘ case is interesting because it shows us conflict between a 
city that was apparently operating on a Primary understanding of eleutheria and a king who 
was operating on a Secondary understanding of it (at Iasos we saw a confluence of Secondary 
understandings). This is important. The example of Athens in 303 shows that even within a 
city promoting its Primary freedom there could, under certain circumstances, be a ‗grey-area‘ 
within which the king could impose on the city a degree of control without undermining its 
Primary freedom (or at least not negating it enough for there to be an intractable conflict over 
it). 
      Ultimately, however, there came a point where the city saw that its freedom was being 
negated in the face of royal will; it had reached its ‗tipping-point‘. Athens initially tried to 
legislate against this and enforce its eleutheria over royal will, but the latter was too 
powerful. The demos was forced to acquiesce and accept its Secondary freedom as promoted, 
guaranteed, and defended by Demetrios. 
 
Conclusion 
      In this chapter I showed that, based on one‘s politics, eleutheria could be seen either as a 
point of unity or conflict within the relationship between city and king. First of all I analysed 
the role of eleutheria in the relationship between king and Primary free city, emphasising its 
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role as unity when the king was seen to support its attainment by the city itself, and as 
conflict when he was seen to try to control it himself. 
      Next I turned my attention to the role of eleutheria in the relationship between king and 
those cities that held Secondary freedom, a more complicated but common occurrence. First, 
I provided an overview of the relationship between both parties, laying particular emphasis 
on the role of civic petition and royal benefaction. Second, I turned to eleutheria itself as a 
benefaction, arguing that as such it was unique because it promoted an active ideological 
programme for the unity of city and king. Antigonos, I proposed, understood this and through 
the Peace of 311 used eleutheria to create an oath-based alliance between himself and the 
Greek cities in his empire. Both parties were united in common defence of Greek eleutheria, 
which then served as the single unifying concept within Antigonos‘ Greek possessions, 
strengthening the empire through the alliance of king and cities in an ideological bond. 
Although this was eleutheria in its most ambitious statement of unity, I also tried to show 
how it could be used to vocalise conflict when the king‘s impositions on a city were seen by 
that city to impinge the freedom it had been granted. Third, I offered a definition of the 
functional and conceptual limits of eleutheria as a medium of interaction between city and 
king. I argued that within the two poles of royal revocation and civic re-assertion freedom 
was a general but malleable status whose precise form was ever changing within the complex 
discourse of honours and benefactions. Eleutheria was only as defined as the specific 
guarantees won by the city. Two cities may have been called free but the actual form of that 
freedom differed based on their individual historical circumstances. Further, I argued that 
there was a ‗tipping-point‘ at which the civic understanding of freedom was severely 
undermined by royal impositions, but that even beyond this eleutheria still functioned as a 
point of unity because it continued to define the ideology of the relationship, if not the actual 
status of it. The king still used it to define his relationship with the city, which could in its 
own turn use eleutheria to exert moral force over the king and attempt to ensure further 
benefactions. 
      I have taken the distinctions of Primary and Secondary freedom as my starting point, but I 
have also tried to move beyond these. In Section 3 I looked at Athens and Demetrios in 303 
as a case-study of eleutheria in action as both conflict and unity. I emphasised the different 
understandings of Primary and Secondary freedom, but tried to show that the rigorous 
distinction between both was undermined by the fact that a city promoting its own Primary 
freedom could assimilate certain royal impositions yet still maintain this freedom. As was 
shown in Chapter 3, this was dependent upon the city‘s willingness to acquiesce to such 
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impositions and both its and the king‘s ability to present such as contributions to the city‘s 
freedom. 
      Eleutheria could be employed by the king to justify to the city his impositions upon it, 
just as it could be used by the city when seeking to assert civic laws over royal authority. In 
both senses, Secondary or Primary, eleutheria offered a functional means of defining the 
relationship between city and king as either unity or discord based on the politics of its 
employer. Because it inherently lacked definition eleutheria was adaptive to the politics of its 
employer and the needs of individual situations. As an ideological concept it always asserted 
something positive for the city. When used to justify royal impositions, it served to assert 
something negative in a positive way. This versatility helped make it so useful and popular a 


















































Chapter 5: Demokratia and Eleutheria: Democratic Ideology between City  
and King 
 
―Libertà e democrazia sono pertanto le due cifre che la memoria storica ha 
selezionato nella rappresentazione del proprio passato‖ 
Culasso Gastaldi 2003: 81 
 
―The interests of democracies and kings are naturally opposed‖ 
τῶν δὲ πραγμάτων ἐναντίαν φύσιν ἐχόντων τοῖς βασιλεῦσι καὶ ταῖς 
δημοκρατίαις. 
Apollonidas of Sikyon (Plb. 22.8.6) 
 
Introduction 
      Hellenistic democracy has enjoyed a recent boom in study. Peter Rhodes laid the 
foundation for studying Hellenistic political systems and procedures with The Decrees of the 
Greek States, but more specifically Susanne Carlsson‘s Hellenistic Democracies and Volker 
Grieb‘s Hellenistische Demokratie, both published within the last two years, have 
emphasised the ubiquity and vitality of democracy within the Hellenistic period, in spite of 
what others may see as the decline of civic political independence in the face of royal 
authority.
1
 Both these works, however, focus primarily on the practical functioning of 
democracy as a political system; they pay scant attention to democratic ideology. 
      This is the first of two thematic chapters on the adaptability of the memory of freedom. I 
am concerned here with the connection between eleutheria and democracy and democratic 
ideology. Emphasis is placed on the adaptability of eleutheria and demokratia to the 
requirements of individual contexts, particularly the role of memory in categorising and 
defining the past within the ever-changing present, a concern taken further in Chapter 6. 
Analysis jumps between Athens and the cities of Asia Minor, both of which reveal different 
yet equally valid and instructive interpretations of democracy and its role within the 
relationship between city and king, emphasising further the fundamental adaptability of 
eleutheria and concepts connected with it, like demokratia. In Athens, after the vicissitudes 
of the years 322-287, the restored democracy saw its demokratia as the key component in its 
eleutheria and asserted it as a political and ideological quality inherent to the demos and 
regained from Demetrios Poliorketes. In Asia, however, and stemming from Alexander‘s 
                                                 
1
 Rhodes with Lewis 1997; Carlsson 2005 (PhD); 2010 (revised publication); Grieb 2008. 
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precedent, the Greek cities appear to have viewed eleutheria and demokratia as royal gifts, 
guaranteed by royal edict alone. This distinction between demokratia as polis-asserted in 
Athens but royally-guaranteed in Asia Minor is one of Primary (self-guaranteed) and 
Secondary (granted by benefaction) freedom, a fact of some importance for understanding the 
role of eleutheria as a point of both unity or discord in the relationship between city and king. 
      Analysis is divided into three sections. Section one looks at Alexander‘s democratic 
nachleben and emphasises the different ways in which he is connected with democracy in 
Athens and the cities of Asia Minor. I emphasise the uniform memory of him as a guarantor 
of freedom and democracy in Asia Minor, but I highlight his differing memory in Athens in 
319-317, when he was seen favourably due to his connection with Polyperchon, and 307/6, 
when the decree for Lykourgos presents him as an opponent of Athenian democracy. I use the 
differing views of Alexander to emphasise how concepts like demokratia are fluid and the 
memory of an individual or event is open to reinterpretation, constantly serving new 
functions when remembered in new contexts. 
      Section two looks at constitutional change and ideological consistency in Athens and Asia 
Minor. First, I look at Athens between 322-262. The period is marked by constant political 
change, but the megistai timai decrees of 287-270 over simplistically present the years 322-
287 as a struggle between oligarchy and democracy. By exploring the language of these 
decrees I analyse how and why the democracy re-wrote the past in such a divisive manner, 
laying particular emphasis on the creation of Demetrios as an oligarchic foil against whom 
the democracy authorised and enforced its authority as the sole guarantor of Athenian 
eleutheria. Second, I return to the cities of Asia Minor where I highlight the close ideological 
similarities between democracy in Athens and Asia Minor. Nonetheless, I argue for a key 
conceptual difference in both eleutheria and demokratia as Primary freedoms in Athens and 
Greece but Secondary freedoms in Asia Minor. 
      Section three focuses on terminology, particularly the kings‘ avoidance in explicitly 
committing to a city‘s demokratia. By looking at instances where demokratia appears or does 
not appear I show that rulers generally avoided expressing their support for it and instead left 
this connection to be made by the demos itself. Rather, rulers refer to the patrioi nomoi and 
the patrios politeia, or they grant ‗freedom to the demos‘. I argue that demokratia is asserted 
by the demos because it is a political expression of the eleutheria awarded by the king. Kings 
prefer more ill defined terms because they are hesitant to commit their support to one specific 
political form, an action that would offer a restrictive political and ideological definition to 
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royal grants of eleutheria, the usefulness of which lay in its ambiguity, its lack of clear 
definition. 
 
SECTION 1: ALEXANDER’S DEMOCRATIC NACHLEBEN 
      This first section looks at both Athens and Asia Minor and seeks to explore through the 
memory of Alexander and his actions the different ways in which both regions presented and 
conceived of demokratia. I begin with the cities of Asia Minor, particularly how Alexander‘s 
grant of freedom and democracy in 334 contributed to the continued association of both these 
terms into the 3
rd
 century. Attention then turns to Athens where I look at Alexander‘s 
Nachleben in 319-317 when he had a positive memory in Athenian public documents and in 
307/6 when he had a negative one. The importance of contemporary concerns in creating 
Alexander‘s image is emphasised and I argue that his afterlife and its connection with 
concepts like eleutheria and demokratia played an important role in developing in Athens, as 
in Asia, the relationship between ruler and city. 
 
1.1: Asia 
      Alexander granted freedom and democracy to the Aegean islands and the cities of Ionia 
and Aiolia but these statuses were gifts, guaranteed and ensured by royal grant alone. The 
freedom Alexander brought was defined simply as the removal of Persian power and should 
therefore be understood as a negative freedom.
2
 Demokratia, however, was an added 
benefaction that was awarded to the cities of Ionia and Aiolia – it was not given to the cities 
of Karia – and marked therefore one specifically positive freedom within a generally negative 
understanding of eleutheria.
3
 Eleutheria assumed a positive understanding for these cities 
through the addition and guarantee of demokratia. The freedom/autonomy of the Greek cities 
of Asia Minor had earlier been guaranteed by Athens and Sparta (Ch.1 §§1.1-2) but it was 
Alexander‘s destruction of Persian power and his explicit grant of eleutheria and demokratia 
together that was immediately significant in the Hellenistic Period, particularly for his 
Successors who continually sought to emulate him in image and action.
4
 Many of 
Alexander‘s guarantees of freedom and democracy were (re-)inscribed during the early 
                                                 
2
 Alexander left Sardis and the other Lydians free and able to use their ancestral nomoi (Arr. An. 1.17.4). 
Bosworth (1980: 128-9) argues that Alexander‘s main concern was to contrast himself with the Persians and 
―probably did not know‖ what those laws or customs were. See also Dmitriev 2011: 430-1. 
3
 Nawotka 2003 (democracy not granted in Karia). This may be connected with the fact that Karia remained 
under the rule of the satrap Ada, on whom see Heckel 2006: s.v. Ada [1]. On Alexander‘s political arrangements 
with the Greek cities, see Dmitriev 2011: 427-32. 
4
 Meeus 2009a. 
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Hellenistic Period at times when his precedent would have been of particular importance for 
ensuring renewed guarantees of such statuses from his Successors. Eresos (c.306-301), Priene 
(c.295-287), and perhaps Chios (in the 3
rd
 century?) all (re-)inscribed letters and judgements 
of Alexander confirming their freedom and democracy, while numerous other cities referred 
to his precedent (see below).
5
 
      Alexander‘s promotion of democracy was not magnanimous, it was a pragmatic policy 
that exploited the internal divisions within the cities in order to enforce his own authority. 
Persia supported oligarchies and had many partisans within the Greek cities, so by presenting 
himself as the promoter of democracy Alexander mobilised the pro-democratic (or anti-
Persian) factions to support him. The result was that anyone not supporting Alexander could 
be demonised as a pro-Persian oligarch who was fighting against Greek freedom and could 
therefore be charged under the League dogma on medising.
6
 Persia supported oligarchies in 
Asia so Alexander supported democracies because they offered loyalty to him; it was this 
same concern for loyalty that led both him and Philip to support oligarchies in Greece (below 
§1.2). This caused problems for Alexander‘s public image because he was seen as a liberator 
in Asia by promoting freedom and democracy but then acted as a tyrant in Greece by 
preferring restrictive oligarchies.
7
 His support of democracy in Asia Minor marked simply a 
pragmatic coincidence whereby his interests and those of the democratic factions coalesced. 
      Regardless of his intention, however, his grant of freedom and democracy marked a new 
phase in the history of the cities of Asia Minor, a ―constitutional New Deal‖ whose effects 
were felt into the Roman Period.
8
 Andrew Erskine suggests that the numerous cults of 
Alexander at Priene, Ephesos, and Erythrai may have been founded in thanks for his 
guarantees of freedom and democracy,
9
 while the likes of Erythrai, Eresos, Amisos, and 
Kolophon successfully invoked Alexander‘s precedent when seeking guarantees of freedom, 
                                                 
5
 Eresos: GHI 83; Aneurin Ellis-Evans of Balliol College Oxford has shown that the dossier was inscribed on 
one stele at one point in time between 306-301. I thank Charles Crowther for bringing this to my attention. 
Priene: GHI 86b; Sherwin-White 1985. Chios: GHI 84a; the text refers to Alexander in the first and third person 
singular and in the first plural. He also appears both with and without the royal title, which is probably 
anachronistic for the text‘s historical date of 334. Heisserer (1980: 89-92) tried to explain away these problems, 
but another solution is that an individual royal letter and civic decree were edited together and inscribed as one 
document in the late 4
th
 or early 3
rd
 centuries, as at Priene. 
6
 Wallace 2011: 150-1; Ch.2 §1. 
7
 D. 17; cf. Polybios‘ corrective (18.14). Further, below §1.2. 
8
 Davies 2002: 2. 
9
 Erskine forthcoming. For a thorough overview of the cults of Alexander the Great, both contemporary and 
posthumous, see Dreyer 2009 (cf. Habicht 1970: 17-28, 245-6, 251-2). He speculates that they arose from two 
contexts, the liberation programme of 334-332 and the deification decree of 324/3. Neither Erskine nor Dreyer 
is aware of the cult of Alexander on Kos (Bosnakis & Hallof 2003: 226-8, num.13; Grieb 2008: 178). 
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autonomy, and democracy from Antigonos, Antiochos II, and even Lucullus.
10
 Further, 
Alexander‘s actions led directly to an assimilation of demokratia with eleutheria which 
meant that for the cities of Asia Minor in the Hellenistic period the guarantee of freedom 
implied royal support for democracy (below §3.1-2). 
      Alexander may have been remembered as the paradigmatic guarantor and defender of 
freedom and democracy but this memory is overly simplified and one-sided. Alexander only 
supported democracies in certain areas, like Ionia and Aiolia, which he did not visit in person, 
and he only installed these to win anti-Persian democrats to his side. His preference for 
oligarchies in mainland Greece reveals that his pro-democratic stance was purely pragmatic. 
Further, he was willing to subvert those democracies when needed. The ‗tyrant‘ Hegesias was 
supported in Ephesos and his Ephesian murderers were charged by the Macedonian governor 
Philoxenos, a stark contrast to the Ephesian demos‘ lavish honours to the earlier tyrannicide 
Heropythes.
11
 Also, Alexander‘s dictate that all cities were to receive back their exiles was a 
clear infringement of their democratic self-government and the terms of the League of 
Corinth (Ch.2 §1). However, his destruction of Persian power and guarantee of freedom and 
democracy were more significant and influential than any later infringements of this freedom 
and democracy. Alexander became an exemplum of democratic patronage, a historical role 
that suited both cities and Successors, each of whom used his historical precedent to ensure 
support and benefactions in the present. 
 
1.2: Alexander in Athens and Greece 
      Demosthenes‘ presentation of Philip as a man with a deep hatred of freedom and 
democracy did not likely represent any political preference on Philip‘s part, but was just 
Demosthenic scaremongering, a characteristic criticised by Polybios.
12
 Such rhetoric was 
undermined when Philip treated Athens leniently after Chaironea; no change in government 
was required, though the Eukrates stele reveals a sense of concern for the authority of the 
democracy (GHI 79). Philip‘s actions elsewhere were, however, different. Throughout 
Greece both he and Alexander favoured whatever political system would bring the greatest 
                                                 
10
 Erythrai: IK.Ery. 31.21-8. Eresos: GHI 83 §5-6. Amisos: App. Mith. 373-4. Kolophon: Mauerbauinschriften 
69. Herakleia Pontika asked Alexander to remove the tyrant Dionysios and restore its πάτριον δημοκρατίαν 
(Memn. FGrH 434 F4). For Alexander as precedent, see Bikerman 1938: 136; Orth 1977: 14-15.  
11
 Hegesias: Polyaen. 6.49; Bosworth 1980: 132; Heckel 2006: s.v. Hegesias; Dmitriev 2011: 103-4, 130. 
Heropythes: Ephesian leader (Polyaen. 7.23.2) and liberator posthumously honoured with public burial in the 
agora (Arr. An. 1.18.11, Ἡροπύθου τοῦ ἐλευθερώσαντος). His tomb was desecrated by the oligarchs in 335 
suggesting that he was influential in turning Ephesos to Parmenion‘s side in 336. On the context, see above 
pg.47 with n.10. 
12
 Above pg.46 with n.4; Plb. 18.14. 
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degree of loyalty to Macedon, which in many cases turned out to be oligarchies and 
tyrannies, or rather governments led by an individual or clique loyal to Macedon. Because the 
League prevented the overthrow of those governments in place at the time of a member‘s 
accession to it, pro-Macedonian oligarchies and tyrannies, such as Eresos (D. 17.7), were to 
be upheld by the League. Eresos was governed by a series of tyrants who erected an altar to 
Zeus Philippios, a dedication which left no doubt where their allegiance lay; Messene was 
ruled by the sons of Philiades, who were re-installed by Alexander after being violently 
overthrown by the democratic faction upon Philip‘s death; Sikyon had at its head an unknown 
gymnastic trainer (paidotribes); in Pellene the demos was overthrown and power given 
(perhaps returned after a democratic uprising) to a wrestler (palaistes) named Chairon; 




1.2.1: Polyperchon’s Edict 
      Polyperchon‘s Edict of autumn 318 sought to damage Kassandros‘ position within Greece 
by invalidating the source of his power: the garrisons and oligarchies installed by his father 
Antipatros. To do so Polyperchon had to undermine the memory of Antipatros‘ past position, 
thus destabilising Kassandros‘ position in the present. This was accomplished in two ways. 
First, the Edict presented Philip Arrhidaios and not Antipatros as the legitimate successor to 
Alexander. Second, it motivated the Greek cities against Kassandros, his garrisons, and 
oligarchies by promising to return them to the position they held under Philip and Alexander, 
i.e. free and autonomous as under the League of Corinth. The Edict by-passed Antipatros and 
claimed that his position and actions after Alexander left for Asia in 334 were an aberration, 
an assumption of royal authority unsupported by Alexander and now Philip Arrhidaios. 
Greece was consequently excused its revolt from Macedon, the Hellenic War, and the legal 
position of relations between the Macedonian monarchy and the Greek states was returned to 
that under Philip, Alexander, and the League of Corinth, as a passage from the Edict reveals 
(D.S. 18.56.3): 
 
                                                 
13
 Eresos: D. 17.7 with Culasso Gastaldi 1984: 41-7. Messene: D. 17.4 with Culasso Gastaldi 1984: 37-8; Plb. 
18.14.3; Frölich 2008: 204-8 (3
rd
 century prominence of Philiades‘ family). Sikyon: D. 17.16 with Culasso 
Gastaldi 1984: 75-6; cf. IG II
2
 448.46-8; Poddighe 2004 (indentifying the paidotribes). Pellene: D. 17.10 with 
Culasso Gastaldi 1984: 54-61; Paus. 7.27.7; Ath. 11.509B. Thebes: Just. 9.4.7; D.S. 16.87.3, 17.8.3-7; Paus. 
9.1.8, 6.5; Arr. An. 1.7.1; cf. Plut. Moralia 177d; Wallace 2011: 148-57. For a useful overview of the evidence 
for these and other Alexander-backed tyrannies, see Ziesmann 2005: 62-3 with n.45. Kondratyuk (1977) argues 
that the League provided oligarchic groups with constant support. Demosthenes (18.295) and Hyperides (Dion. 
6.31-7.2) provide lists of Macedonian sympathisers. 
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―But whereas it happened that, while we [Philip Arrhidaios] were far away, certain 
of the Greeks, being ill advised, waged war against the Macedonians and were 
defeated by our generals, and many bitter things befell the cities, know ye that the 
generals have been responsible for these hardships, but that we, holding fast to our 
original policy (proairesis), are preparing peace for you and such governments 




      The Edict hit the re-set button and restored Greco-Macedonian relations to the point they 
were at between 337-334: the Greeks officially free and autonomous within Philip‘s and 
Alexander‘s League of Corinth. However, Athens‘ and Greece‘s acceptance and support of 
the Edict had interesting implications. Since Polyperchon was ultimately restoring to Athens 
its freedom and democracy – presented as a return to the situation under the League of 
Corinth – the implication was that Athens and Greece had earlier been free and democratic 
under Philip and Alexander. Moreover, it was inferred that this freedom and democracy was 
to some extent guaranteed by the League itself and the kings. Therefore, by supporting 
Polyperchon and ascribing to his Edict Athens was re-writing its history by acknowledging 
that Philip and Alexander, through the League of Corinth, were the patrons and guarantors of 
Athenian freedom and democracy from 337-323, just as Polyperchon and Philip Arrhidaios 
were in 319-317. Previous conflicts with Philip and Alexander, such as the latter‘s demand 
for the ten orators, were glossed over. This, however, left open the motivation for the 
Hellenic War. The Greeks were ―ill-advised‖ in revolting in 323, but was Athens revolting 
misguidedly from the freedom and democracy allegedly guaranteed by Alexander, or was she 
revolting from the abuses of a wayward royal general (Antipatros). 
      Athens‘ reception of Polyperchon‘s Edict, and the historical non-sequitor left by it, can be 
traced within the second Euphron Decree (Prytany IV, 318/7), which retrospectively defined 
the goals of the Hellenic War of 323/2 by the concerns of 319-317: the removal of 
Antipatros‘ garrison and the defence of democracy. The Hellenic War had its origins in 
Athenian conflict with Alexander, but it was re-interpreted within the second Euphron Decree 
as a pre-emptive war against Antipatros‘ soon-to-be-installed garrison and oligarchy. The 
Euphron Decree expanded upon the position presented within Polyperchon‘s Edict and re-
cast the Hellenic War as a struggle against Antipatros on behalf of democracy, as it was 
presented within Polyperchon‘s Edict, rather than against Alexander. Antipatros was now 
painted as the opponent of freedom and democracy, not Alexander, as he earlier had been 
                                                 
14
 Cf. D.S. 18.56.2: ἡγούμενοι δεῖν ἐπαναγαγεῖν πάντας ἐπὶ τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἃς Φίλιππος ὁ 
ἡμέτερος πατὴρ κατέστησεν. 
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during the Exiles Decree and the restitution of Samos to the Samians,
15
 and the Hellenic War 
took on democratic overtones that were not present in 323/2.
16
 
      Earlier evidence exists for a positive, or at least not negative, memory of Alexander 
within Athens. Shortly after the publication of Polyperchon‘s Edict the demos passed a decree 
in honour of Ainetos of Rhodes (Prytany IV, 319/8) in which he is commended for having 
served the best interests of the Athenians and for having fought with King Alexander in 
Asia.
17
 Because Polyperchon presented his authority, manifest through Philip Arrhidaios and 
Alexander IV, as inherited from Alexander and because Athens regained its freedom and 
democracy through the application of Polyperchon‘s Edict, the demos now honoured for their 
past connections with Alexander those associates of Polyperchon who now fought with him 
to restore Athens‘ democracy and free it from the garrison in Piraeus.
18
 At the Panathenaia of 
Hekatombaion 318/7 Polyperchon‘s son Alexandros dedicated panoplies to Athena Polias 
and this may also have been the context for the dedications to Athena Polias by Alexander‘s 




      In the mid to late 330s Alexander was seen to be a threat to Athens‘ democracy and an 
active supporter of tyrannies and oligarchies, like Philip before him. However, when 
Polyperchon sought to present the Greek cities as having been free and democratic under 
Alexander, the Athenian demos was both willing and able to engage with this presentation 
and further a positive image of its relationship with him. The second Euphron Decree reveals 
how the Hellenic War was represented as a struggle against Antipatros, both in origin and 
action, while Rhoxane‘s dedications and the honours for Ainetos reveal a positive 
presentation of Alexander and his importance, through Polyperchon, for the democracy of 
319-317. A very different image, however, appears in the Lykourgos Decree of 307/6. 
 
1.2.2: The Lykourgos Decree 
                                                 
15
 Above pg.101 with n.92. 
16
 For a detailed analysis of the memory of the Hellenic War within the two honorary decrees for Euphron of 
323 and 318 and the Edict of Polyperchon, see Wallace forthcoming A. 
17
 Agora XVI 101.13-18; Naturalization D27; Osborne 1981-83 II: 97; Kralli 2000: 115. Ainetos is curiously 
absent from Heckel 2006. 
18
 In a separate example Polyperchon wrote to Athens requesting honours for Sonikos and Eu[---] because they 
were well-disposed towards the demos and did whatever they could for it (IG II
2
 387.11-15; Naturalization 
D35). 
19
 Alexandros: IG II
2
 1473; Schenkungen NKr 4. Rhoxane: IG II
2
 1492.45-57; Schenkungen KNr 3; SEG LIII/1 
172 (new readings). Themelis (2003) sees both dedications as dating from 318/7, but Kosmetatou (2004) dates 
Rhoxane‘s dedication anytime between 327-316. 
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Stratokles‘ honorary decree for Lykourgos (Prytany VI, 307/6) offers a posthumous account 
of Lykourgos‘ actions on behalf of Athens. It is preserved both on stone and in Plutarch‘s 
Lives of the Ten Orators.
20
 The decree praises Lykourgos‘ building programme, his fiscal 
management, and his commitment to the ideals of eleutheria, autonomia, and demokratia, 
specifically in reference to Alexander‘s demand for the ten orators – Lykourgos included – in 
335.
21
 It is of note to us here that the decree marks a return of Alexander to the democratic 
consciousness, but one very different from that of 319-317. 
      In the decree Lykourgos and Alexander are carefully constructed as binary opposites. 
Lykourgos is the champion of the polis, its freedom, autonomy, and democracy, and he 
stands up against those who would undermine it. Alexander, on the other hand, personifies 
the authoritarian, universal monarch who is out to crush both the individual and his free and 




―When fear and great danger threatened the Greeks because Alexander had 
conquered the Thebans and had become master of Asia and the other parts of the 
world, Lykourgos continued to oppose him on behalf of the demos without 
corruption and blame, providing himself throughout all his life on behalf of the 
fatherland and the soteria of all the Greeks, and contesting with all skill for the city‘s 
eleutheria and autonomia. When Alexander demanded his surrender the demos 
resolved not to hand him over nor to call for his punishment, knowing that in all 
cases it partook with Lykourgos in a just cause.‖ 
 
      Alexander is incorrectly said to have demanded Lykourgos once he had destroyed 
Thebes, conquered Asia, and was inspiring fear among the Greeks, thus giving a global scale 
to the threat he posed to the Greeks and the opposition offered by Lykourgos and Athens. 
Lykourgos is also incorrectly presented as the only orator demanded by Alexander and the 
only individual who stood against him. The nine other orators are forgotten, subsumed within 
the person and example of Lykourgos who is said to have fought Alexander with every skill 
he had to keep the city free and autonomous. Precisely because Lykourgos had protected 
Athens‘ freedom and autonomy the demos has the will and ability to stand against Alexander 
and refuse to hand him over. The moral is, as Bertrand pointed out, that freedom and 
democracy are no longer a natural and perennial reality, rather it is up to each citizen to 




 457; Plu. Moralia 851f-852e. For the relationship between literary and epigraphic texts, see 
Oikonomides 1986; Prauscello 1999. Osborne (1981) argues that IG II
2
 513 is a second copy of the decree. 
Tracy (2003: 70-2) and Pauscello reject this. Gauthier (1985: 89-92) analyses Stratokles‘ role in proposing the 
honours. 
21
 Bertrand (2001: 19) calls it a nostalgic return to the ideals of freedom and autonomy. 
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defend them and for the free and autonomous city to protect the citizen in return.
22
 The 
decree contrasts Alexander and Lykourgos as destroyer and defender of democracy, but by 
over-stating Alexander‘s power and Lykourgos‘ defiance it presents an exaggerated 
promotion of democratic authority, both for Lykourgos himself and for the demos that 
protected him.
23
 It records a narrative that displays the ability of Athenian democracy and the 
ideology of eleutheria and demokratia, as exemplified by Lykourgos, to stand against the 
totalitarian hybris of the king of the world. 
      Enrica Culasso Gastaldi has pointed out that in both 318 and 307 Athens offered 
posthumous honours to two individuals – Euphron and Lykourgos – who had previously 
supported the city, its freedom, and its democracy.
24
 The decrees were, therefore, 
restatements of the validity and authority of the democracy after periods of oligarchy. They 
created the subjects as heroic ideals and patrons of freedom and democracy and recorded 
their lives as inspirational models for citizens and benefactors of the restored democracies; 
indeed Volker Grieb argues that Lykourgos actually personifies the restored democracy.
25
 
When it came to the Lykourgos Decree, however, it also served as a didactic exemplum to 
Demetrios of the strength and resilience of a free and autonomous Athens – a status he had 
just granted the city – against overarching royal interference. That its proposer, Stratokles, 
later had a key role in undermining that democracy by pandering to Demetrios‘ whims should 
not detract from the image of democratic authority presented within the decree. 
      In both 319-317 and 307/6 the memory of Alexander was invoked to different ends. In 
319-317 Polyperchon presented Alexander as a defender of freedom and democracy and 
Athens responded by honouring individuals closely connected with both, like Ainetos and 
Rhoxane, and suitably reinterpreting the origins and intentions of the Hellenic War. In 307/6, 
however, Alexander‘s memory was overtly negative and he appeared as a threat to Athens‘ 
freedom and democracy. This change marks an example of how different aspects of a 
person‘s life can be invoked at different times to present an image of that person sensitive to 
the present context. In 319-317 it was Alexander‘s role as patron of the freedom, autonomy, 
and political inviolability enshrined within the League of Corinth; in 307/6 it was his demand 
of the ten Athenian orators, specifically Lykourgos. This also reveals the important role that 
                                                 
22
 Bertrand 2001: 19. 
23
 The point is more neatly presented in Plutarch‘s account of the decree: οὐκ ἐξέδωκεν ὁ δῆμος διὰ τὸν παρ΄ 
Ἀλεξάνδρου φόβον (Moralia 852d). 
24
 Culasso Gastaldi 2003. Euphron: IG II
2
 448.54-7 (App.1 num.9). Lykourgos: IG II
2
 457.16-17, 22-3 (App.1 
num.13); Plu. Moralia 852d (App.1 num.14). 
25
 Grieb 2008: 70. Kralli (1999-2000: 149) emphasises Lykourgos‘ building programme as another model for 
the restored democracy. On Lykourgos as a historical paradigm for Athens, see also Brun 2003. 
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memory itself played within the relationship between Successor and city. Polyperchon‘s 
power was based on Philip Arrhidaios and Alexander IV as heirs to Alexander. Since 
Polyperchon was restoring Athens‘ freedom and democracy it was only natural that a 
favourable picture of Alexander would be disseminated within Athenian public documents. 
Demetrios, however, had no such direct need of Alexander‘s precedent since he ruled by his 
own right. Therefore, since there was no pro-Alexander, royal narrative to constrain and 
fashion the civic one, Athens was free to use the memory of Alexander‘s actions however it 
wished, even to present him as anti-democratic. Between 319-317 and 307/6 Alexander‘s 
democratic memory altered from a royal-asserted precedent of freedom to a polis-asserted 
example of royal hybris. 
      In the Greek cities of Asia Minor, however, it is the very simplicity, indeed permanency, 
of Alexander‘s pro-democratic afterlife that is of note. He installed democracies in the cities 
of Ionia and Aiolia and because of this he was remembered as an example to be invoked by 
the cities to ensure the continuation of this status. The restriction of his grant to the cities of 
Ionia and Aiolia alone and his later anti-democratic actions were glossed over, or forgotten, 
and a unified, homogenous image was presented of Alexander as the archetypal and perennial 
guarantor of freedom and democracy, a role happily followed by his Successors. 
      The nature of Alexander‘s differing image between Athens and the cities of Asia Minor, 
respectively a threat to and guarantor of democracy, stems from both his purely pragmatic 
response to individual historical circumstances and the cities‘ individual needs at later points 
in time. In Greece, Alexander, like Philip before him, sought to install oligarchies and 
tyrannies as the best means of ensuring Macedonian control. In Asia, he supported 
democracies because the Persians had supported oligarchies. He manipulated the political 
schisms within the cities to create the short-hand of democracy as pro-Macedonian and 
oligarchy as pro-Persian. His concern for democracy was in no way born of altruism, nor did 
his preference for oligarchy in Greece stem from a love of that political system either. He 
followed both because they served his interests at different times. Later, both Athens and the 
cities of Asia Minor chose to promote or denigrate his democratic image based on their own 
needs. 
 
SECTION 2: DEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGY AND CIVIC FREEDOM 
      In this section I explore further the question of ideology and memory, specifically the 
uniformity of democratic ideology in both Athens and Asia Minor, and the ways in which it 
was connected with eleutheria as the fullest expression of a city‘s freedom. I begin with 
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Athens between 322-262, a period marked by dynamic political change but one that was 
simplified in the honorary decrees of the post-287 democracy as a struggle between oligarchy 
and democracy. By exploring the language of these decrees I argue that the past was re-
written so as to enforce the authority of the post-287 democracy. Further, I argue that 
Demetrios was created as an oligarchic foil against whom the democracy could define itself – 
the demos – as the legitimate ruler of Athens and sole guarantor of its eleutheria and 
demokratia. I then turn to the Greek cities of Asia Minor where I detail the close ideological 
similarities between democracy in Athens and Asia Minor. From that, however, I argue for a 
key conceptual difference in both eleutheria and demokratia as a Primary freedom (a right) in 
Athens but a Secondary freedom (a gift) in Asia Minor. 
 
2.1: Athens, 322-262: The Erosion and Restoration of the Demos
26
 
      The years 322-262 are defined by political change: property-restricted timocracies of 322-
319 and 317-307 gave way to democracies in 318/7 and 307-301, of which the years 304-301 
were characterised by democratic subservience to Demetrios. With the turn of the century 
Lachares‘ tyranny was replaced with a brief pro-Demetrios democracy which then turned into 
a more ‗oligarchic‘ regime in the late 290s and early 280s. Democracy was restored after the 
Athenian revolt in 287 and this lasted until Antigonos captured Athens in 262; with a 
duration of 25 years this democracy was the longest period of political stability in a 
generation. The security of Athenian democracy from 401 to 322 was gone; Athens was now 




      Ursula Hackl sees this as a period of decline. She argues that constant interference by the 
Successors led to a blurring of the distinctions between ‗democracy‘ and ‗oligarchy‘ and a 
commensurate decline in Athenian democracy.
28
 Hackl‘s view, however, is one-sided and 
does not acknowledge the re-birth of a strong democratic ideology in the 280s. Helmut 
Halfmann, however, emphasises this rebirth and both he and Julia Shear argue that early 3
rd
 
century democrats were drawing on the experiences of their counterparts at the end of the 5
th
 
century to understand the cycle of democracies and oligarchies.
29
 Both influences are indeed 
detectable but the immediate impetus for the rebirth of democratic ideology and authority 
from 287 lay with the vicissitudes of the democracy in the years 322-287, particularly under 
                                                 
26
 I thank Julia Shear in particular for her insightful comments on this section. 
27
 Hackl 1987: 65, 71. 
28
 Hackl 1987; cf. T.L. Shear 1978: 47-51. 
29
 Halfmann 1989: 21. J.L. Shear forthcoming. 
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Demetrios‘ regimes of 304-301 and 295-287. Hackl‘s impression of slow decline in the face 
of continuous and overwhelming royal interference is too simplistic. The period could instead 
be seen as one of necessary experimentation whereby a working relationship was developing 
between democratic ideology and royal patronage, and Athens‘ relationship with the 
Ptolemies from 287-262 may be seen as a successful example of this. In Asia Minor, the 
Greek cities and Macedonian monarchies were simultaneously developing systems whereby 
concepts like eleutheria and demokratia were integrated into, and in turn helped define, the 
working relationship between both ruler and city (Ch.4; below §2.2). 
      Janice Gabbert offers a more pragmatic analysis of Athens during this period.
30
 She 
argues that politics at this time were essentially non-ideological in that all acknowledged 
democracy as the system of choice but debated the best means of achieving it: which ruler to 
ally with, what level of enfranchisement to accept, and what degree of royal control to 
integrate? Gabbert argues that there was no ideological debate at the time because there were 
no oligarchs, just people who saw different paths to the same end: the peace, stability, and 
prosperity of the city. For her, expressions like oligarchy, tyranny, and ‗undermining the 
demos‘ are simply democratic rhetoric. 
      Gabbert‘s model traces the essentially democratic character of the period and argues 
against the schism of democrat and oligarch that has frequently coloured scholarship.
31
 
Nonetheless, divisions like ‗oligarch‘ and ‗democrat‘ informed political dialogue and were 
the mainstay of the radical democratic faction. Consequently, it is necessary to expand on 
Gabbert‘s analysis and explore how and why the democracy of 287-262 used such 
distinctions reductively to re-write the past as a struggle between oligarchy and democracy. It 
will be necessary to look at post-287 decrees awarding the megistai timai (highest honours) to 
those who supported the democracy in the late 4
th




 Ioanna Kralli‘s 
analysis of these decrees emphasises their political rather than military focus and argues that 
in the early Hellenistic period it was more difficult for an Athenian to benefit the polis 
because he had to negotiate ever-changing political waters as the city‘s loyalties constantly 
shifted between different kings.
33
 
      Nino Luraghi recently showed that the demos used the narratives of these decrees, as 
accounts of the honourands‘ lives, to write the official, democratic history of the years 322-
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 Gabbert 1986; repeated in Dreyer 1999: 78; Grieb 2008: 78. 
31
 T.L. Shear 1978: 54 ―oligarchs like Philippides of Paiania, military leaders like Olympiodoros, and pro-
Macedonian democrats like Stratokles‖. Berlin (2002: 298) also questions such terminology: ―the democrat, the 
oligarch, the plutocratic man: bricks defined in terms of the building into which they naturally fit‖. 
32
 On the megistai timai, see Gauthier 1985: 79-92, esp. 79-82; Kralli 1999-2000. 
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 In what follows I draw upon his conclusions and explore the ways in which the demos 
constructed this narrative. However, I approach the question in a different manner. Rather 
than focusing on what the decrees do say about their honourands I focus on what they do not 
say. By analysing what the decrees leave out we explore from a different angle the question 
of how the demos constructed its narrative. The decrees focus on the honourands‘ opposition 
to Demetrios and his regimes, with events and actions that do not fit this scheme dropped 
from the narrative. Therefore, the decrees are concerned as much with Demetrios, if tacitly, 
as they are with the honourand. The events they recount are selected to fit a pre-determined, 
anti-Demetrios narrative. Actions that do not fit this narrative are ignored. However, before I 
explore the megistai timai decrees of the post-287 democracy, it is necessary to look briefly 
at those passed by non-democratic regimes. This will provide context for the later analysis. 
      The megistai timai decrees awarded by non-democratic regimes to Philippides of Paiania 
in 293/2 (SEG XLV 101) and Phaidros of Sphettos in 259/8 (IG II
2
 682) do not contain strong 
statements of democratic ideology, implying that ideological loyalty was not the primary 
criterion for honours. Both Ioanna Kralli and Andrew Bayliss have emphasised the especially 
pro-Antigonid focus in the presentation of Phaidros‘ honours in 259/8, with Bayliss in 
particular highlighting the proposer‘s ―extreme care‖ in chronicling Phaidros‘ life.
35
 
However, this pro-Antigonid view is completely absent from the decree for Philippides of 
Paiania which mentions few specific offices and provides no chronological or historical 
context for them. If Philippides had served Antigonid interests it is not mentioned, while his 
prominence under the democracy and even Lachares‘ tyranny in making contacts with 
Kassandros, whom Pausanias (1.25.7) claimed was Lachares‘ patron, is entirely glossed 
over.
36
 Philippides of Paiania is honoured for his life in politics, but this was not apparently a 
pro-Antigonid life and we should not see political loyalties and ideology as the primary 
motivating factor here. 
      Kralli and Bayliss identify an Antigonid-friendly narrative in the decree for Phaidros of 
Sphettos (IG II
2
 682), but they do not explore the decree‘s detailed record of Phaidros‘ life 
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 Luraghi 2010: 253-60. 
35
 Kralli 1999-2000: 158-9; Bayliss 2006: 123-4. On Phaidros, see Paschidis 2008a: 140-5, A46, who suggests 
that the decree emphasises Phaidros‘ ―conciliatory political position‖. No archon date survives on the stone so it 
is dated through internal and external political features (Henry 1992; Osborne 2004: 207-8). 
36
 Gauthier (1985: 89-91) emphasises the decree‘s silence on Philippides‘ actions under the democracy. 
Philippides proposed IG II
2
 641 (Prytany II, 299/8) in honour of ambassadors to Kassandros, an embassy on 
which he himself may have served (Paschidis 2008a: 113-15, A38). Tracy (2003: 38) joins IG II
2
 818 to lines 1-
2 of IG II
2
 641. Habicht (1979: 28), however, points out that Philippides was archon basileus in 293/2, an office 
for which he may have been selected by Demetrios, as was the case with Olympiodoros‘ double archonship in 
294/3-293/2 (below n.56). 
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and actions even under regimes openly hostile to Demetrios.
37
 It records that Phaidros was 
general of the equipment twice in 296/5, first under Lachares‘ ‗tyranny‘ and then re-elected 
under Demetrios‘ ‗democracy‘. He was again twice general in 288/7, first under Demetrios‘ 
‗oligarchy‘ and then under the restored democracy, whose revolt he supported; he is recorded 
as having handed Athens free, democratic, and autonomous to his successors. Phaidros was 
then elected general of the equipment in 287/6 and agonothetes in 282/1, both under the 
restored democracy, and he is recorded as having shared (financially?) in his son‘s 
agonothesia in 265/4 during the Chremonidean War against Antigonos Gonatas. Also, the 
decree was perhaps passed in 259/8 which, although shortly after the collapse of the 
democracy to Antigonos in 262/1, is but three years before Antigonos‘ return of eleutheria to 
Athens in 256/5 and may signify a softening of relations between Athens and Antigonos.
38
 
Phaidros may have been sympathetic to the Antigonids, and he was honoured under a pro-
Antigonid regime, but the decree records that he undertook an embassy to Ptolemy Soter and 
he was honoured for military and political offices held under Lachares, Demetrios, and the 
radical democracy, regimes defined by the democracy as ‗tyranny‘, ‗oligarchy‘, and 
‗democracy‘ respectively.
39
 Phaidros apparently resided in Athens continuously from the 
290s to the 250s and was able to adapt himself to the necessities of different regimes by 
putting the welfare of the polis as a whole first, not simply one political ideology. Volker 
Grieb has also emphasised this trait in Olympiodoros, who held office under Demetrios‘ 
regimes of 304-301 and 295-287.
40
 Simple politico-ideological generalities like ‗oligarch‘ 
and ‗democrat‘ do not capture the nuanced careers of such individuals,
41
 but these are 
precisely the terms used by the democracy when it awarded Olympiodoros the megistai timai 
and nullified his non-democratic past (see below). 
      A very different image of the individual‘s service to the state appears in the megistai 
timai offered by the democracy of 287-262;
42
 these decrees present the honourands‘ loyalties 
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 The following outline is based on Habicht‘s and Osborne‘s dating of the Athenian revolt from Demetrios 
Poliorketes to 287. If Julia Shear‘s (2010) re-dating to 286 is correct then Phaidros‘ relationship with both 
Demetrios‘ regime and the restored democracy must be rethought. On the dating of the revolt, see above pg.68 
n.120. 
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 The date of his embassy to Ptolemy Soter (IG II
2
 682.28-30) is debated. Paschidis (2008a: 143-4) overviews 
the evidence and favours 286/5-282. 
40
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 On the political organisation of this regime, see Grieb 2008: 83-8. 
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as being with the democracy alone, not necessarily the city, which they spent long periods 
away from. In contrast with the megistai timai passed under pro-Macedonian regimes, those 
for Philippides of Kephale (283/2), Demosthenes (280/79), Demochares (271/0), Kallias of 
Sphettos (270/69), and perhaps even Olympiodoros (280s?) create and then highlight the 
honourands‘ democratic actions alone.
43
 They are constructed as democratic paradigms who 
never cooperated with any other form of government or compromised their democratic 
principles. This image is artificial but the means by which it is created elucidate how and why 
the radical democracy connected Athens‘ eleutheria and best interests with its form of 
demokratia alone. The following analysis has two foci: first, how the democratic megistai 
timai decrees construct a democratic narrative of the past by emphasising only certain aspects 
of the honourands‘ careers, ignoring events that do not fit. Second, how such ‗subtle silences‘ 
offered the restored democracy a form of implicit self-definition by creating periods of 
‗oligarchy‘ and ‗undermining of the demos‘ as a political ‗other‘, particularly in regards the 
regimes of 304-301 and 295-287 under Demetrios Poliorketes.
44
 
      The decree for Philippides of Kephale (Prytany III, 283/2) opens with an account of his 
life at Lysimachos‘ court, particularly his role in ensuring the burial of the Athenians who 
died at Ipsos and the release of those imprisoned by Antigonos and Demetrios (IG II
2
 657.7-
31). He is said to have ―never done anything contrary to the democracy either in word or in 
deed‖ before he returned to Athens sometime between 287/6-284/3.
45
 We know from 
Plutarch that he criticised Stratokles on stage for ―undermining the demos‖ by fawning on 
Demetrios and that he was consequently exiled shortly before 301 and fled to Lysimachos‘ 
court.
46
 Philippides was prominent in Athens prior to his exile and won the Dionysia of either 
313/2 or 311 (IG II
2
 2323a.41; cf. 2325.164), during the regime of Demetrios of Phaleron. He 
was active on behalf of Athenian interests during his exile but the actions recorded by the 
decree all date to 301-298 and are only mentioned because they marked his opposition to 
Demetrios (ll.14-32): overseeing the burial and repatriation of Athenians who fought at Ipsos 
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 What Habicht (1979: 30) called a ―untadelig demokratischen Haltung‖. On Olympiodoros, see below ns.54-6. 
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 657.48-50 (App.1 num.38); cf. IG II
2
 698 in honour of an unknown individual (l.8): [οὐδὲν ἐποίησεν 
ὑπεναν+τίον τῶι δήμωι, which Tracy (2003: 80-98) dates c.286/5-270. 
46
 Plu. Demetr. 12.4 (καταλύει δῆμον). On Philippides, Stratokles, and Demetrios, see O‘Sullivan 2009a. 
Habicht (1997: 139) dates his exile to ―304 or 303‖. Paschidis (2008a: 117-8) argues that he did not return to 
Athens but assumed new offices in absentia. On Philippides himself, see Sonnabend 1996: 305-13; Paschidis 
2008a: 116-25, A40. 
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and helping with the creation of a new peplos in 299/8 to replace that destroyed in 302/1, on 
which images of Antigonos and Demetrios were etched and whose accidental destruction was 
criticised by Philippides himself as a sign of divine disfavour at Stratokles‘ deification of 
Demetrios.
47
 No further actions are attested from 299/8-287/6 and so Philippides is carefully 
presented within the decree as a staunch democrat who undertook no actions or positions 
under non-democratic regimes. Further, the focus on Philippides‘ exile (c.304/3), his actions 
against Demetrios after Ipsos, and his return in 287/6 write the narrative of his life around 
Demetrios‘ oligarchies; the narrative focus on the years 304/3, 301-299, and 287/6  promotes 
his democratic credentials and validates the democracy itself against its oligarchic, pro-
Demetrios predecessors. 
      The decree for Demochares of 271/0 expands upon these features (Plu. Moralia 851d-f). 
The first actions it records are his leadership in rebuilding the walls in 307/6 (IG II
2
 
463+Agora XVI 109), his preparing arms for the Four Years War (IG II
2
 1487.91-105), and 
his forming an alliance with the Boiotians in 304 (D.S. 20.100.6). This ignores the regimes 
loyal to Antipatros (322-319) and Kassandros (317-307) under which Demochares resided 
and against which he protested in his political life and written work.
48
 Further, the decree 
makes no mention of Demetrios during the years 307-303, even though we know from 
Diodoros that he was also instrumental in bringing the Boiotians to Athens‘ side and so 
probably worked closely with Demochares. Helmut Halfmann speculates that Demochares‘ 
successes in these years were largely based on the money and might of the Antigonid kings 
and although he does not suggest as much one suspects that Laches, the decree‘s proposer 
and son of Demochares, deliberately ignored his father‘s relations with Demetrios and his 
presence under the regimes of 322-307 in order to construct in 271/0 a more democratic-
minded narrative at a time when Athens was moving towards what would become the 
Chremonidean War. Like Philippides, Demochares is said to have held no office and had no 
contact with Athens from 304/3 until his return in 286/5 when he acted on embassies to 
Lysimachos and Ptolemy (286/5) and was part of the delegation that received control of 
Eleusis from Antigonos Gonatas (279).
49
 His absence from Athens during its times of need is 
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 Plu. Demetr. 12.4. On Demetrios and Athena‘s peplos, see Buraselis 2008: 213-14. 
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 Democh. FGrH 75 T1-2, F4; further evidence in Paschidis 2008a: 153 with n.2. Habicht (1979: 25-6) argues 
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 Plu. Moralia 851e-f; Habicht 1979: 24-5; Paschidis 2008a: 153-9, A49. Plutarch‘s text records an embassy to 
Antipatros, long thought to be Antipatros Etesias, but Kevin Clinton, based on information provided to him by 
Basil Petrakos, argues that this should be emended to Antigonos since an as yet unpublished inscription of the 
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presented as a point of merit since it reveals his commitment to the democracy: ―he was 
banished on behalf of the democracy…he would never take part in the oligarchy nor hold 
office while the demos was destroyed and of the Athenians who were in government at this 
same time he alone never took thought to disturb the fatherland with any form of government 
other than democracy‖.
50
 Demochares‘ actions during the years 322-307 were ignored, just as 
for 303-286, in order to create an image of a die-hard democratic partisan. His connection 
with Demetrios from 307-303 was glossed over because it would have undermined this 
democratic image by revealing his ‗capitulation‘ to the future tyrant.
51
 However, Demetrios 
again plays a important but unspoken role within the decree. By focusing on the years 307-
303, Demochares‘ absence during the ―oligarchies‖ of 303-287, and his return in 286, the 
decree constructs the democratic account of his life around the tacit but definite influence of 
Demetrios and his regimes, which again become implicit oligarchic foils to both Demochares 
and the post-287 democracy. 
      The decree for Kallias of Sphettos (Prytany VI, 270/69) functions in a similar way. It 
opens with a long outline of Kallias‘ role in the revolt of 287 (SEG XXVIII 60.11-40) before 
detailing his later embassies to the Ptolemies on behalf of the restored democracy (ll.40-78). 
It then says that Kallias had earlier allowed his property ―to be confiscated in the oligarchy so 
as to act in no way in opposition either to the laws or to the democracy which is the 
democracy of all Athenians‖.
52
 Kallias‘ exile, voluntary or otherwise, and the confiscation of 
his property is probably dated to 304/3, the same time as Demochares‘.
53
 As with the 
Demochares decree, Kallias‘ complete absence from Athenian public life before 287 is seen 
as a commendable sign of his commitment to the democracy alone, at the expense of the polis 
under all other regimes. Also, the narrative of his life and his democratic credentials is again 
structured around that of Demetrios and his control of Athens, both in 304/3 causing Kallias‘ 
exile and in 287 leading to Kallias‘ dramatic return, deus ex machina, to Athens and Athenian 
public life. As before, Demetrios is an oligarchic foil to the democratic protagonist and more 
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generally a patron of the oligarchic regimes against which the radical democracy constructs 
its present authority and validity. 
      Philippides, Demochares, and Kallias were perhaps all exiled from Athens in 304/3 and 
were not to return until after the revolt of 287, when the democracy was secured. 
Olympiodoros, however, was different but the presentation of his life was altered within his 
honorary decree to make it chime with the narratives of the other three. Pausanias (1.26.1-3) 
records a short biography of Olympiodoros which both Christian Habicht and Graham Oliver 
suggest goes back to a now lost epigraphic account, most likely another megistai timai decree 
seen by Pausanias.
54
 Pausanias mentions Olympiodoros‘ defence of Eleusis, probably in 306 
or 305/4, his alliance with the Aitolians in 304 (D.S. 20.100.6), his role in the capture of 
Piraeus and Mounychia, which may belong to either 307/6 or 296/5, and his capture of 
Museion during the revolt of 287.
55
 Assuming Pausanias records the events mentioned within 
the hypothetical decree, this would mean that the radical democracy‘s report of 
Olympiodoros‘ life and actions was again bracketed by events connected with, but not 
mentioning, Demetrios: his return in 304 and his expulsion in 287. The decree does not seem 
to record anything of Olympiodoros‘ role between 304-287, a period in which he was a 
leading social, political, and military figure: probable commander of Piraeus in 296/5; archon 
for 294/3-293/2; recipient of a copy of Theophrastos‘ will in the late 290s or early 280s; and 
strategos in 281/0.
56
 These events are ignored because they conflicted with cooperated 
democratic image of Olympiodoros that the decree wished to present; he had, in reality, 
cooperated with Demetrios on numerous occasions and was a leading personality under his 
regimes. Still, the focus of the narrative on 307-304 and 287 follows the plan seen in the 
decrees for Demochares, Kallias, and Philippides which narrate the honourand‘s actions and 
the Athenian democracy as a parallel to Demetrios‘ corruption of the demos and installation 
of oligarchies. 
      Olympiodoros remained in Athens continuously from before 307 until at least the end of 
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the 280s (his date of death is unknown). He held office during the regimes of Demetrios 
(307-301), Lachares (c.297-295), Demetrios again (295-287), and the restored democracy 
(post-287/6), but within his (hypothetical) honorary decree, as preserved by Pausanias, this 
movement and adaptability is down-played and focus is placed instead on actions of 
importance to the democracy itself: his defence of Eleusis against Kassandros in 306-304, his 
capture of Piraeus for the democracy in 295 (Demetrios is notably absent), and his role in the 
revolt of 287. The decree for Phaidros had a pro-Antigonid focus but it did not demur from 
mentioning actions under other regimes. The decrees for Demochares, Kallias, and 
Philippides, however, have the same narrative focuses as that for Olympiodoros (304/3 and 
287-post) and leave glaring omissions for the honourands‘ lives between 304/3-287/6. 
Demochares and Kallias are said to have had no contact whatsoever with Athens during these 
years while Philippides‘ benefactions under Lysimachos date from immediately after 
Demetrios‘ expulsion from Athens and defeat at Ipsos, which they explicitly reference. In at 
least Olympiodoros‘ case we can see that the democracy created this absence by ignoring 
those elements of his career that did not suit its ideological programme. The honourands‘ 
absence from Athens and Athenian public life becomes a manifestation of their ideological 
purity and this in turn creates a political and ideological schism between democracy/freedom 




      An important dynamic of eleutheria is that it can be contrasted with a people or situation 
that can easily be defined as not being eleutheria. The use of an ‗other‘ enforces legitimacy 
and meaning by contrasting a concept with that which it is not, thus creating a negative, but 
frequently authoritative, meaning (Ch.3 §2.1). What we see in the aforementioned decrees is 
a similar process whereby the self-definition of demokratia is made by creating an ‗other‘ 
against which the democracy can present itself and its partisans, in this case ‗oligarchy‘ and 
‗undermining of the demos‘. The gaps within the decrees for Demochares, Kallias, 
Philippides, and Olympiodoros served two purposes. First, by ignoring their actions and 
positions under non-democratic regimes the decrees constructed their honourands as 
exemplars for the restored, radical democracy, thus marking a democratic re-writing of the 
past as a regressive struggle between oligarchy and the inexorably victorious democracy.
58
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      Second, the accounts of the honourands‘ lives are structured around the actions of 
Demetrios. Thus, the narratives of the ‗big men‘ of the polis are built around those of the 
‗bigger men‘ of the empire. Lara O‘Sullivan has recently commented on the democracy‘s 
simplification of the past, particularly the years 304-301 and 295-287, into a homogenous and 
largely indistinguishable period of oligarchy and ‗undermining of the demos‘.
59
 However, she 
does not see that this process was facilitated by the fact that the regimes of 304-301 and 295-
287 were both controlled by Demetrios, who, therefore, personified the ‗oligarchies‘ he 
supported. By constructing the narratives of the honourands‘ lives in parallel with Demetrios‘ 
influence in Athens, the restored democracy could present Demetrios as a largely unspoken, 
implicit oligarchic foil to the democratic protagonists. Also, by presenting itself as the sole 
guarantor of Athenian demokratia and eleutheria the post-287 demos re-claimed the role that 
had been assumed by Demetrios between 304-301 and 295-287 when he presented freedom 
and democracy as qualities attainable solely by his own will (Ch.4 §3); the demos was again 
asserting its Primary freedom over the Secondary freedom offered intermittently by 
Demetrios. When read in this way, the decrees read less as records of the honourands‘ lives 
and more as constructed statements on a theme: the legitimacy of the restored democracy as 
the sole guarantor of Athenian eleutheria, and the honourands‘ continuous support for it 
against Demetrios and his oligarchies. 
 
2.2: Asia, 334-262: Democratic Ideology and Secondary Freedom 
      Philippe Gauthier has emphasised that democracy was increasingly seen to be the 
political norm throughout the Hellenistic period.
60
 Peter Rhodes, however, has detected 
regional variations in its form and practice and suspects that in most cases democracy simply 
denotes some form of constitutional government with greater or lesser degrees of civic 
enfranchisement.
61
 In particular, he emphasises that not every government felt obliged to call 
itself democratic, even when democratic in form, while other states that did call themselves 
democracies were in fact less democratic that their counterparts.
62
 Demokratia in the cities of 
Asia Minor, therefore, does not have the strong, uniform connotation of enfranchisement for 
all, as seen with Athenian democracy post-287, but reflects more the variations inherent 
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within constitutional government when faced with varying levels of civic enfranchisement 
and royal interference, both Athenian concerns between 322-287. However, if functional 
differences exist regarding the level of enfranchisement, the political forms of democracy, or 
the degree of royal interference deemed acceptable, this does not alter the fact that the 
ideology of demokratia was strikingly consistent between Athens and Asia Minor. 
      There are cases where demokratia denotes something more than just generic 
constitutional government, and is instead explicitly connected with the political independence 
of the demos and the personal responsibility of the citizen to protect the democracy. In such 
cases demokratia defines, in Laurent Capdetrey‘s words, ―la politique normal de la cité‖, and 
the state itself and its democracy become synonymous.
63
 In the Koan arbitration for Telos of 
c.300 citizens are to swear an oath to guard the democracy, abide by its judgements, and 
prevent others from undermining it.
64
 The democratic loyalty oath from the Tauric 
Chersonnese of the early 3
rd
 century compels citizens to swear on behalf of the soteria and 
eleutheria of the city and its citizens that they will defend the demokratia, uphold the state, 
and judge decrees according to the democratic laws.
65
 In the late 3
rd
 century homopoliteia of 
Kos and Kalymna citizens swear to uphold the demokratia and patrioi nomoi of Kos and 
abide by the judgements and decrees of the ekklesia.
66
 Inscriptions from Kyme and Erythrai 
of the mid-3
rd
 century commend generals for defending the cities‘ eleutheria and demokratia 
and for handing it over secure to their successors,
67
 while other examples connect demokratia 
with homonoia thus promoting it as a means of attaining civic unity and political harmony.
68
 
      Contrasts are also made between democracy and oligarchy or tyranny. As in Athens, 
emphasising an oligarchic ‗Other‘ creates by parallel a democratic ideology that promotes 
civic inclusion within the political machine, rather than isolation and elitism through 
oligarchy and tyranny.
69
 Such negative parallels also label opponents oligarchs and tyrants 
and as such threats to the city‘s eleutheria. Alexander granted freedom and democracy to the 
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cities of Ionia and Aiolia and contrasted this with the oligarchy supported by Persia (Arr. An. 
1.18.1-2). In two letters to Chios he specifically contrasted the democracy that he and the 
Greeks brought with the ―oligarchy that had previously been established among you by the 
barbarians‖ (GHI 84b.16-19). Ilion‘s anti-tyranny decree of the early 3
rd
 century continually 
contrasts the democracy it seeks to preserve with tyranny and oligarchy.
70
 In Erythrai the 
democracy contrasts itself with the tyrant that Philistes the tyrannicide killed and the 
oligarchy that later desecrated Philistes‘ statue.
71
 Finally, in the homopoliteia of Kos and 




      Demokratia is also connected with eleutheria, an association which reflects Alexander‘s 
grant of both to the Ionian and Aiolian cities and implies a similar understanding of 
democracy to that seen in Athens, i.e. a democratic government as the only means of ensuring 
the freedom of the city and its citizens. When Antigonos returned eleutheria and autonomia 
to Miletos it claimed that its demokratia was given back as well.
73
 A Delian decree dated 
post-301 and inscribed on a statue-base for Demetrios connects demokratia and eleutheria 
and further associates both with the best interests of the king.
74
 The oath of the Tauric 
Chersonnese not to undermine the democracy is sworn ―on behalf of the soteria and 
eleutheria of the city and the citizens‖
75
 and Lysimacheia‘s treaty with Antiochos I or II 
guarantees the autonomia and demokratia of the city.
76
 The Ionian League called on 
Antiochos to preserve the eleutheria and demokratia of its cities, while Erythrai, Miletos, 
Smyrna, and Mylasa all individually connected their demokratia with their eleutheria.
77
 
      Between Athens and Asia Minor democracy may have been different in form, but these 
differences were simply local variations on a general theme: constitutional government 
through the ekklesia and boule. Ideologically, both Athens and the cities of Asia Minor 
appear to have conceived of and presented demokratia in the same way, as the only political 
system that guarantees civic eleutheria, unifies the polis and the citizens within it, places the 
best interests of the whole above those of the few, and conceives of itself as a system in 
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conflict with the restrictive regimes of oligarchy and tyranny. However, underneath these 
conceptual similarities lurk deeper, more important differences. Democracy was the goal but 
Athens and the cities of Asia Minor had very different ideas on how to attain it and the role of 
the king in ensuring it. The Athenian democracy saw eleutheria and demokratia as self-
asserted inherent rights, not royally-defined status benefactions (Ch.4 §3). In Asia Minor, 
however, demokratia and eleutheria were generally conceived of as royal gifts, status 
benefactions guaranteed and refuted by royal will. An important distinction is therefore 
marked between Athens perception of its eleutheria and demokratia as Primary and the Asian 
cities‘ perception of them as Secondary. The situation in the cities of Asia Minor stems 
directly from Alexander, who unilaterally granted freedom and democracy to the cities of 
Ionia and Aiolia as a royal gift.
78
 Under Alexander, and then his Successors, both statuses 
continued to be guaranteed and revocable by royal edict (Ch.4 §2.2). In this way, eleutheria 
and demokratia existed as another status benefaction within the royally-enforced 
understanding of Secondary freedom. 
      Where demokratia appears in the historical narrative it does so as a status benefaction, 
something granted by a ruler to a city. The Greek, and indeed Lydian, cities of Asia Minor 
were granted freedom by Alexander, but it was a negative freedom defined simply as the 
removal of Persian control.
79
 Democracy was a positive freedom ensured by royal edict and 
granted to only a limited number of cities. Alexander granted democracy generally to the 
cities of Ionia and Aiolia (Arr. An. 1.18.1-2) and specific examples are attested from Chios 
(GHI 84a-b), Mytilene (GHI 85a), and Eresos (GHI 83). Under the Successors democracy 
remained a gift guaranteed by royal action. Miletos was liberated by Antigonos in 313/2 and 
its democracy was given back as a result of this action. On Delos, the island‘s demokratia and 
eleutheria appear in a text concerning its relationship with Antigonos and Demetrios, 
possibly implying some form of royal guarantee of it. Seleukos appears to have been 
connected with the return of demokratia and eleutheria to Lemnos. Lysimacheia made an 
alliance with Antiochos I or II in which he swore to defend its democracy. Although not 
representing the king as the guarantor of democracy, it does create for him the opportunity to 
become it. The Ionian League called on Antiochos to ―take care of the cities of the Ionian 
League so that in future they will be free and democratic‖. When Antiochos Theos oversaw 
the removal of the tyrant Timarchos from Miletos the city claimed that it regained ―eleutheria 
and demokratia from king Antiochos the god‖. Even more striking, Smyrna acted 
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independently in annexing Magnesia-by-Sipylos during the Laodikian War but was 
concerned thereafter to ensure from Seleukos II the guarantee by royal edict of its autonomia 
and demokratia. Furthermore, Seleukos II later restored to Mylasa its freedom and democracy 
through his deputy Olympichos.
80
 
      We can see, therefore, that from Athens to the cities of Asia Minor the methods by which 
demokratia was authorised were strikingly similar, thus implying that despite regional 
variations in form the practicalities of its function and ideology were the same. Democracy 
was consistently presented as the sole political system that guaranteed freedom for the state. 
It empowered the citizens and politicians to act in the state‘s best interests, and it enforced the 
legitimacy of the decisions of the demos, whatever the extent of its enfranchisement. 
However, an important distinction remained in its understanding as an innate, guaranteed, 
and self-assertive right within Athens and its understanding as a royal gift, guaranteed, 
defended, and ultimately revocable by royal will in the cities of Asia Minor. In this regard 
demokratia operates as one specific example of the wider conception of eleutheria itself: a 
Primary freedom (a right) in Athens but a Secondary freedom (a gift) in Asia Minor, where it 
existed as one royally guaranteed Positive freedom within a wider Secondary understanding 
of eleutheria. This, naturally, had important repercussions for the role of eleutheria within the 
dialogue between city and king where it could exist as a point of discord or of unity (Ch.4). 
 
SECTION 3: DEMOKRATIA AND ROYAL TERMINOLOGY 
      In this final section the focus turns to terminology, specifically the royal avoidance of 
direct commitments to demokratia as a constitutional form and aspect of eleutheria. In part 
one I look at instances where demokratia appears, or indeed does not appear, in the early 
Hellenistic Period. I argue that rulers generally avoid expressing their support for demokratia, 
specifically as an aspect of eleutheria. Andrew Erskine has recently, and I believe correctly, 
argued that the connection between eleutheria and demokratia was made by the demos itself 
because it reflected its own political concerns.
81
 I will expand on this by suggesting that 
Hellenistic rulers by and large avoided making that connection precisely because it was a 
civic one and the preference for one political form over another would have restricted the 
plasticity of royal grants of eleutheria; when referring to political forms rulers usually 
express support for things like the patrioi nomoi, patrios politeia, or grant ‗freedom to the 
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demos‘. In part two I argue that demokratia is asserted by the polis because it is a quality 
inherently connected with the demos; it is a political expression of the eleutheria that they 
have been given by the king. Kings focus on more abstract terms because they are hesitant to 
commit their support to one specific political form, an action that would offer a restrictive 
political and ideological definition to royal grants of eleutheria, which were normally and 
ideally ambiguous and lacking clear definition. 
 
3.1: Royal Avoidance of Demokratia 
      The earliest example of a Successor guaranteeing freedom to the Greeks is Polyperchon 
in 319/8. In cities like Athens and Eretria he seems also to have overturned Antipatros‘ 
oligarchies and supported the restored demoi.
82
 However, there is no conclusive evidence that 
Polyperchon actually made explicit statements of support for demokratia itself. Diodoros and 
Plutarch claim that he stated his intention in autumn 319 to support democracy, but both 
accounts are contentious. Diodoros records that before the issue of his Edict Polyperchon and 
his advisors announced that they would restore the democracies to the Greek cities.
83
 This, 
however, is the only mention in Diodoros XVIII-XX of a Successor explicitly granting 
demokratia to a city. It occurs programmatically, before the actual issue of the Edict, but 
neither the Edict itself nor Diodoros‘ subsequent narrative mention democracy. Since the 
Edict only became associated with eleutheria and demokratia as a result of its reception 
within the Greek cities, it would appear that either Diodoros or his source retroactively 
ascribed intent to Polyperchon based on the reception of the Edict within the Greek cities.
84
 
Plutarch‘s account is equally dubious (Phoc. 32.1-2). It records that Polyperchon sent a letter 
to Athens saying that the king was returning demokratia to Athens and ordering the 
Athenians to govern themselves in their traditional manner (κατὰ τὰ πάτρια). This is 
Plutarch‘s only reference to the Edict and it is an obscure one at that. I have argued elsewhere 
that what we have here is again a conflated account in which Plutarch simplifies the process 




      The expression that Polyperchon and other Successors apparently used, or at least that the 
cities ascribed to them, when referring to grants of democracy is ‗to grant freedom to the 
demos‘. In his letters to the Greek cities before his invasion of the Peloponnese Polyperchon 
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apparently called for them to execute the leaders of Antipatros‘ oligarchies and to return 
autonomia to the demoi (D.S. 18.69.3). At Kolophon Antigonos is praised for having given 
eleutheria to the demos while at Ios he is commended for having returned eleutheria to the 
demos but also for having ensured the ancestral laws.
86
 At Bura in 303/2 Demetrios is 
recorded as having given autonomia to the citizens (D.S. 20.103.4). At Iasos Ptolemy‘s 
governor Aristoboulos does not refer to Iasos‘ demokratia but instead expresses his 
commitment to defending the eleutheria and autonomia of the demos.
87
 The phrase is 
ambiguous when it comes to specific political ideologies, such as democracy or oligarchy, 
but it does display a clear preference for constitutional government by the demos while 
simultaneously leaving unspecified the exact level of enfranchisement of that demos and the 
extent of its submission to the ruler. 
      Demetrios was similarly and perhaps surprisingly ambiguous when it came to his 
restorations of eleutheria to Athens in 307 and 295. His campaigns in Greece between 307-
301 were described by Athens as a defence of eleutheria and demokratia, but it is uncertain 
whether this is a purely civic interpretation of events – applying to the ruler the role that you 
wish him to fulfil – or whether Antigonid propaganda actively presented Demetrios‘ 
campaigns in these terms. A series of honorary decrees for Demetrios‘ philoi appear to quote 
royal letters and state that Demetrios revealed the honourands to be contesting on behalf of 
freedom and democracy (Ch.4 §3). However, since the text of the decrees – in each case 
identical – is constructed by their proposer in the ekklesia it is difficult to gauge whether they 
reflect precisely Demetrios‘ actual language, although I have argued that they probably do 
(Ch.4 §3). It is informative therefore to read the literary accounts of Demetrios‘ liberation of 
Athens in 307. Polyainos and the Suda record brief statements, but the major accounts are 
those of Diodoros and Plutarch, which go back to Hieronymos and Philochoros respectively, 
the former an intimate of Demetrios and the latter an Atthidographer and probable eyewitness 
to events. Interestingly, none of these sources mentions the restoration of demokratia; all 
frame Demetrios‘ actions in terms of eleutheria. Diodoros (20.45.5, 46.1) records that 
Demetrios restored eleutheria to the demos, Plutarch (Demetr. 8.5, 10.1) states that his 
mission was to free Athens by restoring her nomoi and patrios politeia, Polyainos (4.7.6) 
claims that he simply made an announcement to free Athens, while the Suda (Δ 431) refers to 
him granting Athens the ability to govern herself autonomously (αὐτονομεῖσθαι) according 
to ―the ancient customs of her constitution‖ (τὸ ἀρχαῖον πολιτείας νόμιμα). From these 
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accounts it seems that Demetrios was reluctant, perhaps unwilling, to mention demokratia in 
307, although he did send letters to Athens in 303 most likely claiming that his associates 
fought on behalf of demokratia, a concern that was then vicariously applied to him. Later, 
when he founded the Hellenic League in spring 302, Demetrios appears to have again 
avoided explicit statements of demokratia since the preserved sections of the League charter 
make no mention of it and refer instead to members‘ patriai politeiai (SV 446.39-40). 
Considering the prohibition on internal political uprisings it is likely that whatever 
constitutions were in place at the time of entry into the League were to remain in force and 
were not permitted to be changed, just as was the case within the earlier League of Corinth.
88
 
The Hellenic League was not exclusively a collection of democracies, but a collection of 
states loyal to Demetrios. 
      When Demetrios captured Athens by siege in spring 295 he restored the offices (ἄρχας) 
best loved by the people (Plu. Demetr. 24.6) and instituted a new democracy for the years 
296/5-295/4 (Ch.2 §7). The decree for Herodoros of Prytany IX 295/4 refers to the demos 
recovering its demokratia, but interestingly makes no mention of Demetrios‘ role in this; it is 
simply stated that the demos ―having recovered the city, might continue to have 
democracy‖.
89
 Demetrios‘ action in capturing Athens and restoring its democratic forms is 
removed from the event and although he may have helped the demos recover the city the 
restoration of demokratia is not directly ascribed to him. As before, the emphasis is placed on 
the demos in whose interest it was to promote democratic authority. 
      Successor hesitancy and civic preference for referring directly to demokratia is also 
apparent in Antigonos‘ liberation of Miletos in 313/2, an event illuminated by a fortunate 
confluence of literary and epigraphic sources. Diodoros records (19.75.3-4) that when 
Antigonos‘ generals Medios and Dokimos arrived before Miletos in 313/2 they roused the 
people to take back their freedom, besieged the akropolis, and restored Miletos‘ constitution 
to autonomy (εἰς αὐτονομίαν ἀποκατέστησαν τὸ πολίτευμα). A parallel account is offered 
by the entry of 313/2 in the Milesian stephanephoroi list which states that ―the city became 
free and autonomous thanks to Antigonos, and the democracy was given back‖.
90
 Whereas 
Diodoros employs, whether deliberately or not, an expression that echoes royal usage, the 
newly-empowered Milesian demos emphasises explicitly the restoration of its demokratia. Its 
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connection with a passive (ἀπεδόθη) suggests that demokratia was not actively granted by 
Antigonos, like eleutheria and autonomia (ὑπὸ | Ἀντιγόνου), but was a consequence of his 
return of freedom and autonomy. As Andrew Erskine has argued, and is developed here, 




      A fragmented Milesian decree found on the Athenian Akropolis, perhaps dating as early 
as c.313 and referring to Antigonos‘ liberation of Miletos, is of note here.
92
 A reference to 
Asandros is plausibly restored and the subject of the decree is said to have recently controlled 
(ἐκυρίευσ*ε]) something, presumably Miletos. Mention is also made of the nomoi and patrios 
politeia. The decree is severely fragmented so the absence of demokratia within the preserved 
parts cannot be pushed too far, but the use of generalising terms like nomoi and patrios 
politeia contrast with Miletos‘ explicit concern for demokratia and is more in line with 
Diodoros‘ statement that Antigonos returned the politeuma. Such terms continually appear 
elsewhere: when a garrison was removed from Eretria c.308 or c.284-280 ―the demos was 
freed and it recovered its patrioi nomoi and demokratia‖; the charter of the Hellenic League 
refers to patriai politeiai; a decree from Ios claims that when Antigonos ―returned eleutheria 
and the patrioi nomoi to the demos‖; and a decree of the League of Islanders in honour of 
Ptolemy Soter commends him for having ―freed the cities, returned the nomoi and restored 
the patrios politeia to all‖.
93
 In the case of the League of Islanders we know that Delos, its 
centre, was free and democratic under Antigonos and Demetrios.
94
 
      Royal avoidance of commitments to demokratia can be seen and explained more clearly 
through a series of inscriptions from Erythrai and Smyrna. Sometime in the 260s the Ionian 
League sent an embassy to Antiochos I calling upon him to protect the cities so that they 
should remain free and democratic according to their patrioi nomoi.
95
 Christian Habicht has 
suggested that Antiochos‘ reply to this embassy may survive in a royal letter to Erythrai of 
c.270-260 in which a king Antiochos swears to preserve Erythrai‘s autonomia and 
aphorologesia, as had been the case under Alexander and Antigonos.
96
 If Habicht is correct, 
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then it is notable that Antiochos makes no mention of demokratia, so forcefully invoked by 
the Ionian League. Instead, he focuses on the more concrete forms of status benefaction, like 
eleutheria and the remittance of taxation, generally aphorologesia and specifically ta 
Galatika.
97
 Antiochos‘ avoidance of demokratia is somewhat more noticeable when we 
consider that in a further Erythraian decree of the 260s the city‘s generals are praised for 
preserving its demokratia and eleutheria, twin concerns already evoked within the Ionian 
embassy to the king.
98
 The exact relationship between these three inscriptions is not certain, 
nor is their attribution to a single reign, but what they show is the concern of Erythrai, and 
indeed the Ionian League, for royal guarantees of eleutheria and demokratia and the apparent 
royal hesitancy in explicitly granting the latter. 
      The situation at Smyrna emphasises more clearly the royal avoidance of declaring support 
for demokratia. In the treaty finalising Smyrna‘s synoikism with Magnesia-by-Sipylos (c.245-
243) the demos of Smyrna claims that Seleukos II Kallinikos ―confirmed for the demos its 
autonomia and demokratia‖ and orders that those partaking of the synoikism are to swear ―to 
join in preserving the autonomia and the demokratia, and the other things which have been 
granted to the Smyrnaians by King Seleukos‖.
99
 Smyrna evidently saw its autonomia and 
demokratia as guaranteed and defended by Seleukos, but the king‘s view on the matter was 
somewhat different. A Delian decree confirming Smyrna‘s asylia recounts a royal letter in 
which Seleukos‘ benefactions to Smyrna were listed. He is said to have ―granted to the 
Smyrnaians that their city and land should be free and not subject to tribute, and guarantees to 
them their existing land and promises to return their fatherland‖.
100
 The different focus 
between the Smyrnaian decree and Seleukos‘ letter is notable: the demos refers to more 
abstract political considerations of particular importance to it and its political authority, while 
Seleukos refers to more concrete, measurable status benefactions, such as the guarantee of 
land and tax-exemption. The different focuses represent to some degree the different 
concerns of both parties and, one suspects, their different understandings of what freedom 
denotes or ought to denote. 
      There are of course exceptions. In 260/59 Antiochos II intervened in Miletos through his 
general Hippomachos who removed the tyrant Timarchos and ―brought eleutheria and 
demokratia thanks to king Antiochos the god‖.
101
 Hippomachos may be the one honoured, 
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but the restoration of freedom and democracy is explicitly ascribed to Antiochos. 
Unfortunately we cannot tell whether such terminology was used by Antiochos himself, but 
the ascription of it to him follows the scheme seen above where the demos is concerned with 
advertising and attaining royal confirmations of demokratia. A second case concerns the oath 
of alliance between Lysimacheia and an unspecified Antiochos, probably I or II. Antiochos 
swears that he will ―protect the city as autonomous, democratic, […] ungarrisoned and 
untaxed‖.
102
 The treaty is one of only a few bi-lateral treaties between a city and a king and 
so is exceptional for that reason alone (Ch.3 §2.3). It is also our only contemporary evidence 
for an explicit royal commitment to defend civic demokratia, but since it is a bilateral treaty 
the terms of Antiochos‘ oath were perhaps asserted by Lysimacheia itself, not the king. 
Nonetheless, Antiochos accepted these terms and in doing so displayed an usual willingness 
to make a legal commitment to Lysimacheia‘s democracy. 
 
3.2: Explanations 
      At this stage it seems apparent that wherever possible Alexander‘s successors avoided 
explicit commitments to demokratia. Demetrios‘ letters to Athens concerning honours for his 
philoi are probably an exception but they do not claim that he himself granted demokratia, 
but rather that it is defended and perpetuated by him and his philoi. The case of Antiochos I 
or II and Lysimacheia is also unusual since it represents the king engaging in a bilateral treaty 
with a city. Early Hellenistic rulers were hesitant in referring to demokratia and preferred 
instead other, less ideologically loaded phrases like patrios politeia, politeuma, patrioi 
nomoi, and ‗granting freedom to the demos‘. Lara O‘Sullivan has called such terms 
―notoriously slippery‖ but herein lies their appeal: they were inherently fluid and could be 
employed by different regimes to mean similar if not the same things. She points out that 
patrios politeia was used to describe such widely different regimes as the oligarchy of 
Antipatros in 322, the democracy of Polyperchon in 319/8, and the democracy of Demetrios 
in 307.
103
 The fluidity in use reflected the abstraction of what such terms were used to define: 
they avoided restrictive, ideologically-charged definitions and favoured instead non-descript 
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but evocative generalities which attempted to connect with an idealised political past, 
whether democratised or not, and define the present regime, whether democracy or not, as a 
parallel to it. 
      Rulers used terms like patrios politeia and nomoi precisely because they were ambiguous 
and defined a positive situation that favoured civic constitutional government without openly 
expressing a particular ideological bias.
104
 In this way, rulers could promote positive 
constitutional change in their favour without promoting a particular constitutional form itself, 
like democracy and oligarchy. That such terms were sometimes used in exactly the same way 
by cities is revealed within the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy where allied 
members were to be free, autonomous, and ―governed under whatever form of politeia he 
wishes‖.
105
 Similarly, in the Chremonides Decree Athens charged Antigonos Gonatas with 
seeking ―to subvert the nomoi and patrioi politeiai of each city‖, a generic enough claim that 
could be widely applied to Antigonos‘ actions without relying on ideologically restrictive 
terminology like democracy and oligarchy, which would only have promoted political 
division among the allies.
106
 Demetrios‘ Hellenic League of 302 did not, to our knowledge, 
reveal a preference for democracy even though he was seen to support this in his campaigns 
against Kassandros. Rather, the charter mentions patrioi nomoi because the League consisted 
of numerous different states with presumably different constitutional forms, such as the 
‗tyranny‘ of Nikodemos in Messene;
107
 the only important unifying factor was their alliance 
with the king, not the governments of individual members. 
      Alexander openly granted eleutheria and demokratia but his successors did not. Why? 
Alexander had the clear parallel in the Persian backed oligarchies and so could claim support 
for democracy in order to create a political contrast with Persia‘s support of oligarchies. In 
this way, Alexander motivated the democratic factions within the Greek cities to his side. 
Interestingly, with the exception of Antiochos I or II and Lysimacheia, the only other 
evidence we have for Successors perhaps employing demokratia in their dealings with Greek 
cities comes from Polyperchon and Demetrios, both of whom were in a similar situation to 
Alexander and used democracy to motivate the democratic factions against Kassandros and 
his power base of garrisons and oligarchies. In such cases the royal use of demokratia was 
possible – though the evidence remains uncertain, specifically in Polyperchon‘s case – 
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because it operated within a very specific ideological and geographical remit against 
Kassandros‘ oligarchies in Greece. Even then demokratia was defined not by what it was but 
rather by what it was not: the restrictive, oligarchic regimes that Kassandros favoured. 
      Normally, however, such a clear ‗us and them‘ distinction was not applicable. In Greece 
Alexander favoured whatever governments would provide the greatest degree of loyalty to 
him, which happened to be tyrannies and oligarchies. Alexander‘s favouring of democracies 
in Asia Minor and oligarchies in Greece was purely pragmatic and had great success in Asia 
Minor, but it led to difficulties in Greece because it allowed him to be presented there as a 
tyrant and even a hypocrite who freed the Asian Greeks by removing oligarchies and 
installing democracies but then enslaved the European Greeks by supporting oligarchies (D. 
17 passim). His support for democracies earned him successes in one area but left him open 
to bad will and dissension in another. Further, Alexander then came under fire from 
democrats for supporting regimes that could only dubiously be called democratic, as with his 
support of Hegesias in Ephesos.
108
 Bearing in mind the difficult public image Alexander had 
to deal with in Greece it is not necessarily surprising that his successors chose to avoid 
making commitments to demokratia. If they explicitly granted a city its democracy then they 
would have left themselves open to critique should they support a potentially non-democratic 
regime elsewhere. Further, granting freedom and democracy would create a precedent 
whereby any and all grants of eleutheria would have to be accompanied by a grant of 
demokratia, a situation far too restrictive for such a fluid concept as freedom. Rulers 
generally relied on phrases like patrios politeia, patrioi nomoi, and ‗giving freedom to the 
demos‘. Further, since each could be connected with eleutheria and/or demokratia the ruler‘s 
commitment to them represented a commitment to the independence of the demos, which was 
in a sense democracy.  
      A common trend that appears throughout the evidence is the civic rather than royal 
insistence on demokratia. Athens (in 319-317, 307, and 295), Miletos, Erythrai, and Smyrna 
all refer to their demokratia, its restoration, and its support by the ruler even when that ruler 
chose not to vocalise such support himself. It is important to note, as Andrew Erskine has 
done, that demokratia was a civic concern and was seen by the demos as the natural 
consequence of a Successor‘s grant of eleutheria to the city.
109
 The islands of the Aegean and 
the cities of Ionia and Aiolia had been granted eleutheria and demokratia by Alexander in 
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334 so these cities saw one as dependent upon the other. Later grants of freedom and/or 
autonomy to the cities were taken to re-affirm the constitutional independence of the demos, a 
body whose authority could be and was described as democracy. Democracy was, as 
Demades said, intrinsically connected with the validity and authority of city‘s laws.
110
 It was 
a civic concern – a manifestation of the primacy of the demos and its laws – not a royal one. 
 
Conclusion 
      This chapter has explored a number of themes and some solid conclusions can be 
reached. I emphasised throughout the importance of memory and the central role played by 
the past in constructing the present. With the characterisation of Alexander in Athenian 
public decrees I showed how the demos could adapt as a political unit to the needs of 
Polyperchon‘s propaganda and accept, even implicitly, Alexander as earlier protector of its 
democracy. Further, through the re-interpretation of the Hellenic War as a struggle for 
democracy I detailed how the demos expanded on that propaganda and took an active role in 
altering the memory of the War to suit its present needs. This alteration of the past to suit the 
present also appeared in the democracy‘s megistai timai decrees which presented a changed 
historical narrative that expounded democracy as the sole guarantor of freedom and the 
inexorable victor in the struggle with Demetrios and oligarchy. However, in Asia Minor we 
saw the simplification and entrenchment of Alexander‘s memory as a patron and guarantor of 
democracy. This whitewashed his numerous attacks on civic freedom and perpetuated into 
the Roman period a simplified image of him as defender of democracy. Part of the resilience 
of this image is the fact that Alexander‘s grant of freedom and democracy offered a precedent 
that was frequently invoked in the Hellenistic period and acted as a formative influence on 
the relationship between the Greek cities and Alexander‘s Successors. 
      A leitmotiv of this chapter has been the division between Primary and Secondary 
freedom. This has been explored in more detail in chapters 3 and 4, but through the above 
analysis I furthered the argument that Athens and Asia Minor conceived of their freedom and 
democracy in Primary and Secondary manners respectively, with the restored democracy in 
Athens asserting its freedom as an innate right and the cities of Asia Minor presenting theirs 
as a royal gift. This, however, related simply to the means by which one attained freedom and 
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democracy. Once democracy was attained its role within the city was conceived of in similar 
terms on both sides of the Aegean: as the political system best ensuring the independence and 
political vitality of the city according to its own accountable laws. The means of achieving 
one‘s freedom and democracy differed, and this altered the way one viewed one‘s 
relationship with the Hellenistic kings (cf. Ch.4 §3), but the function and ideology of 
democracy remained, by and large, the same. 
      I also analysed the royal tendency to shun direct statements of support for democracy. We 
have seen that kings avoided explicitly granting democracy to cities and instead referred to 
terms like patrioi nomoi, patrios politeia, and granting ‗freedom to the demos‘. This, I 
argued, revealed that when kings sought or were forced to offer some form of political 
definition for eleutheria they favoured abstractions that although positive in implication 
eschewed the civic dialogue of democracy, which was too ideologically restrictive for royal 
liking. Instead, kings granted freedom to the demos or gave it control over its nomoi or 
constitution, which was then presented by the demos as democracy. This, I suggested, marks 
different ways of conceiving of and defining eleutheria. When pushed, kings sought to define 
eleutheria via tangible status benefactions, such as remittance of taxation, removal of tyrants, 
and grants of land, benefactions that varied from city to city (Ch.3 §1.1-2). Kings tended to 
avoid potentially divisive political terminology. Cities, on the other hand, were by and large 
governed by the demos and so a royal grant of freedom guaranteed democracy in a sense 
since it was the demos itself that was empowered. Cities asserted democracy as an aspect of 
their freedom because not only were both qualities guaranteed as one by Alexander, but 
because democracy marked the political independence and authority of the city, specifically 
the demos, to govern itself. It asserted the polis, the demos, and the individual polites as the 













Chapter 6: The Memory and Commemoration of the Persian Wars 
 
―The Persian Wars served as a paradigm, providing Greeks with a charter of identity 
…rooted deep in tales of resistance to outsiders.‖ 
Alcock 2002: 84 
 
Introduction 
      The Persian Wars provided a model for understanding the past. Herodotos, for one, saw 
them as the culmination of a temporal narrative explaining the Greek relationship with the 
east (Hdt. 1.1-5), and as such they were used for re-interpreting past conflicts like the Trojan 
War and Amazonomachy.
1
 However, just as they were used to explain the past so too were 
they later used as an ideological touchstone against which present struggles could be 
measured and defined, particularly to authorise a state‘s actions and goals via historical 
parallel. With each use the memory and meaning of the Persian Wars themselves changed, 
becoming a continually adaptive matrix defined in part by the very wars they were used to 
justify: Athens and the Delian League (Thuc. 1.75.3, 76.2); the Peloponnesian War (Ar. Lys. 
1132); Sparta‘s campaigns in Asia (X. HG 3.4.3, 5.5; 7.1.34); and Alexander‘s invasion of 
the Persian Empire (below §1.2).
2
 
      This chapter analyses the memory and commemoration of the Persian Wars and their 
historical connection with Greek eleutheria in the early Hellenistic Period. Focus is placed on 
the role played by both Successor and city in this regard. Commenting on Greece during the 
early Roman Empire, Alcock concluded that the Persian Wars furthered ―a successful 
political consensus between rulers and ruled‖.
3
 Alcock‘s symbiotic image is skewed by 
unique political considerations: 1
st
 century AD Rome was omnipotent in the Greek world and 
there was no challenge to its authority either by city or king. In contrast, the early Hellenistic 
Period was a mix of powerful poleis, leagues, and empires in constant conflict. Accordingly, 
the memory of the Persian Wars and their significance for Greek eleutheria existed within 
this tense political environment as a point of either unity or discord depending on the politics 
of its employer. The forthcoming analysis, sensitive to these twin functions, aims to present a 
more dynamic exploration of the Persian Wars and their significance for Greek eleutheria. 
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      This chapter is split into four sections. Section one concentrates on rulers and is 
concerned with the Macedonian use of the ideology (eleutheria) and spaces (Corinth) 
connected with the Persian Wars. Sections two and three turn to the polis, specifically 
Athens, and evaluate the presentation of Macedon, eleutheria, and the Persian Wars during 
the Hellenic and Chremonidean Wars.
4
 The Athenian, rather than Macedonian, use of 
ideology and space is emphasised. Section four turns to both king and polis and analyses how 
the Gallic Invasions were paralleled with the Persian Wars in literature and archaeology, 
notably the layout of monuments at Delphi, and questions why they were then seen to be a 
struggle for soteria, not eleutheria. Three key points underpin my analysis. First, the memory 
of the Persian Wars was adaptive, so its significance was malleable to individual contexts and 
ideologies. Second, the Persian Wars themselves also offered a contextualised ideology that 
was used by both Greeks and Macedonians to enforce their leadership by defining the enemy 
(Persia, Macedon, or the Gauls) as barbarians and themselves as defenders of Greek freedom. 
Third, the memory of the Persian Wars and Greek eleutheria was personified by sites, 
monuments, concepts, and documents important to the Wars, each of which acted as a lieu de 
mémoire by evoking abstract, ideological significance in contexts where the historicity of the 
subject was not as important as its emotive resonance in the present. Physical lieux de 
mémoire gave the Persian Wars a physically constructed meaning that could be adapted and 
expanded by later patronage and remembrance of these sites, what Gehrke called the 




SECTION 1: PHILIP, ALEXANDER, AND CORINTH 
      Corinth was the location of the headquarters of the Greek alliance during the Persian 
Wars. Later, it became the founding spot of Philip‘s and Alexander‘s League of Corinth and 
the site for Hellenistic declarations of Greek freedom. This section explores how and why in 
each case Corinth and its Persian War past came to be connected with royal, Macedonian 
declarations of Greek freedom. I address the League of Corinth under Philip, then Alexander, 
before lastly looking at the use of the site by the Successors as the spot for royal declarations 
of Greek freedom. 
 
1.1: Philip and the League of Corinth 
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      Philip of Macedon was a source of debate in Athens. For Demosthenes he was a barbarian 
who hated freedom and democracy.
6
 He compared Philip with the Great King and called for 
alliance with Persia against him (3.16, 20, 24; 9.71; 12.6; 15.24). For Isocrates, however, 
Philip was Greece‘s unifier. His dubious ancestry was Hellenised and he was destined to lead 
Greece in a new war against the barbarian (5 passim; Ep. 2-3). Athens, however, presented its 
defeat by Philip at Chaironea as a failed defence of freedom and the Greek motherland and 
paralleled it with her sacrifices for freedom during the Persian Wars.
7
 Aware of such 
sentiment, Philip emphasised his Hellenic credentials when founding the League of Corinth, 
which legitimated his position as hegemon of the Greeks and turned attention onto Persia as 
the barbarian threat. 
      ‗League of Corinth‘ is a modern misnomer for an organisation known in antiquity simply 
as ‗the Hellenes‘.
8
 Since league meetings rotated between the panhellenic games, Corinth was 
no more the home of the League than Delphi or Olympia.
9
 Accordingly, G.T. Griffith 
cautioned against placing too much emphasis on modern nomenclature unattested in ancient 
sources, pointing out that only the inaugural meeting and that of Alexander‘s 
acknowledgement took place at Corinth.
10
 However, Griffith underplays both the importance 
of these formative meetings and Corinth‘s unique role in the foundation of the League. Over 
the winter of 337/6, Philip held at least two and possibly three meetings at Corinth, none of 
which coincided with the panhellenic Isthmian or Nemean Games.
11
 The choice of Corinth 
was therefore significant beyond its connection with any panhellenic festival, particularly 
since it was from Corinth that Philip called for the deployment of League troops to defend the 




      A deliberate connection was made between the League of Corinth, Philip‘s war against 
Persia, and Corinth‘s importance during the Persian Wars. In 480/79 Corinth had been the 
headquarters of the Hellenic League, the symbolic point of defence, and the furthest point 
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reached by the Persian advance.
13
 Its use as the foundation point for Philip‘s League of 
Corinth paralleled its earlier use as headquarters of the Hellenic League,
14
 therefore allowing 
Philip to use it to personify and gain support for his alleged goals of Greek eleutheria and 
war against Persia.
15
 Because Corinth was not connected with the historical memory of one 
particular city, like Marathon and Salamis were for Athens or Thermopylai and Plataia were 
for Sparta, Corinth connected with the generalising ideology of the Persian Wars as a Greek 
struggle against Persia. Further, Philip‘s declaration at Corinth of his intention to exact 
revenge for the destruction of temples in 480/79 was particularly significant since the temple 
of Poseidon at Isthmia was most likely one of those burned by the Persians.
16
 In every way 
Philip‘s use of Corinth as the founding point of the League appropriated through monumental 
space the significance of the Persian Wars as a struggle for Greek eleutheria from Persia and 
applied that ideology verbatim to his Asian campaign. However, Corinth also allowed the 
creation of a Macedonian context for the memory of the Persian Wars, one that represented 
the League of Corinth as the historical and ideological successor of the earlier Hellenic 
League and Philip as the new defender of eleutheria. 
 
1.2: Alexander and the League of Corinth 
      Alexander was elected hegemon at Corinth in 336, but it was Thebes and Plataia that 
conditioned the nature of his manipulation of the memory of the Persian Wars.
17
 Alexander 
used the League and the war against Persia to justify the destruction of Thebes in late 335 by 
passing judgement to the League synedrion. However, since many members were absent 
(Arr. An. 1.10.1), this ad hoc synedrion consisted of those League members who had fought 
alongside Alexander, namely Thespians, Plataians, Orchomenians, and Phokians.
18
 
Nonetheless, the synedrion‘s decision that Thebes was to be razed, it inhabitants sold into 
slavery, and its exiles made outlaws (agogimoi) from League cities was presented as an 
officially binding League dogma. During his Asian campaign Alexander continually referred 
                                                 
13
 Headquarters: Hdt. 7.172; D.S. 11.1.1, 3.3. Defence: Hdt. 7.173, 175. Furthest point: Broneer 1971: 3. See 
also, Hdt. 7.195; 8.123; 9.88; D.S. 11.33.4; Plb. 12.26b.1; Plu. Them. 17.2. Emphasising its role as the spiritual 
centre of the Hellenic League, the Acrocorinth was called the Ἑλλάνων ἀκρόπολιν by the Corinthians (Ath. 
13.573c-e; Theopomp.Hist. FGrH 115 F285a+b; Timae. FGrH 566 F10; Chamael. F31; Plu. Moralia 871a-b; 
Scholion Pi. O. 13.32b; cf. Marincola 2007: 113-14).  
14
 Flower 2000: 98 with n.11. 
15
 Squillace 2010: 80, ―great ideals…that would attract consensus among the Greeks‖. 
16
 Broneer (1971: 3) dates the destruction of the temple to c.480-470. 
17
 On what follows, see the expanded treatment in Wallace 2011: 148-57. 
18
 Arr. An. 1.8.8; Plu. Alex. 11.5; D.S. 17.13.5; Just. 11.3.8. 
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to a dogma of the Greeks that allowed the hegemon to prosecute medisers and made exiles 
agogimoi from League cities; the decision at Thebes is the obvious and only precedent.
19
 
      Thebes was charged with having medised in 480/79, having been honoured as benefactors 
by the Persians, and having destroyed Plataia, the site of the Greek victory and Thebes‘ 
infamous medism in 479.
20
 The charges were deliberately historical in nature and designed to 
parallel contemporary events with those of the Persian Wars; Justin (11.3.9) in particular 
records that Thebes‘ current medism was emphasised. Justin is likely referring to Thebes‘ 
alliance with Persia and the repartee that took place outside its walls when Alexander called 
upon the Thebans to join him in the common peace but the Thebans petitioned those willing 
to join them and the Great King in ridding Greece of the tyrant Alexander (D.S. 17.9.5; Plu. 
Alex. 11.4).
21
 This interchange undermined Alexander‘s leadership by presenting him and not 
Persia as the real threat to Greek eleutheria. It is apt, therefore, that Thebes‘ past and present 
medism was condemned within the synedrion, the official mouthpiece of the Greeks whose 
dogmata were binding on all members. The make-shift synedrion may have consisted of anti-
Theban Boiotians, but their historical role in the struggle for eleutheria in 480/79 (most 
notably Plataia) allowed their judgement to be presented as that of those who fought for 
freedom in 480/79 against those who medised; Alexander was intentionally manipulating 
history at Thebes in 335. The synedrion‘s prosecution of Thebes‘ past and present medism re-
emphasised Alexander‘s hegemony of the Greeks and invalidated the embarrassing dialogue 
before the walls of Thebes. Further, it re-affirmed a united voice in support of Alexander‘s 
Asian campaign. 
      Interestingly, Justin further records that the synedrion repeated the ‗Oath of Plataia‘, a 4
th
 
century document of largely Athenian construction that reiterated the decision of the Greeks 
taken after Plataia in 479 to besiege Thebes (Hdt. 9.86-8).
22
 Reference to the Oath authorised 
the synedrion‘s destruction of Thebes by paralleling it with the Hellenic League‘s earlier 
resolution. This connected the League of Corinth with its predecessor the Hellenic League 
and juxtaposed the dogmata of the former with those of the latter. The use of the Oath 
displays in particular the malleability of the memory of the Persian Wars. By referencing the 
                                                 
19
 In particular at Eresos and Chios (GHI 83 §4; 84a+b; cf. Arr. An. 3.23.8). Further references in Wallace 2011: 
150 with ns.20-7. 
20
 Charges: Arr. An. 1.9.6-10; D.S. 17.14; Just. 11.3.8-11. Benefactors: X. HG 6.3.20, 5.35; 7.1.34. Destruction 
of Plataia: X. HG 6.3.1; Isoc. 14; D.S. 15.46.6, 51.3, 57.1, 79.6; Paus. 9.14.2. 
21
 Wilcken 1967: 72-3; Lane Fox 1974: 87. Bosworth (1980: 79) calls the story ―circumstantial‖, but later 
emphasises its incisiveness against Alexander‘s panhellenic pretensions (1988: 195). For an analysis of the 
different understandings of eleutheria presented here, see Ch.3 §2.2. 
22
 For a fuller treatment of the use of the Oath here, see Wallace 2011: 151 with ns.28-35. For the ‗falsche 
Urkunden‘ of the Persian Wars, see Habicht 1961. 
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Oath, a document implicitly connected with the Athenian memory of the battle of Plataia 
(Lycurg. Leoc. 81; Theopomp.Hist FGrH 115 F153), the synedrion adapted to its anti-Theban 
agenda a pseudo-historical text already adapted to an Athenian agenda. Present authority was 
sought through past precedent, but that precedent was itself manipulated to suit the ever 
adapting needs of the present. The tradition of the Oath acted as a lieu de mémoire for the 
Persian Wars where, as we shall see later with the Themistokles Decree, another ‗falsche 
Urkunde‘ of the Persian Wars, what mattered was not historical fact but the belief in what a 
historical tradition represented at a particular point in time. In this case it was Theban medism 
and Greek unity against the barbarian under Macedonian rather than Athenian leadership. 
      The destruction of Thebes was deliberately juxtaposed with the rebuilding of Plataia. 
After Chaeronea, Philip initiated the reconstruction of Plataia and from 337/6 it began 
sending naopoioi to Delphi again.
23
 After Thebes‘ destruction in 335 the League synedrion 
vowed to re-build Plataia‘s walls (Arr. An. 1.9.10) and it, along with other Boiotian cities, 
was awarded Theban land (D.S. 18.11.3-4). This was particularly significant since it was 
Thebes that had destroyed Plataia in 373.
24
 Financial support was also offered when 
Alexander announced at the Olympic Games of 328, when the League synedrion would have 
been in session, that he would rebuild Plataia in gratitude for her actions on behalf of Greek 
eleutheria during the Persian Wars (Plu. Alex. 34.1-2; Arist. 11.9).
25
 Patronage of Plataia and 
destruction of Thebes marked a new pro-Macedonian, League-backed balance of power in 
Boiotia. However, in light of the forthcoming invasion of Asia, it promoted rewards for the 
historical defenders of eleutheria and punishment for its enemies. Plataia may also have been 
patronised by the institution of the Eleutheria Games in honour of the dead of 479 as well as 
the consecration of the joint cult of Zeus Eleutherios and Homonoia of the Greeks. The 
earliest evidence for both the games and the cult comes from the Glaukon Decree of the mid-
3
rd
 century (below §3.2), but their actual origins remain obscure.
26
 Considering their 
connection with the Persian Wars, Greek eleutheria, and the commemoration of the battle of 
Plataia, a foundation sensitive to these concerns is preferred. The events of 335 provide an 
ideal context, one for which I have argued in detail elsewhere.
27
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 Rebuilding: Paus. 9.1.8. Recent survey work has mapped the outlines of Plataia‘s new walls and shown that 
they enclosed a settlement area of 89 hectares (Aravantinos et al. 2003: 292-6, 302-5). Apparently the intention 
to rebuild Plataia was there from early on (D. 5.10; 6.30; 19.20-1, 42, 112, 326). Naopoioi: Kirsten 1950, col. 
2312. 
24
 Isoc. 5; X. HG 6.3.1; D.S. 15.46.6, 51.3; Paus. 9.1.5-8, 14.2. Thespiai was also destroyed. Thebes later 
destroyed Orchomenos in 364 (D.S. 15.57.1, 79.6). 
25
 Fredricksmeyer 2000, 137-8; Wallace 2011: 149. 
26
 Étienne & Piérart 1975 (App.1 num.50); cf. Heraklides Kretikos 1.11. 
27
 Wallace 2011: 153-6. 
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      Alexander‘s destruction of Thebes and patronage of Plataia marked a calculated insult to 
not only Thebes but also Athens and Sparta.
28
 Moreover, it denoted a strongly Macedonian 
assimilation of the historical traditions of the Persian Wars. By rebuilding Plataia and 
destroying Thebes, Alexander reversed the traditional model of medising Thebes as tyrant of 
the Boiotian cities, most notably anti-Persian Plataia, whom she destroyed in 373. Athens‘ 
inability to defend Thebes or repatriate the Plataians displayed her inability to support either 
her present or ancestral allies. Sparta, though victor in 479, collaborated with Thebes in 
destroying Plataia in 427 and openly denied then her commitments to defend it as a site of 
Greek eleutheria (Thuc. 3.53-68). By re-founding Plataia and condemning Theban medism, 
Alexander assumed in 335 the role that both Athens and Sparta had failed to fill from the 
420s onwards. Sparta, however, received the most attention since she remained aloof from 
the League of Corinth and the new campaign for Greek eleutheria from the barbarian. The 
300 Persian panoplies sent to Athens after the battle of Granikos evoked the 300 Spartan dead 
at Thermopylai and contrasted Spartan defeat with the victory of Alexander and the Greeks.
29
 
Spartan absence from the new struggle for eleutheria was emphasised by the dedicatory 
inscription: ―Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks with the exception of the 
Lakedaimonians dedicate these spoils taken from the barbarians who live in Asia‖ (Arr. An. 
1.16.7; Plu. Alex. 16.8).
30
 Sparta was the only power to have led an invasion of Asia, 
indirectly under the 10,000 and later in the 390s for the autonomia of the Greeks cities (Ch.1 
§2). Alexander‘s actions advertised Macedonian superiority over Thebes, Sparta, and Athens 
both in Asia and in Greece. As hegemon of Greece, Alexander used the memory of the 
Persian Wars to assume the mantle of defender of eleutheria, abandoned in turn by Thebes, 
Athens, and Sparta. 
      Alexander may have used the memory of the Persian Wars to stir up support for his 
campaigns, but the Wars themselves provided a dialogue for defining and understanding 
action through historical and conceptual parallel. However, there was a distinction between 
the memory with its associated, even constructed meaning and the present situation. The 
years of anti-Macedonian propaganda, built on parallels with the Persian Wars, could not be 
so easily turned on Persia. The Persian Wars were for the Greeks the archetypal manifestation 
of Greek eleutheria. They provided a way of viewing the world and Greece‘s role within it, a 
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 Wallace 2011: 152-3. 
29
 Touched upon by W. Will (1983: 56 with n.55). 
30
 Monti (2009) suggests that Alexander intended to parallel Sparta‘s absence at Granikos with her absence at 
Marathon, the first battles in the Persian Wars of Alexander and Xerxes respectively. Spawforth (1994: 243) 
suggests that the inclusion of Spartan troops during the Parthian campaigns of Lucius Verus and Caracalla was 
designed to emphasise Rome‘s success over Alexander‘s failure in leading Spartan troops against the Persians. 
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medium of definition through which a contemporary struggle or enemy could be viewed, 
assimilated, and then condemned. The destruction of Thebes and patronage of Plataia by 
Alexander and the League, as well as the possible foundation of the Eleutheria, all 
emphasised a pro-Macedonian appropriation of the memory of the Persian Wars. However, 
this appropriation was sensitive to the embedded ideology of the Persian Wars and Plataia 
itself as a historical space, both of which were intrinsically connected with Greek eleutheria 
from the barbarian. As a conceptual matrix, the memory of the Wars was simply a veil, and 
one that could fit Macedon as easily as Persia. 
 
1.3: The Successors and Corinth 
      Michael Dixon has recently emphasised the importance of Corinth for royal declarations 
of freedom in the early Hellenistic Period.
31
 However, his analysis does not adequately 
explore how and why this significance developed. He draws attention to the importance of 
the Isthmian Games as a context for such declarations but does not explain how and why this 
context arose. Further, his focus on Polyperchon, though informative, detracts attention from 
the use of Corinth by other rulers. In what follows, I attempt to remedy this imbalance. 
      In late spring/early summer 318 Polyperchon entered the Peloponnese to enforce the 
terms of his Edict. He called together synedroi from the Greek cities to discuss their alliance 
with him and the implementation of the Edict. At the same time he sent letters to the 
Peloponnesian cities calling for the execution of Antipatros‘ partisans and the return of 
autonomia to the demoi.
32
 Dixon has argued that Polyperchon was at this time chairing the 
Isthmian Games, and I am inclined to agree.
33
 It seems likely that he was using them to 
support his campaign for freedom and democracy; the Nemean Games of 319 may have been 
earlier used to test the waters before the announcement of his Edict.
34
 By chairing the 
Isthmian Games Polyperchon presented himself as protector and patron of the Greeks, and 
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 Dixon 2007. 
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 D.S. 18.69.3-4. At the siege of Megalopolis Diodoros (18.70.4) mentions Polyperchon and ―the allies 
(συμμάχων)‖. For the political and propaganda situation of 319-317, see Wallace forthcoming A. 
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 Dixon 2007: 159-61; cf. Ch.2 §3; Wallace forthcoming A: section 2. The date of the Games is debated. 
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mentions a certain Aristonous, probably Polyperchon‘s general honoured at Eretria (Knoepfler Décrets VIII). 
On Aristonous, see Heckel 2006: s.v. Aristonus (without knowledge of either Miller‘s or Knoepfler‘s 
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2
 383b; D.S. 18.48.1-4; Plu. Phoc. 30.4-5). The Nemean Games fell in late August 
(Prytany II), on or just after Metageitnion 11/12
th
 (Lambert 2002a; Perlman 1989; 2000: 154-5; criticised by 
Strasser 2007: 334 with n.29). It is possible, therefore, but far from certain, that Antipatros died before the 
Nemean Games of 319, at which Aristonous may have been sounding out allies and ensuring support for 
Polyperchon‘s position in Greece. 
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offered a display of unity with his allies before the Peloponnesian campaign. As a physical 
space, however, Corinth held particular significance for Polyperchon: his Edict restored to the 
Greek cities the peace (eirene) and constitutions (politeiai) that existed under Philip and 
Alexander (D.S. 18.56.2) and had been validated by the League at Corinth in 337 and 336. 
Polyperchon‘s authority was based on that of Philip and Alexander. Since he was restoring 
the political situation as it existed under their hegemony of the League of Corinth, the 
location of the Isthmian Games at Corinth offered a convenient physical expression of his 
political programme as an extension of previous Macedonian royal policy. 
      Ptolemy too made use of the Isthmian Games upon his arrival in Greece in spring/summer 
308 (Ch.2 §5). He took control of Corinth and Sikyon before chairing the Isthmian Games 
where he announced the freedom of the Greeks and called for allies (Suda Δ 431): 
 
―Indeed, he left the majority of the Greek cities autonomous and began announcing 
the Isthmian armistice (τὰς Ἰσθμιάδας σπονδὰς), encouraging them to make the 
pilgrimage (θεωρεῖν) to the Isthmian Games bearing olive branches as though they 
would be gathering for the purpose of liberation (ἐπ' ἐλευθερώσει).‖ 
Translation adapted from Suda Online 
 
      Like Polyperchon, Ptolemy used Corinth as a military base where his future allies could 
meet, under the guise of the Isthmian Games, in anticipation of his coming campaign fought 
ostensibly on behalf of Greek eleutheria. The Isthmian Games provided, as before, a 
panhellenic stage from which Ptolemy, having just toured the Aegean, could claim a wider 
ideological suzerainty over the Greek world.
35
 Again, Corinth offered a useful symbolism. It 
was the foundation spot of Philip‘s League and it was here that Alexander had been voted 
hegemon. Since Ptolemy had recently been styling himself king and sole legitimate successor 
to Alexander,
36
 Corinth‘s historical connections with Macedonian kingship, exemplified by 
leadership of Greece and support for Greek eleutheria through the League of Corinth, would 
presumably have been connected with Ptolemy‘s patronage of the Games at Corinth and his 
creation of a similar system of Greek allies.
37
 The use of olive branches, theoroi (cf. D. 
18.91), and references to ―the Isthmian armistice‖ all attest to his concern for peace and 
perhaps offer a parallel to the koine eirene guaranteed by the League under Philip and 
Alexander. Ptolemy promoted his potential kingship by mimicking earlier royal actions, 
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 Like Polyperchon, Ptolemy‘s associates appeared elsewhere, such as his son Lagos at the Arcadian Lykaia in 
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3
 314b.7-8; Ath. 13.576e), a point missed by Dixon (2007: 173-5). 
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 Bosworth 2000; Meeus 2009b: 81-3; forthcoming. 
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namely the defence of eleutheria, the provision of peace, and the leadership of the free 
Greeks. Corinth provided a symbolic microcosm of all these concerns. 
      Demetrios‘ Hellenic League was inaugurated at the Isthmian Games of 302, shortly after 
his capture of Corinth (D.S. 20.102-103.3; Plu. Demetr. 25.1). Both Plutarch and a 
fragmentary letter to Demetrios from his philos Adeimantos of Lampsakos give the location 
as the Isthmos or Isthmian Games.
38
 The League met at the panhellenic Games (SV 466.72-
3), which allowed Antigonid suzerainty and concern for Greek eleutheria to be presented to a 
massed Hellenic audience. Many of those present would have been allies and would have 
attested to Antigonid guarantees and proclamations of freedom.
39
 At the panhellenic Games 
Greeks would have seen the Hellenic League in action and witnessed Antigonid kingship in a 
quintessentially Greek context. However, in founding the Hellenic League at Corinth during 
the Isthmian Games, Demetrios was following in Polyperchon and Ptolemy‘s footsteps by 
making a direct claim to be the sole and legitimate heir to Alexander. The father and son 
kings Antigonos and Demetrios leading a league of free Greek states deliberately evoked 
Philip‘s and Alexander‘s earlier example.
40
 Again Corinth acted as a location where 
Alexander‘s Successors could connect with claims to kingship via the historical precedent of 
Philip‘s and Alexander‘s example of leadership of the Greeks on behalf of eleutheria. 
      Corinth later appears wearing a gold crown in the great procession of Ptolemy 
Philadelphos of the 270s (Ath. 5.201c-e).
41
 She stood by Alexander and Ptolemy Soter and 
was followed by personifications of the Ionian cities and those cities of Asia Minor and the 
islands that had been under Persian control. Interpretation of this procession has varied. 
Badian argued that the connection between Corinth and Ptolemy Soter harked back to his 
campaigns of 308, Lehmann suggested that Corinth signified Philadelphos‘ new system of 
alliances in Greece, which would come to fruition during the Chremonidean War, Rice 
contended that Corinth symbolised the League of Corinth and Soter‘s (vicariously 
Philadelphos‘) position as successor to Alexander, while Frank Walbank argued that since the 
name ‗League of Corinth‘ is a modern construct the personification of Corinth should be in 
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no way taken to symbolise it; it merely stood for Greece.
42
 However, as I have shown above, 
the importance of Corinth was not connected with a single event or concern; its appearance 
within the procession must be understood within the context of the site‘s earlier use by Philip, 
Alexander, Polyperchon, Ptolemy Soter, and Demetrios. It symbolised a conglomerate of 
meanings: claims to kingship, succession to Alexander, leadership of the Greeks, and support 
for Greek eleutheria. However, the presence of Corinth between Alexander and Ptolemy 
Soter most likely emphasised Philadelphos‘ succession to their roles as patrons and defenders 
of the Greeks and their freedom, a role Philadelphos would later play during the 
Chremonidean War (below §3). The depiction also carried another edge since Corinth was at 
the time of the procession held by an Antigonid garrison and was itself in need of liberation.
43
 
      The importance of Corinth and the Isthmian Games for statements of Greek eleutheria 
continued into the later Hellenistic and Roman Periods. Both Antigonos Doson (SV 507) in 
224/3 and Philip V in 220 (Plb. 4.25.7-26.1) announced at Corinth their support for Greek 
freedom, while Titus Flamininus and Nero guaranteed Greek freedom during the Isthmian 
Games of 196 BC and 67 AD respectively.
44
 Corinth and the Isthmian Games were the 
defining characteristics of claims to Greek freedom: even though Nero amalgamated all the 
panhellenic Games into one year he waited until the Isthmian Games to make his 
declaration.
45
 For his actions he was associated with Zeus Eleutherios.
46
 
      Philip and Alexander‘s use of Corinth set a precedent for later Diadochoi who used 
Corinth to proclaim freedom not because of its connection with the Persian Wars but because 
of its connection with Philip, Alexander, and the League of Corinth. The change is important, 
but although Dixon detects it he does not explain it.
47
  Corinth‘s connections with the Persian 
Wars and the Hellenic League of 481-479 provided Philip and Alexander with a panhellenic 
context closely associated with the Persian Wars and the defence of eleutheria. This, 
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however, was less useful after Alexander‘s destruction of the Persian Empire, so the contexts 
of panhellenism and Greek eleutheria had to be fulfilled in another way. The founding of 
Greek alliances during the Isthmian Games seen from Polyperchon onwards was an entirely 
new feature that provided an obvious and ready-made panhellenic occasion, while the 
eleutheria connection was provided by the memory of the League of Corinth, the koine 
eirene it guaranteed, and its role as protecting Greek freedom. The process by which this 
came about is worthy of note. Under Alexander there was much opposition to the League 
(Ch.3 §2.2) but, as Plutarch emphasises, Antipatros‘ subsequent installation of garrisons and 
oligarchies in 322 made many poleis long for its return (Plu. Phoc. 29.1). Polyperchon tapped 
into this sentiment and with his Edict defined the situation under Philip and Alexander – the 
League of Corinth – as one of freedom and democracy. With this, the memory of the League 
and the position of the Greek cities under the kings became more widely connected with 
eleutheria, specifically in contrast with the years under Antipatros.
48
 However, the League of 
Corinth, as a political body itself, was not that important, nor was it re-founded.
49
 Corinth 
came simply to embody and enforce the principle that the League represented: Macedonian 
leadership of the Greek states authorised as a defence of Greek eleutheria. Corinth, as a 
physical space, personified the re-interpretation of the memory of the League and its newly 
re-emphasised connection with eleutheria and leadership of the Greeks. Polyperchon and 
others used Corinth to promote and enforce their own campaigns via an adapted historical 
parallel. Over time it eventually became connected with royal Macedonian declarations of 
eleutheria rather than with the Greek memory of the Persian Wars. Thanks to Philip and 
Alexander‘s example, Corinth became constructed as a space significant exclusively for royal 
declarations of Greek freedom,
50
 thus explaining its lack of ideological significance during 
the Hellenic and Chremonidean Wars (below §§2-3). This change in importance from the 
memory of the Persian Wars to the memory of the League of Corinth was an organic process 
facilitated by the fact that Corinth was not inherently connected with the Persian War past of 
one particular city. Further, Corinth‘s changing significance reveals the versatility of 
memory, particularly that concerning the Persian Wars and eleutheria, to the needs of later 
contexts. 
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 Ch.2 §3; expanded in Wallace forthcoming A. 
49
 Dixon (2007: 153) disagrees: ―Polyperchon, Ptolemy, as well as Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios 
Poliorketes all…attempted to revive the League of Corinth‖. 
50
 Dixon (2007: 151-3) argues that declarations of freedom was more legitimate when Corinth was in the 
liberator‘s hands. This is perhaps true: before declaring Greek freedom in 302, Demetrios twice tried in 306 to 
gain control of Corinth through bribery (Plu. Demetr. 15.1-2). 
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SECTION 2: THE HELLENIC WAR 
      Moving from the royal use of the memory of the Persian Wars I turn now to the polis use 
of this memory, specifically the Athenian presentation of the Hellenic War of 323/2. I address 
three major pieces of evidence for the War‘s presentation: the decree declaring war, as 
preserved by Diodoros, Hyperides‘ Epitaphios, delivered in spring 322, and the first honorary 
decree for Euphron of Sikyon, passed in late 323. I emphasise throughout both the uniformity 
of the War‘s presentation as fought under Athenian hegemony for Greek eleutheria from 
Macedon and its continual juxtaposition with the earlier Persian Wars from which it drew its 
significance and meaning. The Persian Wars, I contend, offered a model for later wars by 
presenting a pre-existing ideology that emphasised Greek eleutheria, Athenian leadership, 
and the barbarian ‗Other‘. Further, I highlight the continued importance of spaces associated 
with the Persian Wars – Plataia, Thebes, Thermopylai – in re-asserting and re-interpreting 
memory within the present. 
 
2.1: The ‘Hellenic War Decree’ 
      Diodoros preserves an abridged copy of the Athenian decree declaring war on Macedon 
in summer 323, henceforth the ‗Hellenic War Decree‘ (18.10.2-3). Seeing its origin in 
Hieronymos of Kardia, Lehmann suggested that Diodoros preserves an almost literal 
reproduction of the original decree; an example of Hieronymos‘ penchant for 
―dokumentarische Präzision‖.
51
 Rosen suggests that its proposer was Hyperides; considering 
his selection to deliver the funeral epitaph this is eminently possible.
52
 
      The Hellenic War Decree is divided into two sections: first, the declaration of war and the 
mobilisation of arms for koine eleutheria; second, the ambassadors‘ mission to appeal for a 
general uprising for koine soteria.
53
 If there is a distinction here between soteria and 
eleutheria, beyond a stylistic wish to avoid repetition, then it is of  soteria as a process and 
eleutheria as the result. Nonetheless, the opening exhortation to ―the common freedom of the 
Greeks‖ is programmatic and reveals eleutheria to be the dominant thought of the decree and 
therefore the war.
54
 The second part of the decree is of particular importance since it tells us 
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 Lehmann 1988b: 131; cf. Rosen 1967: 54-5. 
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 Rosen (1967: 55 n.60) considers this certain. 
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 Rosen 1967: 54-5; Schmitt 1992: 53-66; Engels 1993: 344-6; Culasso Gastaldi 2003: 78; Landucci Gattinoni 
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δῆμον καὶ τὰς μὲν φρουρουμένας πόλεις ἐλευθερῶσαι. IG II2 270, a decree dated to the late 320s by M.B. 




that ambassadors were sent out to educate (διδάξοντας) Greece of Athens‘ sacrifices for 
eleutheria during the Persian Wars and reveals how Athens wished to present her role in the 




―Envoys should be sent to visit the Greek cities and tell them that formerly 
(πρότερον μὲν) the Athenian people, convinced that all Greece was the common 
fatherland (κοινὴν πατρίδα) of the Greeks, had fought by sea against those 
barbarians who had invaded Greece to enslave her (ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ), and that now (καὶ 
νῦν) too Athens believed it necessary to risk men and money and ships in defence of 
the common soteria of the Greeks.‖ 
 
      Athens‘ purpose was to link Macedon with Persia. As Enrica Culasso Gastaldi has 
pointed out, the use of πρότερον μὲν and καὶ νῦν created a temporal link between the 
Persian and Hellenic Wars, while eleutheria offered a similar ideological link.
56
 The parallel 
served two goals. 
      First, it assimilated Macedon to Persia and condemned the former via its association with 
the latter. In calling Greece the ―common fatherland of the Greeks‖ Athens created an 
exclusively Greek ethnic and geographical identity that defined Macedon, in juxtaposition 
with Persia, as a non-Greek foreigner invading the koine patris.
57
 The use of ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ 
gave intent to the Persian invasion but also doubled for the Macedonian occupation, which 
promoted slavery in its support of garrisons, the removal of which was one of Athens‘ stated 
goals (D.S. 18.10.2; cf. Hyp. Epit. 5.14-20, 7.2-17). The term ―barbarians‖ acts both as a 
contrast with ―Greeks‖ (mentioned five times in the decree) and as a further parallel between 
Persia and Macedon. 
      Second, it presented Athens‘ leadership during the Persian Wars as an ancestral precedent 
to be followed in the Hellenic War. By referring to ―all Greece‖, ―koine patris‖, and ―the 
common eleutheria of the Greeks‖, Athens attempted to provide the Hellenic War with a 
panhellenic ethos that would attract other Greek states to follow her in the struggle against 
the new barbarian. Athens wished to show the Greeks that she was leading Greece and 
defending their freedom in pursuance of the memory of her ancestral sacrifices on behalf of 
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 Both Hyperides and Demosthenes acted as ambassadors; others, like Pytheas and Kallimedon, pleaded with 
the Greeks not to go to war (Plu. Moralia 850a; Dem. 27). 
56
 Culasso Gastaldi 2003: 78. 
57
 The addition of τῶν Ἑλλήνων gave a Hellenocentic twist to Isokrates‘ earlier exhortation to Philip: ἅπασαν 
τὴν Ἑλλάδα πατρίδα νομίζειν (5.127). 
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all Greece in 480/79.
58
 The decree also supported Athenian naval supremacy in 323/2 by 
saying that the demos earlier fought the barbarians by sea in 480/79 and would likewise now 




2.2: Hyperides’ Epitaphios 
      Delivered in Spring 322 over the Athenian dead, Hyperides‘ Epitaphios was much 
admired in antiquity and provides the best contemporary evidence for Athenian sentiments 
towards the Hellenic War.
60
 Funerary orations are formulaic by nature.
61
 They are designed 
to raise national spirit by justifying the sacrifices of war, and the Persian Wars formed a 
mode of expression common to all.
62
 However, since the Epitaphios shares with the Hellenic 
War Decree the same relentless focus on the Persian Wars both should be treated in unison. 
The speech not only echoes the Decree, but in many cases expands upon its ideas. 
      The Epitaphios betrays a common ideological background with that of the Hellenic War 
Decree, due perhaps to Hyperides‘ possible authorship of both. Athens‘ leadership during the 
Hellenic War is again justified as a continuation of that enjoyed during the Persian Wars (2.1-
8, 19-24). Indeed, Hyperides opens the Epitaphios with a programmatic reference to the 
Persian Wars (2.19-26) thus establishing it and Athens‘ defence of eleutheria as the central 
motif of the entire Hellenic War. Expressions found within the Decree re-appear throughout 
the Epitaphios. Koine eleutheria appears twice while eleutheria occurs eight times.
63
 The 
phrase ―all of Greece‖ (πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα) appear twice (2.22-3, 12.23), while the terms 
koinos, patris, and Hellas occur six, eight, and fifteen times respectively.
64
 Further, a 




 centuries attributable perhaps to Leosthenes, or 
written as a rhetorical exercise in his memory, again presents the Hellenic War as fought ―on 
behalf of the common eleutheria‖ of the wronged (ἀδικουμένων) Greeks.65 
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 Diodoros (18.9.1) also refers to Athens and Aitolia assuming ―the eleutheria and common hegemonia of the 
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      It is important to note, however, that the Epitaphios also expands on the Hellenic War 
Decree by manipulating the memory of specific events and places important to the Persian 
Wars so as to characterise Athens‘ actions and define her goals in the present. Hyperides 
acknowledges the importance of Thermopylai by saying that Leosthenes‘ victory nearby 
added to the site‘s glory (7.24-5). Sparta‘s defeat at Thermopylai is implicitly contrasted with 
Leosthenes‘ glorious victory, a barbed analogy aimed at the Lakedaimonians who remained 
aloof from the Hellenic War, had recently been defeated during the revolt of Agis, and were 
now perhaps aiding Samos against Athens.
66
 The individuals of the Persian War past are also 
invoked.
67
 Whereas Miltiades and Themistokles merely pushed the Persians from Greece, 
Leosthenes surpassed them by defeating the Macedonian barbarians on their own soil (12.38-
13.17). The reference to Miltiades and Themistokles juxtaposes Marathon and Salamis with 
Leosthenes‘ victories at Thermopylai and Lamia and presents the battle at Thermopylai as a 
physical, but now Athenian, connection between the Persian and Hellenic Wars (5.23-30, 
12.38-13.17).
68
 In fact, Hyperides claims that Thermopylai will hereafter serve as a memorial 
to Leosthenes‘ actions whenever the Greeks visit Delphi for the Amphiktionic meetings 
(7.17-32).
69
 However, Hyperides was not above altering events to fit his agenda. Diodoros 
records that after Leosthenes took Thermopylai he returned to Boiotia, defeated the Boiotians 
at Plataia, before then moving north to defeat Antipatros and besiege him in Lamia. 
Hyperides alters the course of events by saying that Leosthenes first defeated the Boiotians 
by Thebes before then taking Thermopylai and defeating Antipatros. The altered order of 
events is perhaps designed to simulate the gradual expulsion of the Persian troops from 
Greece in 479/8, from Plataia, through Thessaly, to Macedon and beyond.
70
  
      Hyperides‘ use of Thebes and Plataia is of particular note.
71
 Diodoros records a battle at 
Plataia between Leosthenes and an alliance of pro-Macedonian Boiotian troops (18.11.3-5). 
Hyperides, however, transposes this battle to Thebes and claims that the razed polis and 
Macedonian garrison inspired the Greeks to fight for eleutheria (5.14-20, 7.2-17). 
Considering his exhaustive use of references to the Persian Wars, Hyperides‘ lack of mention 
of Plataia (for the battles of both 479 and 323) is surprising. The reason, however, is simple. 
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 For Spartan support of Samos, see Arist. Oec. 2.1346b.16-20 with Habicht 1975; cf. Shipley 1989: 168. 
67
 Herrman 2009a: 23. 
68
 The fragmentary speech of/for Leosthenes also refers to Marathon and Salamis as paradigms for Athenian 
leadership in this new struggle for eleutheria (P.Hibeh 15.106-115; FGrH 105 F6). 
69 Ἀφικνούμενοι γὰρ οἱ Ἕλλη*νες ἅπα+ντες δὶς τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ εἰς *τὴν Πυλ+αίαν θεωροὶ γενήσοντ*αι τῶν 
ἔργων τῶν π*επρα+γμένων αὐτοῖς, cf. Poddighe 2002: 27-8. Colin (1946: 297) suggests that with ―theoroi‖ 
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 D.S. 18.9.5, 11.3-5; Hyp. Epit. 5.14-30; Wallace 2011: 158 with n.64. 
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 Treated more fully in Wallace 2011: 157-60. 
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Having been re-founded by Philip and Alexander, Plataia now fought for Macedon against 
Athens. Thebes, destroyed by Alexander, became a symbol of the Greek struggle for 
eleutheria from Macedon. The historical roles of Plataia and Thebes during the Persian Wars 
were reversed; Plataia became the ‗mediser‘ fighting with the barbarian against Greek 
eleutheria and Thebes was the example towards Greek unity against the barbarian. This was a 
particularly difficult situation for Hyperides to assimilate into a funeral speech. By 
transposing the battle to Thebes, Plataia‘s current ‗medism‘ was expunged and an 
embarrassing ideological anomaly was ignored. 
 
2.3: Zeus Eleutherios and the Decree for Euphron of Sikyon 
      The name ‗The Hellenic War‘ (ὁ Ἑλληνικὸς πόλεμος) is unusual. The title first appears 
in the second honorary decree for Euphron of Sikyon (Prytany VI 318/7) and occurs not 
infrequently throughout the rest of the century. However, it is only once recorded in the 
literary tradition, where the more common ‗Lamian War‘ may be traced back to the work of 
Hieronymos.
72
 Since ‗Hellenic War‘ occurs first in Athenian epigraphy we must assume that 
it was Athens‘ choice of name and although it only appears first in 318 (IG II
2
 448.44-5), the 
name most likely derives from 323. Ashton speculated that the lack of reference until 318 
was due to the control exercised by Macedon over Athens;
73
 the oligarchic destruction of 
decrees relating to the Hellenic War would also have been a factor (IG II
2
 448.60-2). 
However, the simplest reasons for dating the name to 323/2 is that it echoes perfectly the 
views presented within the Hellenic War Decree and Hyperides‘ Epitaphios. 
      The most notable thing about the name ‗Hellenic War‘ is that is does not define the war 
by the enemy. Both the Persian Wars (τὰ Μηδικά or ὁ Περσικὸς πόλεμος) and Alexander‘s 
campaign in Asia (ὁ Περσικὸς πόλεμος) were characterised by a divisive reference to the 
enemy.
74
 ‗Hellenic War‘ appeals instead a sense of unity, although Macedonian otherness is 
of course implicit.
75
 It recalls in particular the name ‗the Hellenes‘ used to describe the 
Hellenic League of 480-478, or the Hellenotamiai or Hellenodikai who assessed respectively 
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 Hellenic War: IG II
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 448.43-4; 546.14-15 (dated 318/7-308/7 in IG, 332/1 by Lambert [2002b; 321/0], Meritt 
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 Persian Wars: Hammond 1957; Isoc. 14.57.4; 6.42.9; 8.37.3, 88.7; 12.49.1; Pl. Mx. 242b5; Ephor. FGrH 70 
F119.61; D.S. 11.33.3; 15.2.4, 44.1; D.H. 11.1.2; Th. 5.45, 10.46, 41.45; Pomp. 3.9; D. Chr. 11.145.4; Sopat.Rh. 
8.143.11; Him. Or. 6.211; Lib. Or. 1.66.10. Alexander: Arr. An. 3.6.3; Vit. Arist. 23.1-7. 
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 Lepore (1955: 176) suggests that this echoes Demosthenic rhetoric. 
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the taxation of Athenian allies and the Hellenicity of participants at the Olympic Games.
76
 
Further, it also reflects the use of the name ‗the Hellenes‘ to describe the Macedonian-led 
League of Corinth (337-323) and suggests Athens‘ aggressive re-appropriation of leadership 
in the new struggle for Greek eleutheria from Macedonian, rather than the earlier 
Macedonian-led struggle for Greek eleutheria from Persia. Thus the name aspires to 




      A connection with the Persian Wars and Greek eleutheria is also made through the 





The Stoa, built c.430-420, was intrinsically connected with the Persian Wars and statements 
of eleutheria. Monuments important to Athenian freedom were erected there: the foundation 
document of the Second Athenian Confederacy; statues of Konon and Euagoras; as well as 
the shields of Leokritos and Kydias, the latter of whom fought against the Kelts.
79
 The Stoa 
created an aggregative significance whereby the initial memory of eleutheria and the Persian 
Wars was continually adjusted and expanded by new monuments celebrating later struggles 
for freedom. Similarly, by erecting new monuments by the Stoa the ideology of the Persian 
Wars was applied to them and the campaigns they commemorated. The Stoa was, therefore, a 
progressive ideological space where memory was adaptive and the context of each individual 
monument helped cumulatively define the meaning of each new one. Consequently, by 
placing by the Stoa the first decree for Euphron – being simply an account of Sikyon‘s 
alliance with Athens – Athens appropriated to the entire Hellenic War the ethos of Greek 
eleutheria, Athenian leadership, and a defining connection with the Persian Wars.
80
 
      The Hellenic War Decree, Hyperides‘ Epitaphios, and the first decree for  Euphron all 
reveal a coherent ideology for the Hellenic War. Past Athenian sacrifices on behalf of 
freedom – like Marathon and Salamis – were revisited because they provided an eleutheria-
based tradition that promoted Athenian leadership of the Greeks. In reality Athens may not 
have had hegemony over all the Greeks, but the ideological programme of the Hellenic War, 
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 Hellenic League: Hdt. 7.132.2, 145.1, 172.1; 9.87.1; Thuc. 1.18, 132.2; ATL III 97 with n.12; contra Brunt 
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Leokritos/Kydias: Paus. 1.26.1; 10.21.5-6; cf. Ch.2 §7. 
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 Upon his return to Athens in 322, Demosthenes was commissioned to adorn the altar for the sacrifice to Zeus 
Soter (Plu. Dem. 27.8). 
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assimilating that of the Persian Wars, appealed to this as an ideal. The continual references to 
eleutheria and Hellenes created a quintessentially Hellenic context for the struggle, while the 
recurrence of the Persian Wars emphasised Macedonian otherness and Greek unity in pursuit 
of a koine eleutheria. However, memory was also malleable. Hyperides glossed over the 
Greek victory at Plataia because it did not fit with Plataia‘s role within the Persian Wars, 
while thanks to Leosthenes‘ victory near Thermopylai that site assumed a new, Athenian 
significance for Greek eleutheria. Similarly, the continual focus on eleutheria and the 
Hellenes re-asserted Greek control over the historical traditions of the Persian Wars so 
recently appropriated by Alexander and still contentious, as Plataia‘s alliance with Macedon 
exemplified. Athens disowned Macedonian leadership of the Greeks against Persia and 
reasserted her own leadership against Macedon, but she did so by adapting many of the 
methods adopted by Macedon itself. A very similar focus on identity, space, and the Persian 
Wars re-appears during the Chremonidean War. 
 
SECTION 3: THE CHREMONIDEAN WAR 
      In 268 Athens assumed again a leading role in another war for Greek eleutheria from 
Macedon. Antigonos Gonatas was now the enemy and the decree declaring war, proposed by 
Chremonides son of Eteokles of Aithalides, is fortunately preserved.
81
 Although Athens‘ 
presentation of the Chremonidean War conforms in general to the blueprint found during the 
Hellenic War there are differences, most notably the focus on homonoia as a prerequisite of 
eleutheria within the Chremonides Decree and the use of the historical and cultic landscape 
of Plataia within the Glaukon Decree. Both similarities and variations are worth analysing 
since they reveal the resilience, yet adaptability of the memory of the Persian Wars and Greek 
eleutheria as historical and ideological traditions. This section is again structured around the 
major pieces of evidence – the Chremonides Decree and the Glaukon Decree – and focus is 
once more placed on the versatile use of ideas, monuments, and monumental topography as 
lieux de mémoire. 
 
3.1: The Chremonides Decree 
      Passed in late 268, the Chremonides Decree, like the Hellenic War Decree, presents the 
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―Since previously (πρότερομ μὲν) the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians, and their 
respective allies after establishing a common friendship and alliance with each other 
have fought together many glorious battles against those who sought 
(ἐπιχειροῦντας) to enslave the cities, which won them fame and brought freedom to 
the other Greeks; and now (καὶ νῦν), when similar circumstances have afflicted the 
whole of Greece because of [those] who seek (ἐπιχειροῦντας) to subvert the laws 
and ancestral constitutions of each city, and King Ptolemy following the policy of 
his ancestor and of his sister conspicuously shows his zeal for the koine eleutheria of 
the Greeks…‖ 
Trans. Austin num.61. 
 
      The decree compares the Chremonidean War with the Persian Wars in a manner already 
seen during the Hellenic War. A programmatic, though slightly obscure, reference to the 
Persian Wars leads to a clear juxtaposition of the Persian and Chremonidean Wars with the 
use of πρότερομ μὲν and νῦν δὲ echoing the similar balance found within the Hellenic War 
Decree.
82
 The decree also follows the Hellenic War Decree and Hyperides‘ Epitaphios in 
presenting both Persia‘s and Macedon‘s goal as the enslavement of Greece. This is reinforced 
by the duplication of the participle ἐπιχειροῦντας, applied to both Persia‘s intent on slavery 
and Macedon‘s crimes against Greek laws and ancestral constitutions.
83
 Further, Athens‘ and 
Sparta‘s actions are presented as ensuring, as they had in 480/79, the eleutheria of the 
Greeks, thus presenting Macedon, like Persia, as the destroyer of that freedom.
84
 As with the 
Hellenic War, Athens used the memory of the Persian Wars as an ideological framework 
around which the protagonists and goals of the Chremonidean War could be fitted: Athens as 
leader of the Greeks, Macedon as the barbarian interloper, and eleutheria as the ultimate goal. 
The model offered by the Persian Wars was particularly apt since the alliance between 
Athens and Sparta in 268 was the first between both states since the battle of Plataia in 479. 
Within the Chremonides Decree Athens took care to emphasise the coalescence of the 
alliances and ideals of the past with those of the present.
85
 
      As seen earlier with the Hellenic War, Athens used the Persian Wars as a paradigm for 
enforcing her continual leadership of the Greeks. However, the Chremonides Decree reveals 
that the initiative for war lay with Sparta and Ptolemy Philadelphos who had allied with each 
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2
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other first and only then called on Athens to join the campaign.
86
 Sparta and her allies had 
already set up a war council to which Athens was now to send two synedroi.
87
 In spite of this, 
Athens presents herself within the Chremonides Decree as the driving force behind the war. 
She claims that she had earlier led the struggle for Greek eleutheria during the Persian Wars 
(ll.12-13), projected to the other Greeks Ptolemy Philadelphos‘ concern for freedom (ll.18-
21), alleged that the Greeks were in agreement with this (ll.31-2), and planned on projecting 
this alliance to all Greeks (l.48). For Athens, the Persian Wars were her means of 
emphasising present leadership through past precedent. She alone had the historical 
precedent, built from the Persian Wars and perpetuated with subsequent struggles like the 
Hellenic War, to lead the Greeks towards freedom. The Persian Wars and Greek eleutheria 
were her prerogative, her call to leadership, and her means of understanding and presenting 
war. Even when following others the memory of the Persian Wars allowed Athens to present 
herself as leading. Tarn claimed that ―the curse of the Greek race‖ was its inability to unite.
88
 
With Athens however the ideals existed, but as a tool of hegemony. 
      Athens may have used the memory of the Persian Wars in what was for her a traditional 
way, but the image of eleutheria presented within the Chremonides Decree itself is quite 
novel. The decree stresses that a common harmony (koine homonoia) exists between the 
Greek cities and that this must be maintained as a prerequisite to the safety of the cities and, 
presumably, their eleutheria from Macedonian control.
89
 The idea of Greek unity as a 
requirement of Greek freedom informed the presentation of the earlier Hellenic War, but the 
specific focus on homonoia in the present and in perpetuity is new and presents an ideology 
that perhaps undercuts the Athenian narrative of leadership by emphasising a community of 
action and unity, not necessarily the leadership of one. The importance of homonoia increases 
when we analyse the Glaukon Decree of c.262-242 which is the earliest certain evidence for a 
cult at Plataia to both Zeus Eleutherios and Homonoia of the Greeks (below §3.2). 
      It is perhaps fruitful to mention here the Themistokles Decree, another ‗falsche Urkunde‘ 
of the Persian War that was found at Troizen and offers added insight into the reception and 
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 686/7.48-52. Kallippos of Eleusis was one (IG II
2
 686/7.69). Habicht (1997: 144) speculated that 
Glaukon may have been the other, cf. Kralli 1996: 50. A copy of the alliance between Sparta and Philadelphos 
recently came to light on the island of Schoinoussa; we await publication of this very important document. I 
thank Kostas Buraselis for bringing this to my attention. 
88




 686/7.31-5: ὅπως ἅν οὖν κοινῆς ὁμονοίας γενομ|ένης τοῖς Ἕλλησι πρός τε τοὺς νῦν ἠδικηκότας καὶ 
παρεσπον|δηκότας τὰς πόλεις πρόθυμοι μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου | καὶ μετ’ ἀλλήλων ὑπάρχωσιν 
ἀγωνισταὶ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μεθ’ ὁμον||οίας σώιζωσιν τὰς πόλεις. 
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 Like the Oath of Plataia (above 
§1.2), the Themistokles Decree purports to be an authentic document of the Persian Wars, 
namely the mobilisation decree of Themistokles. Some have seen within it a historical core 
around which later interpolations were added.
91
 The écriture is of the 3
rd
 century and Noel 
Robertson has argued that the document is to be connected with the Chremonidean War; he 
sees an analogy drawn within it between Athenian and Ptolemaic navies protecting Greek 
eleutheria in 480/79 and 268-262 respectively.
92
 Certainty regarding the date, purpose, or 
even content of the decree is impossible, but the claim that Athens was fighting for the 
eleutheria of the Greeks reflects late 4th and 3rd century Athenian propaganda.
93
 However, 
the inscription and erection of such a decree, like the Oath of Plataia, attests to the importance 
and vitality of the memory of the Persian Wars in the mid-3
rd
 century. That the decree 
purports to be genuine reveals, through those very anachronisms derided by scholars of the 
Persian Wars, the continuing vitality of that historical tradition. It emphasises again the ever-
adapting malleability of the memory of the Persian Wars and reveals how that tradition was 
continually revisited as a means of defining later struggles for Greek eleutheria. That Athens 
was presented within the decree as selflessly defending the freedom of the Greeks reveals that 
this image, one propagated by Athens herself, was followed by others and promoted by those 
who saw in it a similar goal. 
 
3.2: Zeus Eleutherios and the Decree for Glaukon: 
      Of even greater importance for the memory and commemoration of the Persian Wars 
during the mid-3
rd
 century is the honorary decree for Glaukon son of Eteokles of Aithalides, 
brother of Chremonides.
94
 The decree records honours passed by the koinon of the Greeks at 
Plataia in thanks for Glaukon‘s goodwill towards the Greeks while in Athens and for the 
continuation of this policy after the Chremonidean War under King Ptolemy (cf. Teles On 
Exile 23). He beautified the shrine, contributed to the sacrifice to Zeus Eleutherios and 
Homonoia, and patronised the Eleutheria. He and his descendents are rewarded with proedria 
at the Eleutheria Games, while the stele is to be erected next to the altar of Zeus Eleutherios 
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 Jameson 1960 (ed. prin.); 1962 (emendations); SEG XXII 274. On the early 19
th
 century discovery and then 
loss of another Troizenian document purporting to date from the Persian Wars, see Frost 1978. 
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 Hammond 1982; CAH IV
2
 558-63; Ostwald 2007: 18-19; strongly criticised in Johansson 2001. Habicht 





 Robertson 1982; cf. Dow 1962: 353-8.
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 SEG XXII 274.14-18 (App.1 num.44). 
94
 Étienne & Piérart 1975 (text, French translation, commentary); Austin num.61 (English translation). For a full 
bibliography on the Glaukon decree and a more detailed analysis of what follows, see Wallace 2011: 160-4. 
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and Homonoia, paid for from the temple‘s finances.
95
 The decree is the earliest datable 
evidence we have for both the Eleutheria  Games and the joint cult of Zeus Eleutherios and 
Homonoia;
96
 it is also significant, as we shall for, for the layout of the monuments 
commemorating the Persian Wars and their integration into the events of the Eleutheria itself. 
      Although the decree mentions neither the Chremonidean War nor Glaukon‘s actions 
within it, it should be read in this context. Glaukon was active during the Chremonidean War 
and was closely connected with the Ptolemaic court.
97
 Of particular note, however, is the fact 
that the Glaukon Decree explicates many of the themes evident within the Chremonides 
Decree: it references the Persian Wars and eleutheria, it defines the enemy as barbarians, and 




―…and he enriched the sanctuary with dedications and with revenues which must be 
safeguarded for Zeus Eleutherios [and] the Homonoia of the Greeks; and he has 
contributed to making more lavish the sacrifice in honour of Zeus Eleutherios and 
Homonoia and the contest which the Greeks celebrate at the tombs of the heroes 
who fought against the barbarians for the eleutheria of the Greeks.‖ 
Trans. Austin num.63. 
 
      The reference to ―the eleutheria of the Greeks‖ echoes of course the sentiments earlier 
seen within the Chremonides Decree, the Themistokles Decree, and the documents pertaining 
to the Hellenic War. Mention of ―the barbarians‖ also repeats the Themistokles Decree, the 
Hellenic War Decree, and Hyperides‘ Epitaphios, but contrasts with the Chremonides Decree 
which refers only allusively to the Persian Wars and avoids derogatory terminology. The 
focus on Plataia and the Persian War dead is notable because it displays Greek control over 
the site‘s historical and ideological importance for eleutheria, something earlier lost to 
Alexander in 335 and avoided in Hyperides‘ Epitaphios of 322. Here Glaukon‘s benefactions 
are directly relevant to the battle of Plataia in that they aggrandise the memory of both it and 
those who died there on behalf of eleutheria. However, since the decree post-dates the 
Chremonidean War and this was, as we know from the Chremonides Decree, connected with 
the concepts of homonoia and eleutheria, the twin deities of Zeus Eleutherios and Homonoia 
of the Greeks emphasise the continuing importance of these concepts even after the Greek 
                                                 
95
 For the possible identification of the altar of Zeus Eleutherios and Homonoia of the Greeks, see Spyropoulos 
1973. On the Eleutheria, see Ch.1 §10; Wallace 2011: 147-9, 153-7, 162-5. 
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 A fragment of Poseidippos of Kassandreia, dated sometime after c.289 and quoted by Herakleides Kretikos 
(1.11; Austin 101), refers to the Eleutheria. 
97
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3
 462; 
Criscuolo 2003: 320-2). Further references in Wallace 2011: 160-1. 
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defeat within the Chremonidean War. Their appearance here, coupled with the importance of 
Plataia and the Eleutheria Games as the seat of the Greek koinon, all highlight the continuing 
significance of the site as a religious and political focal point for anti-Macedonianism both 
during and after the Chremonidean War.
99
 
      The Glaukon Decree is of added importance because it offers an insight into the physical 
layout of the monuments relating to the memory of the Persian Wars in mid-3
rd
 century 
Plataia. The decree had its standort next to the altar of Zeus Eleutherios, which was 
supposedly erected shortly after the battle of Plataia and was inscribed with an epigram of 
Simonides praising military victory over Persia, Greek eleutheria, and the patronage of Zeus 
Eleutherios.
100
 Even though the authenticity of the altar and epigram as an original Persian 
War monument can be doubted,
101
 by erecting the Glaukon Decree next to it, the koinon of 
the Greeks created a ‗symbolic juxtaposition‘ between decree and supposedly authentic altar, 
one which through both content and location connected Glaukon, his benefactions, and the 
struggle against Macedon with the Persian Wars, Plataia, and Greek eleutheria.
102
 Zeus 
Eleutherios, present within both the Simonidean epigram and the Glaukon Decree, acted as 
royal patron for Greek eleutheria as discovered within the Persian Wars and fought for in the 
Chremonidean War. In this regard, the standort of the Glaukon Decree drew a connection 
with the past in much the same way that the standort of the Euphron Decree by the Stoa of 
Zeus Eleutherios did in Athens. However, whereas the altar of Zeus Eleutherios at Plataia 
emphasised a panhellenic memorialisation of a single event, the Stoa celebrated generally 
Athens‘ leadership in struggles for the freedom of the Greeks. One established unity by 
promoting Greek-won freedom for the Greeks, the koinon of whom oversaw the cult; the 
other aimed at promoting through a magnanimous concern for eleutheria the leadership of 
one over the many. 
      The Glaukon Decree is of further significance as the earliest and most detailed datable 
attestation of the penteteric Eleutheria Games at Plataia. It reveals much about the physical 
layout of the monuments commemorating the Persian Wars and their use within these 
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 Plataia‘s importance is further emphasised by the announcement of honours for Eudamos, murderer of 
Aristodemos, the pro-Antigonid tyrant of Megalopolis, at Plataia [ἐν τῶι+ ἀγῶνι ὃν τίθενσι οἱ Ἕλλανες 
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 In the Glaukon decree the agon (i.e. the Eleutheria) is said to have taken place ―at 
the tomb of the heroes who fought against the barbarians for the liberty of the Greeks‖ (ll.20-
4).
104
 The centre-piece of the Eleutheria was the hoplite race. Pausanias records that 
contestants raced from the trophy of 480/79, some fifteen stades from the city, to the altar of 
Zeus Eleutherios, itself close (οὐ πόρρω δὲ ἀπό) to the common tomb of the Greeks; Robert 
has adduced additional Hellenistic epigraphic evidence for this race.
105
 Presuming that its 
route was the same in the mid-3
rd
 century, and there is no reason to think otherwise, then the 
Glaukon Decree, erected by the altar, was positioned within a pre-existing ideological 
landscape that was delimited by the Persian War monuments and structured by the 
Eleutheria; the past and the commemoration of the past respectively. Further, as a memorial 
to Glaukon‘s benefactions to the Eleutheria Games and the joint cult of Zeus Eleutherios and 
Homonoia of the Greeks, the decree‘s standort physically integrated it into the monumental 
topography of both these features. Through text, location, and cult the Glaukon Decree acted 
as a lieu de mémoire for the ideological, physical, and cultic significance of Plataia and Greek 
eleutheria. 
      The geography of Plataia‘s Persian War monuments was, however, artificially 
constructed. Sometime between Herodotus and Pausanias the number of tombs at Plataia 
declined from many tombs of individual cities, to one Athenian, one Spartan, and one Greek 
tomb.
106
 Although undoubtedly a slow process, the alteration of the physical landscape began 
early, as suggested by Herodotus‘ account of cenotaphs raised in shame by cities that missed 
the battle (9.85). It was only with the Chremonidean War and the alliance of Athens and 
Sparta on behalf of Greek eleutheria, for the first time since 480/79, that Plataia was 
presented as a site of Atheno-Spartan importance first and Greek second.
107
 This change was 
made physical through the altered layout of the tombs – perhaps even occurring during the 
mid-3
rd
 century – and conceptual through the institution of an Atheno-Spartan dialogos 
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104
 App.1 num.50. For the epitaphic sense of ἐπὶ + dative, see Étienne and Piérart 1975, 55. A parallel appears 
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nd
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 Paus. 9.2.5-6; Robert 1929. 
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107
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 Robertson 1986. 
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      Hans-Joachim Gehrke has written of the importance of understanding ‗intentional 
history‘, the process by which a society manipulates the past by creating ―new facts, whether 
historical or not,‖ in order to interpret and understand itself and its current needs.
109
 At 
Plataia, memory was constructed, monumentalised, and perpetuated through the alteration of 
physical landmarks (tombs), the construction of festivals of remembrance (the Eleutheria), 
and the addition of monuments of ideological and cultic significance (Glaukon decree; cult of 
Homonoia of the Greeks). Rather than simply interacting with Plataia‘s Persian War past, 
these additions updated and restructured it, providing new understandings of the past relevant 
to the requirements of the present. These new monuments, some of which, like the cult of 
Homonoia of the Greeks, personified important ideological additions to the Persian War 
history, rooted themselves in the past by connecting physically with older monuments, and 
through this association perpetuated themselves and the re-invention of the Persian War past 
they denoted within the present.
110
 As with the Oath of Plataia and the Themistokles Decree, 
these monuments may have denoted anachronistic reinterpretations of the Persian Wars, but 
they reveal the continued vitality of the Persian Wars and their connection with Greek 
eleutheria. The past was not stagnant historical fact; Plataia reveals the authority and 
importance of later monuments, sometimes anachronistic, in constructing and renewing in 
perpetuity the changing historical ‗reality‘ of the Wars for the ever-changing present. 
 
SECTION 4: JUXTAPOSING THE GALLIC INVASIONS AND THE PERSIAN 
WARS 
      The Hellenic and Chremonidean Wars drew on the Persian War past and its connection 
with the concept of eleutheria. However, whereas the Gallic Invasions of Greece and Asia 
Minor in the years 280-278 were paralleled with the Persian Wars they were not 
conceptualised as a struggle for eleutheria, but as one for soteria. In this section I first 
analyse the parallels between the Persian Wars and the Gallic Invasions, particularly through 
the use of monuments at Delphi and Athens, before then outlining the distinctions in meaning 
and significance between their different conceptualisation as struggles for eleutheria and 
soteria respectively. I then offer an explanation as to why the Gallic Invasions as a war 
fought for soteria from a new barbarian foe did not apparently influence the presentation of 
the later Chremonidean War. 
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      The main literary accounts of the Gallic Invasions are provided by Pausanias and Justin. 
Pausanias‘ account (1.4; 10.19.5-23.14) dates from the second century AD and is both 
derivative and, in places, exaggerated. Justin‘s account (24.4-25.2) was probably also written 
during the late second century AD and is an abbreviation of the earlier, 1
st
 century BC, 
Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus.
111
 Both accounts overlap, particularly in their 
treatment of the assault on Delphi, but Pausanias preserves much extra information and 
explicitly parallels the Gallic Invasion with the Persian Wars.
112
 For example, Pausanias 
compares the make-up of the Greek force at Thermopylai in 479 with that in 279 (10.19.12-
20.5), he relates that the Greek position was turned by the same mountain pass used by the 
Persians (10.22.8-13, with the Phokians again as defenders), and his account of the assault on 
Delphi mirrors that of Herodotus in its focus on divine manifestations and natural disasters.
113
 
Whether or not these exaggerated parallels are Pausanias‘ own work or that of his source is 
unsure, but they reveal that the Gallic Invasions were paralleled with the Persian Wars in the 
literary sources at least. 
     Pausanias‘ account of the monuments at Delphi also presents the Gallic Invasions as a 
parallel to the Persian Wars. Fortunately, an amount of this can be checked by paralleling the 
literary and archaeological sources. Pausanias informs us that the shields taken from the 
Galatians were dedicated on the temple of Apollo next to the Persian shields dedicated by 
Athens (10.19.4).
114
 Naturally, the balance was conscious and the Aitolians were attempting 
to parallel their role in the Gallic Invasions with Athens‘ role in the Persian Wars by hanging 
the Gallic shields on the western and southern faces of the temple, in juxtaposition to the 
Persian shields on the eastern and northern sides.
115
 The Persian shields, therefore, took pride 
of place and could be seen on approach to Delphi from the east (the route taken by both 
Persians and Gauls), but the Gallic shields hung on the southern side, directly above the 
Athenian Stoa, a monument erected after the Persian Wars and decorated with ropes taken 
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from Xerxes‘ Hellespontine bridge.
116
 So, while the Persian shields greeted the visitor from 
the east a separate visual dialogue was created between the Athenian Stoa and the Gallic 
shields dedicated on the temple façade above it.
117
 Therefore, just as the shields balanced 
both Persian and Gaul with the achievements of Athens and Aitolia so did the Aitolian 
shields mark a parallel with the spoils in the Athenian Stoa below them. One should also note 
that some of the statues in honour of the Aitolian generals may have stood on the temple 




      A similar use of monumental space took place in Athens. The shield of Kydias, the most 
outstanding of the Athenian soldiers at the Greek defence against the Gauls at Thermopylai in 
279, was inscribed and dedicated by his relatives in the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios (Paus. 
10.21.5-6). There, as at Delphi, the shield interacted with pre-existing monuments that 
commemorated Athenian eleutheria as achieved during the Persian Wars and defended 
thereafter, such as the Charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy (GHI 22), the Euphron 
Decree (IG II
2
 448), and the shield of Leokritos (Paus. 1.26.1-2). Kydias‘ shield assumed for 
Athens‘ role in the Gallic Invasions the accumulated significance of these monuments, but 
also contributed a new dynamic to the memory of the Persian Wars by connecting them now 
with the defence of Greece from the Gallic barbarians. At both Athens and Delphi physical 
and cultic space was used to construct a direct connection between the Persian Wars and the 
Gallic Invasions, one that assumed for the latter the importance of the former as a united 
defence of Greece from irruptive barbarian invasion. 
      The Gallic Invasions may have been paralleled with the Persian Wars in both literary and 
archaeological sources, but they did not form a conceptual parallel. The Persian Wars were 
conceived of as a struggle for eleutheria while the Gallic Invasions were uniformly presented 
as a struggle for soteria, as is revealed in the earliest documentation for the Invasions in 
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Greece and Asia Minor. A Koan decree passed in response to the assault on Delphi and 
providing for sacrifices in commemoration of it refers specifically to Zeus Soter, a deity 
continually associated with the defence of Delphi.
119
 A Smyrnaian decree in honour of Sotas 
commends him for defending Smyrna against Gallic incursions and protecting the koine 
soteria of the demos.
120
 Other texts from throughout Greece and Asia use soteria when 
referring to the invasion.
121
 Even later, when the Aitolians re-organised the Delphic Soteria 
festival in 250/49, the Gallic Invasions were still presented as fought solely on behalf of 
soteria.
122
 The choice of soteria was dictated by the nature of the Gauls‘ actions: they 
ransacked the chora;
123




 and caused 
famine by burning crops and rural buildings.
126
 Soteria defined the defence from such 
destructive though temporary incursions. Since there was no danger to the civic institutions or 
threat of lasting political submission, the Gallic Invasions were not widely presented as a 
threat to eleutheria.
127
 The Invasions were a historical parallel to the Persian Wars, but they 
were not an enhancement of them. Although establishing a new barbarian paradigm, the 
Gallic Invasions could never replace the Persian Wars as the means for understanding both a 






      The Persian Wars were intrinsically connected with eleutheria, as it was with them. Their 




 centuries lay in large part with the fact that they were a 
historical parallel that could be used to promote a particular ideological programme. By 




 398 of July 278 (App.2 num.32). 
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applying the model of the Persian Wars to a later struggle one defined that struggle as fought 
against a foreign, non-Greek ‗Other‘ who intended to undermine the eleutheria of the Greeks. 
Control over memory was a means of enforcing hegemony in the present. Both Philip and 
Alexander employed the model of the Persian Wars to enforce their hegemony over the 
Greeks in anticipation of the invasion of Asia. Athens responded to this during the Hellenic 
and Chremonidean Wars by re-asserting a Helleno-centric memory of the Wars that promoted 
Athenian leadership of the Greeks, presented Macedon as a barbarian invader, and styled 
Athens‘ herself as a selfless defender of the eleutheria of the Greeks.
129
 The Gallic Invasions 
were also paralleled with the Persian Wars as a means of understanding and condemning 




      Eschewing Alcock‘s claim that the Persian Wars fuelled ―a successful political consensus 
between rulers and ruled‖, I showed that in a time of multiple powers the memory of the 
Wars and their connection with the concept of eleutheria acted as a point of both unity and 
discord. Philip and Alexander manipulated the memory of the Persian Wars to promote Greek 
unity under Macedonian royal hegemony, a use later echoed in the Successors‘ use of the site 
of Corinth as a backdrop for declarations of Greek freedom. However, I also traced the polis 
use of the Wars during the Hellenic and Chremonidean Wars, when it was designed to stoke 
conflict with Macedon and promote Athenian leadership. Since the Persian Wars provided a 
blueprint for presenting and understanding conflict, their use to promote either unity or 
division was based on the politics of whoever referred to them. The question ultimately 
became, whom did one wish to define as the ‗Other‘: Persia, Macedon, or the Gauls. 
      Looking at the Persian Wars as a lieu de mémoire I also analysed the use of specific 
locations and concepts as connectors with the Wars. Sites like Corinth, Plataia, and Thebes 
personified physically the memory of the past within the present, even projecting it into the 
future.
131
 However, they were not simply static connectors. Memory did not exist as a series 
of immutable historical facts but rather as a malleable series of social readings continually 
altered and re-interpreted to fit the changing needs of the present. As such, Corinth, Plataia, 
and Thebes were employed by Philip and Alexander to support a Macedonian reading of the 
Persian Wars that denigrated Thebes, Sparta, and Athens and espoused instead Macedonian 
authority as the new, successful defender of Greek eleutheria. However, the site of Plataia 
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 Spawforth (1994) looks at Rome‘s later use of the Persian Wars during its conflicts with Parthia. 
130
 Spawforth 1994: 240. 
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was later re-appropriated by Athens for a Greek, particularly Atheno-Spartan, memory f the 
Persian Wars and Greek eleutheria. By its very physicality, space could be altered to give 
tangibility to such new readings of the past. Monuments located near the Stoa of Zeus 
Eleutherios, such as the Euphron Decree and the shields of Leokritos and Kydias, assimilated 
to each present context the historical and ideological authority of the Persian Wars as an 
Athenian led struggle for Greek eleutheria. Similarly, the erection of the Glaukon Decree 
next to the altar of Zeus Eleutherios at Plataia integrated it, and vicariously the mid-3
rd
 
century struggle against Macedon, into the ideological topography of the Persian Wars and 
the Eleutheria Games, their cultic commemoration. The physicality of space assimilated the 
past to the present, but it also helped construct that past itself. 
      Eleutheria, as a political concept, was discovered during the Persian Wars and it was 
from them that it drew its meaning and significance. However, just as monuments and 
locations connected with the Wars could be altered to promote new meaning within the 
present so too could concepts. The addition of the cult of Homonoia of the Greeks to that of 
Zeus Eleutherios at Plataia, and the presence of both deities as theoi symbomoi, altered the 
physical, cultic, and conceptual landscape of Plataia as a site intrinsically connected with the 
Persian Wars. As the Oath of Plataia and the Themistokles Decree were ‗falsche Urkunden‘ 
of the Persian Wars, so now was homonoia constructed as a ‗falsche Begriff‘. Derivative and 
anachronistic they may be, but such anachronisms emphasised the abiding validity of the 



















      The role played by eleutheria within the relationship between city and king in the early 
Hellenistic period was a diverse one. Throughout this thesis I have continually drawn 
attention to the inherent ambiguity in the meaning of eleutheria and the malleability of its use 
in action. This one conclusion has underlined the three main research questions undertaken 
by this thesis: the use and understanding of the concept of eleutheria (Part One); the role it 
played within the relationship between city and king (Part Two); and its connection with 
democratic ideology and its importance as a lieu de mémoire for memorialising and 
commemorating the past (Part Three). 
      First, use and understanding. I have shown that eleutheria lacked a clear definition and so 
was malleable in meaning. Its significance or meaning in each context was dependent upon 
individual circumstances with different criteria being emphasised by different states at 
different times. Context was all important and in each context different features of eleutheria 
were emphasised, often based on the local concerns of the polis. This lack of definition 
denotes an element of continuity in the use and understanding of eleutheria from the 
Classical to the Hellenistic periods; it allowed the concept to be continually exploited within 




 centuries as it later 




 centuries. Nonetheless, 
eleutheria was not empty propaganda. Kings were concerned with ensuring the willing 
support of the cities and so were forced to offer tangible benefactions when guaranteeing 
their freedom. 
      Second, the relationship between king and city. Cities were not a homogenous political 
whole that thought and acted everywhere in one uniform way. Likewise, kings and their royal 
policies were not all the same. Contexts differed over time and space and the nature of the 
relationship between one king and city was a unique mix of royal policies, political necessity, 
civic traditions, and local history. Variety was the common thread and in the creation and 
structuring of the relationship between city and king the role played by eleutheria was a 
central but fluid one. As a status benefaction it expressed royal control over the city, but in a 
way that defined the empire in terms beneficial to the polis. It promoted unity between both 
parties, but the manners in which it was used and the precise statuses it denoted were open to 
great diversity. It could define positively various forms of royal control, but when the city 
wished to assert its independence then eleutheria could operate as a point of ideological 
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conflict with the king. The distinction between Primary and Secondary perceptions of 
freedom is central to an accurate appreciation of the role it played within the relationship 
between city and king. 
      Third, democratic ideology and lieu de mémoire. Expanding from the fluidity in the use 
of eleutheria and the malleability of its role within king/city relations, I have also looked at 
the ways in which eleutheria was used to connect with both the recent and distant past. 
Athenian decrees post-287 revealed how the recent past was rewritten as a struggle between 
oligarchy and democracy so as to enforce the legitimacy of the latter as the one true guarantor 
of eleutheria. However, the use of the past was adaptive and a figure like Alexander the Great 
could retroactively be seen to be either a guarantor or threat to democracy depending on the 
political requirements of the time. As regards the more distant past, the historical tradition of 
the Persian Wars offered a powerful precedent not only for struggles between Greeks and 
foreign powers, like Persia and Macedon, but also for the ubiquity of eleutheria as a political 
and cultural concept within the Greek city. Sites of importance during the Wars existed 
within the present as lieux de mémoire. They connected with that past but since the idea they 
related – Greek eleutheria from a barbarian ‗other‘ – was non-specific, the significance of 
such sites was malleable and could be adapted by both Greeks and Macedonians. 
      The specifics of the role of eleutheria within each of these three research questions were 
explored in each of the six chapters of this thesis. 
      In chapter one I traced the origins and initial distinctions of the terms eleutheria and 
autonomia before then arguing for a developing synonymity of both arising in the early 4
th
 
century, but perhaps stemming from 5
th
 century ambiguity over their precise individual 
meanings. I argued that this synonymity arose not out of a decline in the significance of 
eleutheria, as had commonly been thought, but through an increase in the significance of 
autonomia to denote a condition equal in meaning to that of eleutheria. This, I showed, was a 
consequence of the continued use of the term in Spartan international diplomacy and its 
eventual incorporation within the King‘s Peace and all subsequent koinai eirenai. I also drew 
attention to the disparity between the perceived meaning of autonomia as equal to eleutheria 
and the reality of its actual use by Sparta. I argued that as a result of this disparity a new 
political phrase was created, eleutheria kai autonomia, which sought to define, against 
Spartan abuses of autonomia, the ideal of total freedom from foreign control. Both autonomia 
and eleutheria kai autonomia described the same ideal and both remained common 
throughout the 4
th
 century, the former in connection with the Persian-backed koinai eirenai 
and the latter with the Second Athenian League and later both the League of Corinth and the 
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propaganda of Antigonos Monophthalmos. However, I was careful to point out that despite 
its synonymity with eleutheria, autonomia could on occasions describe the specific 
significance of eleutheria as the empowerment of the demos to use its own laws. 
      Chapter two turned attention to the early Hellenistic period itself and provided a narrative 
of the years 337 to 262. I traced the continuities in the use and understanding of eleutheria 
from the Classical to the Hellenistic periods, arguing against a conceptual division between 
both; the battle of Chaironea should not be treated as a dividing line between the free 
Classical polis and the un-free Hellenistic polis. Rather, it marked the creation of a new 
dynamic in the rise of the Macedonian empires and the importance of eleutheria as a point of 
dialogue between city and king. I drew attention to the royal use of grants of eleutheria as a 
means of ensuring Greek goodwill (eunoia) and support. This served numerous ends, not 
least gaining support for expansionist campaigns and unifying city and king under a common 
ideological banner. I also maintained that the constant concern of rulers to appear truthful in 
their grants of eleutheria, as attested within the sources, required their granting of tangible 
benefits to the cities. 
      In chapter three I moved to examine those features that were seen to undermine eleutheria 
and also to address some of the different ways in which it could be analysed and interpreted 
in practice. I argued that since many forms of foreign control could be compatible with, and 
even a defence of, the city‘s freedom we must perforce be aware that eleutheria did not in 
practice carry a specific, single meaning but that what it entailed varied from context to 
context. I emphasised that it was vitally important that any foreign impositions on the city be 
seen to be ideologically beneficial to it, that they defend rather than restrict its freedom. The 
terminology used to describe them (phylake not phroura; syntaxis not phoros) was important 
since it hinted at defence and synergy rather than control and exploitation. I turned then to 
ancient classifications of eleutheria and showed that no single, universal definition existed 
but that meaning was adaptable and dependent upon individual contexts. I then applied these 
conclusions to a study of the typology of civic statuses and argued that, because of the 
malleable role played by eleutheria in the relationship between city and king, a more simple 
distinction should be drawn between Primary and Secondary perceptions of freedom. The 
borders between these statuses were, however, easily crossed and eleutheria could define in 
each case a positive understanding of the city‘s position, both within and outwith the control 
of an empire. 
      In chapter four I applied these Primary and Secondary understandings of freedom to an 
analysis of the nature of the relationship between city and king. I argued that both 
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understandings were mutually exclusive and that eleutheria could be used to vocalise either 
discord or unity depending on the politics of its proposer. Focus was placed in particular on 
the role of eleutheria within the relationship between the king and those cities that were free 
in a Secondary manner, specifically its use as a royal status benefaction. I argued that 
eleutheria acted as a point of unity by providing a positive definition of royal power, one that 
served the interests of both city and king by presenting the king as a defender rather than 
oppressor of the city‘s freedom. In the case of Antigonos Monophthalmos I showed that 
within his letter to the Skepsians he used eleutheria to strengthen his empire by unifying 
under a common ideological bond the goals of both king and city. 
      I was also concerned with tracing the functional limits of eleutheria within the 
relationship between city and king. I claimed that freedom could be negated by either royal 
cancellation of the status or civic reassertion of a Primary understanding of freedom, but that 
within these limits the practical status of individual free cities varied according to 
circumstance. Further, I argued that each city could reach a ‗tipping-point‘, a point at which it 
perceived its Secondary freedom to be irrevocably undermined. When reached, the city saw 
that the king was no guaranteeing its freedom anymore and so could assert for itself, through 
revolt, a Primary perception of freedom or an alternative Secondary guarantee of freedom 
under the patronage of another king. I turned to Athens in the years 304-301 as a case-study 
for these theories in action and traced there the ideological conflict over whether the city‘s 
freedom could best be attained in a Primary or a Secondary manner. 
      Chapter five marked the first of two thematic chapters focused on applying the idea of 
memory and commemoration, specifically the lieu de mémoire, to an analysis of eleutheria. 
This chapter dealt with the connection of eleutheria and demokratia, specifically within both 
democratic ideology and the memory and commemoration of the past. By treating of 
Alexander‘s democratic nachleben I showed that, as with eleutheria, the memory of the 
individual was adaptive to individual political contexts. Athens followed the pro-democratic 
image of Alexander presented within Polyperchon‘s Edict in 318/7, but asserted in 307/6 a 
different view that presented him as a threat to the city‘s democracy. Expanding beyond 
Alexander, I also showed how the post-287 Athenian democracy actively reinterpreted and 
reconstructed the events and politics of the years 322-287 as a simplistic, bi-partite struggle 
between democrats and oligarchs with the aim of enforcing through historical legitimacy the 
validity of the post-287 democratic regime as the sole guarantor of Athens‘ freedom. 
      I also explored the similar ways in which Athens and the cities of Asia Minor conceived 
of democracy, specifically its connection with eleutheria as denoting the empowerment of the 
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demos. Nonetheless, I was careful to show that, like eleutheria itself, demokratia could be 
read in both Primary and Secondary manners: Athens viewed its demokratia as a self-
guaranteed and self-asserted right (Primary), but the cities of Asia Minor saw theirs as 
guaranteed by Alexander‘s precedent and perpetuated thereafter as a royal status benefaction 
(Secondary). Importantly, however, I noted that kings only rarely made explicit reference to 
demokratia, preferring instead more abstract terms like politeia or nomoi. This, I argued, was 
in part because political terminology like demokratia, and its implicit alternative oligarchia, 
was potentially divisive and so kings left the connection between freedom and democracy to 
be made by the city itself, specifically the empowered demos. 
      In chapter six I turned attention to the continued importance within the early Hellenistic 
period of the sites, ideology, and concepts associated with the Persian Wars as the seminal 
struggle for Greek eleutheria. I treated of the different ways in which the historical 
significance of the Wars could be appropriated for the present and what purpose this served 
within the politics of the time. I argued in particular that the Persian Wars were primarily of 
use as a pre-existing ideological model that could be applied to, and hence offer an 
interpretation of, any struggle. They promoted the hegemony of one state by presenting that 
state as a defender of eleutheria – in Athens‘ case imitating its role in 480/79 – and tarring 
their opponent as an ‗other‘ who wished like Persia to remove Greek freedom. This model 
was employed by both Athens and Macedon and reflected the nature of the concept of 
eleutheria itself: it unified states under the banner of a Hellenic struggle for eleutheria, but 
promoted discord by asserting that struggle against another power. 
      I also illustrated how physical spaces and concepts served as lieux de memoire for the 
Persian Wars and Greek eleutheria. The sites of Corinth, Plataia, and Thebes were closely 
connected with the Persian Wars and so imbued with ideological significance. This also took 
place more locally within the monumental landscape of the polis itself, particularly through 
the layout of monuments in the north-west corner of the Athenian agora and on the 
battlefield of Plataia. I traced the malleability of the memory and historical significance of 
such locations and explained how they could be appropriated for different ends by both 
Macedon and Athens. I showed how Corinth became intrinsically connected with 
Macedonian guarantees of freedom rather than with the Greek defence of eleutheria as during 
the Persian Wars, but that Plataia‘s historical significance could be manipulated by both 
Philip and Alexander in their campaigns against Persia but also by Athens against Macedon. 
Furthermore, I revealed that such sites were not simply receptacles of static, pre-existing 
ideology but rather that the interplay of their physical monuments, added to over time, 
223 
 
continually re-structured this ideology by constructing various layers of meaning, each 
grounded within not only the individual significance of the monument itself but also within 
the interplay of that monument with those around it, Spawforth‘s ―symbolic juxtaposition‖. 
Plataia provided a good example when the concept of homonoia was deified and an altar to 
Zeus Eleutherios and Homonoia of the Greeks was consecrated, thus placing the later concept 




































 Century Greece and Athens 
 
      What follows is a catalogue of epigraphic references to eleutheria, autonomia, demokratia, soteria, and (patrios) nomoi and politeia from 
384/3 to c.262 in mainland Greece. The catalogue is based primarily on references to eleutheria, autonomia, and demokratia. References to 

















384/3 Athenian alliance 
with Chios 
συμμάχος δὲ 
ποι||εῖσ*θα+ι *Χί+ος ἐπ’ 
ἐλευ*θε+ρίαι καὶ 
αὐτον|ομί*α+ι (ll.19-21) 
 συμμάχος δὲ 












 copy of the 
Chios alliance? 





























ἄγειν τὴ*ν χώραν+ 
ἔχοντας ἐμ βεβαίωι 
τὴ|*ν ἑαυτῶν 





ἄγειν τὴ*ν χώραν+ 







ὄντι καὶ αὐτονόμωι, 
πολι|τ*ευομέν+ωι 
πολιτείαν ἣν ἅν 
βόληται μή|τε 
*φρορ+ὰν εἰσδεχομένωι 
μήτε ἄρχοντα | 
ὑπο*δεχ+ομένωι μήτε 
φόρον φέροντι (ll.9-23) 
πᾶσαν+…ἐξεῖναι 
αὐ*τ+||ῶ*ι ἐλευθέρ+ωι 
ὄντι καὶ αὐτονόμωι, 
πολι|τ*ευομέν+ωι 
πολιτείαν ἣν ἅν 
βόληται μή|τε 
*φρορ+ὰν εἰσδεχομένωι 
μήτε ἄρχοντα | 
ὑπο*δεχ+ομένωι μήτε 









378/7 Athenian alliance 
with Chalkis  
ἔχ*εν τὴ+ν ἑαυτῶν 
Χαλκιδέ*ας ἐλ|ευθέρ+ος 
ὄντα*ς 
καὶ] αὐτονόμος καὶ 
αὐ*τοκ|ράτορα+ς? μήτε 
φρορὰν 
ὑποδεχομένος *παρ’ | 




τὰ δόγματ*α τῶ|ν 
συμμάχων] (ll.21-6) 
 ἔχ*εν τὴ+ν ἑαυτῶν 
Χαλκιδέ*ας ἐλ|ευθέρ+ος 
ὄντα*ς 
καὶ] αὐτονόμος καὶ 
αὐ*τοκ|ράτορα+ς? μήτε 
φρορὰν 
ὑποδεχομένος *παρ’ | 










Olympia 365/4 Alliance between 
Arkadia and Pisa 
[ἐλευθέρους 
κα+ὶ αὐτονόμ*ους | καὶ 
ἀφρωράτους (?) ὄντας 
πᾶσαν τὰ]ν αὐτῶν 
χ[ῶραν+ (ll.5-6) 
 [ἐλευθέρους 
κα+ὶ αὐτονόμ*ους | καὶ 
ἀφρωράτους (?) ὄντας 
















Thebes 362 Epigram 
on statue of 
Epamino-
ndas 
αὐτόνομος δ΄ Ἑλλὰς 
πᾶσ΄ ἐν ἐλευθερίῃ 
(l.4) 
 αὐτόνομος δ΄ 









































νῦν λέγων καὶ 
πράττ+|ων ἀγαθ[ὸν 
ὅτι ἅν δύνηται ὑπὲρ 
τῆς ἐλευθερία+|ς τῶν 
Ἑλλ[ήνων+ 
 (ll.5-7) 










[ἐκ τῆς φυγῆς τήν 
τ+|ε φρουρὰν ἐξέβαλε 
ἐκ τῆς ἀκρο*πόλεως 
ἑκόντων τῶν 









μήτε τὴν ἑαυ*τοῦ 
πατρ+|ίδα μήτε τὴν 
ἄλλην Ἑλλαδα ἰδεῖν 
δουλεύουσαν (ll.54-
  νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ ὅ 
τε δῆμος 
*κατελ+|ήλυθε 








οἱ ἐν τεῖ ὀλιαρχίαι  
πολιτευόμεν*οι καὶ] 
| τὰς στήλας 
καθεῖλον· νῦν δὲ 
ἐπειδὴ ὅ τε δῆμος 
*κατελ+|ήλυθε καὶ 
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πεζοὶ δὲ ἱππῆέ*ς τε 
γέ+ρας θέσ*αν, οὓς 
προ+έηκε*ν+ | δᾶμος ὁ 
Βοιωτῶν *τοῦδ+ε μεθ’ 
[ἁγεμόνο+ς || 
ῥυσομένους 
Ὀπόε*ντ+α, βαρ[ὺν δ’ 
ἀπὸ δεσ+μὸν 
ἑλ[όντες+ | φρουρᾶς, 
Λοκροῖσιν *τεῦ+ξαν 
ἐ*λευθερίαν+ (ll.3-6) 
























 ὅπως ἅν κα*ὶ οἱ 
ἄλλοι ἅπαντες+ | 
φιλοτιμῶνται 
ἄρχειν κατὰ τοὺ*ς 
νόμους καὶ ὑπὲρ 
τῆς+ | δημοκρατίας 
ἐθέλωσι πάντα 
π*ράττειν εἰδότες 
ὅτι+ || χάριτας 
ἀπολήψονται παρὰ 






















































































ἥ τε φρου<ρ>ὰ 








ἥ τε φρου<ρ>ὰ 




<νόμ>ους καὶ τὴν 
δημοκρατίαν 
ἐκομίσατο (ll.4-5) 
  ἥ τε φρου<ρ>ὰ 











Athens 306/5 Athens 
honours 
Timotheos 
for help in 
Hellenic 
War 







































[…]ότιμος π*ρ+ότερόν τε 
κατασταθεὶ*ς ἐπὶ τὴν | τ+οῦ 




τ||ὸν Ε+ὔριπον κα*ὶ] α*ἴ+τιος 
ἐγένετο *τοῦ τὴν πόλ|ιν+ 
αὐτῶν ἐλευθέραν γενέσθαι 
κα*τὰ τὴν προ|α+ίρεσιν τῶν 
βασιλέων Ἀντιγόνο*υ καὶ 
Δημη|τρ+ίου (ll.2-8) 





















Athens 304/3 Demetrios 
frees 
Chalkis 
*τὴν τῆς πόλεως 
ἐλευ+θεριαν (l.30) 
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Delphi 304 Elateia 
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Xanthippos Ἀπόλλωνι Ξάνθιππον 














ἀπροφασίστω|*ς τῆι τε τῶν+ 
βασιλέων προαιρέσει | *καὶ 
τῆι τῶ+ν Ἑλλήνων 
ἐλευθερίαι (ll.12-14) 










[ἐ]|πὶ δουλείαι λαβὼν κατὰ 
*κράτος ἐλευθέρας κα+|ὶ 
αὐτονόμους πεπόηκεν 
(ll.7-9) 



















περὶ οὗ ὁ βασιλεὺς 
ἐπέ*σ|τειλεν+ τῆι βουλῆι 
καὶ τῶι δήμωι, ἀποφ|*αίνων 
φ+ίλον εἶ<να>ι <α>ὐτῶι καὶ 
εὔνουν ε|[ἰς τὰ τῶν+ 
βασιλέων πράγματα καὶ 
τὴν τ|*οῦ δήμο+υ τοῦ 
Ἀθηναίων ἐλευθερίαν καὶ 
|| *συναγ+ωνιστὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς 
δημοκρατίας (ll.10-15) 
…τὴν τ|*οῦ δήμο+υ 
τοῦ Ἀθηναίων 



























ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ δή*μου | 
σωτηρίας καὶ τῆ+ς τῶν 
ἄλλων Ἑλλήνω*ν 
ἐ|λευθερίας] (ll.15-18) 
  δι*ετέ|λεσεν 
συμπράττων+ 
ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ 
δή*μου | 
σωτηρίας καὶ 
















*περὶ οὗ ὁ βασιλ+|εὺς 
ἐπέστειλεν τεῖ *βουλεῖ καὶ 
τῶι δήμωι | ἀπ+οφαίνων 
φίλον ε*ἶναι αὐτῶι καὶ 
εὔνουν] | [εἰ+ς τα τῶν 
β*α+σι *λέων πράγματα καὶ 
τὴν τοῦ || δ+ήμου τοῦ 
[Ἀθηναίων ἐλευθερίαν καὶ 
συνα|γωνιστὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς 
δημοκρατίας+ (ll.11-16) 

















ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος 
ἀπέστελλεν τὸν ὑὸν αὐτοῦ 
Δημήτριον 
ἐλευθερώσο*ντ+α τ*ήν+ τε 
πόλιν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους 
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Ἕλ*ληνας (ll. 15-18) 
27. 
RIG 452 





συνηγωνίσατο αὐτοῖς εἰς 
τὴν | ἐλευθερίαν τῆς 
πόλεως καὶ τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν 
| τῆς φρουφᾶς (ll.7-9) 












*κ|αὶ ἀπεσταλ+μένος μετ*ὰ 
Δημητρ|ίου εἰς τὴ+ν 
Ἑλλάδα σ*υνηγωνί|ζετο 

























   ἀγ *ωνίζεσθαι 
ὑπὲρ τοῦ δή|μο+υ 
τοῦ Ἀθη*ναίων 























303/2 Statue of 
Demetrios 
τοὺς ὑπεναντίους τῆι 
δ*ημοκρατίαι ἐξέβαλε καὶ 
ἠλευθέρωσε τὴν+ | χώραν 




*τοὺς δὲ μετ’ αὐ]|τοῦ 
τιμῶν καὶ περὶ πλείστο*υ 
ποιούμενος τὴν σωτηρίαν 
αὐτῶν, τούτων δὲ] | καὶ 
δεηθέντων ἡγεῖσθαι τῆ*ς 








τὴν+ | χώραν 
τὴν Ἀθηναίων 












 *τοὺς δὲ μετ’ αὐ]|τοῦ 






















   *καὶ ὅτε Ἀθηναῖ|οι 
ἔ+θεντο τὰς 
ἐπιδόσει*ς ε+ἰς *τὴν 
παρασκευὴν τοῦ | 





































   ἐπιμελεῖται δὲ || 
*τῆς συνκομιδῆς 
το+ῦ σίτου τῶι 









































































καὶ συ*ν+|εργῶν εἰς τὴν 
ἐλευθερ*ί+αν τῆι *π+|όλει καὶ 
κομισαμένου *τ+οῦ δήμ*ο+|υ 
τὸ ἄστυ (ll.15-18) 
 
συνεργῶν *ε+|ἴς τε τὴν τοῦ 
Πειραιέως κομιδ*ὴ]|ν καὶ 
τὴν τῆς πόλεως 
ἐλευθερί*α+||ν (ll.32-5) 


















ταγὸν ἔθεντο | τόνγε μετ’ 
εὐδόξ*ο+υ πάντες 
ἐλευθερ[ί+ας (ll.11-12) 











καὶ κομισαμένου τοῦ δήμου 
τὴν ἐλευθερίαν διατ|ετέλεκε 
λέγων καὶ πράττων τὰ 
συμφέροντα τεῖ τῆς | 















ὅπως ἅν διαμένει ὁ δῆμ||ος 
ἐλεύθερος ὢν καὶ τὸν 
Πειραιᾶ κομίσηται καὶ τὰ | 
φρούρια τὴν ταχίστην (ll.34-
6) 
 
ἀγῶνα κατεσκεύασεν τεῖ 
Δήμ|*ητρι καὶ τεῖ Κόρη+ι 
*πρ+ῶτος ὑπόμνημα τῆς τοῦ 






















 280/79 Athens 
honours 
Demosthenes 
πεπολιτευμένῳ τῶν καθ΄ 
ἑαυτὸν πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν καὶ 
δημοκρατίαν ἄριστα· 
φυγόντι δὲ δι΄ ὀλιγαρχίαν͵ 
καταλυθέντος τοῦ δήμου 
(851c) 
πεπολιτευμένῳ 







τοῦ δήμου (851c) 











ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως 
΢ελεύ*κο||υ…38…πρεσ+βευ









ην τὴν νῆσον 
(l.28) 














 271/0 Athens 
honours 
Demochares 




οὐδὲ ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν 
ἠρχότι καταλελυκότος 
τοῦ δήμου· καὶ μόνῳ 
Ἀθηναίων τῶν κατὰ 
τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν 
πολιτευσαμένων μὴ 
μεμελετηκότι τὴν 





μήτε λόγῳ μήτε ἔργῳ 
(851f) 















ένου τοῦ δήμου ἀλλὰ 
καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν 
ἑ*αυτοῦ] | προέμενος 
δόσιν δοθῆναι ἐν τεῖ 
ὀλιαρχίαι ὥστε μ*ηδὲν 












μήτε τοῖς νόμοις μήτε 



































 ἔχειν ἑκατέρους 
τὴν 
ἑαυτῶν ἐλευθέρ-] 

























































ἐλευθερίας τῆς τε 










































δήμωι εἰς τὴν 
ἐλευθερίαν (ll.9-11) 











































παρέδωκεν καὶ τοὺς 
νόμους κυρίους τοῖς 




























































































Σὸν | ἀγῶνα ὃν τιθέασιν 
οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐπὶ | τοῖς 
ἀνδράσιν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς 
ἀγω|νισαμένοις πρὸς 
τοὺς βαρβάρους | ὑπὲρ 
τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων 
ἐλευθερίας (ll.20-4) 
















 Century Asia Minor and 
the Aegean 
 
      What follows is a catalogue of epigraphic references to eleutheria, autonomia, demokratia, soteria, and (patrios) nomoi and politeia from 
334 to c.220 in Asia Minor and the Aegean islands. The catalogue is based primarily on references to eleutheria, demokratia, and autonomia. 














 ὅπως μηδὲν 
ἐναντί|ον ἦι τῆι 
δημοκρατίαι μηδὲ τηῖ 
τῶν φυγάδων 
καθόδωι (ll.5-6) 










 ὤς κεν οἰ πόλιται 
οἴκει*εν τὰμ π|ό+λιν 





   
3. 
GHI 86b 
Priene 334 Alexander 
regulates 
Priene 












4. Priene 334 Priene   αὐτονόμων | *ἐόν+των   
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Priene 330/29 Priene 
honours 
Philaios 
  Πρι*η+νέω*ν α+ὐτο*ν+-




Priene 330/29 Priene 
honours 
Theodoros 










Miletos 313/2 Antigonos 
captures 
Miletos 
ἡ πόλις | 
ἐλευθέρα καὶ 
αὐτόνομος 
ἐγένετο ὑπὸ | 
Ἀντιγόνου καὶ ἡ 
δημοκρατία 
ἀπεδόθη (ll.2-4) 
ἡ πόλις | ἐλευθέρα 
καὶ αὐτόνομος 
ἐγένετο ὑπὸ | 
Ἀντιγόνου καὶ ἡ 
δημοκρατία ἀπεδόθη 
(ll.2-4) 
ἡ πόλις | ἐλευθέρα καὶ 
αὐτόνομος ἐγένετο 














































ὅπως ὁ δῆμος 
φαίνηται παρέδωκεν 
αὐτῶι Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ 
βασιλεὺς | τὴν 
ἐλευθερίαν καὶ 
Ἀντίγονος (ll.6-7) 










RC 1; SV 
428 
Skepsis 311/0 Letter to 
Skepsis by 
Antigonos 
*τῆς τῶν | Ἑλλήνων 
ἐλ+ευθερίας (ll.1-2, 61) 
 
τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ 
τὴν αὐτ*ον+|ομίαν 
(ll.55-6) 







Skepsis 311/0 Skepsis‘ 
reply 
τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὅτι 
ἐλεύθε|*ρ+οι καὶ 
αὐτόνομοι ὄντες ἐν 
εἰρήνηι (ll.15-16) 
 τῆς τῶν 
Ἑλλήνων 




τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὅτι 
ἐλεύθε|*ρ+οι καὶ 
αὐτόνομοι ὄντες 











 ἐλεύθερον καὶ 
αὐτόνομον καὶ 
ἀφρούρητον καὶ 



















ἐλευθερίαν | καὶ τὴν 
αὐτονομίαν τῶι δήμωι 
τῶν Ἰασέων (ll.12-13) 
 διαφυλάξω τὴν 
ἐλευθερίαν  | καὶ 
τὴν αὐτονομίαν 

















π[…]ειας καὶ — — 
ἐλευθέρα *τ+ῆι πόλει 
ὁμ*ο+ν*οο+ῦντε*ς | κα+ὶ 















   
15. 








Ἀντίγονος ὁ βα*σιλεὺς 
— — — τήν τε | 
ἐλευθερίαν ἀπέ+δωκεν 
τῶι δήμωι τῶι Ἰητῶν 
καὶ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς 
πατρίο*υς] (ll.2-3) 
 
   …τοὺς νόμους 
τοὺς 
πατρίο[υς— — 
— ὅπως ὁ δῆμος 






















[ὅπως ὧν ὀ|φ+είλουσιν 
αἱ πόλεις ἐλεύθεραι 
γένωνται. νομίζον*τες 







γὰρ ὑμᾶς τό 


















πρέσβεις πρὸς τὸν 




 πρέσβεις πρὸς 
τὸν βασιλέα 





















τι οὐδὲ καταλύοντι 
τὸν δᾶ|μον εἰδὼς 
ἐπιτραψέω· αἰ δέ κα 



































σωτηρίας | καὶ 
ἐλευθερίας πόλεος 























Priene c.297 Soteria 
Festival 
[ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτονομίας 
καὶ] | ἐλευθερίας 
ἀγῶνος (ll.16-17) 
 
τούς τε ἐλευθέρους 
πάντας (l.22) 
 τὴν αὐτονομί-












































Priene 296/5 Priene 
honours 
Helikon 
παρακαλ [ῶ+ν αὐτοὺς 
*τηρε+ῖν *τὴν | ἄκρ+αν 
ἐπιμελῶς, λογιζομένους 
ὡς οὐθὲ*ν | με+ῖζόν ἐστιν 
ἀνθρώποις Ἓλλησιν τῆς 
ἐ||*λε+υθερίας (ll.17-20) 
    
23. 
I.Priene 3 
Priene 296/5 Priene 
honours 
Megabyzos 






Priene 294/3 Priene 
honours 
Apellis 







Ilion c.281 Law against 
tyranny and 
oligarchy 
 ἀπ*οκτ+είνηι τ*ὸν 
τ+ύραννο*ν ἢ τὸν 
ἡ+|γεμόνα τῆ*ς+ 


















or II and 
Lysimache-
ia. 
 *δι+αφυλάξω τὴν 
πόλιν | [ἐν 
αὐτονομίαι καὶ] ἐν 
δημοκρατιαι | [ — 
— — — — — — — 
]σαν καὶ 




τὴν πόλιν | [ἐν 
αὐτονομίαι καὶ] 
ἐν δημοκρατιαι 
| [ — — — — — 

















ἄγ|*ειν δὲ+ κα*ὶ κα+τὰ 
μῆνα γ’ ἕκαστον δύο 
θύσια||*ς+ ἐν ἧι ἡμέραι 
ἐλεύθ*ερ+οι ἐγενόμεθα 
(ll.18-20) 
    
28. 









τάς τε π[ό|λ+εις 
ἐλευθερώσας καὶ τοὺς 
νόμους ἀποδοὺς || *κ+αὶ 
τὴμ πάτριομ πολιτείαμ 
πᾶσιγ καταστήσα*ς | κ+αὶ 
τῶν εἰσφορῶγ κουφίσας 
(ll.13-16) 


































δι ὰ προγονῶν ἦν | 








ἢ παραχ+ωρήσῃ τοῖς 
καταλυόντεσσι τὸν 
δᾶμον...] (ll.13-14) 














τᾷ καταλύσαι τῶ 
δάμω (l.23) 




δι ὰ προγονῶν ἦν | 




























 *τοῖς ἐμμένουσι 
τ+ῶν πολιτᾶν τοῖς 
νό*μ+οις *καὶ | τοῖς 
ποτ’ αὐτὸς 
ὁμο+νοιοῦσι καὶ 
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τοῖς τὰ β[— — — 
|| — — — 
δαμοκ+ρατίαι εὖ 
ἦμεν α[ὐτοῖς καὶ | 













 τῶι τε δάμωι τῶι 
Κώιων γίνεσ|θαι 























τῶμ πόλε|*ων τῶν 








τῶμ πόλε|*ων τῶν 






















































δι’ ο[ὗ] τὴν 
δημοκρατίαν 
συνδιετήρησαν τῶι 
*δή]|μωι καὶ τὴν πόλιν 
ἐλευθέραν παρέδωκαν 
τοῖς μεθ’ αὑτοὺς 
ἄ*ρ|χ+ουσιν (ll.12-14) 
   
35. 
IK.Ery. 







  καὶ ἐπειδὴ οἱ περὶ 
Θαρσύνοντα καὶ Πυθῆν 
και Βοτ|τᾶν ἀπέφαινον 
διότι ἐπί τε Ἀλεξάνδρου 
καὶ Ἀντιγόνου 
αὐτό|*ν+ομος ἦν καὶ 
ἀφορολόγητος ἡ πόλις 
ὑμῶν, καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι 
πρόγο|*νοι+ ἔσπευδον 
ἀεί ποτε περὶ αὐτῆς, 
θεωροῦ<ν>τες τούτους 
τε κρί||*ναν+τας δικαίως 
καὶ αὐτοὶ βουλόμενοι 
μὴ λείπεσθαι ταῖς 







συγχωροῦμεν τῶν τε 
ἄλλων ἁπάντων καὶ | 
























το*ῦ+ Θεοῦ (ll.6-7) 



















συνδιατηρήσω τήν τε 
αὐτονομίαν καὶ 
δημοκρατίαν καὶ τἆλλα 
τὰ | ἐπικεχωρημένα 












συνδιατηρήσω τήν τε 
αὐτονομίαν καὶ 
δημοκρατίαν καὶ τἆλλα 
τὰ | ἐπικεχωρημένα 








































ἐπικεχώρηκε δὲ τοῖς 
[΢μυρ+|ναίοις τάν τε 





   καὶ τάν τε 
ὑπάρχουσαν 
αὐτοῖς χώραν 













 τοὺς ἄλ+λους 
Ἕλλ*ηνας? — | —+ΑΡ 
τὴν δη*μοκρατίαν? 
— | — τὴν 
αυ+τονομίαν *—| — 
κα+ὶ? ἀφρουρη*το — 
|| — τὴ+ν πάτριον 
*πολίτειαν+ (ll.1-5) 
τοὺς ἄλ+λους 
Ἕλλ*ηνας? — | 
—+ΑΡ τὴν 
δη*μοκρατίαν? 
— | — τὴν 
αυ+τονομίαν *—
| — κα+ὶ? 
ἀφρουρη*το — || 
— τὴ+ν πάτριον 
*πολίτειαν+ 
(ll.1-5) 
 τοὺς ἄλ+λους 
Ἕλλ*ηνας? — | 
—+ΑΡ τὴν 
δη*μοκρατίαν? 
— | — τὴν 
αυ+τονομίαν *—
| — κα+ὶ? 
ἀφρουρη*το — || 












ἔγραψεν ἡμῖν ὁ 
βασιλεὺς ΢έλευκος | 
[ἐ+λευ*θ+ε*ρῶσ+αι 




τήν τε δημοκρατίαν 
καὶ τὴν χώ|*ρ+αν καὶ 
*π+ά*ν+τα (ll.29-31) 








τὴν *ὑμετέραν πόλιν 
τὴν φρου+|ρὰν ἐκ τῆς 
παραλαβόντες γὰρ 
τὴν *ὑμετέραν πόλιν 
τὴν φρου+|ρὰν ἐκ τῆς 
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ἐν ἧι ἡμέραι ὁ 
δῆμος ἐκομίσατο τήν 
*τε ἐλευθερία+ν καὶ 
τὴν δημοκρατίαν 
ἐν ἧι ἡμέραι ὁ 
δῆμος ἐκομίσατο τήν 
*τε ἐλευθερία+ν καὶ 
τὴν δημοκρατίαν 





Mylasa c.220 Philip V 
confirms 
Labraunda 
and land to 
Mylasa 
΢έλευκον δὲ ἀφιέντα 
τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθέραν 
ἀποδοῦ||ναι ὑμῖν τά 
τε λοιπὰ χωρία τὰ 
προσόντα τῆι πόλει 
κα*ὶ | τ+ὸ ἱερόν (ll.34-
6) 
































 οἵδε βουλόμενοι 
διὰ παντὸς 























 ἐμμενῶ || τᾶι 
καθεστακυίαι 
δαμοκρατίαι καὶ τᾶι 
ἀποκαταστάσει | τᾶς 
ὁμοπολιτείας καὶ τοῖς 
νόμοις τοῖς ἐγ Κῶι 
πατρίοις (ll.14-16) 
 
ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ οὐδὲ 






  ἐμμενῶ || τᾶι 
καθεστακυίαι 
δαμοκρατίαι καὶ τᾶι 
ἀποκαταστάσει | τᾶς 
ὁμοπολιτείας καὶ τοῖς 
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